

CLASS No.

940.28

BOOK No.

G64L

PROPERTY OF THE
CARNEGIE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
LIBRARY

DATE

Sept 1929

ACC. No.

18813

940.28 G64L

**Carnegie Institute of Technology
Library**

PITTSBURGH, PA.

Rules for Lending Books.


1. Reserve books may be used only in the library, until 8 P. M. After that hour they may be requested for outside use, due the following morning at 9:30. Ask at the desk about week-end borrowing privilege.
2. Books not of strictly reference nature, and not on reserve may be borrowed for longer periods, on request. Date due is stamped on date slip in book.
3. A fine of five cents an hour is charged on overdue reserve books. Two cents a day fine is charged on overdue unreserved books.

Arts Branch Library.

Most of the books in this collection are for use in the library only. A few books and mounted plates may be borrowed. Ask the assistant in charge.



Swanson



**HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE,
1878-1919**

HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE
1871-1918

HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE 1878-1919

By
G. P. GOOCH, D.Litt.

Author of "History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century," etc.



LIBRARY
CARNEGIE INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA


NEW YORK
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY

940.28

G64h

Authorized Edition

LIBRARY OF
CARNEGIE INSTITUTION OF
TECHNOLOGY
WASHINGTON, D.C.



PRINTED IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PREFACE

AMONG the results of the Great War have been the opening of the archives of Berlin, Vienna and Petrograd, and the appearance of innumerable autobiographies, recording and explaining the part played by rulers and ministers, diplomats, soldiers and sailors in the generation preceding the outbreak of the struggle or during the course of the conflict. Though much of this literature is highly controversial and requires to be used with caution, sufficient material has accumulated to justify an attempt to reconstruct the main outlines of European history from the Congress of Berlin to the Treaty of Versailles. Professor Pribram's "Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary," and the *Livres Jaunes* on the Franco-Russian Alliance and the Entente with Italy, reveal the obligations and transformations of the diplomatic groups into which the Great Powers were divided. Republican Germany has set an example to her victors by ordering the publication of the most important dispatches and memoranda in the archives of the Foreign Office from 1871 to 1914, of which the first six volumes bring the story down to the fall of Bismarck. The Bolsheviks, again, in their campaign against the old regime and the old diplomacy, have revealed a mass of dispatches and telegrams, treaties and protocols, which enable us to measure the ambitions of the last of the Romanoffs.

It is impossible within the limits of a single volume to do justice to a period crowded with events, fermenting with new ideas, and enriched by the triumphs of invention and discovery. The theme of this book is the relations of the Great Powers of Europe to one another. It is a history of

Preface

Europe, not a history of the world. If Great Britain quarrels with France about Egypt or with Russia about Afghanistan, we must for a brief space cross the Mediterranean or the Caspian. But it is no part of our duty to describe the Venezuela crisis of 1896, the Boer war of 1899, or the Russo-Japanese collision of 1904. Nor is it necessary for our purpose to deal with domestic events, such as Home Rule or Woman Suffrage, the Dreyfus case or the denunciation of the Concordat, the rise of German Socialism or Stolypin's agrarian reforms.

No one can be more conscious than the author that a study of the European system which perished in the flames of the Great War is a hazardous enterprise, and that any conclusions at which he arrives are necessarily provisional. We possess sufficient material to trace the main lines of development with a steady hand; yet every month adds to our knowledge of detail and to a clearer appreciation of the personality of the protagonists. The historian of the future will know much that is hidden from us to-day, and he will approach his task in a calmer spirit than is possible to those who have been shaken by the storm and the earthquake.


The present work is planned as a continuation of Fyffe's admirable "History of Modern Europe, 1792-1878," the colours of which are as fresh to-day as when they were painted.

G. P. G.

December, 1922.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. AFTER THE TREATY	I
2. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE	32
3. THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA	73
4. BULGARIA AND THE POWERS	115
5. THE DUAL ALLIANCE	156
6. WILLIAM II	188
7. ARMENIA AND CRETE	232
8. FASHODA	264
9. THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR	298
10. THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE	337
11. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE	369
12. THE NEAR EAST	398
13. ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY	427
14. AGADIR	458
15. THE BALKAN WARS	490
16. THE BREAKING OF THE STORM	532
17. THE WORLD WAR: FIRST PHASE	560
18. THE WORLD WAR: SECOND PHASE	607
19. THE SETTLEMENT	659
INDEX	697



HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE

CHAPTER I

AFTER THE TREATY

"I BRING you Peace with Honour," announced Beaconsfield to the applauding multitude on his return from the Congress of Berlin in July, 1878.¹ Yet the Treaty provided no permanent settlement of the tangled problem of the Balkans, and most of its signatories left the German capital smarting under a sense of disappointment or humiliation which boded ill for the tranquillity of Europe. Turkey had lost half her European dominions; Roumania resented the restoration of Bessarabia to Russia; Bulgaria brooded regretfully over the spacious boundaries assigned to her by the defunct treaty of San Stefano; Montenegro, though doubled in size, dreamed of the still more generous provisions of the same charter; Serbia lamented the transference of Bosnia from the nerveless grasp of Constantinople to the tighter grip of the Hapsburgs; Greece contrasted the nebulous recognition of her claims with the substantial awards to her Balkan rivals; and, finally, Russia saw the precious fruits of her struggles and sacrifices torn away from her by Beaconsfield and Andrassy,

¹ The student of contemporary history, once for all, may be referred to "The Annual Register" and Schulthess' "Europäischer Geschichtskalender." Friedjung, "Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus"; Egelhaaf, "Geschichte der neuesten Zeit"; Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe, 1878-1916"; and Holland Rose, "The Development of the European Nations," are also useful.

with the assent, if not indeed the encouragement, of Bismarck, while Austria pocketed Bosnia and Herzegovina as a reward for inglorious neutrality.

I

The execution of the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin proved no easy task,¹ for Russia and Turkey, though antagonists in the recent conflict, were at one in their desire to impede the settlement. "The usual duality of Russian policy is again apparent," complained Salisbury to Lord Augustus Loftus, the British Ambassador at Petrograd. "Every trick which the imagination can conceive, every subtle misconstruction of the Treaty is being used for the purpose of hindering its proper execution. But from Livadia we get nothing but professions of an intention to abide by the Treaty. The great question is: Will they evacuate on May 3 all the territories south of Roumania? If not, I do not see how peace can be preserved; for having induced the Turk on the faith of the Treaty to evacuate Batum, Varna and Schumla, it is impossible that we can leave him in the lurch. The Tsar understands the meaning of a point of honour."²

During the latter part of 1878 no progress was made towards the delimitation of the Bulgarian frontier, and the Tsar refused to recall his troops from the Balkan peninsula till that task was completed. The British Commissioner, General Hamley, was instructed to secure for Turkey a frontier which she could defend, fortify and garrison, while Russia demanded the boundary most favourable to her Bulgarian *protégé*. In January, 1879, Gortchakoff, in an arrogant dispatch, charged Great Britain with deliberately impeding progress, to which Lord Salisbury retorted that the delay was owing to the

¹ See Hertslet, "Map of Europe by Treaty," IV; and Holland, "The European Concert in the Eastern Question."

² Oct. 16, 1878, Lady G. Cecil, "Life of Lord Salisbury," II, 344-5.

assertion of the Russian agents that the arrangements were merely temporary, and that Eastern Roumelia was, after all, to be united to Bulgaria. The Tsar, to do him justice, was more reasonable than some of his subordinates, and in the spring he instructed them that they must accept and carry out the Treaty. From this moment the frontier negotiations proceeded smoothly. In return for this belated compliance Russia was permitted to regard May 3 as the beginning instead of the close of the period of evacuation, on condition that the process was concluded within three months.

The main achievement of the Congress of Berlin was to destroy the Big Bulgaria which was called into being by the Treaty of San Stefano.¹ Macedonia was restored to the direct rule of the Sultan, Eastern Roumelia was granted autonomy under a Turkish Governor, and Bulgaria started on its career as a peasant community with a population of two millions between the Balkan mountains and the Danube. It was taken for granted at the Congress that the new State would be a pawn in the hands of its creators; and the expectation was fulfilled when Russian officers and officials descended on Sofia in a swarm. Pending the election of a ruler, the country was governed by a Russian Commissioner, Prince Dondukoff, who treated it like a Russian satrapy, and hoped to secure the throne for a Russian Prince if not for himself. The Constitution drafted by the Commissioner was a curious blend of democratic provisions and executive autocracy, the object of which was the mutual checkmate of the ruler and the Parliament, while the Tsar hovered in the background as a *Deus ex machina*. Thus a Single Chamber, manhood suffrage, payment of members, free and compulsory education and a free Press were balanced by the fact that Ministers were not responsible to the Chamber, which the ruler could dissolve. The Constitution was

Russia
rules
Bulgaria

¹ See W. Miller, "The Balkans," and "The Balkans," by Nevill Forbes, etc.

accepted by an Assembly of Notables at the ancient city of Tirnovo in April, 1879, when Alexander Prince of Battenberg, son of Prince Alexander of Hesse (a cousin of the Grand Duke of Hesse) by a morganatic marriage with a Polish Countess, was summoned to the throne. The Prince, though only twenty-two years old, had fought for Russia—and therefore for Bulgaria—in the Turkish war, and was a handsome man of martial bearing and winning manners. He was the choice of the Tsar, his uncle by marriage, and he took the oath to the Constitution in the uniform of a Russian General. "Accept your Prince from my hands," said the Tsar to a deputation from Bulgaria; "love him as I love him."

The Bulgarians naturally resented the action of Russia in handing over the Bulgarian territory of the Dobrudja to Roumania in compensation for the surrender of Bessarabia; but with this exception they regarded their liberators with grateful hearts. Their feelings were shared to the full by the Prince; yet a brief experience of Russian tutelage wrought a dramatic change both in the ruler and his people. "I am devoted to the Tsar and wish to do nothing that could be construed as anti-Russian," he wrote to Prince Carol of Roumania after a few weeks on the throne, "but unfortunately the Russian officials have behaved with great lack of consideration. Utter chaos exists in all Ministries. Every day I am confronted with the alternative of signing the Russian demands or being accused in Russia of ingratitude. My position is really frightful. I reject everything that is against my conscience, and every day I must write to the Tsar to anticipate the slanders of the Russian officials."¹ "You will have a hard and thorny task," replied Carol, who knew something of the difficulties of foreign rulers in the Balkans, "but I am convinced that much can be made of Bulgaria, and that you will lay the foundation-stone of the future Great Bulgaria. In the desperate condition of Turkey

**Prince
Alexander
Complains**

¹ "Aus dem Leben König Karls von Rumänien," IV, 223.

the hopes of your people will be fulfilled quicker than you expect. The diplomatists with all their arts and crafts cannot impede the march of events. What you write of Russian misconduct does not surprise me, and I felt sure you would have many unpleasant struggles. I advise you to proceed with caution."¹

The Prince made the best of the situation, though with growing anger in his heart. "If the Russians go on like this," he remarked to Kalnoky, the Austrian Ambassador, on a visit to Petrograd, "they will be the most hated people in Bulgaria in a few years. They take their orders from Milutin (the Russian Minister for War), not from me." The Tsar's personal friendliness was unabated; but the situation grew worse when his assassination in 1881 brought to the throne a ruler who made no pretence of sharing his father's affection for the Prince. The Austrian Minister at Sofia besought him not to be a doll; but the young ruler was convinced that it was useless to kick against the pricks. Unable to work with his anti-Russian Parliament, he threatened resignation unless irresponsible authority was accorded to him. The Assembly was dissolved, the Constitution suspended, and a packed Assembly conceded autocracy for seven years.

The *coup d'état* of 1881 was only in appearance a triumph for the Prince, for the real victor was Russia. During the next two years Bulgaria was nothing but a Russian province. Russian Hostility of Alexander III
generals were appointed to the Interior, War, and Justice, and the powers of the tame Assembly were limited to voting the budget. When the high-spirited Prince began to chafe against the usurpation of his powers, he was informed that his Russian Ministers took their orders from the Tsar. Two years later, on a visit to Moscow for the coronation, he bitterly complained to the Tsar and to Giers of Russian dictation, and on his return he restored the Constitution of 1879.

¹ Corti, "Alexander von Battenberg," 47-9. This interesting book is based on the Prince's papers.

The Russian Ministers, who had not been consulted, left Sofia in disgust, and the Prince emerged as the hero of his people and the champion of the principle "Bulgaria for the Bulgarians." There was something like open war between Sofia and Petrograd, and the Prince's letters were left unanswered. "Russia hates me because she fears me," he wrote to the German Crown Prince Frederick; "but I rejoice in this hatred, which I reciprocate with all my heart, though circumstances compel me to control my feelings for some years." The estrangement was increased by his desire to marry Princess Victoria of Prussia, the granddaughter of the Kaiser, and attempts were made from Russia to thwart his matrimonial projects by spreading unfounded rumours as to his private life. The Princess was too young and the Prince's position too insecure for him to ask the Kaiser's permission; and in 1884, on a visit to Germany, he was told both by the aged monarch and by Bismarck that his ambition was hopeless. "The marriage," declared the Chancellor bluntly, "is impossible, and so long as I am Chancellor it will not take place. Germany has no interest in Bulgaria. Our interest is peace with Russia. Now you are a Bulgarian you must submit to Russia." Thus in public and private affairs the Prince found himself opposed and checkmated by Russia. The Russian agents and officers remaining in the country busily intrigued with native malcontents. The one definite service rendered to the new State by its Russian patron was the training of an army; but there was no room for sentiments of gratitude while the Bulgarian people felt that it had only escaped from the savage grip of the Turk to fall into the iron hand of the Muscovite.

While Bulgaria was starting on her course heavily handicapped by Russian domination, Eastern Roumelia, as an autonomous province under the sovereignty of the Sultan, entered on a path which was bound to lead to union. No one within or beyond her boundaries disputed that her inhabitants desired to be governed from Sofia; and

**Eastern
Roumelia**

the sole ground of frustrating their wishes was the resolve of Great Britain and Austria to limit the sphere within which Russian influence would be supreme. A memorandum to the Powers was drawn up by three leaders of Bulgarian opinion protesting against partition, begging good treatment for the province, and proclaiming that the inhabitants would without doubt sooner or later resort to arms. The Commissioners, who were appointed directly after the close of the Berlin Congress, represented the six Great Powers and Turkey, and included Baron Kallay for Austria and Sir Henry Drummond Wolff for Great Britain.¹ After a preliminary meeting at Constantinople the Commission established itself at Philippopolis, and on the whole worked harmoniously, the Russian opposition gradually dying away.

The Organic Statute under which the province was to live was signed at Constantinople in April, 1879. The Constitution was less democratic than that of Bulgaria. Of the Assembly of fifty-six, The
Organic
Statute thirty-six were elected on a property or culture qualification, and twenty were nominees or ex-officio members. The Assembly was allowed to discuss finance and administration, but not high politics. Bulgarian, Turkish and Greek were all recognized as official languages, and the chief posts were entrusted to Roumeliots. Aleko Pasha, ex-Secretary of the Turkish Embassy in London, and a Christian of Bulgar origin, was appointed Governor-General, and was assisted by six directors. The native militia was officered by Russians and Bulgarians, and a judicial system on European lines was introduced. For some years the machinery worked smoothly, all the more because it was generally recognized that union with Bulgaria was only a matter of time. After the Treaty of Berlin had decided the fate of the province, the Tsar had dispatched a General to advise the population to submit to separation for the time. He took with him, however, a large consignment of rifles, and was instructed

¹ See Drummond Wolff, "Rambling Recollections," II, 197-241.

to deliver a message of encouragement. "Russia has done what she could to help you. She is not responsible for your severance from Bulgaria. Accept these rifles, learn how to use them, and later on help yourselves." Both the rifles and the advice were accepted, and the inhabitants, confident that they were fulfilling the wishes of Russia no less than their own, began to make plans for a not too distant future. Their forecast of events was shared by Prince Alexander, who had confided to Andrassy on his selection for the throne that he would respect the Treaty of Berlin as long as possible, but that the separation could not possibly be permanent.

The Russo-Turkish war had been won with Roumanian help; but Russia proposed and the Powers approved treatment rarely meted out to an ally. Russia argued that Bessarabia had been snatched from her after the Crimean war, and Roumania retorted that it had been taken by Russia in 1812. The appeal to history, however, was of less weight than the universal sentiment that timely support on the battlefield should have been rewarded and not penalized. It is true that Roumania received the Dobrudja; but she had no desire—and therefore felt no gratitude—for the strip of marshy land between the Danube and the Black Sea, the population of which was predominantly Bulgarian, and the severance of which from Bulgaria constituted an additional complication for the harassed statesmen of Bucharest.

The anger of his subjects was fully shared by Prince Carol, who, aided and encouraged by his gifted wife "Carmen Sylva," had ruled the country with energy and wisdom since 1866, and had led it to victory in the Turkish war.¹ "It is sad," he wrote to his father, Prince Antony of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, on August 4, 1878, "that Europe should force a young State, which has proved its

¹ The history of the foundation of the Roumanian State is written once for all in the King's own papers, "Aus dem Leben König Karls," four volumes. The work was translated and abridged by Sidney Whitman as "King Carol of Roumania."

power and vitality in a bloody war, to surrender a province. It is deeply wounding to make the independence which we won on the battlefield dependent on the cession of Bessarabia. When it became known people were so angry that even the coolest heads declared that they would rather resign the claim to independence than pay this price. I dissuaded the Ministers and other leaders from rash action. Europe desires and needs peace, and will not stick at half measures to carry out the decrees of the Congress by force. After the first outburst of anger they saw that we could not flout Europe. The loss of a province is always a hard blow for a dynasty. I hope the odium will not fall on me, for I have done my utmost to avoid the misfortune. The districts beyond the Danube are not given us as compensation for Bessarabia. We take them as war indemnity. So we have won much morally and materially. The districts have a great future." "Reconciliation with Russia," replied the wise old father, "is a demand of self-preservation. Lasting enmity would be a lasting danger and would jeopardize internal development. However hostile opinion remains, all friends of Roumania advise a *modus vivendi*. The whole national energy must be concentrated on the Dobrudja. A formal protest would be a political error."¹

Roumania took possession of the Dobrudja in November, 1878; but its southern frontier was not fixed for nearly two years, since the real point at issue was the sphere of Russian influence. According to the Treaty, the boundary was to be drawn to the east of Silistria; but while the Russian delegate on the International Commission strove to move it as far as possible from the Bulgarian fortress on the Danube, the delegates of the other Powers endeavoured to fix it so close that the *abattoir* was on Roumanian soil. The line was determined in June, 1880, the Roumanian frontier running very close to the town.

Scarcely less humiliating to Roumanian sentiment than

The
Dobrudja
Frontier

¹ "Aus dem Leben König Karls," IV, 88-90, 96-7.

the cession of Bessarabia was the demand for equal citizenship for the Jews, which the Treaty of Berlin laid down as a condition precedent to recognition. As the constitution of 1866 declared that only Christians could become Roumanian citizens, a Constituent Assembly was needed for its modification. Passionate debates continued throughout the summer of 1879. "It is worse than the councils of war before Plevna," complained the distracted Prince. "At home I am accused as a champion of the Jews, abroad I am condemned as a weakling." His father agreed that it was the most dangerous crisis of the reign, but urged him to yield, since all the Powers except Russia were inexorable. Sturdza was dispatched to ask counsel of Bismarck, who replied that the Treaty of Berlin was a *bloc*, and that if a part was infringed the whole structure would collapse. When the Parliament showed no signs of yielding Great Britain proposed a collective Note, to be executed by Austria, and Bismarck threatened to refer the matter to Turkey. Finally, on October 18, 1879, the disqualification of 1866 was repealed, and Jews were allowed to be naturalized and to hold land. Several hundreds who had fought in the war were naturalized *en bloc*; but with that exception a special vote of the Legislature with a two-thirds majority was required in every case. This lip-service to the principle of religious equality was accepted by the Powers, Lord Salisbury observing that, though not a complete fulfilment of the demand, he trusted to Roumania to approximate more and more to the liberal intentions of the Powers. His hopes were sadly disappointed, for almost the whole of the large Jewish population remained aliens in the land of their birth.

Russia, Austria and Turkey had recognized the new State without waiting for the removal of the disqualification, and Italy now followed suit. The Western Powers were persuaded by Bismarck to hold their hand till Roumania had bought the railways from Bleichröder and other German bankers who had financed their construction.

Recognition by Germany, France and Great Britain took place on February 20, 1880, when the period of probation came to an end. A year later Prince Carol took the title of king, his crown being constructed of Turkish cannon captured at Plevna. On this occasion Parliament was unanimous, and all the Powers joined in congratulations. In the same year the succession to the childless King was settled in favour of his nephew Ferdinand, son of the Leopold whose candidature for the throne of Spain had launched the Franco-German war of 1870. Relations with Russia remained strained, and in 1883 Roumania became a secret partner of the Triple Alliance. That the young kingdom had come safely through its trials in peace and war was due in equal measure to its accomplished ruler and to his trusted Minister Bratiano, the Liberal leader, who remained in power from 1876 to 1888.

Coronation
of Carol,
1881

While the other Balkan States received prizes for taking part in the Turkish struggle, Greece was rewarded for standing aloof. Since the creation of the kingdom she had never ceased to demand better frontiers, and during the war offensive demonstrations had occurred in Thessaly. Her troops had been withdrawn at the instance of the Powers, and her demand to be heard at the Congress of Berlin was allowed. Her cause was pleaded by Delyannis and supported by Waddington; but Article 24 was distressingly vague, for Greece and Turkey were exhorted to come to an agreement on the "rectification of frontiers," and to seek mediation in case of need. The frontier proposed by Waddington, assigning Thessaly and the larger part of Epirus, was inserted in the protocol, not in the treaty; and the dispute which arose from the carelessness or timidity of the Congress occupied the Chancelleries of Europe for three years.¹

Greece affected to consider the line suggested at Berlin

¹ The best account is given by the French Minister at Athens, Comte de Mouy, "Souvenirs," ch. 5, "L'Annexion de la Thessalie"; cf. Fitzmaurice, "Life of Granville," II, ch. 6.

its own, and *pourparlers* with Turkey a mere formality. Turkey, on the other hand, issued a memorandum condemning Greek pretensions and retaining its rights over provinces "happy under the laws of the Empire." Great Britain persuaded the Porte to send Commissioners to meet Greek Commissioners at Prevesa in the spring of 1879; but the meeting only revealed the impossibility of agreement, for the protocol which Turkey treated as a mere expression of opinion was brandished by Greece as the considered verdict of Europe. The Turkish offer was so small that Greece refused to discuss it, and invoked the assistance of the Powers. At the suggestion of Waddington Greeks and Turks met again at Constantinople in August under the supervision of the Ambassadors; but the negotiations once again proved fruitless.

After an interval of many months Great Britain and France proposed a collective Note calling on Turkey to execute the protocol, and, in the event of refusal, a conference of ambassadors aided by experts. The Powers agreed, and Turkey accepted the conference, reserving her liberty of action on its decisions. The conference met in Berlin in June, 1880, and accepted the line (which included Jannina) drawn up by Freycinet, who had succeeded Waddington and shared his sympathy for Greece. Both the Turkish offer of less than the Berlin protocol and the Greek demand for more were rejected; and, after the Freycinet line had been worked out by a technical commission, Turkey and Greece were called on to accept it as "the solemn manifestation of the will of Europe." Greece hastened to obey a command which gave her almost all that she wished; but Turkey declined, and no steps were taken to compel her. Greece now determined to occupy the territory assigned to her, and began to mobilize. The Cabinets adopted a collective Note, drawn up by Great Britain, informing Turkey that the question could not be reopened, and adopting the lines fixed in the recent conference. It appeared as if the Sultan

Greek
Frontier
Claims

would have to yield; for Gladstone, who had returned to power in May, was a notorious enemy of the Turk and a whole-hearted Philhellene. The Turcophil Ambassador Layard was recalled from Constantinople, and Goschen, though refusing to be his successor, accepted a special mission to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, for he was as ready as the Prime Minister to employ force, in order to compel obedience to the public law of Europe, and he hailed with delight the vigorous action which broke down Turkish resistance in Montenegro. Bismarck, on the other hand, was opposed to coercion which might lead to war and thus reopen the Eastern question.¹

At this moment Turkey received unexpected aid from a change of Ministry in France, which brought Ferry to power and Barthélemy St. Hilaire to the Quai d'Orsay. The veteran translator of Aristotle might have been expected to be Attitude
of
France more Philhellene than statesmen ignorant of the services of Greece to civilization; but he proceeded to astonish Europe by a series of dispatches depicting in vivid terms the danger of war, lecturing Greece on her mobilization, commanding her to accept arbitration, and accepting the Turkish contention that the Berlin Conference was nothing more than an attempt at mediation. Such language was music to the ear of Abdul Hamid, but provoked indignation in Athens, where credits were voted and military preparations were continued. France now suggested that Turkey and Greece should refer their dispute to the arbitration of the Powers. The proposal was declined by Turkey, who asked in turn for a discussion at Constantinople, in which she, but not Greece, should take part. The Powers, weary of the controversy and encouraged by Bismarck, accepted the suggestion which they had hitherto declined, reserving to themselves the right to impose terms if agreement proved impossible.

¹ Elliot, "Life of Goschen," I, ch. 7; "The Mission to Constantinople"; cf. "Die Grosse Politik," IV, 17-20.

Though Bismarck professed himself favourable to Greece, Goschen reported that he was opposed to all his colleagues at Constantinople, who would think Greece lucky if she secured any extension of her frontiers, and who only desired Turkey to make concessions sufficient to prevent a revolution at Athens. Goschen himself was willing to surrender Cyprus in order to help Turkey to cede Epirus as well as Thessaly. The proposal was vetoed by Granville, who, however, in a circular dispatch dated March 21, 1881, recalled the decisions at Berlin and reminded the Powers that they were bound to satisfy the legitimate hopes of Greece. Turkey now herself proposed the cession of Thessaly, fearing a less favourable decision by the Ambassadors. Greece was finally allotted almost the whole of Thessaly, including Larissa and Volo, while Turkey retained all Epirus, except the district of Arta. Though indignant that Epirus had escaped her grasp and determined to win it by war or diplomacy at some future date, Athens submitted, and the Treaty which had cost so much trouble to frame was signed on May 24, 1881.

Bismarck would have preferred the cession of Crete rather than Thessaly; but the Greeks insisted on extending their mainland possessions, and Crete had to be content with a modification of the Organic Law of 1868. The Pact of Halepa, which derived its name from the suburb of Canea where it was signed in October, 1878, provided that the Governor-General should hold office for five years and be assisted by an adviser professing the faith to which he did not himself belong. The General Assembly was to sit for forty to sixty days in the year, and to consist of forty-nine Christians and thirty-one Mussulmans. Greek was to be the official language of the Assembly and the Courts. Natives were to have the preference for official posts. After the cost of administration had been met the surplus was to be divided equally between the Imperial Treasury and local needs, such as roads, harbours,

Autonomy
for
Crete

schools, hospitals and other conveniences of civilization, on which nothing had been spent since the Venetians were expelled by the Turks in the seventeenth century. A political amnesty and remission of arrears of taxation were promised and newspapers were authorized. It was the high-water mark of Turkish concession. Photiades Pasha, an able and conciliatory Greek, was appointed Governor-General, and the island entered on a decade of unaccustomed tranquillity.

Montenegro took peaceful possession of the territory awarded to her on the frontier of Herzegovina; but she was unable to obtain the two Albanian districts of Gusinje and Plava, which were inhabited by fighting Mussulmans who cared nothing for the Sultan nor the Treaty, and objected to being transferred to a new ruler like cattle. The envoy sent by the Porte to persuade the tribesmen to obey the Berlin award was murdered in August, 1878, and a second emissary failed to bend their will. The Sultan was glad of an excuse to take no further action, and it was widely believed that the Albanian League which had been formed to resist the provisions of San Stefano was revived at his suggestion. A compromise was suggested by Count Corti, Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, by which, instead of Gusinje and Plava, Montenegro should obtain part of the former and a strip between Podgoritza and Lake Scutari inhabited by Christians. The plan was accepted, but its execution was again frustrated by the Catholic Albanians, who objected to the rule of the Orthodox Prince Nicholas. The Mirdite Prince, Bib Doda, though his territory was not concerned, marched to the assistance of his Catholic friends, and 10,000 armed men were soon gathered on the frontier.

At this moment Gladstone, whose admiration for Montenegro had been loudly expressed, returned to power. Representatives of the Powers met at Berlin in June, and proposed that Montenegro should receive the port of Dulcigno and a strip of coast southward to the River

Montenegro
and
Turkey

Boyana.¹ This time it was Turkey's turn to protest, since Dulcigno had a Mussulman population; and the Albanians were secretly urged to resist the cession. Gladstone wins Gladstone was always ready for strong Dulcigno measures where Turkey was concerned, and at his suggestion a naval demonstration of the Powers took place in September off Dulcigno, while Montenegrin troops approached the town by land. "If Turkey befools Europe at Dulcigno," he remarked, "we may as well shut up shop altogether." Turkey refused to yield, and the admirals had no wish to bombard the little town. Gladstone's impatience at Turkish obstruction was shared by Goschen, who wrote to Granville from Constantinople: "The fleets must come up here. The Sultan has begun the struggle. The Turks must not win." Gladstone had no intention of allowing the Turks to win, and when he decided to seize the Custom house at Smyrna the Sultan realized that the game was up. Dervish Pasha, the Turkish commander, drove out the Albanians from Dulcigno, and on November 26 the town was occupied by Montenegrin troops. Prince Nicholas gave public expression of his gratitude to Great Britain for securing him an outlet on the Adriatic; but he never developed the port, which was, indeed, nothing but an open beach. Dervish Pasha completed the pacification of Northern Albania by treacherously inviting Bib Doda to visit a Turkish ship and carrying him off to Asia Minor, where he lived in exile, till the Young Turk revolution of 1908 restored him to his home. Other members of the Albanian League were also exiled, and Montenegro entered on her inheritance without further strife.

The inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, like the inhabitants of Albania, objected to being transferred from Mussulman to Christian rule; but Austria was strong enough to enforce her Treaty rights without assistance

¹ See Morley, "Life of Gladstone," III, 8-10; Fitzmaurice, "Life of Granville," II, ch. 6; Gwynn and Tuckwell, "Life of Sir Charles Dilke," I, ch. 21.

from her co-signatories.¹ Before embarking on the Turkish war in 1877 the Tsar had purchased the neutrality of Austria by recognizing her right to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the motion of Great Britain the provinces were entrusted to her at the Congress of Berlin. At the eleventh hour, however, the Turkish plenipotentiaries refused to sign the Treaty unless Andrassy assured them that the occupation would be provisional and the sovereign rights of the Sultan maintained. Andrassy refused; but two days later, the day on which the Treaty was to be signed, they renewed the demand, and the Austrian plenipotentiary gave way. "Austria declares that the rights of the Sultan in Bosnia and Herzegovina will in no way be affected by the occupation, which is to be regarded as provisional. An arrangement as to the details of the occupation will be made immediately after the Congress." With this written declaration in their pocket, the Turkish plenipotentiaries signed the Treaty.²

A few days later a proclamation to the inhabitants was issued. "The troops are about to cross the borders. They come as friends to end the evils which have disturbed not only Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the adjoining lands of Austria for years. The Emperor could no longer look on and see violence reigning in the vicinity of his territories. At the Berlin Congress it was unanimously resolved that Austria should restore order and welfare, and the Sultan has entrusted you to the care of the Emperor." The announcement of the coming occupation fell like a bomb. A bandit named Hadji Loo, who had won local prestige by a pilgrimage to Mecca, organized opposition in Serajevo, the Bosnian capital,

**Austria
occupies
Bosnia**

¹ See Sosnosky, "Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns seit 1866," I and II, 1-42; and Larmeroux, "La Politique Extérieure de l'Autriche-Hongrie," I. The Austro-Russian agreements were revealed by Fournier, "Wie wir nach Bosnien kamen." They are printed in Pribram, "The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary," II, 193-203.

² See Wertheimer, "Graf Andrassy," III; and "Le Rapport Secret de Carathéodory Pacha," ed. Bareilles.

where a provisional Government was formed. Turkey made no official pronouncement, and the Turkish officials left the province under rebel escort. Similar steps were taken in Mostar, the capital of Herzegovina. Eighteen days after the signing of the Treaty of Berlin Austrian troops crossed the frontier in four columns, and met with hostility from the outset. A squadron of hussars was cut to pieces, and as Serajevo was approached a holy war was proclaimed. The city was stormed after a desperate resistance, in which a large part perished in the flames. Meanwhile guerrilla warfare broke out in the rear. The 72,000 troops allotted to the task had to be reinforced. Herzegovina was subdued by the end of September, and on October 20 the last Bosnian stronghold surrendered.

In addition to Bosnia and Herzegovina Austria obtained at Berlin the right to station garrisons in the Sanjak of Novibazar, a narrow strip of land separating Serbia from Montenegro and connecting Bosnia with Macedonia. After the unpleasant experience in Bosnia, Andrassy was in no hurry to occupy the Sanjak, and it was not till the following year that he suggested an amicable arrangement with Turkey. A Convention was signed in April, 1879, according to which Austria was only to occupy the western portion. The garrisons took up their station in September, the Turkish administration and Turkish troops remaining in the Sanjak. This curious arrangement, which was of no advantage to Austria, and locked up troops in a position which would have been a death-trap in time of war, was destined to continue for a generation.

Bosnia and Herzegovina had yielded to overwhelming forces and modern artillery in the autumn of 1879; but the Mussulman inhabitants were scarcely more discontented than the Orthodox. Brigandage continued in the outlying parts, and gendarmerie posts were occasionally attacked. When the provinces were at last beginning to settle

**Bosnian
Revolt,
1882**

down, the imposition of conscription in November, 1881, stirred the smouldering embers. Some of the conscripts in Herzegovina disobeyed the summons to present themselves, and during the winter public buildings were set on fire. In the opening days of 1882 fresh attacks on patrols convinced Austria that she must act. Taught by experience, she dispatched not less than 60,000 troops to quell the revolt, and by the end of April tranquillity was restored. With the appointment in the same year of Kallay, a Hungarian nobleman and historical scholar, to the post of Joint Minister of Finance, which carried with it the administration of the provinces, Bosnia and Herzegovina entered on a period of rapid material development; and during the twenty years of his enlightened rule the inhabitants, both Christians and Mussulmans, enjoyed a prosperity and a tranquillity which they had never known as a portion of the Ottoman Empire.

While Beaconsfield's supreme object had been to prevent Russia from dominating the Near East, his Foreign Secretary regarded the Treaty of Berlin as nothing more than a respite during which Turkey must be compelled to put her house in order. And such compulsion could only be exercised by Great Britain, for Great Britain alone of the Powers had a disinterested desire to alleviate the lot of the subjects of the Sultan. Within a month of the close of the Congress a dispatch to Constantinople proposed a reform scheme by which each vilayet in Asiatic Turkey was to have a Governor appointed for a fixed term, while the virtual control of police, justice and taxation was to be in European hands.¹ The Ambassador, Sir Henry Layard, was instructed to press urgently for its acceptance; for "the Sultan's inclination to come to an agreement and our power of insisting upon it will diminish with each succeeding month." So anxious was Salisbury to seize the opportunity that he was prepared to support a loan of six millions for which the Sultan asked, on the

Reforms
for
Turkey

¹ "Life of Salisbury," II, ch. 8. Aug. 8.

ground that reforms were impossible without money. The project, however, was vetoed by the Prime Minister; for the bondholders protested at the first rumour of a fresh loan, and the combination of trade depression, a bad harvest and the Afghan war made money scarce.

Despite the refusal of a loan, the Foreign Secretary continued to exhort and threaten the Sultan, who seemed in no hurry to answer the British dispatch of August 8. "The reluctance of England to enter on a full policy of partition," he wrote on October 17, "will not bear more than a certain amount of strain; and that reluctance is the solitary support on which the Sultan's Empire now rests." A few days later the Porte replied to the dispatch of August 8, promising reforms less drastic than those proposed, but not without value if they could be carried out. To ensure, or at any rate to encourage, their execution the British Government appointed British officers as special consuls at eight centres in Asiatic Turkey, with instructions to visit every part of their district, to inquire into the complaints of the inhabitants, to remonstrate against abuses, to spur local officials to action, and to report to Constantinople and London. The reports which reached Downing Street during 1879 from Sir Charles Wilson and his colleagues were filled with stories of brigandage, famine and outrage. As the result of vigorous representations by the British Ambassador a few individual grievances were redressed, some bad officials dismissed, and some tolerable governors were appointed.¹ But the Consuls were not hopeful, for the root of the evil was in Constantinople. When they spoke of impending Arab and Armenian revolts the Sultan replied that the mere presence of European supervisors stimulated discontent, and his promise to employ Europeans in high administrative posts was evaded.

Salisbury was profoundly depressed, but refused to

¹ See Watson, "Life of Sir Charles Wilson," ch. 7-11; cf. "Lord Kitchener's Life," I, 37-8.

confess himself beaten. "The prospect is not bright," he wrote to Layard in November. "The character of the Sultan appears to be the doom of his race. But we must keep on pegging away and use every means of influence we possess.

**Abdul
Hamid
Resists**

The first step is the appointment of a European officer, General Sir Valentine Baker, with an independent command of the gendarmerie. If the Sultan stands out we must be prepared for great events. Our action may not go farther than demonstrations to establish that our responsibility for Turkey is at an end. But it will not be from us that the fatal blow will come. The present palace system will not be indefinitely submitted to by the Asiatic populations." The threat secured the appointment of Baker, who had fought for Turkey in the Russian war, as Inspector-General of Reforms in Asia Minor; but the instructions which he received did not confer the executive authority for which he hoped. Salisbury attempted to keep up his own spirits and those of his agents by reflections on the novelty of the situation. "I am afraid you take a desponding view of your work," he wrote to a consul at the end of 1879. "But this is the first serious attempt to cure misgovernment which has endured for centuries. In the nature of things the process must be very, very slow." He worked out a scheme of constitutional changes necessary to avert disaster, embracing "a small Council of State, nominated for life, exempt from exile, and with a veto on all provincial nominations and dismissals." But he had no expectation of securing assent to such far-reaching encroachments on the Sultan's prerogative, and he had to confess to himself that nothing could be done at present except to support the Consuls. His task was indeed hopeless, for in the recent struggle between Russia and Turkey his chief had stood by the Sultan in shining armour and had torn up the Treaty of San Stefano. Moreover, Abdul Hamid was well aware that he had nothing to fear so long as Beaconsfield held sway in Downing Street.

The return of Gladstone to power in May, 1880, was followed by a fresh attempt to secure the realization of the Sultan's promises of reform, and when the usual evasive reply was received he invited the Powers to join in pressure at Constantinople. The Powers agreed, and on June 11 an identic Note was delivered to the Porte demanding "complete and immediate execution of Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin."¹ A further collective Note on September 7 set forth the required reforms in detail. Fresh promises were made and new schemes were elaborated; but the Sultan knew that no Power except Great Britain had its heart in the work, for even Russia had begun to lose interest. Gladstone's efforts were as fruitless as those of Salisbury; and in 1883 Bismarck, who was anxious to avoid the revival of the Eastern question, informed the British Government that Germany cared nothing about the Christian subjects of the Sultan, and advised him to drop the matter. Nothing more, indeed, could be done at the moment. The Concert was dead, and the British occupation of Egypt destroyed whatever influence Great Britain possessed at Constantinople. The military consuls were withdrawn, in the belief that they were useless, though civilian consuls were allotted to Erzerum, Van and Diarbekir. When Salisbury returned to office in 1885 he asked for the documents relating to our influence at Constantinople, and after perusing them he observed, "They have just thrown it away into the sea without getting anything whatever in exchange." It is arguable that the withdrawal of the military consuls was a mistake; but when Gladstone took the helm in 1880 Great Britain possessed no influence worth speaking of at Constantinople. Indeed, it became clear that

¹ "The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and the Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend their application."

pressure without the intention of resorting to force stiffened rather than weakened the resistance of the Sultan, who had no intention of allowing Armenia to go the way of Bulgaria. Moreover, nobody contemplated the cancelling of the Cyprus Convention, which, in return for the promise of British aid against any Russian attempt to take Turkish territory in Asia, bound the Sultan to introduce the necessary reforms for the protection of his Christian and other subjects. The lamentable result of the fitful interest shown by the Powers was to awaken hopes in the Armenian highlands which could not be fulfilled, and to arouse suspicions in the breast of the Sultan which were to bear fruit in organized massacre and outrage in days to come.

II

Though war between Great Britain and Russia over Constantinople had been narrowly averted, the antagonism remained, and it seemed possible that the powder might catch fire in the highlands of Afghanistan.¹ So long as Beaconsfield was at the helm the avowed object of British policy was to thwart Russian ambitions, while Alexander II, checkmated in the Near East, naturally turned his attention to the No Man's Land beyond the Caspian. His armies, however, had suffered so severely in the Turkish campaigns that he had no wish to try conclusions with Great Britain; and the British Cabinet, now that the menace to Constantinople was removed, desired to resume normal relations. Early in 1879 Lord Dufferin, fresh from his term of office in Canada, was dispatched to Petrograd to pour oil on the troubled waters. On presenting his letters of credence the new Ambassador was greeted by "a great scolding" from the autocrat, who complained

Russia
in
Transcaspia

¹ See Lady Betty Balfour, "Lord Lytton's Indian Administration." The Conservative policy is set forth in Buckle, "Life of Disraeli," VI, ch. 10 and 13; and "Life of Salisbury," II, ch. 8. An excellent account of the Afghan problem is given in Rose, ch. 13 and 14.

that England had thwarted his plans in a war not of ambition, but to rescue the Christians of Turkey from their suppressor. He had nevertheless done his best to meet English wishes at Berlin, and he would try to find a friendly solution of all outstanding questions. The charm of Lord Dufferin and his gifted wife proved irresistible, and invitations to the British Embassy were accepted even by the champions of Pan-Slav ideals.¹

Despite the desire of the two Governments to live in tolerable harmony after the Congress of Berlin, forces had been set in motion in Central Asia which could not be reversed when peace was restored in Eastern Europe. Though **Russia and Afghanistan** the Russian Government assured Lord Clarendon in 1869 that it regarded Afghanistan as entirely outside its sphere of influence, a correspondence relating to frontiers began in the following year between General Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, and the Ameer. In 1875 the reception of a Russian envoy in Cabul and the annexation of Khokand alarmed the Home Government, where Disraeli had succeeded Gladstone; and in 1876 Lord Northbrook, the cautious Whig Viceroy, made way for Lord Lytton, who had no belief in the Lawrence policy of "masterly inactivity." "We wanted a man of ambition, imagination, some vanity, and much will," wrote Beaconsfield, "and we have got him." A treaty with the Khan of Khelat in 1876 brought Baluchistan within the orbit of the British Empire and enabled troops to be stationed at Quetta in the southern flank of Afghanistan; and a conference at Peshawar in 1877, which broke down on the refusal to allow British officers access to frontier posts, convinced the Viceroy that the Ameer was irrevocably committed to Russia. The cynical phrase of a Russian general, "*Nos frontières marchent avec nous*," was widely quoted; and both Lord Lytton and Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State, were deeply impressed by the writings

¹ Lyall's "Life of Dufferin," I, ch. 8; and Lady Dufferin, "My Russian and Turkish Journals."

and warnings of Sir Henry Rawlinson, who laboured unceasingly to arouse his countrymen to the dangers of Russia's advance towards the frontiers of India.¹

After the Peshawar Conference all communications with the Ameer ceased, and the situation was complicated by the Russo-Turkish war. The summon-
Stolietoff
in
Cabul
 ing of Indian troops to Malta in the spring of 1878 and the order of the fleet to Constantinople seemed to bring war within sight. Russia retaliated by moving troops towards the Afghan frontier and by the dispatch of General Stolietoff to Cabul on June 13, the day of the opening of the Berlin Congress. Gortchakoff pretended that the mission was purely one of courtesy; but the dispatch of an envoy to Cabul formed part of the scheme for the invasion of India which Skobelev had drawn up during the Turkish war.² Moreover, on April 25, in order to strengthen Russian influence in the coming negotiations, the War Minister had ordered the dispatch of three columns as a demonstration. The main force left Tashkend on June 13; but when it reached the Afghan border news arrived that the Treaty of Berlin had been signed. Stolietoff, however, only left Cabul on August 24, carrying with him, it was generally believed, a treaty with the Ameer, and members of the mission remained for some weeks longer in the Afghan capital. On learning of Stolietoff's reception the British Government invited the Ameer to receive a similar mission from India. No reply to the letter was received, and on September 8 the Viceroy telegraphed home that the envoy, General Sir Neville Chamberlain, would wait no longer and would march through the Khyber Pass to Cabul with an escort.

The proposal involved war unless the Ameer surrendered, and the mission was held back by a telegram from London, where a communication from Petrograd was awaited. When the Treaty of Berlin was signed Beacons-

¹ See G. Rawlinson, "Sir H. Rawlinson."

² Printed in Rose, 602-7.

field expected that Russia would recall the Stolietoff Mission and the troops. After waiting for a few weeks a letter was dispatched to Gortchakoff, who replied in most conciliatory terms that military demonstrations in the direction of Afghanistan would be discontinued, and that Russia did not aim at special influence in that country. The veto reached Simla too late, for negotiations with the semi-independent Khyber tribes for the passage of the mission had been begun by the frontier officers, who reported that to postpone the advance would arouse the contempt of the tribesmen. The mission was compelled to return to Peshawar by forces which it was useless to attack.¹ It was decided on October 30 to demand a written apology within three weeks for the affront in the Khyber Pass, and the reception of a permanent British mission. No reply to the ultimatum was received, and British troops crossed the frontier at three points. The defeated Ameer now offered to receive an envoy at Cabul, but the time for negotiations with Shere Ali was past. His troubles were

**Shere Ali
Overthrown**

due to Russia, but the assistance of Russian troops for which he asked was refused. In replying to a vote of censure on December 16 the Prime Minister spoke in friendly tones of his old antagonist. Preparations against India when war seemed likely were legitimate, and now the crisis was over the Tsar had ordered his troops to retire. "Russia has taken every step in this business to make honourable amends to England, and her conduct presents the most striking contrast to that of the Ameer." The campaign proceeded without a hitch, and Shere Ali fled to Russian Turkestan, where he died within a few weeks. By the Treaty of Gandamak on May 26 his son, Yakub Khan, accepted British direction of his foreign policy, and consented to a permanent British Resident at Cabul, in return for a promise of support against Russian aggression. Some frontier districts were ceded, and the British retained control of the Khyber Pass. "Greatly

¹ "Life of Salisbury," II, 337-44.

owing to your energy and foresight," wrote the Prime Minister to the Viceroy, "we have secured a scientific frontier for our Indian Empire."

The jubilation with which Beaconsfield and Lytton regarded their handiwork was rudely disturbed by the news of the assassination by mutinous troops of Sir Louis Cavagnari, the British The
Cavagnari
Mission envoy, with mission and escort, six weeks after his arrival. The treacherous Yakub abdicated, and after quelling sporadic risings Roberts ruled the country from Cabul throughout the winter. Early in the following year Abdurrahman, a nephew of Shere Ali, emerged from Turkestan, where he had lived as a Russian pensioner, claimed the throne, and, aided by British confidence, money and arms, built up a powerful and united kingdom, to which Kandahar was wisely restored by the Gladstone Government. The Afghans had learned by bitter experience the danger of intriguing with Russia and the futility of trusting to her promises of support, and Great Britain learned that an independent and contented Afghanistan was the best barrier against Russian designs on India. Lord Ripon, who had succeeded Lord Lytton as Viceroy, proclaimed and applied the principle that the danger of Russian wiles within the frontiers of India could best be met by winning the confidence of the Indian peoples. "The steady pursuit of the policy of the present Government," he wrote in 1882, "will place us in a better condition to encounter Russian intrigues than the fortification of all the frontier towns of Afghanistan and the garrisoning of the whole of them with British troops."¹

The signature of the Treaty of Berlin and the establishment of a friendly Ameer at Cabul diminished the Anglo-Russian tension in the Middle East without removing its causes. Russia had not recognized British over-lordship in Afghanistan, and everyone knew that the steam-roller, after a brief halt, would resume its advance. Preparations for an expedition against the Tekke Turcomans in the

¹ See Lucien Wolf, "Life of Lord Ripon," II, ch. 15-17.

summer of 1879 prompted a request from the British Ambassador for explanations, and elicited soothing assurances. The Tsar sent a message to the Queen that the expedition would not develop into an attack on Merv, and the Russophil Duke of Argyll rallied his countrymen on their "mervousness." But a rebuff to a Russian force at the end of 1879 led to the dispatch of a larger expedition under Skobeleff, who stormed Geok Tepe, the Turcoman stronghold, in January, 1881, and slaughtered twenty thousand of the inhabitants. The wholesale massacre broke the spirit of the Turcomans, and spread the terror of the Russian name throughout Central Asia. The Russian Foreign Office once more explained that there would be no advance on Merv; but Russian assurances failed to reassure even the Gladstone Ministry. Hartington, the Indian Secretary, announced on August 1, 1881, that Great Britain would not tolerate foreign interference in Afghanistan. Ripon would have preferred a deal to a threat, and proposed that Great Britain should assent to Russia's advance on Merv in return for a promise to abstain from interference in Afghanistan. Russia, he believed, would occupy Merv in any case, and he advised that we should purchase security for Afghanistan while our assent was worth paying for. The plan was approved by Hartington but not by Granville, and was considered too risky to adopt.

Despite repeated assurances Merv was occupied in February, 1884, and Russian territory was now almost, if

Russia not actually, in contact with north-west
takes Merv, Afghanistan, and within easy reach of
1884 Herat.¹ That Russia should have taken

this step with full knowledge of the importance attached to the matter by Great Britain suggested the resolve to pick a quarrel. It was impossible to check the Russian advance by force, and the Government of

¹ See Fitzmaurice, "Life of Granville," II, ch. 12; Holland, "Life of the Duke of Devonshire," I, ch. 14; Gwynn and Tuckwell, "Life of Dilke," II, ch. 39.

India suggested a Joint Commission to determine a frontier which Russia could not overstep without a breach of faith. The Cabinet approved, Russia accepted, and Sir Peter Lumsden started in the autumn to meet the Russian Commissioner General Zelenoi. The General was due on the frontier on October 13; but early in October it was announced that he was ill and could not arrive till February. Lumsden was unable to commence work, and, despite urgent communications from the British Government, the General's "illness" continued throughout the winter. The breach of faith was aggravated by the fact that a large Russian force was meanwhile occupying territory forming part of the region whose ownership the Commission was to determine, and threatening frontiers which the military authorities deemed necessary to the defence of Afghanistan. Granville was convinced that the procrastination in regard to the Zelenoi mission was due to the approval, if not indeed the suggestion, of Bismarck, at that moment annoyed with British policy in regard to German colonial aims.

On February 14, 1885, an unfounded rumour reached London that the Russians were marching on Herat, and on February 21 it was announced that troops were close to Penjdeh, a fertile valley within the territory claimed by the Afghans, but to which Russia had announced that the claim would be disputed.¹ The British Government at once remonstrated; but the Russian Government declined to withdraw their advanced posts, adding that the officers had been ordered to avoid conflicts and that complications were only to be feared if the Afghans attacked. Lumsden, on his side, advised the Afghans stationed at Penjdeh to return to the positions they occupied, but not to advance beyond them. The Russians brought up reinforcements, and early in March the Indian Government was ordered to assemble a force to march to the relief of

**Tension
at Penjdeh,
1885**

¹ For the Russian side see Stead, "The M.P. for Russia" (Olga Novikoff), II, ch. 9.

Herat in the event of war. The troops became restless and excited as they faced one another, and the situation was so grave that on March 4 the Queen sent a telegram to the Tsar. "The motive for this telegram is my keen desire that there should be no misunderstanding between the two countries. The news from the Afghan frontier causes me the greatest disquietude. I appeal to your good feelings, dear brother, to do all you can to prevent the misfortunes which would arise from an armed conflict between the Russian and Afghan troops."

The Russian Government now justified the delay of General Zelenoi by the argument that before delimitation could take place its principles—whether
Danger
of War purely geographical or partly ethnographical—must be settled, and proposed to send an envoy to London. The objection, if it really existed, should have been communicated in the previous year, and the prospect of indefinite delay increased the apprehension that the Russian troops would seize the disputed territory while negotiations were proceeding. There was, moreover, the danger lest the Afghans, encouraged by the presence of Lumsden, might resist a Russian attack, even if they did not provoke a collision. On March 30 the expected explosion took place. The Afghans occupied a position from which they declined to withdraw, and were attacked by General Komaroff, who proceeded to occupy the oasis of Penjdeh. "War is inevitable," declared the British Ambassador when the news reached Petrograd. "I shall be told to demand my passports."¹ The Tsar was inclined to disavow his General, but the excitement of the Press forced him to show a brave face. On April 27, in asking Parliament for a credit of eleven millions, Gladstone accused the Russians of an act of unprovoked aggression. In the event of war the British Government expected assistance from the Sultan, who, however, desired to remain neutral, and who inquired whether the other Powers would defend

¹ Baddeley, "Russia in the 'Eighties," ch. 10.

his neutrality by sending ships to the entrance of the Straits. None of them could promise such assistance; but he was none the less encouraged to maintain neutrality.¹

The tension was acute, and in every capital in Europe war was considered inevitable; but neither Government desired a conflict. Moreover, the Ameer, at this moment a guest of Lord Dufferin in The
Penjdeh
Settlement India, anxious to prevent his country becoming the battlefield of an Anglo-Russian conflict, refused the offer of British troops and expressed his readiness to surrender part of the disputed territory in the north.² The British Government proposed arbitration; but the Tsar replied that General Komaroff had acted rightly, and that he would never allow his conduct to be submitted to arbitration. The Cabinet, unwearied in its efforts for peace, pointed out that rejection meant war, and begged the Tsar to accept the appointment of an arbitrator, who, it was added, need never act. The Tsar finally assented to arbitration by the King of Denmark, and the crisis was over. His initial refusal remained a secret, and his consent was hailed with relief except by the Jingo Press in both countries, which shed tears of anger at the "humiliation." No more was heard of the arbitration, and the two Governments finally agreed that the Zulfikar Pass should remain Afghan territory, while Penjdeh was adjudged to Russia. The actual delimitation was to be worked out by a mixed Commission, which completed its task in 1887. Thus ended the excursions and alarums which began with the Stolietoff Mission and arose from Beaconsfield's resolute opposition to Russian ambitions in the Near East.

¹ See "Die Grosse Politik," IV, 111-28; and Freycinet, "Souvenirs," II, 300-3.

² "Life of Dufferin," II, ch. 3.

CHAPTER II

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

I

THE outstanding result of the Congress of Berlin in the realm of high politics was the estrangement of Russia from Germany. The Slavophiles had forced the Tsar to support the revolt of the Balkan Christians, and their voices were raised in shrill anger when the triumphs of the battlefield were sacrificed at the council table. The restoration of Bessarabia and the annexation of Batum and Kars seemed a poor return for so much blood and treasure. "The Congress is a conspiracy against the Russian people," shrieked Ivan Aksakoff, "in which Russian representatives have taken part. The diplomacy of St. Petersburg is more dangerous than Nihilism. It is disgraceful treachery to the historic mission of Russia, and has lost for ever the respect and affection of the Slavs. Russia has been crucified by her own statesmen. A fool's cap and bells have been set upon her head."¹ In the *Moscow Gazette* Katkoff, the prince of journalists, proclaimed that Germany had left Russia in the lurch, and that the road to Constantinople lay through Berlin. Jomini, the strongest brain in the Foreign Office, wrote violent articles in the official Press, and General Milutin, the War Minister, worked openly for a French alliance. Schuvaloff, the chief Russian plenipotentiary at the Congress, whom Bismarck described as the cleverest man in Russia, after resuming his post in London for a short time, was recalled and virtually disgraced. The veteran

¹ A. Fischel, "Der Panslavismus," 428.

Gortchakoff, who had helped to shape Russian policy since the Crimean war, though compelled by advancing years to relinquish his grip, had not lost all his influence; and his personal hostility to Bismarck, dating from the war scare of 1875, was notorious. And, finally, the Tsar himself shared to the full the anger of his subjects at the substitution of the Berlin compromise for the dictated settlement of San Stefano. His wrath was increased by the fact that the Emperor William, on the victorious conclusion of the Franco-German war, had solemnly assured his Imperial nephew that he would never forget the services rendered by Russia. He spoke bitterly of the European coalition against Russia under Bismarck's leadership. Alexander was still under sixty, but the anxieties and disappointments of his reign had aged and soured him. Bismarck cruelly described him as sick in mind and body and prematurely worn out; and his conduct in the year following the Congress betrayed a lack of self-control.

The Tsar's anger at the Berlin settlement rose to fever pitch when he learned that the German agents on the international commissions appointed to carry out the delimitations supported the Austrian rather than the Russian view in cases of disagreement.¹ In the spring of 1879 Italy was approached through the old Hungarian and Garibaldian rebel, General Türr, as to whether she would co-operate in a war against Austria; and soundings were taken in Paris, of which Waddington informed Bismarck, with equally little result. Russian troops were concentrated on the German and Austrian frontiers, and in June the Tsar at the last moment cancelled a visit to Berlin for the golden wedding of his uncle. On August 8 the German Ambassador reported the monarch's angry com-

**The Tsar's
Threats**

¹ Their instructions were to support the majority when Russia and Austria disagreed. The best book on Bismarck's later foreign policy, after his own "Reflections," is Plehn, "Bismarck's Auswärtige Politik nach der Reichsgründung." Grant Robertson, "Bismarck," is also useful. Erich Mack, "Kaiser Wilhelm I," is a masterly study of the Emperor.

plaint that "if Germany wished the friendship of a hundred years to continue, she must alter her ways. *Cela finira d'une manière très sérieuse.*" Bismarck forwarded the Ambassador's dispatch to the Emperor William, who replied that his nephew had been misled by Gortchakoff, and that he would soon change again; but this pleasant fiction was destroyed by an autograph letter from the Tsar to his uncle written on August 15. He repeated his strictures on the conduct of German agents on the Commissions, reminded his correspondent of the services of Russia in 1870, "which you said you would never forget," and added that he could not hide his fears that the consequences might be disastrous for both countries.¹ The Kaiser was more pained than angered by the violence of tone, and he charged Bismarck to draft a response. The Chancellor replied from Gastein that it was regrettable that such a letter of unconcealed menaces, in which he detected the hand of Milutin, should be written, and if the Kaiser replied in a similar strain it would probably lead to war. To go on his knees to the Tsar, on the other hand, would merely encourage him to further menaces. Gratitude for 1870 could not compel Germany to sacrifice her friendly relations to Austria. The Kaiser replied to his nephew on August 28 in a letter drafted by the Chancellor, denying that his agents had received Russophobe instructions and that Bismarck was hostile, and recalling the occasions on which Austria and Germany had aided Russian interests.

While the Kaiser believed that the rift in the lute was not beyond repair, his omnipotent Chancellor had reached the conviction that the hour for a new orientation of German policy had struck. The Dreikaiserbund of 1872 had received a

¹ The dispatches relating to the foundation of the Dual Alliance are published in "Die Grosse Politik," III, 1-136. The Treaties mentioned in this chapter are printed in Pribram, "The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary," I; cf. Wertheimer, "Graf Andrassy," III; Singer, "Geschichte des Dreibundes"; and Coolidge, "The Origins of the Triple Alliance."

rude shock when Alexander and Gortchakoff hurried to Berlin in 1875, and in 1876 Gortchakoff rejected the suggestion of a treaty guaranteeing the German possession of Alsace and Lorraine in return for energetic support of Russian policy in the Near East. The Tsar also received a rebuff when on the eve of the Turkish war he asked whether Germany would remain neutral if Russia went to war with Austria.¹ After vainly endeavouring to evade the embarrassing question the Chancellor replied that Germany could indeed suffer her friends to win or lose battles, but not that one of them should be so injured as to endanger its position as a Great Power. This refusal of neutrality angered Gortchakoff and his master; and when the friendly Schuvaloff discussed an alliance before the Berlin Congress, Bismarck pointed out that Germany would be in an inferior position, since both the geographical position and the autocratic Government of Russia would render it easier for her to dissolve the tie. His lifelong policy was to cultivate the friendship of Russia without committing his country to her exclusive protection. He defined his rôle at the Berlin Congress as that of an honest broker, and he always maintained that he had given full weight to Russian interests. "I conceived my rôle," he declared in his historic speech of February 6, 1888, "almost as if I were the third Russian delegate. No Russian wish reached me which I did not adopt and fulfil. I behaved in such a manner that at the end of the Congress I thought to myself, 'If I did not already possess the highest Russian order in brilliants, I ought to receive it now.' I had the feeling that I had performed a service for a foreign Power which a Minister is seldom in a position to render. The campaign therefore surprised me. These attacks grew during 1879 into peremptory demands to put pressure on Austria. I could not agree; for if we estranged ourselves

**Russian
Ingratitude**

¹ For relations between Germany and Russia before the Berlin Congress see "Die Grosse Politik," II.

from Austria we should—unless we wished to be wholly isolated—necessarily fall into dependence on Russia. Would that be tolerable? I once thought that it would, on the ground that where no antagonism of interests existed there would be no reason for Russia to terminate the friendship. The course of the Congress disappointed me, and showed me that not even a complete temporary subordination of our policy could guarantee us against antagonism.”

Bismarck exaggerated his complaisance for Russia at the Congress; but there was no shadow of excuse for the taunts of treachery with which he was assailed, or for the belief that with a word he could have maintained the Treaty of San Stefano intact. The neurotic excitement of Russia and her ruler turned his thoughts increasingly towards a defensive alliance with Austria against a common danger. “The idea of coalitions gives me nightmares. We had waged victorious wars against two Great Powers. Everything depended on inducing at least one of them to renounce the design of revenge. It could not be France. The Treaty of Reichstadt revealed the danger that Kaunitz’ league of France, Austria and Russia might be revived. I had therefore to choose between Russia and Austria. In point of material force, union with Russia has the advantage, and because I placed more reliance on traditional dynastic friendship and community of conservative instincts than on fits and starts of public opinion among the Hungarian, Slav and Catholic populations of Austria, Hungary would always be pro-German if she thought merely of her interests, but she is anti-Austrian; and the Germans in Austria also often lose touch with the dynasty.”

Despite the obvious disabilities of the Hapsburg realm as an ally, Bismarck’s hesitations were swept away by the synchronizing of the Tsar’s threats with the news of Andrassy’s forthcoming resignation. Fearing lest his successor might be Francophil or Russophil, the Chan-

cellor wrote that he would be glad to see him at Gastein or elsewhere. The Austrian Foreign Minister was no less eager for insurance against Russia, whom, with British aid, he had thwarted at Berlin; and he arranged to reach Gastein on

**The Gastein
Conversations**

August 27. Prolonged and earnest conversations took place on the two following days. Russia, began the Chancellor, wanted the German vote cast against Austria. "If I refuse, I shall break with Russia for Austria's *beaux yeux*." Andrassy then complained of Russian armaments, demands and threats, adding that Vienna had lost all confidence in the Tsar, and that Austria, France and Great Britain had agreed to vote together. "What, then, would Austria do if Russia attacked Germany without provocation?" asked the Chancellor. "She would support you with all her strength," replied Andrassy, "and all her peoples would applaud." "In that case," rejoined Bismarck, "would Austria consider a League of Peace? Germany wanted nothing more." "We, too," replied Andrassy. "Even the Archduke Albrecht now sees that Austria's welfare is bound up with Germany, and I think I can answer for the loyalty both of Germans and Magyars to a German alliance." The two statesmen agreed to meet again in Vienna after consulting their respective masters. The Emperor William promptly telegraphed, "Consider journey to Vienna impossible"; but Bismarck replied that he could not accept responsibility for telling Andrassy that he was forbidden to return his visit, and his master gave way. The discussions with Andrassy were reported in great detail on August 31, and Bismarck argued that since the Tsar's threats had destroyed confidence in Russia, a defensive alliance with Austria was indispensable for Germany's safety. Without it, Russia would attack, and Austria would join France. If Germany did not secure Austria at once she might not be able to obtain her support when she needed it.

"I found the Emperor so fully convinced of the useful-

ness and indeed the necessity of such an arrangement," wrote Andrassy joyfully to Bismarck on September 1, "that further argument proved to be superfluous. He sees therein not only no departure from the determination to maintain peace between the three empires, but the only possible way of removing the sword of Damocles. As soon as you have obtained the approval in principle of the Emperor William I am authorized to receive a draft text and to prepare one myself. I am to remain in office till this matter is completed, and my successor, whom I have informed, is in perfect agreement. I have no peace of mind till I see the torch extinguished which the Tsar half-unconsciously brandishes above the European powder-barrel, and while I know the peace of Europe to rest in the hands of a Milutin, a Jomini, and presently doubtless of an Ignatieff. I am convinced the Tsar does not wish for war at present; but I cannot forget that he had no desire for the war just concluded. I consider it a European necessity to provide against this danger."

In thanking Andrassy for his letter, Bismarck replied that unfortunately from the nature of things, geographical as well as political, his task could not be so speedily completed. "I have been obliged to dictate to my son sixty pages, the contents of which I had to expand by telegraphic and other additions. Yet in spite of all my pains, I have not succeeded in entirely removing the apprehension that our peaceful scheme may conceal some secret views of an aggressive character. This idea is unwelcome to a gentleman of eighty-two. For him the attitude of the Tsar was only recently illuminated as with a lightning flash, though I have been repeatedly obliged to recognize the situation during the past few years. It will be a trial to find himself forced into making a choice between the two neighbouring empires. With our dynasty habit exercises enormous influence. Besides, the Tsar is now endeavouring to force Jupiter Tonans into the background by a rapid transition to sunshine. The last threats were

**The
Kaiser's
Objections**

followed within a week by a friendly invitation to send a Russian officer to Warsaw. This was accepted by the Emperor, who announced the dispatch of Field-Marshal Manteuffel without my previous knowledge. Manteuffel met with very considerable readiness to make advances, in the sincerity and performance of which I cannot place any confidence. I am not aware whether the meeting which is to take place to-day at Alexandrovo was suggested by him or by the Russians."

The Kaiser assured Bismarck that he was only going to Alexandrovo to discover the origin of "the incomprehensible letter," and to defend his Chancellor against baseless accusations. When the ^{Kaiser and} monarchs met on September 3 the ^{Tsar} Tsar, who had suggested the interview, was in his most winning mood. He expressed regret that the letter of August 15 had caused offence, and wished it to be regarded as if never written. Nothing was further from his intention than to threaten. He had only called attention to the fact that, if the Press of both countries continued to rail at each other, a feeling of hostility would arise. The peace of Europe could only be preserved, in the future as in the past, by good relations between Prussia and Russia. The votes of the German agents on the European Commissions had aroused great irritation, for Russia was merely trying to improve the lot of the Christian populations; and the antagonism encouraged the Turks to obstinacy. Bismarck appeared unable to forget Gortchakoff's stupid circular of 1875; but Gortchakoff was *homme mort*. The Kaiser replied that he had been pained by the letter, but was glad to hear that no threat was intended; that Bismarck, though he had not changed his views, could not understand the attacks in semi-official organs; that the German agents had been instructed to support Russia and Austria when they were in agreement, and to vote with the majority when they were not. On the following day the Kaiser conversed with Giers, the acting head of the Foreign Office, and General Milutin,

the Minister of War. The former expressed satisfaction at the removal of misunderstanding, while the latter explained the maintenance of large military forces after the close of the Turkish war on the ground that England was organizing and arming Asia Minor through her Consuls, and that a new conflict in the Near East was at hand in which England would be supported by Austria and possibly by France.

The Kaiser returned from Alexandrovo convinced that the Russian danger was imaginary. In forwarding the report of the conversations to Bismarck, he added that neither the Tsar nor any of those who stood highest in his confidence had the slightest desire to wage war on Germany. It was therefore unnecessary to change the traditional policy, and still less to form a defensive coalition against Russia. "Put yourself in my place for a moment. I am in presence of a personal friend, a near relative and an ally, in order to come to an understanding as to some hasty and indeed misunderstood passages in a letter, and our interview leads to a satisfactory result. Shall I now join a hostile coalition against this sovereign behind his back? I will not absolutely deny that the dangers set forth in your memoranda may arise one day, particularly on a change of rulers; but I am utterly unable to see that there is any imminent danger. It is against my political convictions and my conscience to bind my hands for the sake of a possible eventuality. I must not disavow you and the steps which you have taken with Andrassy and his master. You may therefore speak of the eventuality of disagreement developing into a possible breach, and enter into *pourparlers* respecting the possible measures to be taken. But I do not authorize you to conclude a convention, to say nothing of a treaty. In this way I hope our views will again agree. If so, I can look forward with confidence to the future, which would otherwise be very dark, and anticipate a continuance of our relations with Russia, which are growing more friendly. I cannot tell

**The
Kaiser's
Policy**

you how painful this episode has been to me, when it seemed, for the first time in seventeen years, as if we do not agree." Bismarck was wholly unaffected by the report of the visit to Alexandrovo, which, indeed, he had tried to prevent. He pointed out that there was no idea of attacking Russia. If, however, Austria were attacked and in danger, Germany would be compelled by self-interest to support her, alliance or no alliance, since Germany's position, confronted by a victorious Russia, a defeated Austria and a hostile France, would be untenable. Moreover, instead of fighting Austria, Russia might win her over by the promise of Silesia. The Tsar was only friendly till he could win France or Austria or both. He could be informed of the pact when it had been signed.

While the Chancellor was wrestling with his master for permission to push forward, he secured the assent of Bavaria, which occupied a position of special importance in relation to foreign affairs. **Bismarck
consults
Bavaria** "Russian policy," he wrote to King Ludwig on September 10, "has come to be entirely dominated by the warlike, revolutionary tendencies of Panslavism. Shuvaloff is in disgrace; the leading Minister is Milutin, the War Minister, who has increased the army. The Tsar did not desire the Turkish war, but was forced into it by Panslav feeling, which might drive him to war again. In these circumstances I cannot resist the conviction that in the future, perhaps in the near future, peace is threatened by Russia and perhaps by Russia alone. Her attempts to find support in France and Italy have failed, and she has recently presented to us threatening demands which involve that we should make a definite choice between herself and Austria, at the same time instructing the German members of the Eastern committees to vote with Russia in doubtful questions; whereas in our opinion the true construction of the decisions of the Congress is that of Austria, France and England, with whom Germany has accordingly voted, so that Russia with or without Italy is in a minority. Unless we join Austria, she will not be

to blame if she seeks an *entente* with France or Russia, and Andrassy's resignation makes this our last opportunity." Only the two Emperors, concluded the Chancellor with a delicate compliment, had been informed. The King immediately replied that an Austrian alliance would have his full approval.

To convert his master was the urgent task of the moment, and at Holstein's suggestion Bismarck summoned Prince Hohenlohe, at that time Ambassador in Paris, to Gastein.¹ On his arrival Hohenlohe confided to Holstein that he was himself unconverted. "Firstly, I do not trust Austria. Secondly, I do not think Russia really hostile. Finally, I believe an Austro-German alliance will lead to a Franco-Russian alliance—and that is war." These doubts, however, were swept away when he saw the Chancellor next day. "He convinced me of the necessity," wrote the Prince in his diary. "He says Austria cannot stand alone in face of Russian threats. She will work round to an alliance with Russia or France. In both cases Germany is in danger of isolation. The Kaiser resists, owing to the fatal visit to Alexandrovo. Bismarck threatens to resign, and the Kaiser to abdicate. He asks me to see the Kaiser."

On September 16 Count Stolberg, Vice-President of the Ministry, informed the Chancellor that the Kaiser would sanction a general defensive alliance, of which, however, the Tsar must be informed. Bismarck at once told Andrassy that his master agreed "in principle" with his own views, and proposed oral discussion. On September 21 accordingly he left Gastein for Vienna in good spirits. "During the long journey," he writes in his "Reflections," "my sense of being in true German territory was deepened by my reception at the stations. In Vienna I found the people in a similar frame of mind. The greetings of the closely packed throng were continuous. The struggles of the past had not stifled the sense of the

¹ "Denkwürdigkeiten," II, 274-7.

community of blood. The Emperor was very gracious." The discussions of Gastein were resumed with the Emperor, Andrassy, Haymerle, the Foreign Secretary elect, and Koloman Tisza, the Hungarian Premier. Though Bismarck's first object was insurance against Russia, he also desired aid against an attack from France; and indeed his master forbade an alliance directed against Russia alone. Andrassy replied that Austria had no quarrel with France and no reason to fight her, and cogently argued that such a treaty would drive France and Russia into an alliance. Bismarck rejoined that if Austria would support him against France, he would support Austria against Italy, though Germany had no quarrel with the latter. Austria, retorted Andrassy, did not require help against Italy; but she would support Germany against France if France was supported by Russia.

Bismarck suggested that the alliance should be rendered permanent by being communicated to and approved of by the Parliaments of Berlin, Vienna and Budapest. Andrassy replied that a public treaty would be a provocation, since it would

Andrassy
versus
Bismarck

register the isolation of Russia and thereby weaken the peace party in St. Petersburg. Russia would ask to enter, and that would be the renewal of the Dreikaiserbund, which he did not desire, as the Tsar was always casting his dignity into the scales. Bismarck observed that he feared he could not secure his master's assent to a secret and limited treaty, but invited Andrassy to produce a draft. On September 24, before accepting the Austrian scheme, the Chancellor made a final appeal for a defensive alliance against France as well as Russia. "He rose," relates Andrassy, "almost crumpling the paper in his hand, and came quite close to me. 'I can only say, think what you are doing. For the last time I advise you to yield. Accept my proposal,' he cried with loud voice and threatening mien. 'If not (a moment's silence, in which I heard my heart beat) I must accept yours.' The last words he spoke in a friendly way, adding with

a smile, ' But it will give me a cursed lot of trouble.' He gave me his hand. The approach of the towering figure was so threatening that I wonder what would have happened if my nerves had failed me." ¹ Bismarck at once visited the French Ambassador in Vienna to explain that the understanding need not disquiet France, as its character was purely pacific. Two days later, on reaching Berlin, he informed the Russian Ambassador that nothing had occurred to disquiet Russia.

The first part of the struggle was over; but a second and far graver contest of wills was at hand. Bismarck

The Kaiser Yields had not been able to secure the general treaty of defence which his master demanded, if treaty there was to be; and the weary Chancellor felt unable to face oral controversy with his master. Hohenlohe had already done his best to convert the Kaiser in an interview at Strassburg on September 22. The aged monarch complained bitterly that Bismarck, "apparently to avenge the letter," proposed an alliance against Russia which he could not accept. Hohenlohe argued in reply that Austria and Russia would combine at Germany's expense, and that France would join them when the Anglophil Waddington fell. On September 24, after signing the Treaty, Bismarck wrote a long letter explaining its nature and advantages, and added that without it he could not continue responsible for the safety of the country in view of the dangers which the future held in store. The Emperor was thus confronted with the most painful decision of his life. He was tormented not only by the fear of appearing disloyal to his nephew, but by the conviction that notice of withdrawal from the Convention of 1873 should be given before a new treaty was framed. Acceptance of the Vienna draft was approved by the Empress, and urged by the Crown Prince and Moltke not less vigorously than by Hohenlohe and Stolberg; but to all appeals the harassed Kaiser replied,

¹ The story thus related by his secretary Doczy doubtless grew in the telling; but Andrassy described the incident to several friends

"Rather abdication than perfidy." He was finally converted though not convinced by Count Stolberg, after a meeting of Ministers at Berlin on September 28, when the Chancellor explained the Treaty, added that he would resign unless his advice were adopted, and secured the approval of all the Ministers present. The Kaiser endeavoured to placate his conscience by insisting that the Tsar should be informed of the Treaty; but Andrassy vetoed its communication before signature and forbade mention of a "Treaty," lest the Tsar should call for the text, or insist on a "warmed up Dreikaiserbund." A final attempt to secure Austrian aid against a French attack was repulsed by a threat of resignation from the whole Ministry, and the Kaiser gave way on October 5. The Treaty was signed in Vienna on October 7 by Andrassy and the German Ambassador, Prince Reuss. The troubled monarch now pleaded that his nephew should be informed before ratification, but once again he was overruled and the Treaty was ratified on October 16.

The agreement was enshrined in a protocol, a joint memorandum, and a series of clauses. The former, signed by Bismarck and Andrassy at Vienna on September 24, briefly describes the origin of the pact. In the joint memorandum, signed on the same day, the Governments promised to remain true to the Berlin settlement. "To obviate every complication in the execution of the Treaty, both shall keep before them their friendly attitude towards Russia. Both declare their intention not to attack or menace Russia owing to differences arising out of the Treaty. As a proof of friendliness, they intend to negotiate new commercial Treaties." The Treaty itself opened with the usual pacific preamble. "Inasmuch as an intimate co-operation of Germany and Austria menaces no one, but is rather calculated to consolidate the peace of Europe as established by the Treaty of Berlin, Their Majesties, while solemnly promising each other never to allow their purely defensive agreement to develop an aggressive tendency,

**The Dual
Alliance**

have determined to conclude an alliance of peace and mutual defence.

"I. Should, contrary to their hopes and loyal desire, one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia, the other is bound to assist and only to conclude peace in common.

"II. Should one of the two be attacked by another Power, the other will observe at least benevolent neutrality. Should, however, the attacking party be supported by Russia, either by active co-operation or by military measures which constitute a menace, the other shall aid."

The third article bound the Allies for five years, and the Treaty was to be prolonged for three years more unless one of them desired negotiations a year before its expiration.¹ The fourth article bound the Allies to secrecy, except in a single eventuality. "The Allies venture to hope that, after the sentiments expressed by the Tsar at Alexandrovo, Russian armaments will not prove menacing. In that event they would consider it an obligation of loyalty to let the Tsar know confidentially that they must consider an attack on one as directed against both."

The day after the signing of the Treaty Haymerle succeeded Andrassy as Foreign Minister. "If its making was difficult," wrote the great Hungarian statesman to Bismarck on leaving office for **Austro-German Satisfaction** ever, "I hope that it will be all the easier to maintain." "The fear of war," replied the Chancellor, "has everywhere given place to confidence in peace." Its authors might well look with satisfaction on their handiwork. It gave Andrassy exactly what he wanted, neither more nor less; and, though Bismarck had failed to carry his whole programme, he had insured against the most dangerous risk and had healed the feud between Vienna and Berlin. "It is the completion of my work of 1866," he declared with justifiable pride. The terms of the Treaty were not published till 1888; but all

¹ It was renewed in 1883 and at subsequent intervals. Not till 1902 was it agreed that it should be automatically extended at the end of each three-year term.

Europe knew that a momentous change had occurred. "I believe the best hopes of the stability and peace of Europe rest on the strength and independence of Austria," declared Salisbury on October 18. "Recent events justify the hope that if Austria is attacked she will not stand alone. The papers say a defensive alliance of Germany and Austria has been concluded. If true, it is good tidings of great joy." King Humbert expressed his satisfaction to the German Ambassador, and Waddington described it as a pledge of peace. In Russia it was regarded as a blow, but not as a menace. "Russia lost Austria after San Stefano," commented the Germanophil Schuvaloff bitterly, "and now she has lost Germany." The Emperor William was at last permitted to send a copy of the joint memorandum of September 24 with a letter explaining that the conversations described therein were necessitated by the approaching resignation of Andrassy. "The two Chancellors agreed on a new *entente* to fill the void left by the abolition of the Germanic Confederation. I feel sure you will approve its principles and restore the *entente* of the three Emperors. If, however, the Nihilists and Panslavs were to dominate the Government, they would meet with joint resistance in the neighbouring countries." The Tsar replied that he fully approved the memorandum, and saw in it the return to the perfect understanding of the three Emperors which had rendered such services to Europe. The Kaiser's apprehensions as to the effect of the new departure on his nephew's mind proved baseless, for the Austro-German *rapprochement*, though its precise nature was kept secret, reduced instead of increasing the fever. "Six weeks ago," observed Bismarck to the French Ambassador in November, "Russia was dreaming of fire and flame. My deal with Austria has brought her to reason. A week after it was notified in St. Petersburg the *détente* began. The Press campaign against Germany and Austria has been wholly stopped, and the heir to the throne is coming to pay his respects to the Kaiser."

The Tsar
Reassured

The Austro-German alliance removed the immediate danger to both parties; but Bismarck, baulked of his full demand, regarded it as merely a part of his grand scheme of defence. He hoped, wrote Lord Odo Russell to Lord Granville,¹ that it would hold back the Panslav flood till the peace party in Russia got the upper hand, and till he could renew the Dreikaiserbund. Indeed, he regarded his handiwork with singular detachment. "Our principal concern," he wrote in his "Reflections," "is to keep the peace between our two Imperial neighbours. I regarded it as no less enjoined on us to cultivate neighbourly relations with Russia after than before. If we maintain the bridge which leads to St. Petersburg, Vienna can bridle its anti-German influences. If we had an irremediable estrangement from Russia, Austria would enlarge her claims. It is no part of German policy to expend our blood and treasure for the purpose of realizing the designs of a neighbour. In the interest of the European equilibrium the maintenance of Austria as a strong, independent Great Power is for Germany an object for which she might in case of need stake her fortunes with a good conscience; but Vienna should avoid deducing from the alliance claims it was not concluded to support. It does not dispense us from the attitude of *toujours en vedette*."

While the fate of the Treaty had been trembling in the balance the Chancellor had fitted another string to his bow.

**Bismarck
sounds
England**

He had sounded Disraeli in 1876 in vain with regard to close political co-operation, and he now renewed the attempt. On September 26 the German Ambassador appeared at Hughenden, where the Prime Minister was resting after the labours of the session.² Panslavism, he declared, was dominant in Russia, who was likely to attack Austria, and such an attack would result in a general war.

According to Beaconsfield's version of the interview the

¹ "Life of Granville," II, 209.

² See Buckle, "Life of Beaconsfield," VI, 486-94; "Life of Salisbury," II, 364-70; "Die Grosse Politik," IV, 3-14, and III, 127-36.

Ambassador declared that an alliance of Germany, Austria and Great Britain, bartering support against Russian aggression for maintaining British interests in the East, would maintain peace, and the Chancellor desired to know whether he would favour it before he suggested it to the Kaiser. He replied that he was and always had been favourable to the principle of an alliance or a good understanding with Germany, but that a step which might seem hostile to France would be unpopular. Münster, however, was merely instructed to ask what England would do if Germany's refusal to yield to Russian demands should lead to war, and according to his report it was his host who proposed an alliance, and added that he would regard a French attack on Germany as a *casus belli*. Bismarck replied to Münster that his expectations were not altogether fulfilled, since no promise of armed assistance had been given, though he was grateful for the promise to keep watch on France. Münster replied that Beaconsfield regarded it as understood that he would support Germany and Austria in a war with Russia.

The Prime Minister had referred the Ambassador to the Foreign Minister; and in writing to Salisbury a day or two later he expressed greater sympathy for an alliance than he had displayed in his report to the Queen. "A fear of Russia, as the Power that will ultimately strike at the root of our empire, is singularly prevalent. I believe that an alliance between the three Powers might be hailed with something like enthusiasm by the country. France could not in reason object to our helping Austria if attacked by Russia." Salisbury told the Ambassador that the Cabinet would stand by Germany if trouble arose with Russia; that he desired an alliance with both Powers; that peace would be secure if Russia knew that Germany and England would support Austria against an attack; that we could prevent France joining in a conflict begun by Russia. Münster made no suggestion of an alliance, and the conversation left the impression that Bismarck was now less

Beacons-
field's
Reply

anxious to secure British support. No further steps were taken, for the Chancellor had secured his master's consent to the Austrian Treaty. When, at the end of October, the Austrian and German Ambassadors confidentially announced its conclusion to Salisbury, no suggestion was made on either side that Great Britain should join it. Both parties were satisfied to let the matter drop. "Your Majesty is as free as air," wrote the Prime Minister, "and that, too, without showing any want of sympathy with the Austro-German view"; to which the Queen replied, "We are well out of it." Bismarck, on his side, had learned that Great Britain continued to be animated by the friendliest feelings for the Central Powers, and the unfriendliest feelings for Russia, and he would have had difficulty in securing his master's assent to an alliance which would have emphasized the isolation of the Tsar and almost compelled him to seek the friendship of France.¹

When his policy of threats had driven Germany into the arms of Austria, Alexander's obvious interest was to secure from the goodwill of his neighbours what he could not extract from their fears. **Russo-German Rapprochement** Directly Bismarck had returned from Vienna, Sabouroff, a diplomat of the school of Schuvaloff, not of Gortchakoff, arrived in Berlin with instructions to discuss a Russo-German agreement.² The Chancellor, without betraying any secrets, explained that Austria would no longer look to a western alliance in order to defend her interests in the East. "I have thus arrived at the first stage in my policy—placing a barrier between her and the western Powers. Despite the clouds of this summer I do not despair of accomplishing the second part, the reconstruction of the Dreikaiserbund." Sabouroff replied that if Bismarck could show an *entente à trois* to be profitable to Russia and a pledge of peace,

¹ According to Eckardstein, Beaconsfield drafted a scheme for an alliance shortly before his fall. "Erinnerungen," II, 102-6.

² See "Die Grosse Politik," III, 139-79; and Simpson, "The Sabouroff Memoirs," in the *Nineteenth Century*, Dec., 1917, and Jan., 1918. Sabouroff's memoirs have been subsequently published in Russian.

the Tsar would not oppose it, but he wished for a closer relationship. "My desire for an alliance remains," rejoined the Chancellor, "but the situation has changed. In 1877 I was prepared for an offensive and defensive alliance, but to-day it could only be one of defence." Sabouroff carried away the impression that an entente was possible, and Bismarck undertook to persuade his master.

The two men did not meet again till the end of January, 1880, when Sabouroff was transferred from Constantinople to Berlin. Now that the Treaty with Austria was signed and ratified he had no wish for an entente confined to Russia and Germany.

Sabouroff
and
Bismarck

An agreement to defend each other against a coalition, he pointed out, involved a promise by Germany to attack Austria in certain circumstances. That would be a dangerous secret, and if it leaked out Austria would seek an alliance in the West. "Your interest is not to embroil Germany and Austria. You forget the importance of being a party of three on the European chess-board. That is the object of all the Cabinets, and above all mine. Nobody wishes to be in a minority. All politics reduce themselves to this formula: try to be *à trois* in a world governed by five Powers. I have made an *entente à deux* in order to return thereafter to an *entente à trois* if you really wish it. I do not see why Austria should refuse. If she does, we can fall back on an *accord à deux*." Sabouroff proceeded to sketch an agreement which would guarantee Russia against the entry of foreign fleets into the Black Sea, promising in return that changes in the *status quo* of Turkey in Europe would only take place with Austrian consent. Bismarck was asked to sound Austria.

To secure the assent of Austria was not an easy task. Haymerle was no less suspicious of Panslavism than Andrassy, and when he visited Friedrichsruh in August he refused to commit himself. He considered that the Austro-German treaty was sufficient, and he feared that an *accord à trois* might loosen the bond. Moreover, he

had no desire to facilitate Russian expansion in the Near East, while Bismarck frankly told Sabouroff that he did not share the general prejudice against handing over Constantinople—"the latchkey of her door"—to Russia, if Russia abstained from interference in Austria's sphere of influence in the Western Balkans. Since Vienna was so unsympathetic Bismarck made no further advances to Sabouroff, and at the end of the year Haymerle reiterated his conviction that Russia was hostile and could not be trusted. He was, however, willing to consider a limited agreement, since he could not rebut Bismarck's argument that at any rate Russia would be less of a danger if bound by some tie.

Bismarck and Sabouroff proceeded to draw up an agreement, which the Tsar, his eldest son and Giers approved.

Austro-Russian
Rapprochement Alexander was now as anxious for the revival of the Triple Entente as Bismarck himself, and it was agreed that the Kaiser should convert Francis Joseph. He therefore dispatched an autograph letter to Vienna, declaring that the time had come to restore the entente, to remove the soreness which had prevailed since 1879, to guarantee European peace, and to strengthen the monarchical principle. Even when Francis Joseph was ready to re-establish the Dreikaiserbund, Haymerle still held out. Bismarck complained that he was not an easy dove to tame; nor did he yield till Bismarck informed him that he must say Yes or No. At this moment, however, the assassination of Alexander II on March 13 caused delay and encouraged Haymerle, to Bismarck's annoyance, to offer fresh suggestions. Bismarck allowed him to fix the duration of the Treaty at three years, remarking that when Austria had worn the flannel next her skin for that period she would not be able to take it off without running the risk of catching cold. When Haymerle finally announced his country's acceptance, he stubbornly added the words, "By the express commands of the Emperor Francis Joseph."²

Alexander III, though of inferior intellectual calibre, possessed greater steadiness of character than his father. Though the husband of a Danish wife and strongly opposed to German influences at ^{The Tsar} Alexander III Court and in the Government, he had no desire to cut the threads which were barely woven once again with Berlin; and he never forgot the horrors of the Turkish campaign in which he had taken part. The circular issued to Russia's diplomatic representatives on his accession announced that Russia had reached her full development, that her foreign policy would be absolutely peaceful, and that his first task would be the internal development of the country. Even stronger than his love of peace was his horror of revolution; and he saw in the conservative States of Germany and Austria welcome allies in the struggle against the forces of anarchy and irreligion to which his father had fallen a victim. A week after his accession he telegraphed cordial congratulations to the Kaiser on his eighty-fourth birthday; and the aged monarch remarked, "From the new Tsar the old warmth, loyalty and friendship—that does one good."

With such a ruler there was no need to delay the agreement which already existed in outline; and on May 18 a "Ministerial Declaration of Policy on the Relation of the Dual Alliance to the League of the Three Emperors" stated that "with regard to the coming negotiations the German and Austrian Governments recognize that the prospective Triple Agreement can under no circumstances prejudice their treaty of alliance which continues to determine the relations of the two Powers." The Treaty, concluded for three years and to be kept secret, was signed at Berlin on June 18 by Bismarck and the Ambassadors Szechenyi and Sabouloff.

I. If one Power should find itself at war with a fourth Great Power, the others will observe benevolent neutrality and try to localize the conflict. This shall apply also to a war with Turkey, but only if a previous

agreement shall have been reached between the three Courts as to the results of this war.

Three
Emperors
League II. Russia, in agreement with Germany, declares her firm resolution to respect the interests arising from the new position assured to Austria by the Treaty of Berlin. The three Courts will take account of their respective interests in the Balkan Peninsula, and promise that any modifications in the territorial *status quo* of Turkey in Europe can be accomplished only in virtue of a common agreement.

III. They recognize the European and mutually obligatory character of the principle of the closing of the Straits. They will take care in common that Turkey shall make no exception to this rule in favour of any Government by lending the Straits to warlike operations. In case of—or to prevent—such infringement, the three Powers will inform Turkey that they would regard her as putting herself in a state of war towards the injured party and as having deprived herself of the security assured to her territorial *status quo* by the Treaty of Berlin.

The Protocol, signed on the same day, added a number of important details.

1. *Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Austria reserves the right to annex these provinces at whatever moment she may deem opportune.

2. *The Sanjak of Novibazar*. The declaration exchanged between the Austrian and Russian plenipotentiaries at Berlin on July 13, 1878, remains in force.

3. *Eastern Roumelia*. The three Powers regard an occupation of Eastern Roumelia and of the Balkans as dangerous for the general peace. If it occurs they will try to dissuade the Porte from such an enterprise, it being understood that Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia

are to abstain from provoking the Porte by attacks against the other provinces of Turkey.

4. *Bulgaria.* The three Powers will not oppose the eventual reunion of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia if this question should come up by the force of circumstances. They agree to dissuade the Bulgarians from all aggression against the neighbouring provinces, especially Macedonia, and to inform them that in such a case they would be acting at their own risk.

5. *Attitude of Agents in the East.* To avoid collisions of interests in local questions, the three will order their representatives and agents to compromise their divergences by friendly explanations, and, where they do not succeed, to refer the matter to their Governments.

The new friendship of Germany and Russia, which in Bismarck's words would prevent an Austro-Russian war and a Franco-Russian coalition, was sealed by the visit of the Tsar and Tsarina to Danzig in September. Though the aged Gortchakoff remained nominally Foreign Minister, he was no longer in even partial control; and Giers, a Protestant bourgeois of Jewish blood, who had married a relative of the Chancellor and was acting head of the Foreign Office, accompanied his master, whose devotion to peace he fully shared. The visit gave pleasure to both sides, and Giers informed the Austrian Ambassador that the Emperor had returned in a satisfied and tranquil mood. Bismarck, he reported, was thoroughly pacific, and the recognized necessity of joint defence against Socialism and revolution proved a bond of union. On Gortchakoff's death early in 1882 Giers, to the delight of Bismarck and to the anger of the Slavophiles, who pined for Ignatieff and satirically described his successful rival as German Ambassador to the Court of Russia, was appointed Foreign Minister. Though the Tsar was determined to be his own pilot, it was of good omen that his

Giers
succeeds
Gortchakoff

chief adviser was an honest and cautious statesman of the school of Schuvaloff.

Though the Russian Government was once more on friendly terms with Vienna and Berlin, unofficial opinion in Russia continued hostile. Its manifestations in the Press were now severely controlled, and the astonishment was therefore all the greater when Skobelev, the hero of the Turkish war and the idol of the Pan-slavs, broke the silence by a speech in Petrograd in January, 1882, on the anniversary of the taking of Geok Tepe.¹ Angered by the spectacle of Austria suppressing a rising in Herzegovina provoked by the introduction of conscription, and apprehensive lest Montenegro might be invaded, the gallant General declared that Russia could not be provoked too far. "The Russians belong to the great Slav race, the members of which are now persecuted and oppressed. Our faith in the historical mission of Russia is our consolation and strength." The warning to Austria, which was echoed by a call to arms in Aksakoff's *Rus* and which the General's admirers declared to have saved Montenegro from invasion, naturally excited the Central Powers, whose anger in turn spurred Skobelev to fresh pronouncements in Paris. Russia, he declared to sympathetic ears, among them a deputation of Serb students, had not freed the Balkan Slavs to see Austria trample on them. She was not crippled by the recent war, and would shrink from no sacrifice for religion and race. If Austria attacked the Southern Slavs outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia would fight. No authorized version of his utterances in Paris was issued, and he was rumoured to have added that the German was the enemy; that a struggle between the Teuton and the Slav was inevitable and could not be long delayed; that the conflict would be terrible, but that the Slavs would prove victorious. Giers promptly expressed the regret of the Russian

¹ See Olga Novikoff, "Skobelev and the Slavonic Cause" (1883), Part II, ch. 2-3; and Baddeley, "Russia in the Eighties," ch. 6.

Government, and on his return home the General was bidden to hold his tongue. The Dreikaiserbund was none the worse for the incident; but it was a genuine relief to Petrograd, scarcely less than to Vienna and Berlin, when the famous soldier died suddenly at Moscow a few weeks later.

The Emperor William had come to realize that the Austrian alliance was not incompatible with a friendly Russia, and he supported his Chancellor in avoiding any action which might tend to disturb the welcome if precarious harmony.

The
Skiernewice
Meeting, 1884

For instance, when Moltke begged Bismarck in the summer of 1881 for money for the eastern frontier, on the ground that Russia was strengthening her fortifications, improving her railways and could now concentrate on the German frontier more rapidly than Germany herself, he declined. In February, 1883, Sabouroff suggested the prolongation of the Treaty of 1881, and in November Giers renewed the suggestion during a visit to Friedrichsruh. The Kaiser owed his neighbour a return visit for the Danzig meeting of 1881, and the presence of Prince William at the coming of age festivities of the heir to the throne prepared the way for his grandfather. The Treaty of 1881 was renewed in March, 1884, without modification, and in September the three Emperors, accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, met at Skiernewice, where the mistrust of Francis Joseph and Kalnoky was disarmed by the transparent sincerity of their host.¹

II

The governing principle of Bismarck's policy since 1871 was to safeguard his conquests and to preserve the peace of Europe by keeping France in quarantine, for without allies she was too weak to challenge the Treaty of Frankfurt. In 1881, ten years after the struggle, he could point to an Austrian alliance, a revived Dreikaiser-

¹ "Die Grosse Politik," III, 285-377.

bund, and a friendly England; and before the end of the same year the only other Great Power in Europe was seeking admission to the league which, in fact though not in name, defied the continental ambitions of France.

The making of Italy had been assisted at different times by a French and a Prussian alliance, and after the process was complete the new State
Crispi visits
Bismarck, committed itself neither to Paris nor to
 1877 Berlin. United Italy, indeed, was not at first taken very seriously as a Great Power, and no special efforts were made to court her favour. Bismarck, it is true, was ready at any moment to add Italy or any other State to the list of guarantors of the settlement of 1871; but he was in no hurry, since the fear of a clerico-monarchical restoration in France prevented Rome from establishing relations of confidence and cordiality with Paris. The fall of the Right in 1876 brought Depretis into power, and in the summer of the following year Crispi, the strongest figure of the Left and at that moment President of the Chamber, was sent on a roving mission to the capitals.¹ Paris he found, as he expected to find, "distrustful"; but the real object of his journey was to learn the mind of Bismarck, who had recently put out feelers for closer union, and was now taking the waters at Gastein. "I am charged to ask if you would ally with us," he began, "in case we are forced into war with France or Austria." "If Italy is attacked by France," replied the Chancellor, "we should join—and we will make a treaty for this purpose. But I do not expect such an attack unless France returns to monarchy, that is, to clericalism. I could not, however, consider the possibility of Austrian hostility. I am your friend, but I will not break with Austria. If she takes Bosnia, you could take Albania." He refused to recommend to Vienna the improvement of Italy's northern boundaries, but advised his visitor to see Andrassy. In Berlin the Italian statesman was the guest at a Parliamentary banquet presided

¹ Crispi, "Memoirs," II, ch. 1.

over by Bennigsen, and the ceremony was interpreted abroad as the harbinger of closer relations. At Budapest Crispi found Andrassy in friendly mood, but made no suggestion of an Austrian alliance, for which indeed he had no wish. The journey bore no immediate fruit, for in 1878 Depretis was succeeded by the Francophil Cairoli. On the eve of inviting Andrassy to Gastein in 1879 Bismarck told the Italian Premier of his plans, and assured him that Italy would be welcome as a third in the partnership at any time; but Cairoli saw no need to accept the offer. When two Cabinet Ministers acted as pall-bearers of the President of the Irredentists early in 1880, Austria massed troops on the frontier, and the Italian Government announced that the advance of troops in the Tirol must be considered a menace. Irredentist incidents, tolerated by the Government, continued, provoking retaliatory measures from Vienna.¹ But at the very moment when a Francophil Premier was in power at Rome, and Italy and Austria were spitting fire at one another across the frontier, France took a step which drove the new kingdom into the Austro-German camp.

When the news of the Cyprus Convention leaked out during the Congress of Berlin, Waddington was pacified by a suggestion that France should find compensation in Tunis.² "Waddington and I often discussed the events taking place in the Mediterranean," reported Lord Salisbury.³ "With respect to Tunis I said that England was wholly disinterested, and had no intention to contest the influence which the geographical position of Algeria gave to France." On his return to Paris the French Premier asked for the substance of these informal negotiations to be placed on record in a formal dispatch, and Lord Salisbury complied. Similar counsel was proffered by Bismarck,

Congress
of
Berlin

¹ See Mayr, "Der Italienische Irredentismus."

² Hanotaux, "Contemporary France," IV, 382-7.

³ "Life of Salisbury," II, 332-3.

who since 1871 had encouraged France to seek colonial compensation for the loss of the Rhine provinces, and who foresaw that a French occupation of Tunis would destroy the Francophil party in Italy. A rumour that the Chancellor had offered Tunis to Count Corti led

France
covets
Tunis

Waddington to warn the Italian Government that France had long regarded Tunis as necessary to her interests, and that Italy could only cherish dreams of conquest by risking the open enmity of France.¹ On the other hand, Waddington told the Italian Ambassador at Paris in August, 1879, that he was opposed to the annexation of Tunis; that it had never been discussed by the Cabinet; and that so long as he remained in office nothing would be decided without Italian co-operation. In June, 1880, President Grévy observed to the Ambassador that, though the country might become a source of friction, it was not worth a cheap cigar.² In the following month, however, Freycinet, who had succeeded Waddington in the Premiership, used words to the Italian Ambassador which were calculated rather to confirm than to allay the suspicions of Italy. "For the present we have no intention to occupy the country, but the future is in God's hands. Why do you persist in thinking of Tunis? Why not turn your attention to Tripoli?" "We seek neither Tunis nor Tripoli," rejoined the Ambassador, "only the *status quo*." "The future is in God's hands," repeated Freycinet, "and one day, doubtless far off, France may be led to occupy Tunis. If so, Italy shall be informed as long before as possible, and shall have our support in obtaining adequate compensation." So far from leaving the future "in God's hands," Freycinet was at that moment endeavouring to plant his foot in the Promised Land. "In agreement with Gambetta," he writes in his "Memoirs,"³ "I tried to make

¹ See Hanotaux, "Contemporary France," III, 576-91; Billot, "La France et l'Italie," I, ch. 1; and D'Estournelles de Constant, "La politique française en Tunisie."

² Crispi, "Memoirs," II, ch. 2.

³ "Souvenirs," II, 168-71.

use of the permission of Berlin, and I instructed Roustan to persuade the Bey to accept a Protectorate. He was almost persuaded, and Roustan wrote to me, 'Disembark a company of fusiliers, and the Bey will sign.' I was about to authorize it when I fell. I told Ferry, adding, 'The fruit is ripe; you will pluck it at the right moment.' Tunis was a bad neighbour, and there was always a danger lest Italy might forestall her rival."

The country whose fate was thus being canvassed in the Chancelleries of Europe formed in theory a part of the Ottoman Empire, but was ruled by a dynasty which had been in possession Europe
and
Tunis for two centuries. In the third quarter of the nineteenth century only a small fraction of the land was under cultivation, and despite heavy taxation there was an annual deficit. In 1869 a Triple Financial Control was established by Great Britain, France and Italy; but the experiment was doomed to failure, for each of the three was playing for its own hand. Great Britain had secured most of the concessions for public works; France had learned to regard the country as a natural adjunct to Algeria; and Italy, on becoming a Great Power, could not fail to be interested in a country which was reached in a few hours from Sicily and attracted a growing number of Italian colonists. From the middle of the 'seventies an open struggle was in progress between the three Consuls, all of whom happened to be men of ability and resolve. Sir Richard Wood had represented Great Britain since 1855; Roustan, who arrived in 1874, had represented France in Syria and was determined to win Tunis for France; while Macchio was equally vigorous and unscrupulous in pushing the claims of Italy. On several occasions the French Ambassador in Rome was instructed to warn the Italian Government that Macchio's imprudences might goad France to action, and to explain that, although France had no intention of annexing the country, she could not allow Italy to establish an influence superior or indeed equal to her own. The issue of the

conflict was determined in advance by the secret conversations at Berlin, and it only remained for France to seize her prey at the most suitable moment.¹

Ferry's Foreign Minister, Barthélemy St. Hilaire, a convinced partisan of a Protectorate, resumed negotiations with the Bey early in 1881 on the pretext of regulating the policing of the frontier. **Jules Ferry's Preparations** Roustan submitted a treaty similar to that sanctioned by Freycinet; but the Bey hesitated and the foreign Consuls advised him to refuse. At this moment the Kroumirs in the north raided across the Algerian frontier, and on April 4 Ferry obtained six million francs for an expedition to restore order.² A shrill outcry at once arose in Constantinople and Rome. Since she reoccupied Tripoli in 1835 Turkey had claimed a shadowy suzerainty over Tunis, which was partially recognized by the presents of successive Beys to the Sultan as Caliph; and in 1871, hoping to profit by the disasters of France, she formally declared her sovereignty, which was at once pronounced null and void by the French Government. To this firman, nevertheless, Turkey appealed when French troops invaded Tunis, and prepared to reinforce her garrison in Tripoli and to send ships. France sharply replied that if the Turkish fleet appeared on the scene it would be attacked. Cairoli declared that France had deceived him, and invited Great Britain to join in a naval demonstration. "If Ferry had only told me," complained the Italian Ambassador to Freycinet, "we could have prepared public opinion in Italy; as it is we look like dupes." Unfortunately Ferry did not consider himself bound by the promise of his predecessor to let Italy know before a decisive step was taken, and argued that Italy, though surprised, was not deceived. Bismarck, on the other hand, assured the French Ambassador that Germany would make no oppo-

¹ How her conduct appeared to an Englishman may be seen in Broadley, "The Last Punic War."

² Rambaud, "Jules Ferry."

sition to French action, even if it resulted in annexation.¹ Granville offered mediation, but discouraged action at Constantinople, and merely exacted from France a confirmation of the treaties favouring British commerce and a promise not to fortify Bizerta.

The Tunis expedition was France's first military effort since the *débâcle*, and her task appeared easy enough. Twenty-three thousand troops marched in from Algeria, and eight thousand were landed at Bizerta. After a trifling resistance the Bey yielded to his fate, and on May 12 signed the Treaty of Bardo, which the French General presented him, with the warning that deposition would follow refusal, and with the promise not to enter the capital if he yielded. The Treaty established a Protectorate, France undertaking to defend the Bey against danger to his person and dynasty, and guaranteeing the existing treaties with the Powers, while assuming control of foreign relations. Financial reorganization was to be undertaken, and a Resident Minister was to represent France. Germany, Austria and Spain congratulated the French Government, and no one troubled about the paper protests of Turkey. "France is resuming her place among the Great Powers," wrote Gambetta proudly to Ferry, the real founder of the second French colonial empire. It had required no more than twenty days to transform Tunis into a French Protectorate; and the Treaty of Bardo was ratified on May 23, Clemenceau alone voting against it, on the ground that "it profoundly modified the European system and chilled precious friendships cemented on the field of battle." Believing that the submission of the Bey involved the submission of his subjects, Ferry recalled most of the troops; but the south was unconquered and the tribes quickly rose. Sfax was bombarded and taken by assault, the army was raised to fifty thousand, and on October 28 the capture of the holy

Treaty
of
Bardo

¹ St. Hilaire wrote a private letter to Bismarck expressing the gratitude of France for German support.

city of Kairouan, the attack on which was postponed till the summer heat was over, ended the revolt.

The seizure of Tunis overthrew Cairoli, who lamented to the French Ambassador that he was the last Italian Minister who loved France. Italy seethed with indignation, the prestige of the dynasty received a rude shock, and wounded pride spurred her rulers to a momentous resolve. What, they asked themselves, was there to prevent the country which had pocketed Tunis from proceeding to gobble up Tripoli, or even from attacking the virtually undefended coasts of the peninsula itself? Italy's natural ally would have been the strongest naval Power in the Mediterranean; but Great Britain had declined to protest against an act which she had herself suggested. To whom, then, should she turn save to the arch-enemy of France, with whom Crispi had discussed a defensive alliance four years earlier?

The conclusion of the Austro-German pact of 1879 had been followed by a good deal of discussion between Berlin and Vienna in regard to Italy.¹ Neither Bismarck nor Haymerle had much confidence in Italian statesmen or military strength, and Bismarck was much more eager to repair the wire to St. Petersburg than to throw a bait to Rome. Haymerle, on the other hand, anxious to keep Russia in quarantine, regarded Italy as an important piece on the chess-board, and was anxious to avoid any step which might push her towards France and, through France, eventually link her discontents with those of Russia. Thus he declined Bismarck's suggestion to answer Italian "irredentism" by an increase of armaments, and he had no desire to recover lost territory in the south by a war which would invite a flank attack from the north. His policy was to avoid a quarrel with Italy and to draw Great Britain into the orbit of the

¹ See Pribram, "Secret Treaties," II, ch. 1; "Die Grosse Politik," III, 183-247; Billot, "La France et l'Italie," I, ch. 2; Crispi, "Memoirs," II, ch. 2; Chiala, "Pagine di Storia Contemporanea," II and III; and "La Politica Estera Italiana" (anonymous).

Central Powers, since she, too, was the enemy of Russia, and could hold back Italy if Austria were at war with Russia. He knew that it would be difficult to win Germany for a Triple Alliance with the point against Russia, and therefore, in sending Kalnoky to Berlin in February, 1880, on his way to take up the embassy in St. Petersburg, he merely proposed to ask for British help *pro domo nostra*. The Chancellor did not wish Austria to attack or to excite Italy, but he recommended plain speaking in Rome. Italy's jackal policy—always ready to attack from behind and to seize part of the booty—needed a sharp lesson. He had ceased to believe that she would be a trustworthy ally. He discouraged an application to England as unnecessary, as she would in any case hold Italy in check; and to confront Russia with the spectre of a coalition would only arouse her suspicions.

The discussion was renewed in October when Italy, apprehensive of French designs in Tunis, began to take soundings. The Chancellor replied that the road to Berlin lay through Vienna, and, when Vienna expressed readiness to listen to suggestions, Maffei, Secretary of the Italian Foreign Office, drafted a neutrality treaty "as a first step towards more intimate relations," shortly before King Humbert's first visit to Vienna in February, 1881. The basis was to be the *status quo* in the East, as defined in 1878. Maffei added that France was striving hard for Italian friendship, on the basis of a deal over Tunis and Tripoli. Haymerle welcomed the idea of a neutrality agreement, but added that Bosnia and Herzegovina must be excluded from a guarantee of the *status quo* in the East. On the other hand, Austria would pledge herself to undertake no conquests in Albania or towards Salonika, if Italy would do the same, and would not oppose an extension of the Italian sphere in the Mediterranean outside the Adriatic. She would also make an "arrangement" in the Tunis question in Italy's interest, and favour the annexation of Tripoli. Despite the favourable response in

Humbert
visits
Vienna

Vienna, official negotiations were not initiated, and the Austrian Ambassador in Rome reported that the "unofficial" approach was not seriously meant. Austria had soon less need to desire them; for on June 18 the revival of the Three Emperors League diminished the value of an Italian alliance.

When the news of the Treaty of Bardo reached Rome, Sonnino wrote that Italy must seek for British friendship and a close alliance with Germany and Austria, since isolation was annihilation. **Advice of Bismarck** Anger against France was intensified by a sanguinary *fracas* at Marseilles in June, when French troops from Tunis were received with whistling, and the mob attacked the Italians who were assumed to be the culprits. Many Italians left the city, and anti-French demonstrations occurred in Italy. No final resolve, however, was taken for several months, and negotiations for a new commercial treaty were brought to a successful conclusion in the autumn. Despite the repugnance of the new Premier Depretis, an old Irre-
dentist, and the lukewarmness of his Foreign Minister, Mancini, they both accompanied the King and Queen to Vienna in October. An alliance was not proposed by the hosts, and the guests avoided the risk of a rebuff; but the friendly welcome and a general discussion of the situation prepared the way. A fresh request to Bismarck for his mediation provoked the reply that Italy, as the Power needing security, must make the first advance. The Chancellor informed Kalnoky, the new Austrian Foreign Minister, of Italy's action, and added that any agreement would be of one-sided advantage to Italy, all the more since the untrustworthy character of her policy and the continual change of Ministers might easily involve her friends in trouble, and rendered it doubtful whether she would fulfil her obligations. He advised his colleagues not to refuse what might strengthen the position of the Italian dynasty and therefore the monarchical principle, but to suggest the postponement of an answer till a *modus vivendi* with the

Pope had been reached, and then to make any Austro-German obligations to Italy dependent on the continuance of the present relations of those two States to Russia. King Humbert and his Ministers, however, were eager for a decision, and in the closing days of 1881 the Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna were instructed to state that Italy wished, independently of particular questions, to join Germany and Austria, and would be ready to co-operate with them even if their obligations to other Powers did not allow an alliance. On January 19, 1882, the first conversation took place between Kalnoky and Robilant, the Italian Ambassador at Vienna; and on February 1, Launay, the Italian Ambassador at Berlin, discussed an alliance with Bismarck. The Chancellor observed that as Germany had no differences with Italy, the latter must first win Austria for a treaty. "The key of the door which leads to Berlin is in Vienna." He pointed out various difficulties, among them the uncertainty arising from Ministerial changes in Rome, and sent the Ambassador away neither wholly satisfied nor wholly disappointed.

The negotiations in Vienna were by no means easy. Robilant suggested a mutual guarantee of territory, which Kalnoky refused as involving too great risks for both; and a neutrality treaty which he favoured was declared useless by Robilant.

The
Alliance
Signed

Kalnoky consulted Bismarck, who advised him not to underwrite the possession of Rome but to offer more than a cold neutrality, lest Italy should sell herself to France for a guarantee of her capital. An agreement was finally reached in a compromise between neutrality and guarantee, which was signed at Vienna on May 20. If Italy were attacked by France without provocation, her partners would come to her aid. Italy, in turn, would help Germany against a French attack. If one of the Allies (or two) were attacked and engaged in war with two or more Great Powers, the *casus fœderis* would arise for all. If a Great Power threatened the security of one of

the signatories, and that one was forced to make war, the others would observe benevolent neutrality, reserving the right to take part in the conflict if they should see fit. If peace was threatened, the Allies would consult with regard to military measures. The pact was to hold for five years, and to be kept secret. At Italy's wish each of the Allies signed an Additional Declaration, affirming that the treaty could in no case be regarded as directed against Great Britain.

Though Italy was the petitioner, she obtained greater advantages than Austria; for the latter was bound to aid her against a French attack, while she was not pledged to help her ally against a Russian onslaught. She was, moreover, by the fact of the alliance, protected against an Austrian attack. At the Congress of Berlin she had played a minor part, but from 1882 onwards she was recognized as a Great Power. Though she had failed to secure the coveted guarantee of her capital, her hold over it was strengthened. The Treaty also brought solid advantage to the Central Powers. Bismarck was not only freed from the remote fear that Italy might join France in an attack, but secured an ally in resisting such attack. Austria, again, had no longer to fear a stab in the back if she was engaged in a life and death struggle with Russia, and could count on Italian assistance in repelling a Franco-Russian assault. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* accurately described the Triple Alliance as a *mariage de raison*. It neither supplanted nor modified the Austro-German Treaty of 1879, of which Italy had no knowledge. In the following year Mancini revealed the existence, though not the terms, of the alliance, and all the party leaders, including Cairoli himself, expressed approval. The Ministry received a vote of confidence in a general election, and the sharp repression of Irredentist riots which followed the execution of Oberdank, the would-be assassin of Francis Joseph, was a further indication that official Italy had resolved to pursue a new course. The alliance was

Italy's Advantages

naturally disapproved in Vatican circles, where it had been an article of faith that Francis Joseph would never combine with the House of Savoy. How fragile were the links that bound Italy to her new allies was only to be discovered in after years by the statesmen, and in still later times by the peoples, of the Central Empires.

The Bismarckian system of insurance against a disturbance of the *status quo* by France or Russia was completed by secret treaties with Serbia and Roumania. At the Congress of Berlin **Austro-Serb Treaty, 1881** Russia's whole-hearted support of Bulgaria prevented her doing justice to the claims of Serbia; and Andrassy's services in securing for the latter Nish and Pirot, then occupied by the Bulgarians, turned her eyes towards Vienna, despite her dislike of the occupation of Bosnia. The Serbs were naturally Russophil; but the creation of a Big Bulgaria by the Treaty of San Stefano had been a rude shock to a country which expected a reward for its help in the common struggle against the Turk. In 1880 Mijatovich, the new Foreign Minister, went to Vienna to negotiate with Haymerle,¹ who declared that there was no objection to Serbia's expansion to the south if she was not a Russian satrapy; and on June 28, 1881, the Austrian Minister at Belgrad and the Serbian Foreign Minister signed a secret treaty for ten years.

I. Both Powers engage to pursue a friendly policy.

II. Serbia will not tolerate political, religious or other intrigues which, taking her territory as a point of departure, might be directed against the Monarchy, including Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novibazar. Austria assumes the same obligation with regard to Serbia and her dynasty.

III. If the Prince of Serbia wishes to assume the title of king, Austria will recognize it and will use her influence to secure recognition by the other Powers.

¹ Mijatovich, "Memoirs of a Balkan Diplomatist," ch. 3; and Pribram. "Secret Treaties," I.

IV. Without a previous understanding with Austria, Serbia will not conclude any political treaty with another Government, and will not admit to her territory a foreign armed force, regular or irregular, even as volunteers.

V. If either be threatened with war or finds itself at war, the other will observe friendly neutrality.

VI. Where military co-operation is considered necessary, details will be regulated by a military convention.

VII. If, as a result of circumstances not at present foreseen, Serbia were in a position to make territorial acquisitions to the south (except the Sanjak) Austria will not oppose, and will use her influence with other Powers to favour Serbia.

A Personal Declaration by Prince Milan was annexed to the Treaty. "I hereby assume the formal engagement not to enter into any negotiation relative to Serbia a Kingdom, any kind of political treaty between Serbia and a third State without communication with and the previous consent of Austria." In the autumn the Serbian Premier, not quite satisfied with a particular clause, went to Vienna, and in a "Declaration of the two Governments" restated the meaning which Mijatovich thought was already clear. "Article iv cannot impair the right of Serbia to negotiate and to conclude treaties, even of a political nature, with another Power. It implies for Serbia no other engagement than that of not negotiating or concluding any political treaty which would be contrary to the spirit and the tenor of the treaty." Thus Serbia obtained Austria's leave to expand southwards and to become a kingdom, a privilege of which Prince Milan availed himself in the following year. In return Serbia placed her foreign policy under Austrian control, and transferred her capital account from the Russian to the Austro-German firm. In February, 1889, she was rewarded for her loyalty by the renewal of the alliance till 1895 and by additional guarantees and concessions. Austria undertook to prevent any hostile in-

cursion from Montenegro through territory under her administration, and to urge Turkey, in case of need, to take similar steps; and Serbia was authorized to extend her frontier in the direction of the Vardar valley "as far as circumstances permit."

Roumania, like Serbia, had fought on the side of Russia in the Turkish war; and, like Serbia, she was deeply angered at her lack of reward. The forced cession of Bessarabia rankled in her memory, and when Russia began to threaten the Central Powers in 1879 the sympathies of her Hohenzollern ruler pointed to an association with Vienna and Berlin. In 1880 Carol's diary records the first attempts from Vienna towards a *rapprochement*, which failed owing to Roumania's demand for Transylvania and Bukovina.¹ In 1883, after long conversations of Bratiano with Bismarck and Kalnoky,² the Austrian Foreign Minister and the Roumanian Minister in Vienna signed a secret alliance for five years on October 30. If Roumania were attacked without provocation, Austria was to help. If Austria were attacked in a portion of her states bordering on Russia, Roumania would help. If either were threatened by aggression, military questions were to be determined by a convention. A treaty providing for the accession of Germany was signed on the same day, and both parties forthwith invited the Emperor William to adhere to the pact. Germany accepted the invitation, and five years later Italy was asked and consented to accede to the Treaty. The Treaty was renewed at intervals, and was still in force in 1914.

In 1883 Bismarck could more than ever congratulate himself on the success of his labours. Austria and Italy were his allies. Great Britain was friendly, and the Courts were connected by marriage. Russia was a member of a revived Dreikaiserbund. Serbian policy revolved in the orbit of Vienna, and an allied Hohenzollern king ruled at

¹ "Aus dem Leben König Karls," IV.

² "Die Grosse Politik," III, 263-82, and Pribram, I.

Bucharest. In the same year General von der Goltz began to reorganize the Turkish army, and laid the foundations of German influence on the Bosphorus. France stood alone, estranged from Great Britain over Egypt and from Italy over Tunis; and under the virile guidance of Jules Ferry she seemed to have turned her thoughts from the Rhine provinces to the alluring task of rebuilding her colonial empire, in which she received and appreciated the diplomatic support of Berlin. The mighty Chancellor bestrode Europe like a Colossus, and lesser men watched anxiously for his smiles and frowns.

CHAPTER III

THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA

FROM the Congress of Berlin onwards the relations of the European Powers were complicated in an increasing degree by territorial and commercial rivalry outside Europe; and the Dark Continent offered a tempting field for expansion, ambition and intrigue. At the opening of the present narrative the possessions of the Powers were mere patches on the map—Algeria in the north, two British colonies thousands of miles to the south, with a few British, Spanish and Portuguese settlements dotted along the west and east coasts. Forty years later Abyssinia and Liberia were the only portions of Africa not subject to European rule. The headlong rapidity of the process of partition naturally generated friction; and in particular the conflicting ambitions of Great Britain and France more than once led the two peoples to the verge of war.

I

The accession of Ismail to the Khedivial throne of Egypt in 1863 was followed by the construction of railways, telegraphs, lighthouses, harbours, and, above all, the Suez Canal, which was opened to traffic in 1869; and large sums were at the same time squandered on war in the Sudan and on costly palaces for the ruler.¹ When the slender resources of the country were exhausted, the spendthrift began to seek accommodation abroad. The sale of

¹ In addition to the official publications see, above all, Lord Cromer, "Modern Egypt"; Freycinet, "La Question d'Egypte." Sir Auckland Colvin, "The Making of Modern Egypt," is a useful summary.

his Suez Canal shares to the British Government in 1875 led to the dispatch of the Cave commission of inquiry, which reported that national bankruptcy was inevitable. The Caisse de la Dette was accordingly instituted in May, 1876, with control by Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria and Italy over a large part of the revenue. In the autumn of the same year Goschen and Joubert visited Egypt in the interests of the British and French bondholders, and a Dual Control was established—a British official to supervise the revenue and a French official to watch expenditure. Salisbury would have preferred British predominance, but accepted "parity of influence." "When you have got a neighbour bent on meddling in a country in which you are deeply interested, you may renounce or monopolize or share. Renouncing would have been to place the French across our road to India. Monopolizing would have been very near the risk of war. So we resolved to share."¹

In 1878, after further inquiry by an Anglo-French Commission, the vast property of the Khedive was brought under supervision, and Ismail accepted, in substitution for the Dual Control, the position of constitutional ruler with the Armenian Nubar Pasha as Premier, Rivers Wilson as Minister of Finance, and a Frenchman as Minister of Public Works.² Seven months later, however, in February, 1879, he engineered a military riot, forced Nubar to resign, and attempted to return to the delights of personal rule. A momentary compromise was found in a new ministry, retaining the British and French Ministers, with Tewfik, the Khedive's son, as its nominal head. But in April Ismail dismissed his Ministers—European as well as native—and appointed Cherif as Premier. The French financial houses pressed for immediate intervention, and Waddington, the French Premier, suggested the deposition of the Khedive; but the British Government had no wish to be

¹ "Life of Salisbury," II, 331-2.

² See Sir C. Rivers Wilson, "Chapters from My Official Life."

a mere dividend collector for the bondholders. The Khedive, however, was warned—and warned in vain—to behave himself; and in June the British and French agents in Cairo urged him to abdicate. He refused; but the Sultan deposed him by telegraph, and appointed Tewfik his successor. The blow fell so suddenly that Ismail made no resistance, and quietly withdrew to Italy, leaving no regrets behind him.

Though Salisbury had not instigated the Sultan's action, it was none the less a salutary decision. The task was now to revive the Dual Control.

"We want to have some control over the ^{Law of} Liquidation government of Egypt," he wrote to Lord Lyons on July 7, "though we do not want to assume any overt responsibility. We shall be safer and more powerful as wire-pullers than as ostensible rulers. The control should take the form of inspection. Actual authority we cannot exercise."¹ Major Baring and De Blignières were appointed controllers, without executive power but with rights of inquiry into all branches of the Administration and with power to make suggestions. As the controllers were irremovable, Egypt was now virtually governed by the two Powers. "There is a very decided improvement," wrote Major Baring to Lord Lyons on December 29, 1879. "Since I have been connected with Egyptian affairs I never remember things going so smoothly. I like what I see of the Khedive. What we want is time." An international Commission of Liquidation was appointed to arrange a composition with Egypt's creditors, and Salisbury insisted that it should deal not only with the debt but with the needs of the country. Difficulties with France and other Powers postponed the appointment of the Commission with full powers till the spring of 1880; but its work was rapid and effective, and the Law of Liquidation was passed in July. The creditors were divided into three classes, two-thirds of the revenue were mortgaged for their claims, interest was reduced to

¹ Lord Newton, "Life of Lord Lyons," ch. 13.

four per cent., and a limit was placed on national expenditure. The establishment of the Caisse de la Dette and the limitation of expenditure saved Egypt from the abyss of bankruptcy, to the edge of which a fertile land and an industrious people had been brought by an improvident ruler.

Two years of quiet progress followed the deposition of Ismail, and the Gladstone Ministry, formed in 1880, had at first more urgent problems to face else-

**Rise of
Arabi**

where;¹ but the Cairo Government lacked moral authority. Resentment of alien rule and of the ever-increasing number of foreign residents grew into a threatening demand of "Egypt for the Egyptians." The storm broke on September 9, 1881, when Arabi, an Egyptian officer, accompanied by 5,000 soldiers, surrounded the palace, demanding an increase of the army, a change of Ministry, and a National Assembly.² The revolt was directed not only against the Europeans but against the ruling class, of Turkish or Circassian descent, which monopolized the highest posts in the army and the administration. The Government was too weak to resist, Arabi was promoted, and a period of veiled military dictatorship combined with foreign supervision set in. Arabi became a national hero, and a collision between the two authorities was inevitable. The situation was complicated by the arrival of a Turkish mission; and the French and British Governments, though desirous of co-operation, found it difficult to agree on the measures to take in the event of the expected conspiracy to overthrow the Khedive.

On the formation of Le Grand Ministère in November, 1881, Gambetta, a convinced supporter of the Condominium and mindful of Thiers' advice, "Surtout n'aban-

¹ For the policy of the Gladstone Government in Egypt (1880-5) see the official biographies of Gladstone, Granville, Dilke, the Duke of Devonshire, Northbrook, and Lord Lyons.

² Much information on Arabi and the Nationalists is to be found in Wilfrid Blunt, "Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt," and "My Diaries"; and in Broadley, "How We Defended Arabi."

donnez jamais l'Egypte," at once invited Great Britain to discuss measures for the security of the Khedive, and proposed a joint assurance of sympathy and support.¹ Gambetta's Note, accepted by the British Government on January 6, 1882, informed the Khedive that the two Governments considered his maintenance on the throne "as alone able to guarantee good order and prosperity," and expressed their resolve to guard by their united efforts against "all cause of complication, external or internal, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt." Granville explained to the French Ambassador that acceptance of the Note did not commit the British Government to any particular mode of action. Indeed, he remarked confidentially that he did not think it would prove of any practical use, and described it to the French Ambassador as purely platonic. "The *mauvais quart d'heure* may arrive at any moment," he wrote to Lord Lyons. "Gambetta would probably desire joint intervention, to which the objections are immense. The best plan would be for the Powers to make Great Britain and France their mandatories."

The joint Note presented on January 8 was received without gratitude by the Khedive and with angry surprise by everyone else. The Sultan read it as an usurpation of his supreme authority, and as a sign that Egypt would share the fate of Tunis; the Chamber of Notables, which had just met, regarded it as an encouragement to the Khedive to resist its advice; the Nationalist party resented it as a threat of intervention; and the Powers began to murmur. "It has at all events temporarily alienated from us all confidence," telegraphed Sir Edward Malet from Cairo. "Everything was progressing capitally, and England was looked on as the sincere well-wisher and protector of the country. Now it is considered that she has definitely thrown in her lot with France, and that France, from motives in connexion with her Tunisian campaign, is

Anglo-
French
Note

¹ See Reinach, "Le Grand Ministère"; and Deschanel, "Gambetta."

116
73
2

determined ultimately to intervene here. For the moment it has caused the national party, the military and the Chamber to unite in a common bond of opposition to England and France, and to make them feel more forcibly that the tie which unites Egypt to the Ottoman Empire is a guarantee to which they must strongly adhere to save themselves from aggression. The military, who had fallen into the background on the convocation of the Chamber, are again in everybody's mouth, and Arabi is foremost in protesting against what he considers an unjust interference." The Note was, in fact, a blunder of the first magnitude, and brought strength not to the Khedive but to Arabi, who henceforth represented not only the army but the nation. Moreover, the British and French Governments were not in real agreement, for while Gambetta looked forward with impatience to an Anglo-French occupation, Granville was anxious to avoid action, and would have preferred Turkish intervention if force were required. "From the moment the joint Note was issued," declares Lord Cromer, "foreign intervention became an unavoidable necessity." The pacific Granville was alarmed, and proposed a joint telegram that the Note had been misunderstood; but Gambetta naturally refused to draw back. The Notables, strong in the support of public opinion, now compelled the Khedive to change his Ministers, Arabi became Minister of War, and the power of the Controllers diminished.

The situation was eased by the fall of Gambetta on February 1, after two months of power, and the accession to office of Freycinet, who did not share his friend's desire for adventure in Egypt, or his indifference to the frowns of Europe. The new Premier was informed that the British Government, in signing the Note of January 8, intended to reserve not only the method but also the principle of action, and that they were opposed to military intervention. The warning to France that she might find herself alone was needless, for Freycinet was as anxious

**Fall of
Gambetta**

as Granville to avoid risks. Turkey had already protested against the joint Note, and the four Powers made an identical verbal communication to the Porte that "the *status quo* should be maintained, and could not be changed without agreement between the Powers and the Suzerain." Gambetta stood alone among French statesmen of the first rank in his forward policy. "In finance Egypt is an Anglo-French question," declared Jules Ferry; "in politics it is a question for the Concert." And such was the view held by Freycinet and his valued counsellor President Grévy.

Now that the towering figure of Gambetta no longer blocked the way, Granville was free to express his preference for the Concert over Anglo-French partnership. On February 6 he proposed a fresh exchange of views, suggesting that any intervention should be in the name of Europe and that the Sultan should be consulted. Freycinet accepted the suggestion, and on February 11 the two Governments issued to the four Powers a circular inviting discussion. Any intervention should represent the united action and authority of Europe, and the Sultan should be a party to any proceedings or discussion. Bismarck, who had expressed a hope that Freycinet would be "more European" than Gambetta, was pleased at the invitation to internationalize the problem, but he had no desire to land German troops in Africa. Indeed, he told the French Ambassador that if France and Great Britain, who possessed special interests, desired to act and the other Powers gave them a mandate, he would agree. To the mighty Chancellor such questions were pawns in his game of chess against France. Egypt, he declared, was the Schleswig-Holstein of the two Western Powers; they would intervene together and quarrel over the spoils.

Freycinet
and
Granville

The situation was desperately tangled. The Gladstone Cabinet objected to intervention from any quarter, while French policy varied from month to month. A proposal of Freycinet to depose Tewfik was rejected in London

as unnecessary and indeed, after the joint Note promising him support, impossible. Freycinet's next plan was to send an Anglo-French squadron to Alexandria to protect the foreign population, the other four Powers being asked to co-operate in inviting Turkey to abstain for the present from all interference. On the other hand, Turkish troops might be summoned by France and Great Britain and operate under their control, if their landing should be considered advisable after the arrival of the fleets. Granville approved the programme, while suggesting that the Sultan should be told that his help might be invoked later and that the other Powers, including Turkey, should be represented in the naval demonstration. But the latter proposal was declined by Freycinet.

Sir Edward Malet pointed out that unless the Sultan's approval of the action of the Powers was secured and proclaimed in advance, the Chamber and the army might combine to resist. The Sultan, however, annoyed by the dispatch of an Anglo-French squadron to Alexandria, was in no mood to oblige, and his ambassadors in Paris and London were instructed to protest. The other Powers were also offended at not being consulted, and declined to join in the Anglo-French recommendation to the Sultan to abstain from interference. Granville accordingly endeavoured to pacify the Powers and the Porte by a reassuring telegram. "It was never proposed to land troops. The Government intend, when calm is restored and the future secured, to leave Egypt to herself and to recall their squadron. If a pacific solution cannot be obtained, they will concert with the Powers and with Turkey on the measures which appear to them and the French Government the best." Smooth words failed to allay the smart, and the Sultan secretly encouraged Arabi to resist Anglo-French pressure. When the Khedive accepted an Anglo-French demand for the dismissal of his Ministry and the temporary withdrawal of Arabi from the country, the Ministry resigned; but public opinion

demanded the reinstatement of Arabi, and the spiritless Khedive capitulated. The attempt to liberate him from the military dictatorship had merely riveted its yoke. The Nationalists were intoxicated by their triumph, and attacks upon Europeans were expected from hour to hour.

The naval demonstration having failed, Freycinet proposed a conference, and Granville approved. Bismarck applauded the suggestion, but the Sultan refused, preferring to dispatch a commission to Egypt. The mission, however, was doomed to failure, for while its leader, Dervish Pasha, was instructed to support the Khedive, his colleague was secretly ordered to co-operate with Arabi. The object of the mission was not to assist the Khedive, but to restore the authority of the Sultan, whose desire was to pose as a bulwark against European aggression.

Before the Conference started work the long-expected explosion took place at Alexandria on June 11, when fifty Europeans were killed and a larger number wounded. Arabi was now in the saddle, and requested Dervish Pasha to leave the country. Not only Christian but Turkish families hurried away in fear of their lives. On hearing the news Freycinet urged the immediate meeting of a conference, with or without Turkey, and the Conference met at Constantinople on June 23 without its host.¹ On the opening day the Sultan informed Lord Dufferin that he was ready to exclude France, whom he hated, and to hand over to Great Britain the control and administration of Egypt, reserving only the modified rights of sovereignty which he possessed. The Ambassador replied that if he were to transfer Egypt in fee simple Great Britain would scarcely accept the burden, and his refusal was approved by his Government. After a fortnight's discussion the Sultan was invited to send troops to restore order, subject to making no change in the

Alexandria
Riots,
June 11

¹ See Lyall, "Life of Lord Dufferin," II, ch. 1.

privileges and international obligations of Egypt; but before Turkey accepted the limiting conditions a step had been taken which changed the whole situation.

Since the massacre at Alexandria Arabi had ruled Egypt, and Freycinet began to talk of making terms with him; but the British Government sturdily replied that the military party must be overthrown. The opportunity arrived when the strengthening of the fortifications at Alexandria appeared to threaten the safety of the ships in the harbour. On July 3 the British squadron was instructed to destroy the earthworks if the erection of batteries were continued. The Powers were informed of the order, and France was invited to co-operate. Freycinet declined on the ground that isolated action, except to defend the safety of nationals, would be disloyal to the Conference, and that no troops were at hand to repress the disturbances which an attack would provoke. A demand for cessation of work on the fortifications produced no result, and on July 11 the forts were destroyed. The disorders foretold by Freycinet at once broke out. Several Europeans were murdered, the European quarter was set on fire, and the town was pillaged for three days, after which some British troops which had just arrived were landed. Arabi proclaimed "irreconcilable war" against the British, and was dismissed from his post as Minister of War.

The news was received with varying emotions. The Sultan denounced the act as contrary to International Law, and the Tsar openly expressed his indignation. France, having advertised her disapproval by removing her ships, abstained from further comment. For a moment it appeared that the Conference, which was engaged in discussing the conditions of Turkish intervention, had lost its purpose; but Great Britain displayed no desire to separate herself further from the Concert, and on July 15 she invited the Powers to co-operate in securing the safety of the Canal. Of this limited duty Freycinet was not

afraid, and the British and French squadrons were ordered to patrol the Canal; but troops were also needed, and an Anglo-French telegram invited the Conference to select the Powers for defending the Canal in case of need, the Ambassadors being instructed to add that their Governments were ready to undertake the task. Freycinet had already secured preliminary credits, promising to take no action without further authorization by the Chamber. Germany, Austria and Russia, however, declined to confer a mandate, though they had no objection to the two Powers defending their own interests. The refusal of a mandate alarmed the French, and when on July 29 Freycinet asked for a further credit, pointing out that the defence of the Canal did not constitute intervention in Egypt, he was **Fall of Freycinet** defeated by an overwhelming majority.

The vote of the Chamber gave Egypt to Great Britain. The abdication of France which began when the fleet sailed away from Alexandria was confirmed. Tunis had proved more troublesome than had been expected; a campaign in Egypt suggested difficulties and hardships, and it was feared that Bismarck might be setting a trap. On the following day, July 30, Prince Hohenlohe informed Freycinet that Berlin was ready to propose the collective protection of the Canal in the form which he would prefer, and on July 31 and August 1 similar communications arrived from Italy, Russia and Turkey. If these assurances had come a day or two earlier, lamented the Minister in writing his memoirs, he would not have fallen. Be that as it may, Clemenceau spoke for the majority of his countrymen when he persuaded the nervous Chamber to limit its responsibilities.

On the day before the overthrow of Freycinet the British Ambassador in Rome had invited Italy to join Great Britain and France in securing the safety of the Canal, and to co-operate with Great Britain in a movement in the interior, which France declined to join.¹

¹ Crispi, "Memoirs," II, ch. 3.

Mancini replied that, as the question had been submitted to the Conference at Constantinople and Turkey had undertaken to dispatch troops, he could not support another mode of intervention.

Italy declines Granville politely replied that he had been glad of an opportunity of giving a proof of British friendship for Italy. The decision was bitterly regretted by Crispi, who reminded Mancini of Cavour's participation in the Crimean war. "The Government of tiny Piedmont had the courage that the Government of Italy lacks to-day." Granville, on the contrary, was delighted at Italy's refusal. "We have done the right thing. We have shown our readiness to admit others, and we have not the inconvenience of a partner." He feared that co-operation with any Power would inevitably lead to friction, and the path was now clear for suppressing Arabi. Though the Sultan had agreed to send troops, the conditions of their employment were not accepted, and he had no mind to act as the mandatory of the Powers. Thus Great Britain, who at first resolved to avoid even joint military intervention, was now committed to isolated action, while France had by her own timidity since the fall of Gambetta handed over Egypt to her rival without a struggle.

The British Government now displayed a decision and energy that had hitherto been lacking. The Sultan was informed that, in view of the growing seriousness of the situation, Great Britain considered herself invested with the duty of restoring order in Egypt and maintaining the safety of the Canal, and a circular dispatch informed the Powers that Great Britain, with the approbation of the Khedive, would safeguard the Canal. General Wolseley sailed for Port Said, and on September 13 Arabi was crushed at Tel-el-Kebir. A few days later Wolseley entered Cairo, and the Khedive returned from Alexandria, where he had taken refuge. Assuming that foreign intervention was necessary, Great Britain was better fitted for the task than Turkey; but, in the words

of Granville, the isolated action which had been forced upon us was not of our seeking.

Bismarck was delighted with the news of Tel-el-Kebir. "You have his full sympathy for the vigorous policy you have adopted," reported Lord Ampthill from Berlin. "He has never concealed his anxious desire to see Austria occupy Bosnia, France Tunis, and England Egypt; and now that these wishes have been realized his next wish is that the occupation may last, and thereby minimize the ever-recurring danger of another Oriental crisis. In his opinion a gradual dismemberment of the Turkish Empire is the only pacific solution of the Oriental question." The Chancellor's good will was cemented by the kindness shown by official and unofficial society to his son Herbert, at this time a member of the staff of the German Embassy. "The friendship of the British Empire," declared Bismarck, "is much more important for us than the fate of Egypt." He added that he would not oppose annexation, though he did not advise it.¹ France, on the other hand, pretended that the situation as between the two Western Powers had not been radically changed by the campaign. A few days after Tel-el-Kebir the British Chargé at Paris was told that "it would be in the interest of England to give at an early date some notion of her future intentions." It was impossible to give a precise reply; but the Egyptian Government, like the British, desired the abolition of the Dual Control. The country which had refused every invitation to co-operate now fought against the inevitable results of unilateral intervention. When, in November, the Presidency of the Commission of the Debt was offered to France, it was declined on the ground that it was inconsistent with the dignity of France to accept as an equivalent for the abolition of the Dual Control a position which was simply that of cashier. After some sharp diplomatic exchanges France "resumed her liberty of action in Egypt"—a

Bismarck's
steady
Support

¹ "Die Grosse Politik," IV, 36-8.

euphemism for hostility which lasted till 1904. Scarcely less hot was the anger of the Sultan at the spectacle of a British garrison securely entrenched in a Turkish province without asking or receiving his permission.

Though at that time no British statesman, Liberal or Conservative, dreamed of a permanent occupation,

**The
Dufferin
Mission**

some organization was required; and Lord Dufferin, who as Ambassador at Constantinople had taken the leading part in the Conference, arrived on November 7 as High Commissioner, and remained in Egypt till May, 1883.¹ "H.M. Government," ran his instructions, "while desirous that the British occupation should last as short a time as possible, feel bound not to withdraw from the task thus imposed upon them until the administration of affairs has been reconstructed on a basis which will afford satisfactory guarantees for the maintenance of peace, order and prosperity in Egypt, the stability of the Khedive's authority, the judicious development of self-government, and the fulfilment of obligations towards foreign Powers." Dufferin fulfilled his difficult task with his usual discretion and skill. The Sultan issued an Iradé prohibiting the Khedive from adopting measures without submitting them for his approval; but Tewfik, while profuse in acknowledgment of the Sultan's rights, explained that he was no longer a free agent. "Le véritable Khédive, c'est Lord Dufferin." To resist would lead to abdication.

The Dufferin Report combined literary distinction with political wisdom and insight. Egypt, he declared, had never known good government; but the spirit of the age had reached the valley of the Nile, and the fellah, like his own Memnon, had not remained irresponsive to the beams of the new dawn. His capacities must be developed. Egypt should be governed neither from London nor by an irresponsible centralized bureaucracy, but by the creation, within prudent limits, of representative institutions, municipal and communal self-government. The

¹ Lyall, "Life of Dufferin," II, ch. 2.

rudimentary communal electorate supplied a starting point for political growth. The fellahin would vote for members of Provincial Councils, which would in turn elect a majority of the Legislative Council, while more than half of the General Assembly would be delegated by the spokesmen of the villages. The Legislative Council and the Assembly, however, were merely consultative bodies except in the case of new taxes, to which the assent of the Assembly was required. The scheme for administrative reorganization embraced the army, justice, police, taxation and other urgent problems; but the assistance of Europeans for some time was indispensable. "It is absolutely necessary to prevent the fabric we have raised from tumbling to the ground the moment our sustaining hand is withdrawn. The administrative system must have time to consolidate." Dufferin's recommendations were approved by the Cabinet, embodied in an Organic Decree, and worked out during three decades of benevolent despotism.

Great Britain had not conquered Egypt; for it belonged to Turkey, with whom we had not been at war. The anomalous position was authoritatively defined in a circular dispatch to the Powers dated January 3, 1883. Events, declared Lord Granville, had thrown upon Great Britain the duty of suppressing Arabi. "Though for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquility, H.M. Government are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it. Meanwhile the position in which H.M.'s Government is placed towards His Highness imposes on them the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress." The Canal must be neutral in time of war and open equally to the commerce of all nations in time of

**British
Policy
Defined**

peace. Among desirable reforms were the equal taxation of foreigners and natives, the creation of a small but efficient army under foreign officers, the substitution of an efficient *gendarmerie* for the native police. A British adviser was to supersede the Dual Control, and a representative assembly was foreshadowed. It was the imprimatur of the Cabinet on the Dufferin programme. A few days later the Dual Control was abolished by

Khedivial decree. In September Sir Evelyn
 Sir Evelyn Baring arrived in Cairo with the modest
 Evelyn Baring title of Consul-General and Diplomatic
 Agent, little thinking that he was to rule the country for twenty-three years. The Treasury was empty and the State owed 100 millions; but the situation was not hopeless. A British garrison was now at his back, and though the Caisse de la Dette remained, the Dual Control had vanished. The Khedive was of a gentle and yielding nature, and power immediately passed into the hands of the British Agent, who was loyally supported from home. "It should be made clear," wrote Granville when he entered on his duties, "that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges H.M. Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices." In other words, Egypt was to be a British Protectorate without the name. "We are uncommonly grateful to the Prince," observed Harcourt to Herbert Bismarck. "He could have upset the cart if he had wished. That we were left alone is due to Germany's good will."¹

Though early evacuation was impossible, the reduction of the garrison was urged by Dufferin, and Baring was prepared to content himself with 3,000 troops at Alexandria. The reduction, however, and the removal of troops from Cairo were postponed when an ill-disciplined Egyptian army, commanded by Hicks, a British soldier

¹ "Die Grosse Politik," IV, 48.

of fortune, was annihilated at the end of the year in Darfur by the Mahdi, a sheikh of Dongola, who had raised the flag of revolt in 1881. Though the British Government had unwisely refrained from vetoing the expedition on the ground that it had no concern with the Sudan, it now forbade the Khedive to attempt the reconquest of the province, for which he possessed neither the troops nor the money. Khartum and other fortified posts in the Sudan held out, but were likely to be surrounded by the flowing Mahdist tide. The British Government accordingly ordered the evacuation of the country south of Wady Halfa; but the sea coast from Suakin to Massowah and the country up to the White Nile was to be held, in order to check the slave trade between Africa and Asia. When the decision to evacuate the Sudan was censured by the Opposition as an act of cowardice, Granville replied that the Government had never assumed responsibility for that distant province. War in its trackless deserts would throw Egypt back into the financial chaos from which she was beginning to be extricated by British hands.

**The Mahdi
Revolts,
1881**

A loan was needed by the Egyptian Government to meet the expenses of the rebellion and the Hicks expedition, and it was also desirable to modify the Law of Liquidation, which made it impossible for the Government to pay its way. Granville therefore proposed a conference to enable the Government to fulfil its obligations and to restore equilibrium. The Egyptian Question had not been the subject of international discussion since 1882, and Ferry accepted on condition that related questions should be canvassed in preliminary conversations between Granville and Waddington, the French Ambassador. France obligingly disclaimed a desire to restore the Dual Control or to substitute a French for a British occupation if Great Britain withdrew, and accepted the undertaking of Great Britain not to alter the international situation of Egypt. Granville regarded this statement as an approval of the policy of the dispatch of January 3, 1883, and proposed in

return evacuation in January, 1888, if the Powers were then of opinion that such withdrawal could take place "without risk to peace or order." He also proposed to work out plans for the free use of the Suez Canal and the neutralization of Egypt on the Belgian model after evacuation. Both parties were pleased with the *pourparlers*. "Egypt is neither French nor English," declared Ferry in presenting the papers; "it has never ceased and never will cease to be a European question."

The Conference itself, which opened on June 28, 1884, belied the hopes that were raised by these amicable preliminaries. Though its programme was

**The London
Conference,
1884**

confined to the financial situation, differences at once showed themselves. France desired to increase the power of the Caisse and thus in some measure to restore the Condominium. She opposed the reduction of the interest on loans by one-half per cent., which the British recommended on the ground that the security had improved, and equally objected to the idea of a British guarantee of the debt as a means of reducing the rate. The two parties indeed approached the Conference at cross-purposes, the one merely desiring to ease the financial situation, the other to emphasize the European character of the Egyptian problem. "Jules Ferry," wrote Lord Lyons on June 3, "thinks little of any consideration in comparison with the political success which it would be to him to give France again a political footing in Egypt, and, as a means to this, to get a time fixed for the departure of our troops. I am very unhappy about the growing ill-will on both sides of the Channel. It is not that I suppose France has any deliberate intention of going to war with us. But the two nations come into contact in every part of the globe, and questions arise which, in the present state of feeling, excite mutual suspicion and irritation. Who can say when and where some local events may not produce a serious quarrel, or some high-handed proceedings of hot-headed officials occasion an actual collision?" Thus, after seven sittings in the

course of a month, the Conference broke up without reaching any decisions.

After the failure of the London Conference and in view of the imminent bankruptcy of Egypt, Lord Northbrook, an ex-Viceroy of India and at that moment First Lord of the Admiralty, was sent to Egypt to report and advise.¹ He Northbrook
visits
Egypt spent six weeks in the country and drew up two reports. The first, devoted to finance, recommended the extension of irrigation, the abolition of the *corvée*, greater freedom in the taxation of foreigners, a reduction of the land tax, and the issue of a loan of nine millions, the interest of which was to be guaranteed by the British Government. "The effect of the proposals," he concluded, "will undoubtedly be to substitute the financial control of England for the international control proposed by the Conference; but the alteration seems to me an advantage both to the Egyptian and the English Governments. Nor do I see what objections the other Powers can entertain to this control by Great Britain after her sacrifices in maintaining the peace and safety of Egypt and the financial liability now to be undertaken." A second report, dealing with the Egyptian problem as a whole, argued that progress to be solid must be gradual. "I cannot recommend the Government to fix any date at which the British troops shall be withdrawn. Their strength may be reduced before long to about 4,000 men; but it would not be safe or wise to fix any definite time for their entire withdrawal, because the safety of such a step must depend on the internal state of the country, and upon the political position of Egypt."

Northbrook was too sanguine in his belief that "no Power could object" to financial control by Great Britain. When the Egyptian Government took his advice to burst its fetters by employing part of the surplus ear-marked for the debt to meet the deficit on the administration, the Caisse secured a judgment from the Courts restoring the

¹ See Sir B. Mallet, "Lord Northbrook."

money. The proposal of a British guarantee of a loan was rejected not only by France but by Gladstone, Childers, and all the Commoners in the Cabinet, though approved by Granville and the Peers. "Had his proposals been accepted by the Cabinet and carried into execution," writes Lord Cromer, "internationalism, which has been the bane of Egypt, would have received a heavy blow, and the paramount power of Great Britain, as the guide and protector of Egypt, would have been asserted. Nothing was done to carry his policy into execution. His mission was a failure." This verdict is scarcely fair to the Cabinet, which would have found it difficult if not impossible to secure the assent of the Powers; for Turkey was by no means inclined to facilitate our task, and France remained actively hostile. Italy, alone of the Powers, was friendly, for it had been arranged that she should take possession of Massowah and the adjacent coast in the Red Sea.

At length in March, 1885, the London Convention relaxed the stifling grip of the Law of Liquidation, and enabled a loan of nine millions to be raised at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., guaranteed by the Powers, which paid the indemnities due for the damage to Alexandria in 1882 and the deficits of 1882 and 1883, and left a million over for improving irrigation. The Convention also arranged for an International Commission at the end of two years if Egypt could not pay her way; but the situation slowly improved, and the Commission was not required. Sir Edgar Vincent, the financial adviser, economized on everything except irrigation, which was developed by Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff. Sir Evelyn Wood trained a native army, and Sir John Scott reformed the administration of justice. The Khedive remained friendly and unambitious, and though the Armenian Nubar, the cleverest brain in Egypt, resented dictation and resigned in protest, Sir Evelyn Baring gradually won the confidence of his native colleagues.

A declaration added to the London Convention announced a conference in Paris on the status of the Suez

Canal. Ferry, who eagerly desired to revive French interests in Egypt and to reconquer lost ground, invited the Powers to establish a system for guaranteeing at all times and to all comers the free use of the Suez Canal. The object of France and the majority of the Powers was to internationalize rather than neutralize the Canal; and this policy was fought by the British delegates, Sir Julian Pauncefote and Sir Rivers Wilson, who were willing to neutralize the Canal but not the ports of access, and attempted to reserve for Egypt rights of police, which Great Britain would exercise in her name. After ten weeks of discussion a treaty was drafted representing the views of the majority; but Great Britain and Italy declined to accept it and the Conference broke up without result. The fall of Ferry shortly afterwards removed the champion of the forward policy; but on February 22, 1886, an amended text was submitted for British approval. Lord Rosebery postponed the discussion, and negotiations continued at intervals till an agreement was reached between France and Great Britain in October, 1887, and accepted by the Powers in October, 1888. The "Treaty for the establishment of a definite régime to guarantee free use of the Canal" was in itself satisfactory to France; but in a dispatch, dated October 21, 1887, Lord Salisbury repeated the fatal words used by Sir J. Pauncefote at the end of the sittings of 1885. "Great Britain formulates a general reservation in so far as the Treaty is incompatible with the transitional and exceptional situation and would impede the liberty of action of the British Government during the occupation." France accepted the reservation "on the understanding that all the Powers may take advantage of it." The Treaty was thus reduced to an academic declaration; for, if Great Britain were at war, she could control and block the Canal.

Suez
Canal
Treaty

The determination to surrender the Sudan to the Mahdi and to withdraw the European garrisons was wise and indeed inevitable; but the selection of Gordon for the task

was a tragic blunder. He had been Governor-General of the Sudan in the later years of Ismail, but he possessed no other qualification. "Gladstone's Government," writes Lord Cromer, "made two great mistakes in dealing with the Sudan.

**The
Gordon
Tragedy**

The sin of omission was that it did not stop the Hicks expedition. The sin of commission was the dispatch of Gordon to Khartum. No Englishman should have been sent to Khartum, and if anyone had to be sent, he was not the man. Had I known him better I should certainly never have agreed to his employment. On reaching Khartum his combative spirit completely got the better of him. He was above all a soldier and a very bellicose soldier, and he could not brook the idea of retiring before the Mahdi. As for his instructions he threw them to the winds." There is nothing to add to Lord Cromer's measured condemnation. But though Gordon was cut off owing to his own disobedience to orders, this was no excuse for the delay in sending an expedition for his relief. At no moment in recent years did British prestige stand lower in the world than when the news arrived in February, 1885, that Khartum had fallen and its romantic defender had perished. The British Government impulsively resolved to carry out the fallen hero's programme of smashing the Mahdi; but the Penjdeh crisis compelled them to hold their hand, and the reconquest of the Sudan was postponed for a decade.

Though the Conservatives had sharply attacked the Egyptian policy of the Gladstone Ministry, Salisbury had no more desire to remain permanently in Egypt than his rival, and on taking office in the summer of 1885 he at once dispatched Drummond Wolff as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Sultan,¹ whose co-operation he was to invite in the settlement of the Egyptian question. On October 24, two months after his arrival in the Turkish capital, he signed a convention providing that the British and Turkish Governments were

¹ See his "Rambling Recollections," II, 274-320.

each to send a special Commissioner to Egypt, who, in agreement with the Khedive, were to reorganize the army and reform the administration. "So soon as the two Commissioners," ran the sixth article, "shall have established that the security of the frontiers and the good working and stability of the Egyptian Government are assured, they shall present a report to their respective Governments, who will consult as to the conclusion of a convention regulating the withdrawal of the British troops in a convenient period." The Convention was approved by all four Powers, and the Sultan expressed his pleasure at its conclusion. Wolff reported that it had done much to allay Turkish irritation, adding that the Turkish Commissioner, if wisely chosen, would be useful in creating institutions combining eastern and western elements and in tranquillizing the Sudan. He at once left for Egypt, followed by the Turkish Commissioner, Mukhtar Pasha, at the close of the year. Discussions between Wolff, Mukhtar and the Khedive on the pacification of the Sudan, the finances and the army, continued throughout 1886, and at the close of the year Wolff returned to England to discuss the situation with Salisbury.

First Wolff
Convention,
1885

While the Commissioners were wasting their time in Cairo, the French Government, once again under the direction of Freycinet, continued its effort to shorten the occupation. In his first conversation with Herbert Bismarck, the Foreign Secretary, on October 18, 1886, Herbette, the newly appointed French Ambassador at Berlin, made a bold bid for German support in the Egyptian quarrel.¹ The idea of *revanche*, he declared, was out of date, and an immense *détente* would occur if the Chancellor would publicly declare that he intended to use his enormous authority to maintain the *status quo* in the Mediterranean. All suspicions and apprehensions would disappear; all eyes would turn away from the eastern frontier, and France could employ all her

¹ "Die Grosse Politik," VI, 144-52.

strength and resources where her vital interests were concerned. "For us it is really a question of our existence as a Great Power that England should evacuate Egypt. The Mediterranean is the pivot of our policy, and the English are abominated in France, much more than the Germans have ever been." In his interview with the Chancellor shortly afterwards the Ambassador renewed his appeal for German co-operation, but was informed that Germany could not press England to leave the country. The good will of France could never make up for the ill-will of England.

At the same moment Waddington was instructed to raise the question in Downing Street. "You are quite

France mistaken in thinking we want to stay in-
suggests definitely," replied Salisbury; "we only
Evacuation seek the means to withdraw honourably.

Our troops would be much more useful in India. We are resolved to evacuate, but, when we do so, we shall ask Europe to fix a period in which we shall have the right of re-entry if new disorders occur. Without this our work of reorganization would be imperilled. A period of surveillance is necessary. We intend to negotiate with the Sultan, but desire first an agreement with France." Freycinet replied by asking for an early declaration fixing the date of evacuation, and adding that the sooner it came the longer might be the period of surveillance. "Great Britain is forming cadres with British officers. This is natural, but does not tend to evacuation. The Sultan is now willing, owing to our representations, to form cadres with Turkish officers. We should not, however, oppose if England keeps some European officers for a time. Finally, any administrative or financial reforms tending to reduce the French *personnel* would be very unpopular, unless the date of evacuation is fixed. Egypt is the only question that divides us." The dispatch was conciliatory in tone; but on November 17 the Premier spoke gravely and almost threateningly in the Chamber. "If a Great Power installed itself definitely in Egypt,

it would be a very grave blow at the influence of France in the Mediterranean, and in my opinion France should never accustom herself to the idea that it could pass definitely into the hands of a Great European Power."

Early in 1887 Wolff returned to Constantinople to negotiate the second Convention contemplated in the pact of 1885, and sent a memorandum to the ^{Second Wolff} Grand Vizier proposing the neutralization ^{Convention,} of Egypt, the retention of a sufficient ¹⁸⁸⁷ number of British officers in the Egyptian army, and the right to re-enter in case of need. The latter claim, replied the Porte, was to usurp the Sultan's prerogative; but a right of joint intervention was accorded in the Convention signed at Constantinople on May 22. The British troops were to retire after three years. If dangers within or without necessitated postponement, they would retire immediately after the disappearance of the danger. After ratification of the Convention the Powers were to be invited to guarantee the inviolability of Egypt. Turkey, however, would use her right of military occupation if she had reason to fear invasion or internal disorder, or if the Khedive neglected his duties towards the suzerain Power or his international obligations. The British Government was likewise authorized in similar cases to send troops to remove the dangers. The British and Turkish commanders were to act with due regard to Turkish rights, and the Turkish and British troops would be withdrawn when the grounds of their intervention were removed. If the Sultan did not move, Great Britain might take military action alone. In a letter attached to the Convention, Wolff explained that, if at the end of the three years one of the Great Mediterranean Powers should not have accepted it, Great Britain would consider this refusal as the "appearance of danger from without" contemplated by the Convention.

The Sultan, Kiamil Pasha, the Grand Vizier, the Ministers, and the Sheikh-el-Islam were anxious to settle

the Egyptian question; but the Convention provoked an outburst of wrath in France and Russia. Nelidoff, the Russian Ambassador, reproached the Grand Vizier with sacrificing the rights of the Sultan, adding that Russia would prefer an undefined state of transition to a recognition of Great Britain's special rights, and Giers observed to the Turkish Minister at Petrograd that Russia would probably refuse her cohesion. France, who was even more hostile, vainly urged Germany to join in protest, and informed the Sultan that she could not accept the right of re-entry without limit of time. The Turks were alarmed, and pretended to believe that, if the Convention were ratified, France might occupy Syria and Russia Armenia. The Porte therefore asked for an extension of the month in which ratification was due; but it made no use of the time granted, and Wolff left Constantinople on July 16. Shortly afterwards the Turkish Ambassador in London tried to reopen negotiations, but Salisbury cogently replied that "as long as the Sultan was so much under the influence of other advisers as to repudiate an agreement which he had so recently sanctioned, any fresh agreement would obviously be liable to meet with the same fate."

Despite the repudiation of the Wolff Convention, the Turkish Commissioner remained in Cairo, without defined functions and as a centre of intrigue. On the other hand, the diplomatic position of Great Britain was improved; for the world now knew that she had reached an agreement for evacuation with the Sultan, who had withdrawn his assent under pressure from France and Russia. The conduct of France did not encourage Great Britain to further efforts to limit the duration of her stay in the valley of the Nile; and the cessation of the recurring deficits in 1888 encouraged Baring and his associates to persevere in their difficult task.

II

While France sought a *solatium* for Sedan in rebuilding her lost colonial empire, victorious Germany was for a decade content with the mastery of the Continent. Millions of Germans emigrated to America during the nineteenth century, but their loss was not greatly deplored. The traditions of the Hansa exerted no spell on Bismarck, who desired neither colonies nor a fleet, though he encouraged other Powers to direct their gaze beyond the seas. Indeed his refusal to thwart their ambitions was an essential element in the policy of safeguarding his own handiwork. "He will hear nothing of colonies," wrote Hohenlohe after a visit to the Chancellor in 1880. "He says we have not the fleet to defend them nor the bureaucracy to administer them. He spoke of my report on French plans in Morocco, and believed we could be glad if France took it; she would have plenty to do, and it would be a compensation for Alsace-Lorraine."¹ Bismarck's calculated *désintéressement* was gratefully recognized in Downing Street. "On the sound rule that you love those most whom you consort with least," wrote Salisbury to Lord Odo Russell on January 14, 1880, "Germany is clearly cut out to be our ally. Even our ancient friend Austria is not so completely free from any plans or interests which cross our own for the present."² The Foreign Secretary was wise to add the saving clause, for the spectacle of German enterprise enriching foreign lands and other Powers greedily carving up the African joint stimulated the German appetite, and eventually compelled the Chancellor to satisfy its hunger before it was too late.

The connexion of Germany with Africa dates from the second half of the seventeenth century, when Prussian ships took part in the slave trade. A foothold was estab-

¹ Hohenlohe, "Denkwürdigkeiten," II, 291. ² "Life of Salisbury," II, 373.

lished on the Gold Coast, and an island off Senegal was bought by the Great Elector, whose head was full of colonial schemes.¹ The Brandenburg African Company was founded in 1681; but the enterprise proved a commercial failure and was abandoned forty years later. Interest in the Dark Continent was revived by German explorers, traders and missionaries in the nineteenth century; and when the Empire was founded Hamburg merchants had already opened up a brisk trade both on the east and west coasts. In 1878 a German branch of King Leopold's International African Association was formed, and in 1882 the German Colonial Society was founded. It was to the west coast that German eyes were most frequently turned. In the middle of the century missions were established in Damaraland and Namaqualand; and in 1864 some missionaries hoisted the German flag to the north of Walfisch Bay, the only harbour on the long unoccupied coast between the Orange River and Angola. The Bay was vaguely regarded as British; and in 1868, owing to friction between missionaries and natives, the British Government promised the same protection to German as to British subjects, thus implying that Damaraland and Namaqualand were within our sphere of influence. On the other hand, there was no effective British occupation except at Walfisch Bay; and, despite the appeal of the Governors of Cape Colony in 1867 and 1877 to annex the whole coast from Cape Colony to the Portuguese frontier, the Government refused to extend the area of territorial sovereignty beyond Walfisch Bay and fifteen miles of sea frontage when action was finally taken in 1878. In 1880, when German missionaries complained of the danger from native wars and of the lack of protection from the British authorities, Bismarck inquired whether the British Government was pre-

¹ The most useful surveys of the foundation of Germany's colonial empire are Zimmermann, "Geschichte der Deutschen Kolonialpolitik"; and Lewin, "The Germans in Africa." An excellent sketch is given by Dawson, "The German Empire," I, ch. 17.

pared to afford the same protection to German as to British subjects. The promise was given, but accompanied by a disclaimer of responsibility outside Walfisch Bay. The door thus stood open for Germany, official or unofficial, to enter on any other section of the desolate coast. For two years longer, however, neither Power showed any desire to add the uninviting No Man's Land to their empire.

In November, 1882, Luderitz, a Bremen merchant, acting on the suggestion of the Colonial Society, asked his Government to afford protection if he acquired territory in South-West Africa.¹

South-
west
Africa

Bismarck gave the required promise, subject to the condition that no other Power claimed the district. He proceeded to ask the British Government whether it claimed sovereignty or could afford protection in the Angra Pequena region. If not, the German Government would protect its own subjects, though without the least intention of establishing a footing in South-West Africa. Granville replied that before deciding he must know the position of the proposed factory, and must consult the Government of Cape Colony. Without waiting for the British response Luderitz signed a treaty with a Hottentot chief for a small area with a sea frontage of ten miles, and proceeded to hoist the German flag. Cape Colony, though it had never desired to occupy Angra Pequena, was annoyed; but it did not suggest the occupation of the rest of the coast. On August 18 the German Government informed its Consul at the Cape that, if the rights of other nations were not thereby infringed, it would give protection to the Luderitz settlement; and a gunboat was stationed in the Bay of Angra Pequena. The commander of a British gunboat sent some months later from the Cape was informed that he was in German territorial waters.

¹ Both the British and German Governments published numerous Blue Books on the colonial friction of 1883-5. Cf. "Lord Granville's Life," II, and "Die Grosse Politik," IV, 1-108.

The Chancellor, expecting Great Britain to further German colonial policy in return for his invaluable support in Egypt, declined to be hurried or to hurry the Government, though it was twice reminded that he was waiting for a reply. At last, after nine months, Granville replied in November, 1883, that, though sovereignty had only been proclaimed at Walfisch Bay and the islands off Angra Pequena, any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction by a foreign Power between Angola and Cape Colony would infringe our legitimate rights. It was a provoking communication, and Bismarck could hardly be blamed for inquiring on what these "legitimate rights" were based. Further delay ensued, for Bismarck's dispatch of December 31 was referred to the Colonial Office, and Lord Derby proceeded to consult Cape Colony; but owing to a change of Ministry, the answer, recommending the British Government to assume control of the whole coast up to Walfisch Bay, including Angra Pequena, did not reach London till May 29, 1884. It was

**The
Chancellor
Acts** too late; for, on April 24, the Chancellor, weary of the repeated delays and apprehensive of being confronted with a *fait accompli*, proclaimed a protectorate from the Orange River to Angra Pequena. In an outspoken dispatch of June 11 to the German Ambassador in London he sharply complained of "the game of hide and seek with the Colonial Office," and of the pretext that the Colonies were independent States. His question, he observed, could have been answered in a week without referring it to the Cape. It was only necessary to state the extent of the recognized possessions of England at that moment; whereas Lord Granville, and still more Lord Derby, had chosen to understand it as an inquiry whether it would suit England to annex fresh territory.¹ The feeling that Germany had not been treated fairly had been strengthened by the

¹ In his anger Bismarck proposed to the French Ambassador in May an *entente* in African questions to the exclusion of England, but did not follow it up. See Bourgeois et Pagès, "Origines et Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre," 208-10.

contention of British statesmen that England had a right to prevent settlements in the vicinity of her possessions, and that she asserted a sort of Monroe doctrine in Africa. Granville replied that the Government had no thought of obstructing German colonization, and that he had not gathered that Germany had colonial ambitions. He explained that the Cape Government had to be consulted on matters concerning them, and that Derby understood that Germany wished Great Britain to take the territory under her protection. At this moment Herbert Bismarck paid one of his flying visits to England and told Granville very plainly what his father thought of the action of the Government. The Foreign Minister apologized for misunderstandings, brought the matter before the Cabinet, and on June 21 informed the Ambassador that Great Britain recognized German sovereignty at Angra Pequena. On August 7 a German captain hoisted the German flag over Angra Pequena, and the whole coast between Cape Colony and the Portuguese frontier, except Walfisch Bay, was subsequently declared German territory. The clumsy handling of the situation was resented by several members of the Cabinet. Granville's errors were mainly due to his failure to realize that, despite the Chancellor's personal indifference to colonies, Germany was determined to have them; and for this ignorance Lord Amphill and Münster were in part responsible.

**Lord
Granville's
Errors**

"Bismarck is very grateful to you," reported Amphill. "The Press is all praise at the fairness, justice and friendliness of your decision, and I hear from all sides that it has done immense good to our international relations; for the Germans had set their hearts on the protection of Luderitz's enterprise. The Crown Prince, who shared the national craving but dreaded the anger and irritation it was producing against England, shares the national delight at your decision, which re-establishes the good feeling between England and Germany. The Crown Princess is also beyond measure happy at the general

contentment and altered tone of the Press. I am immensely relieved at your having dispelled the threatening incubus. It is a remarkable fact that Bismarck, contrary to his convictions and his will, has been driven by public opinion to the colonial policy he had hitherto denounced as detrimental to the concentration of German strength." At the same time a dragging dispute relating to the land claims of German settlers in Fiji was referred to a mixed Commission.

Just when the sun had begun to shine brightly, the news that the Cape Parliament had asked for the annexation of Angra Pequena revived Bismarck's anger and suspicion. If England ignored his protest, he declared on August 22, there would be a total breach. The matter was too small to fight about, but diplomatic difficulties could be raised in various quarters. He also renewed his complaints about the delay in answering his dispatch of December 31, 1883, and charged Derby with employing the interval to encourage the Cape Government to seize the coast and anticipate the action of Germany. Still more surprising was the complaint that he had received no reply to a dispatch which he read to the Reichstag, warning Great Britain that if she refused her aid in German colonial enterprise, he would seek assistance from France. The incident displayed Bismarck at his worst; for the dispatch in question, by his own instructions, had never been presented. The gentle and courteous Granville was alarmed by these unexpected outbursts. "I am afraid we shall find Bismarck a great difficulty in our path. He is making use of us for electioneering purposes. We have met all his open colonial grievances; but he has a secret one—Heligoland." The Ambassador had, in fact, informed the Foreign Secretary in May that Germany desired to construct a canal from the North Sea to the Baltic, and sounded him as to the surrender of the island, which was useless to England, and which would strengthen the good feeling of Germany in an extraordinary degree.

The Foreign Secretary urbanely replied that the cession of Gibraltar would doubtless strengthen our good relations with Spain; and a further reference to the subject in the following year met with a similar dilatory response. Granville believed that the cession would be unpopular, and that in any case Gladstone, Derby and himself were not the people to make it; but it might be worth considering as a factor in solving the financial difficulty in Egypt.

"We have to deal with two sovereignties," wrote Bismarck to Münster on December 5. "One is exercised by Lord Granville, who utilizes our friendship in Egypt and elsewhere, and believes that his assurances of friendship are sufficient payment for it. The second is that of Lord Derby, who opposes us at most points where we touch. We cannot keep two accounts with England." A new source of friction occurred in the publication in a Blue Book of a dispatch containing a protest and a claim arising out of the bombardment of a village in the Cameroons, in which British property had been damaged. Such documents are not, as a rule, published till they are in the hands of the party to whom they are addressed; but in the present case it was communicated to the German Ambassador instead of to his chief. For this trifling matter Bismarck staged an angry scene with the British Ambassador, and revived the old claim for compensation for property injured by the bombardment of Alexandria. Further friction arose when the Chancellor declared a Polish traveller in West Africa to be a British agent, and demanded a formal repudiation of him and his works.

Granville and Derby, the most long-suffering and conciliatory of men, were now convinced that further yielding would only encourage the heavy-handed Chancellor to bully Great Britain. Since 1876, the year before the annexation, German eyes had turned towards the Transvaal as an outlet for emigration and perhaps something more. A company, it was suggested, might obtain Delagoa Bay, or St. Lucia Bay in Zululand, and build a line to Pretoria.

Anglo-
German
Friction

Another plan, of which the energetic Luderitz was the author, aimed at securing Pondoland. There was no danger at Delagoa Bay, since Great Britain held a right of pre-emption; but German plans in Zululand were suddenly frustrated by the hoisting of the British flag at St. Lucia Bay on December 18, 1884. At the same moment Sir Charles Warren was dispatched from Cape Colony to eject Boer trekkers from Bechuanaland, and Sir Harry Johnston was sent on a mission which ultimately led to the acquisition of British East Africa.

Bismarck had displayed remarkable patience and consideration before founding Germany's first colony; but the next stage in the growth of her African Empire was carried through by a piece of sharp practice. In April, 1884, the British Foreign Office was informed that the German Consul-General Nachtigal would visit the west coast of Africa to report on German commerce; and, after assurances that his objects were purely commercial, Granville promised the assistance of the British authorities on the spot. But on July 5 Nachtigal, after arrangements with the chiefs, declared Togoland a German Protectorate. He next sailed to the Cameroons, where the principal chief signed a treaty in return for £100, and hoisted the German flag over the Cameroon river. The British Consul in the Cameroons now returned from his holiday and proclaimed a Protectorate over the Oil Rivers, the mouths of the Niger, and the coast westward to the boundary of Lagos. Nachtigal's swoop only deprived Great Britain of a small section of the coast line; but Germany was subsequently permitted to annex the whole district of the Cameroons, though Cameroon chiefs had asked for British protection since 1879, and Granville confessed that the Government were intending to annex the country had Germany not done so.

In the same eventful year, 1884, Germany planted her foot in New Guinea, to which the colonial party had for several years turned longing eyes. The western end of

the great island belonged to the Dutch, and a British company received a charter in 1881. The demand of the Governments of the Australian Colonies for the annexation of the eastern half being ignored, Queensland proceeded to annex it in April, 1883, without authorization, but was promptly overruled by the Home Government. Despite this rebuke an

The
Pacific
Ocean

intercolonial convention at the end of the same year demanded the annexation of all the unappropriated parts of New Guinea and the neighbouring islands, and declared that the acquisition of territory in the south-west Pacific was challenged by German settlers in the south seas, who proceeded to claim the protection of their Government; and in May, 1884, a German New Guinea Company was formed. An expedition was dispatched by the Company to acquire unappropriated territory on the north-east coast, and official protection was asked and accorded. The British Cabinet was divided, some of its members supporting the Australasian demands, while Gladstone, Granville and Derby favoured a friendly arrangement with Germany, whose good will in the Egyptian quarrel with France was urgently needed. No decision was reached, and when Meade, the Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office, was sent to Berlin at the end of the year he was greeted with rebukes. England, declared the angry Chancellor, was obstructing Germany in the Pacific no less than in Africa. She already possessed a mass of territory which would require years to develop, and it was unworthy of her to grudge Germany a portion of New Guinea. Meade replied that the Colonies considered the Colonial Office to have been unduly pro-German; that the annexation of the Cameroons and Togoland had been accepted without protest; and that the Colonial Office had informed the Foreign Office that it preferred Germany to France as a neighbour.

"Our relations with England have grown steadily worse ever since May," wrote the Chancellor to Münster on January 25, 1885, "and it would not have occurred if you

had presented our desires more energetically." Herbert Bismarck was accordingly once again sent to London in March, and once more set forth the grievance of his countrymen with a frankness which the Ambassador had always feared to adopt. He explained that Germany, failing to receive the expected support in her colonial undertakings, had been compelled to show the difference between German friendship and enmity. "All the Ministers with whom I spoke," reported the envoy, "assured me that they quite understood the situation, and that now it had been so clearly explained further misunderstandings appeared to be impossible." The Prime Minister warmly grasped the proffered hand. "If Germany is to become a colonizing Power," he declared in sonorous tones in the House of Commons, "all I say is, God speed her! She becomes our ally and partner in the execution of the great purposes of Providence for the advantage of mankind." The Foreign Secretary, in full sympathy with his chief, expressed the same aspirations in more prosaic phraseology. "There appears to be a suspicion in Germany that we do not give full recognition of the present position of that great nation. I believe, on the contrary, that there is no country in which not only politicians, but all classes of the population appreciate more and with greater pleasure the important position which Germany has taken in Europe since its unification." A few weeks after these declarations the division of New Guinea was amicably arranged, Great Britain obtaining the southern half of the eastern portion of the island, while Germany secured the northern half, which was christened Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, and the New Britain Islands, which were renamed the Bismarck Archipelago. The sun was shining again; but the spectacle of Great Britain, with territory in every continent, grudging a modest colonial empire in the unappropriated tropics to a Great Power with a growing trade and population, while accepting the steady support received from Germany in Egypt,

was neither forgotten nor forgiven, while the high-handed and occasionally deceitful methods of Bismarck left a disagreeable impression in Downing Street. On the other hand, British statesmen were thankful that it was Germany and not France who had so rapidly extended her dominions, since French colonization meant the doom of British trade.

The acquisition of the most valuable and thickly populated portion of Germany's colonial empire occurred without the friction that had marked the earlier stages of its construction. The authority of the Sultan of Zanzibar extended over the coast and far into the interior of East Africa, and several of the Powers signed commercial treaties with him in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. British influence was supreme at his Court, and in 1878 an offer to accept British protection was made and declined. Next to the British, the Germans were the most active and numerous of European traders, and in October, 1884, a German Consul was appointed at Zanzibar. In reply to an inquiry from the British Foreign Office, Bismarck replied that there was no intention of proclaiming a Protectorate; but there were pushing men in Germany resolved to force the Government's hand. Karl Peters, who had brought back from a residence in England a living interest in colonial questions, had founded a Society for German Colonization, which concentrated its attention on East Africa. Despite the absence of official encouragement, Peters and two friends arrived at Zanzibar on November 4, 1884, dressed like mechanics, crossed to the mainland, penetrated beyond the coastal zone owing allegiance to the Sultan, concluded treaties with native chiefs, and hoisted the German flag over an area of 60,000 square miles. The explorer hurried home, founded a German East African Company, to which he transferred his treaty rights, and in February, 1885, secured Imperial protection over the territories. The Sultan protested, but the British representative was ordered

Peters
and
Zanzibar

to support German claims, and it was decided to limit the Sultan's authority to a strip ten miles deep along the coast. When he still refused to surrender his claims to the hinterland, and sent troops to enforce them, a German squadron appeared with an ultimatum, to which he yielded. When the sultanate of Witu and parts of Swahililand and Somaliland were subsequently added by Peters and his associates, a delimitation of Anglo-German spheres of influence became necessary, and in the autumn of 1886 Great Britain recognized Germany's rights over a strip of coast and over the Kilimanjaro region, Uganda and Witu. Since the two rivals were now in agreement, the Sultan had no choice but to accept the diminution of his inherited rights and claims. Three years later, Peters having discredited himself by his cruelties, German East Africa was transferred to the control of the Crown, to whom in 1890 the Company sold its rights. Germany's overseas empire was further enlarged by the planting of her foot in Samoa. The colonies thus acquired without a fleet and without moving a soldier were widely separated from the mother country and from one another, and were unsuited to settlement by white men, at any rate in large numbers; but their possession increased the pride and self-confidence of the new-born German Empire, turned the eyes of the German people from the exclusive contemplation of the European chess-board to the larger problems of Weltpolitik, and ultimately stimulated the demand for maritime power.

The partition of Africa was carried out not only by the Great Powers, but by the ruler of a country too small to satisfy his masterful ambition.¹ In 1876 King Leopold, who had followed the exploration of the Dark Continent with passionate interest, invited to Brussels the leading geographical experts of the world and created the "Inter-

¹ See, above all, Stanley, "The Congo." The latest and most impartial survey is by Professor A. B. Keith, "The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act."

national Association for the Exploration and Civilization of Africa," with himself as the President. Each nation was to establish a Committee and to undertake a section of the work, but the Belgian Committee at Brussels, where the headquarters of the Association were placed, alone displayed continuous and creative activity. The journey of Stanley from the Indian Ocean to the Great Lakes and from the Great Lakes along the Congo to the Atlantic coast in 1875-7 riveted the King's attention on the Congo basin. Stanley was promptly invited to Brussels, and in November, 1878, a separate committee of the Association was created with the title *Comité d'Etudes du haut Congo*. Though international in name, the undertaking was financed by Leopold, who dispatched Stanley in 1879 to conclude treaties with the chiefs. Between 1880 and the summer of 1884 the great explorer signed "treaties" with hundreds of chiefs and established stations on the Congo and its tributaries, where his rival de Brazza, a French naval officer of Italian descent, was already laying the foundations of the French Congo.

The prospect of a new State in the heart of Africa aroused the apprehension of other colonizing Powers. The west coast had been explored by Portugal as far back as the fifteenth century, and it was on the daring adventures of Prince Henry the Navigator and his successors that she now based appeals to Great Britain to recognize her claims on the Congo. In February, 1884, after prolonged negotiations, an Anglo-Portuguese Convention was signed, recognizing both banks of the mouth of the river as Portuguese territory, in return for promises of commercial equality for all nations, free navigation of the Congo and the Zambesi, and the suppression of slavery and the slave trade in her new territory. Granville pointed out that the assent of Great Britain to Portuguese claims was only the first step, and the Treaty found no favour with the other colonizing Powers. Though it did not interfere with King Leopold's claims in the interior, he

was not the man to watch in silence the corking of the Congo bottle, and he quickly found powerful allies. The French colonial movement was in full swing under Jules Ferry, and de Brazza's achievements on the north bank aroused hopes that France might one day obtain the whole territory in question. A **Anglo-Portuguese Convention, 1884** fortnight after the signature of the Treaty France informed Portugal that she could not acknowledge it, and a month later Bismarck announced that Germany could not recognize such far-reaching arrangements in which she had not been consulted. The opponents of the Treaty were further strengthened by the recognition of the flag—and thus of the territorial sovereignty—of the International Association of the Congo (as the Comité d'Etudes was now called) by the United States. At the same moment Leopold signed an agreement with France promising not to cede without previous consultation any of its stations or territories, and according France pre-emption if the Association were ever compelled to realize its possessions.

Confronted by this formidable coalition, Portugal had no choice but to surrender, for Great Britain, with Egypt on her hands, could afford her no support. It was clear that the fortunes of the Congo basin could only be determined by an International Conference, and on October 8, 1884, Germany and France—for a brief period on the best of terms—jointly invited the Powers to Berlin to discuss freedom of commerce, freedom of navigation on the Congo and the Niger, and the methods of rendering occupation of territory effective. The Conference of the Powers, including the United States, assembled in November, and sat till the end of February, 1885, much time being occupied by the territorial dispute between France, Portugal and the Congo Association. By the Berlin Act the basin of the Congo was defined by the watersheds of the Congo tributaries and the Nile on the north, of the eastern affluents of Lake Tanganyika on the east, and of the Zambesi on the south. In this vast

area the trade of all nations was to enjoy complete freedom. Freedom of navigation of the Congo and its tributaries was enjoined, differential dues on vessels and merchandise were forbidden, and trade monopolies were prohibited. The provisions of the Act were to be carried out by an International Commission. The Powers undertook to watch over the moral and material welfare of the natives, to suppress slavery and the slave trade, to encourage missions and exploration, and to prevent the Congo basin from becoming the arena of warfare. The International Association, possessing no legal status, was not represented at the Conference; but, as it was recognized by and concluded conventions with all the Powers before the close of the Conference, it signed the general Act. British recognition was coupled with a convention empowering Consuls to hold Consular Courts, and to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over British subjects. The King, having secured recognition, proceeded to settle his boundaries with France and with Portugal, which recognized the northern bank of the Congo as belonging to the Association.

When the Berlin Act was signed, Leopold requested the Belgian Parliament to authorize his acceptance of the position of sovereign of what was henceforth officially known as "The Independent State of the Congo"; and permission was granted on condition that the connexion of Belgium and the Congo should be exclusively personal. The King thus found himself undisputed ruler of a territory of almost a million square miles, for, though the Powers had claimed ex-territorial jurisdiction, they did not exercise their rights, and most of them knew little and cared less whether the stipulations of the Act concerning the welfare of the natives and the liberty of commerce were violated or observed. The international character of the State quickly disappeared as foreign officials were replaced by Belgians, and the large sums spent by the King out of his own pocket increased his

determination to be master in his own house. But the vast estate required larger sums for communications and development than he could supply, and money was raised in Belgium, first by a lottery loan and later by a Parliamentary grant. The publication of his will in 1889, leaving the Congo State to his country after his death, encouraged further investments of the national wealth.

The early efforts of the King to cope with his gigantic task were watched with general sympathy and approval;

**The
Brussels
Act**

for the first Governor-General was loyal to the Berlin Act, and philanthropists looked forward to a systematic campaign against the slave trade which desolated and disgraced the heart of Africa. It was in no hostile spirit that in 1889 the British Government urged Leopold to summon a conference at Brussels, and after months of discussion the Brussels Act was signed by the seventeen Powers which took part in it in July, 1890. Elaborate provisions for the suppression of the traffic were drawn up, and the sale of liquor and fire-arms was subjected to rigorous supervision and in certain areas entirely prohibited. Not a few of the delegates to the Conference left Brussels with the hope that their labours had ensured a brighter future to the natives; but it was only a year later that The King inaugurated the system of monopolies, concessions and exploitation which for the next twenty years turned large tracts of the Congo State into a hell upon earth and brought down maledictions on the head of its royal oppressor.

CHAPTER IV

BULGARIA AND THE POWERS

DURING the years following the renewal of the Dreikaiserbund in 1881 Europe enjoyed a brief respite from the crises and alarms which had followed one another in rapid succession since 1875; but Beaconsfield had confided in the Crown Princess at the Congress of Berlin that the Bulgarian settlement would not last longer than seven years.¹ The prophecy was to be fulfilled to the letter. A few hours' work in Philippopolis on a September day in 1885 burst the floodgates that had been so laboriously constructed by the Treaty of Berlin, reopened the feud between Russia and Austria, destroyed the Dreikaiserbund, and led to a new grouping of the Great Powers.

Irredentism in Eastern Roumelia had been fostered for a brief period by Russia, who in the pact of 1881 secured Austria's assent in advance to its union with Bulgaria; but when the friendship between Petrograd and Sofia cooled, Alexander III ceased to desire a change which would strengthen an ungrateful satellite. The Prince, while smarting under Russian hostility, was anxious for the sake of his country to remove it, and in the summer of 1885 he confided his troubles to Kalnoky. The Austrian Foreign Minister invited him to attend the forthcoming manœuvres in Pilsen, when he would have the chance of meeting Giers at the neighbouring Franzensbad. He seized the opportunity and informed Giers that he desired

¹ See "Die Grosse Politik," V and VI; Corti, "Alexander von Battenberg"; Plehn, "Bismarck's Auswärtige Politik," 183-305; Sosnosky, "Balkanpolitik," II; Beaman, "Stambuloff"; Pribram, "Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary"; Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," V.

a *modus vivendi*, to which the Russian Foreign Minister replied that he too desired a reconciliation. The two men parted on friendly terms, the Prince expressing his belief that there would be no outbreak in Eastern Roumelia for the present, and assuring the Minister that he had no intention of disturbing the *status quo*. He spoke in perfect good faith; but a meeting had already been held on June 22 in a village near Philippopolis, where it was agreed to proclaim the union of the province in September, after the harvest was gathered in. When the date approached the Prince was informed that the country was tired of separation, that every town possessed a secret committee, that union would be proclaimed on September 18, and that he must lead it or be swept aside. Alexander was used to threats, and did not take the warning seriously. A week later, on celebrating his birthday, he displayed his good will to Russia by the distribution of distinctions to Russians serving in Bulgaria; but on the same day the mayors of all the towns of Eastern Roumelia accompanied their congratulations with the expression of a wish that he should soon be the ruler over both Bulgarias. The Prince woke up to the situation when on September 16 Karaveloff, the Premier, informed him that union was about to be proclaimed. With his promise to Giers on his conscience Alexander argued that it was impossible, adding that he would himself act when action became possible, but that at the present moment Bulgaria would find herself alone.

The Prince struggled in vain against the resolve of a united people, and on September 18, according to programme, the Konak in Philippopolis was
Revolution in Philippopolis,
 Sept. 18 surrounded and the Governor-General conveyed across the frontier. The news was at once telegraphed to the Prince, who was at Burgas. "The whole population of South Bulgaria has to-day proclaimed union with North Bulgaria. The army of South Bulgaria has already taken the oath to you and occupied the Turkish frontier, and impatiently awaits its

new chief." The telegram was signed by "the Commander of all the South Bulgarian troops." The Prince telegraphed to Karaveloff, the Premier, and Stambuloff, President of the Chamber, to meet him at Tirnovo. The former, like the Prince, found it difficult to choose between offending Russia and disappointing Bulgaria; but hesitation was swept away by the virile resolution of Stambuloff. "Sire, revolt is an accomplished fact. Two roads lie before Your Highness: the one to Philippopolis and as far further as God may lead; the other to Darmstadt. I counsel you to take the crown which the nation offers you." "I choose the road to Philippopolis," was the reply; "and, if God loves Bulgaria, may He protect me and her." A proclamation accepting the union was at once drafted and published. On the same day the three men started in carriages towards Philippopolis, greeted throughout the journey with passionate enthusiasm, and entered the southern capital three days after the revolution. The Prince's decision was promptly confirmed by the Sobranje, which proclaimed the union of the two main portions of the Bulgarian race. The army was mobilized, for war seemed probable if not inevitable.

The conspirators had chosen their time well. The Tsar, as usual, was spending the summer with his wife's relatives in Denmark, Giers was on holiday in the Tyrol, and the recently appointed British Ambassador at Constantinople, Sir William White, was a stout friend of the Balkan peoples.¹ Europe naturally expected the Sultan to invade Eastern Roumelia and drown the revolt in blood; and the paradoxical spectacle was witnessed of Nelidoff, the Russian Ambassador, urging him to smite down Orthodox Slavs by the Mussulman sword. Abdul Hamid, however, evinced no desire to take the field, either because he was afraid of the risk of the conflict spreading,

Russia
and
Turkey

¹ Edwards, "Sir W. White," ch. 18. Morier thought that Great Britain should humour Russia in Europe in order to avoid a challenge in Asia. White, on the contrary, believed that yielding in Europe would encourage Russia to press forward in Asia.

or because he expected the Powers to veto his advance, or because he regarded the province as lost in all but name since 1878, or perhaps because he believed that Prince Alexander might form a welcome buffer between Russia and Turkey. On entering the southern capital the Prince had gone straight from the *Te Deum* in the Cathedral to the mosque, where he had ordered prayers for the Sultan; and he sent a message to his suzerain that the revolution was not aimed at Turkey and that he would protect the Mussulmans. Though on September 23 Turkey invited the intervention of the Powers to maintain the Treaty of Berlin, it soon became clear that the Prince was not threatened from Constantinople. But while the attitude of Turkey was better than the conspirators had dared to hope, the Russian bear at once showed his claws. The Prince had telegraphed to Petrograd that he felt compelled to fulfil the wishes of his country and asked for Russian support. Giers telegraphed to his master, "For heaven's sake no union"; and the Tsar answered the Prince's appeal not only by a telegram of disapproval but by an order peremptorily recalling every Russian officer from Bulgaria. A deputation was sent to Copenhagen to beg him to modify his hostility. "There can be no question of dissolving the union," was the reply; "but so long as you keep your present Government expect from me nothing, nothing, nothing."

Against the hostility of Russia could be set the active encouragement of Great Britain. Queen Victoria had taken a fancy to the handsome young Prince on a visit to England, and the marriage of her daughter to Prince Henry of Battenberg increased her interest in his brother. Moreover, in championing the union she was also giving rein to her undiminished animosity against Russia. Her views were shared by Salisbury, who was now his own master and able to display the sympathy with the Balkan Christians which Beaconsfield had never understood. One of the first acts of the provisional Government at Philip-

Queen
Victoria's
Support

popolis was to implore British aid; and British Consuls were ordered to recognize it *de facto*. The three Empires, on the contrary, suggested a conference of Ambassadors at Constantinople, which should summon the Prince to evacuate Eastern Roumelia. Bismarck's policy was to keep the peace between Russia and Austria by supporting them in their respective spheres of influence. "In Bulgaria," he declared, "I am Russian," and he described the Prince as Russia's Statthalter. Francis Joseph ignored the Prince's appeal for support; but Kalnoky informed the Sultan that though he had a right to coerce Bulgaria he hoped he would not do so for fear of complications. Salisbury accepted the Conference, retaining a free hand if it should determine on coercion. In the instructions to Sir W. White he declared in significant phrases that we were not bound to the letter of the Treaty of Berlin, but must consider reason as well as legality and not forget the wishes of the inhabitants. The Prince should be appointed Governor-General for life. The British Ambassador found himself alone in the Conference which met on November 5, and which, since unanimity proved impossible owing to his opposition, broke up on November 25.

Kalnoky, who desired neither to disrupt the Dreikaiserbund nor to evict the Prince, suggested that he might compound for his offence by ceding to Serbia Widin and a strip of territory south of Pirot. As the ally and diplomatic champion of Serbia he had proposed territorial compensation for his *protégé* directly the revolution in Philippopolis occurred, but he insisted that such compensation should be secured peacefully through the good offices of the Powers. Neither Germany nor Russia, however, recognized a Serbian claim to a *solatium*, and King Milan determined to win it by his own sword. He declined to receive the Bulgarian Minister who brought a letter from the Prince, and on November 14 he declared war. Salisbury had warned Serbia against attacking either Bulgaria or Turkey, and promised that if she

Serbia
attacks
Bulgaria

abstained the British Government would prove her friend. The headstrong Milan, however, refused to wait. The Serbian army crossed the frontier, was hurled back after a three days' battle at Slivnitsa, and pursued to Pirot, where it was again defeated, despite the fact that the Bulgarian army was led by inexperienced officers who had never commanded more than a company. A collective Note of the Powers persuaded Serbia to cease hostilities, but Bulgaria refused the request for an armistice.

The Austrian Minister hurried to the Bulgarian headquarters at Nisch to stop hostilities; and when Prince Alexander replied that he would halt if the Powers would recognize the union, the Austria saves Serbia Minister bluntly rejoined that he could not negotiate, and that if he advanced he would confront Austrian troops, while Russia would occupy Bulgaria and he would lose his throne. The intervention was only just in time, for when hostilities ceased after a fortnight's duration Serbia's munitions were exhausted, and a Bulgarian occupation of Belgrad would have overthrown the dynasty.¹

After Alexander's sensational victory no more was heard of the reconquest of Eastern Roumelia. The outspoken Katkoff censured the Tsar for sacrificing Russia's influence, and Giers admitted that the *status quo ante* could not be restored. Belgrad, Athens and Sofia, he suggested, should be invited by the Powers to demobilize, and Turkey to follow suit. Milan, however, was still in fighting mood, and instructed his delegate to the peace conference at Bucharest to spin out negotiations till the army was ready to renew the struggle, and then to break off the discussion.² Some of the Generals, however, secretly urged Mijatovich to make peace; and after he had wasted three months in the Roumanian capital with the delegates of Bulgaria and Turkey, the Great Powers insisted on a conclusion, and a single-clause treaty stated that "peace is restored." The controversy between Bul-

¹ Mijatovich, "Memoirs," ch. 4.

² *Ibid.*, ch. 5.

garia and Turkey was terminated by a convention on February 1, 1886, recognizing Prince Alexander as Governor-General of Eastern Roumelia for five years; and the two countries agreed that if either were attacked the other would send troops. Lord Rosebery, the Foreign Secretary in Gladstone's short-lived third administration, advised the Porte to abandon the pact, which Russia declared she would never accept. As Bismarck upheld the Tsar's objection, the military alliance was cancelled, and Russia's veto on the recognition of Prince Alexander by name was accepted. The Powers, including Turkey, then recognized "the Prince of Bulgaria" as Governor of Eastern Roumelia for five years.

The storm aroused by the coup at Philippopolis was not yet over, for Greece, like Serbia, had demanded compensation for the aggrandisement of Bulgaria.¹ If Eastern Roumelia might join ^{Greece} ^{demand} Bulgaria, she argued, why should not ^{Compensation} Epirus join Greece? The Sultan, however, was in no mood for further sacrifices, and the streets of Athens echoed to the shrill cry "Zito Polemos!" When Greek and Turkish troops were sent to the frontier, the Powers, at Salisbury's suggestion, dispatched two notes to Athens, the first inviting her to disarm, the second announcing that no naval attack on Turkey would be permitted. Greece proudly replied that to submit to the menaces of Europe would be to compromise her liberty; and though she kept her ships in port, she continued her military preparations. Delyannis armed the population on the frontier, and these irregulars, who obeyed no orders, harassed the Turkish outposts. All the Powers except France and Italy were ready for coercion, and the fleets assembled at Suda Bay on January 29, 1886. Encouraged by the vigorous action of the Powers, Turkey denounced "the inexplicable ambition of the Greeks," declared her

¹ See Mouy, "Souvenirs," ch. 6; Stillman, "Autobiography," ch. 37; and Rumbold, "Final Recollections of a Diplomatist," ch. 3-6. The British Minister was personally in favour of the satisfaction of Greek claims and opposed to the blockade.

readiness to "take up their challenge and defend her honour," and even hinted at a demand for compensations for her military expenditure.

When Gladstone succeeded Salisbury a ray of hope shone for a moment in Athens; but Lord Rosebery was as determined as his predecessor, in the **Blockade of Greece** interests both of peace and of Greece herself, to prevent a conflict.¹ Delyannis and the Chamber remained so bellicose that Lord Rosebery proposed to demand the reduction of the army to a peace footing, adding that if she refused the Minister should be recalled and a blockade proclaimed. All the Powers except France agreed, Freycinet replying that he regretted the peremptory tone of the demand relating to the army, and declining to promise to withdraw the French Minister or to establish a blockade. On the same day, April 23, wishing to spare Athens the humiliation of an ultimatum, he urged Delyannis to reduce the army without waiting for compulsion, adding that France would not forget it if Greece deferred to her views. It was a warm and friendly appeal, and on April 25 the Premier promised not to disturb the peace.² Despite this surrender at the eleventh hour, the joint Note of Great Britain, Russia, Germany and Austria was presented on April 26, insisting that orders should be issued within a week to reduce the forces on land and sea to a peace footing. Next day the blockading fleets of the four Powers appeared off the Piræus. The Ministers left the capital, and a blockade of the ports was proclaimed.

Delyannis was obstinate; but the King ordered him to demobilize or resign. He resigned, and was succeeded by Tricoupis; but the crisis was not over, for on the day of his appointment the Turkish army received orders to cross the frontier on the following day and march on Athens if Greek attacks were not instantly stopped.

¹ E. T. Cook, "The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery," 6-11.

² Freycinet, "Souvenirs," II. Jules Ferry blamed Freycinet for separating France from the Concert.

Skirmishing was in progress all along the frontier, Delyannist officers were in command, and it was impossible to reach sections of the front by telegraph. "If fighting cannot be stopped at once we are lost," cried the new Premier to Stillman, the *Times* correspondent, who, at his request, persuaded the secretary left in charge of the British Legation (though without diplomatic relations to the Greek Government) to telegraph home a request that Turkey should be informed that the Greek troops were being ordered to stop fighting. Stillman also informed the Turkish Minister, who telegraphed to Constantinople.

Peace was thus preserved with only a few hours to spare, and Greece was saved from herself. "Delyannis," records Stillman, "had promised war in the childish expectation that the Powers would oblige the Sultan to make some concession. The reserves were ill clad, and everything was lacking. The casual observer could see that war was not intended." Her military preparations cost Greece one hundred million drachmas and a forced currency; but she was fortunate enough to find in the scholarly and high-minded Tricoupis, who ruled her for the next four years, a watchful guardian of the peace and a thrifty steward of her slender resources.

Greece
gives
way

While Serb and Greek claims for compensation were being proffered and rejected, the angry Tsar bided his time. On May 19 he ominously announced that "circumstances might compel him to defend by arms the dignity of the Empire." That he was moved by wounded pride, not by reverence for the sanctity of treaties, was revealed when in June, 1886, he suddenly repudiated the clause in the Treaty of Berlin constituting Batumi a free port. In reply to Giers' protest he exclaimed that he could not observe the Treaty of Berlin when everybody was making holes in it. Great Britain alone protested against the offence. His wrath was increased when the Prince summoned the representatives of his new province to Sofia, as if it were already a recognized part of his dominions,

excusing his action on the ground that otherwise the Opposition would have rejected the Turco-Bulgar pact. The Prince, however, was playing a losing game, for Russian agents were busily intriguing, and on the night of August 21 some discontented Bulgarian officers entered the Palace, forced him at the point of the revolver to sign his abdication, and hustled him out of the country. "Words fail me to express my feelings and anxiety," wrote Queen Victoria, in her emotional way, to the victim. "Your parents could hardly be more anxious. My indignation against your barbaric, Asiatic, tyrannical cousin is so great that I cannot trust myself to write about it. My Government will do all that it can to win over the Powers to your cause."

Prince Alexander Kidnapped The Provisional Government only held office for three days, for loyal regiments marched on the capital, where Stambuloff, President of the Chamber, took control of the situation and begged the Prince to return. The invitation was accepted; but on reaching Rustchuk he was peremptorily informed by the Russian Consul that Bulgaria's welfare could only be found in reconciliation with Russia. The Prince should have deferred a reply till he reached the capital; but his spirit was broken by the Tsar's unrelenting hostility, and while Stambuloff, who had met him at the landing-stage, was asleep, he telegraphed an abject surrender. "Russia gave me my crown, and I am ready to return it into the hands of her sovereign." The telegram was read with satisfaction in Petrograd and Berlin, but with consternation by the Prince's friends at home and abroad. "I am speechless," wired Queen Victoria, "and I implore you to retrace this step. After such triumphs it is unworthy of your great position." "It is a political error," wrote his father. "You should have replied from Sofia." The critics were right, for he sacrificed both his dignity and his throne. The Tsar, unappeased by surrender, drafted and dispatched a reply of brutal directness, which reached him before his

entry into Sofia. "I cannot approve your return to Bulgaria, as I foresee the sinister consequences for the country already so sorely tried. You will understand what you have to do. I reserve my decision as to my future action." The Russian thunderbolt struck the Prince to the earth, and Stambuloff's virile exhortations were in vain. On reaching his capital he resigned, sorrowfully explaining that one man could not stand alone against Europe, and wishing his successor better fortune. After appointing a Regency of three, headed by Stambuloff, he left the land which he had entered with high hopes seven years earlier and had served with courage and devotion.

Though Alexander was eliminated, the Bulgarian problem had not been solved; and, indeed, the worst was to come, for the Great Powers were to be drawn into the controversy. The Treaty of 1881 had reconciled Berlin and Petrograd,

**Bismarck
supports
Russia**

but had only plastered the deep-seated sore of Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans. Bismarck had repeatedly announced that Germany had no interests in Bulgaria, which he never ceased to regard as within the Russian sphere of influence; and, true to his conviction that the Eastern Question was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier and to his lifelong principle of leaving Russia a free hand in the Near East, he was prepared for a Russian protectorate over Turkey through control of the Straits, for which Alexander longed more than for anything else, and even for the occupation of Constantinople itself. From the beginning of the crisis he had warned Kalnoky to do nothing to provoke Russia, and to observe the Treaty of 1881 in letter and spirit; and he now proposed that Russia and Austria should divide the Balkans into an eastern and western zone of influence. The suggestion was approved in Petrograd but declined in Vienna, where the exclusion of Russia from the Balkans was an axiom; and to a Russian occupation of Bulgaria, which was regarded as highly probable, and which Kalnoky regarded as in no way covered by the Treaty of

Berlin, Austria prepared to offer determined resistance. For the first time since the formation of the alliance Berlin and Vienna disagreed about an international issue, and Austria resented the *carte blanche* given by Bismarck to her dreaded rival.

On September 25, General Nicholas Kaulbars, brother of the former Minister of War, entered Sofia as the Tsar's representative, to restore Russian influence. His first act was to order the liberation of the kidnappers of the Prince and the postponement of the elections for the Grand Sobranje, which was to choose a new ruler. The Regency, inspired by Stambuloff, declined to obey, and the elections strengthened its hands. The new Assembly, overwhelmingly anti-Russian, proceeded to choose Waldemar of Denmark, a brother of the King of Greece and the Tsarina, for its prince; but the honour was declined. The Russian candidate, the Prince of Mingrelia, a school friend of the Tsar, was vetoed by Great Britain and Italy. Kaulbars now declared the Sobranje and its decrees, no less than the Ministry and the Regency, illegal, and, accompanied by the Russian Consuls, withdrew from the country, after a jack-boot dictatorship of two months. The King of Roumania was also approached, and Stambuloff never ceased to regret that he refused the offer.

In her opposition to Bulgarian nationalism Austria had hitherto appeared to side with Russia, to the dismay of

Opinion in Austria	certain of her leading statesmen. Andrassy drew up a Memorandum for the Emperor, arguing that her sphere was in the Near
-----------------------------------	--

East, which she must dominate, and that she must prevent Russia bringing all the Slavs under her influence. Kalnoky, he complained, had brought her back to the Balkans, whence she had been removed by the Treaty of Berlin; and his policy of admitting Bulgaria to be in the Russian sphere would lead to a retreat from Austria's sphere of influence or to partition, which would result in war. The Dreikaiserbund, he argued, was an

unnatural grouping and destroyed her liberty of action. The German alliance was enough. Other leading politicians in Hungary, where opinion was violently Russophobe, argued that the German alliance was worth little if Austria had to yield to Russia every time. These complaints were repeated in the Hungarian Parliament and in the Delegations at Budapest; but they were without foundation, for there was little practical difference between Kalnoky and Andrassy. Austria, declared Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, on September 30, wished to foster the independent development of the Balkan States and prevent a protectorate or the permanent influence of a foreign Power. If Turkey did not press her rights, no one else was justified in armed intervention, and changes in the Balkans could only occur in agreement with the signatory Powers. Despite the Tsar's outcry, "Tisza has insulted Russia and therefore has insulted me," Kalnoky declared in the Delegations on November 13 that a military occupation of Bulgaria would compel Austria to take action. At the same moment Bismarck informed Russia that, though he would not oppose an occupation, he advised her not to provoke Austria. Credits were unanimously voted by the Delegations; and, though Germany would not assist, Kalnoky did not stand alone.

Great Britain had watched the kidnapping and the deposition of Prince Alexander with genuine indignation. At the Lord Mayor's banquet Salisbury spoke for the country in denouncing the treachery of officers "debauched by foreign gold"; and Lord Iddesleigh, who for a brief space held the seals of the Foreign Office under the watchful eye of his chief, suggested that the Sultan should be invited to recall him. The Prime Minister, though rejecting such a policy of provocation, declared, as he had declared ten years earlier, that we could not allow Russia to attack Constantinople; but, as British interests were not directly concerned in Bulgaria, he decided to take no action. Italy, too, expressed her disapproval of

Indignation
in
England

Russia's conduct, and the Tsar was condemned to listen to a chorus of rebuke from Budapest and Vienna, London and Rome.

Bismarck was determined to avoid being drawn into a quarrel arising from Austrian opposition to Russian policy in the Balkans; for he not only asserted but sincerely believed that Bulgaria was tacitly recognized by the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin as within the Russian orbit. Yet public opinion in Russia declined to regard the Chancellor as a friend; the Press campaign of 1879 was revived; and military preparations were made on the southern frontiers. It was at this moment, when Bismarck was fighting Russia's battle against his own ally, that

Katkov's Katkov opened his campaign to turn the
Press eyes of the Tsar from Berlin to Paris.¹

Campaign The most celebrated of Russian journalists was an accomplished classical scholar and a master of several modern languages. Beginning life as Professor of Philosophy at Moscow, he drifted into journalism, and in 1850, at the age of thirty-two, he became editor of the *Moscow Gazette*, which he quickly transformed into the oracle of the Slavophiles. He became a national and international personage during the ruthless suppression of the Polish rebellion of 1863, when in the name of his countrymen he hurled back the criticisms of Western Europe, and inspired Gortchakoff's disdainful rejoinders to the threats of intervention. The grateful Tsar not only read his paper with attention but allowed the journalist the privilege of direct communication. His gospel was that of Nicholas I, the gospel to which his father reverted after the experiments and disappointments of the early years of his reign—autocracy, orthodoxy, nationality. The assassination of Alexander II strengthened his influence, and Alexander III, who cared little for his German relatives and much for his Danish wife, read

¹ See Élie de Cyon, "L'Alliance Franco-Russe," ch. 4. The whole work is a pæan to his friend and master. A life of Katkov is badly needed.

the *Moscow Gazette* with even greater sympathy than his father, who to the end emitted flickers of his early Liberalism. The leading articles indeed were written for Imperial eyes, and during the closing years of his life Katkoff was the most powerful man in Russia after the sovereign.

The disruption of the Dreikaiserbund by the Bulgarian quarrel provided the great journalist with the opportunity for his last and greatest campaign. Austria's antagonism to Russian aims in the Near East was notorious, and he believed that the sole object of Bismarck's studied friendliness was to keep Russia within the German orbit. It was clear that the Dreikaiserbund would not be renewed; but would the Tsar have the courage to free himself at the same time from the stifling embraces of Berlin? In the summer of 1886 the *Moscow Gazette* began to demand a Franco-Russian *rapprochement*, and at the end of the year he drew up a memorandum to the Tsar calling for a complete change in the orientation of Russian policy. He had sympathized with France in 1870, and he now urged the sovereign not to repeat his father's mistake. To promise neutrality in a Franco-German war, he argued, denoted hostility to France, since it enabled Germany to remove her troops from the east. The logic of events pointed to a Franco-Russian entente. A strong France was essential to European equilibrium, and a weak France involved the isolation of Russia. If Russia regained her liberty of action, she would become the arbiter of Europe and could prevent war, as she prevented it in 1875. The Memorandum made a deep impression on the Tsar, who showed it to Tolstoi, Minister of the Interior, but not to the Foreign Minister; for it was a sustained onslaught on Giers, who retained full confidence in Bismarck and saw no reason to scrap the historic policy of Russo-German friendship. The unbridled attacks on the Foreign Minister in a country where the liberty of the Press was unknown led

Katkoff
and
France

observers, at home and abroad, to the natural conclusion that the campaign was approved if not inspired by the Tsar himself. "I ought to be accredited to Katkoff," observed Sir Robert Morier caustically, "since Giers represents neither the people nor the Tsar."

Bismarck remonstrated in vain against the Press campaign, and his answer to Katkoff was given on

**Bismarck's
European
Survey**

January 11, 1887, when he introduced a new Army Bill a year before the expiry of its predecessor, and surveyed the European situation in one of the greatest of his speeches. The three days' debate was opened by the aged Moltke, who painted in sombre colours the dangers hanging over the Fatherland. "None of us is unaware of the seriousness of the time. All the Powers are busily preparing to meet an uncertain future. Everyone asks, Is war coming? I do not believe that any statesman will deliberately apply the match to the gunpowder heaped up in every land. But the passions of the mob, the ambition of party leaders, misguided public opinion—these are elements potentially stronger than the will of the rulers. If any country can work for peace it is Germany, which is not directly concerned in the questions which excite the other Powers. But to carry out this rôle of mediation Germany must be ready for war. If the demand of the Government is refused, I believe that war is certain. The eyes of Europe are on this assembly. Give us our whole demand, our provision for seven years. A vote for one or for three years is no help."¹

Bismarck's speech of two hours filled in the Field Marshal's outlines.² "We have no warlike needs, for we belong to what Metternich called saturated states. But we need an army strong enough to ensure our independence with the aid of an ally. We do not expect an attack or hostility from Russia. That is not the cause of our army bill. We maintain the same friendly relations with the

¹ The speech is printed in Bismarck's "Reden," XII, 173-5.

² *Ibid.*, XII, 175-226.

present as with the late ruler, and they will not be disturbed by us. Nor do I believe that Russia seeks alliances in order to attack us. Everyone who knows the Tsar trusts him.¹ If he intends unfriendly relations, he will say so. We shall not have troubles with Russia unless we go and seek them in Bulgaria, as our Opposition journals demand. I should have deserved prosecution for treason for such folly. When I read these declamations I could not help thinking of the words, 'What's Hecuba to him?' What is Bulgaria to us? It is all the same to us who rules there and what becomes of her. I reiterate my words about the bones of the Pomeranian grenadier. The Eastern question is not a *casus belli* for us. We shall allow nobody to throw a noose round our neck and embroil us with Russia. The friendship of Russia is of much more value to us than that of Bulgaria. The difficulty is not to keep Germany and Russia but Austria and Russia at peace, and it is our duty to ingeminate peace in both Cabinets. We risk being called pro-Russian in Austria and still more in Hungary, and pro-Austrian in Russia. That does not matter if we can keep the peace. Windthorst wishes German policy to be identical with that of Austria. Our relations with Austria rest on the consciousness of each that the existence of the other as a Great Power is a necessity in the interests of European equilibrium, not on the notion that the one places its whole strength at the service of the other. That is impossible. There are special Austrian interests for which we cannot intervene, and there are German interests for which Austria cannot intervene. We do not ask Austria to take part in our quarrels with France, or in colonial difficulties with England, and in like manner we have no interests in Constantinople."

¹ Bismarck explained to the Bavarian Government that for diplomatic reasons he had expressed greater confidence in Russia than he felt. The Tsar attached an importance to the powerful influences pressing for war which was incompatible with German interests.—"Die Grosse Politik," V, 117.

After thus declining to be drawn into war with Russia in support of Austrian policy in the Near East, the Chancellor turned to the West, where the era of *rapprochement* inaugurated by Waddington and continued by Ferry had come to an end and where a new and sinister figure occupied the centre of the stage. "We have tried to oblige France everywhere except in Alsace-Lorraine. We have no intention and no reason to attack her. I would never fight because I thought a war might be inevitable. I cannot see into the cards of Providence. If the French will keep the peace till we attack, then peace is assured for ever. Do we want more French soil? I was not anxious to take Metz. I have complete confidence in the present French Government. Goblet and Flourens are not the men to make war. If you could guarantee their continuance in office I would say, save your money. But the stimulation of the *feu sacré* by an active minority makes me anxious. We have still to fear an attack—whether in ten days or ten years I cannot say. War is certain if France thinks she is the stronger and can win. That is my unalterable conviction. She is infinitely stronger than she was. If she won she would not display our moderation in 1871. She would bleed us white, and, if we won, after being attacked, we would do the same. The war of 1870 would be child's play compared with 1890 or whatever the date. The Governments and the army chiefs cannot assume responsibility for doing nothing. There is also the possibility, even if France did not expect to win, that she might launch a war as a safety valve, as in 1870. Indeed, why should Boulanger not do so?"

The famous General had seen service in Algeria, Italy, Cochin China, and the campaign of 1870.¹ In 1882 he was appointed Director of Infantry at the War Office,

¹ The best study of the Boulangist movement in relation to foreign affairs is in Albin, "L'Allemagne et la France." Maurice Barrès has painted a brilliant picture of Boulangism in "L'Appel du Soldat."

and in 1884 commander of the army in Tunis. Returning to Paris in 1885, he plunged into the whirlpool of politics under the auspices of Clemenceau and the Radicals, and in January, 1886, Freycinet chose him as his Minister of War. Freycinet was a good Republican, but in sending a firebrand to the War Office he was unwittingly jeopardizing the life of the Republic. The new Minister played his cards skilfully, winning the favour both of officers and privates by much-needed improvements in the conditions of service. But his other activities were less innocent, and people began to whisper and to watch. In the summer of 1886 the German Embassy, and not the German Embassy alone, began to be alarmed.¹ "The topic of the day is the conduct of Boulanger," reported Lord Lyons on July 2, 1886. "He has by degrees put creatures of his own into the great military commands, and he is said to have used strange language in the Council of Ministers. From the way people talk one would think the question was whether he is aiming at being a Cromwell or a Monk." A fortnight later Lord Newton, of the British Embassy, described his first appearance at a big military display in Paris. "The mountebank had provided himself with a high-actioned black circus horse. As he pranced backwards or forwards on the circus horse and the public yelled their acclamations, President Grévy and the uninteresting crowd of bourgeois Ministers and deputies who surrounded him seemed visibly to quiver and flinch. From that day Boulanger became a dangerous man. The circus horse had done the trick."² After a year's absence from Paris, Prince Hohenlohe, the late German Ambassador, now Statthalter of Alsace-Lorraine, described in his diary on November 10, 1886, the new and alarming situation. "What strikes me most is the change in Boulanger's position. In the spring of last year he was considered a *farceur*. To-day he has the majority of the Chamber

Rise
of
Boulanger

¹ "Die Grosse Politik," VI, 125-222.

² Lord Newton, "Life of Lord Lyons," 521.

on his side. Freycinet does not dare to get rid of him, and even Ferry would find it difficult to form a Ministry without him. He knows how to win people and to dazzle the masses. If he stays two years longer in office, the conviction will become universal that he is the man to reconquer the provinces, and as he is utterly unscrupulous and extremely ambitious he will carry the masses into war. Blowitz agrees, and says that, if he remains, war will come in 1888. His fall is inevitable directly the country sees where he is leading it. Then he will be swept away, for the country is still pacific. But in a year it will be different."¹ "In Boulanger," echoed the Belgian Chargé a month later, "the whole of France personifies her dreams of future greatness." In the closing days of the year the Freycinet Ministry fell, but his successor, Goblet, retained the dashing soldier at the Ministry of War.

So imminent did a Franco-German war appear during the opening weeks of 1887 that Salisbury was forced to consider the British attitude if it should break out. In 1870 Gladstone and Granville had saved Belgium from attack by agreeing to intervene against whichever of the combatants violated its neutrality. In 1887, however, the sympathies of the Prime Minister were deeply engaged on the side of the Central Powers, and, being convinced that peace was threatened by Russia and France alone, he desired not to intervene if Germany, in repelling a French attack, were to march through Belgium. On February 4 a letter signed "Diplomaticus" appeared in the *Standard*, then in close touch with the Prime Minister, which was generally regarded as semi-official. "In 1870 Lord Granville wisely bound England to side with France if Prussia violated Belgian territory, and to side with Prussia if France did so. Would Lord Salisbury act prudently to take upon himself a similar engagement? It seems to me that such a course at the present moment

¹ "Denkwürdigkeiten," II, 400-1.

would be unwise to the last degree. However much England might regret the invasion of Belgian territory by either party to the struggle, she could not take part with France against Germany without utterly vitiating and destroying the main purposes of English policy all over the world." A passage through a country, he added, was not taking possession, and Great Britain would certainly receive a guarantee of integrity from Bismarck. A leading article argued that it would be crazy to engage in a fearful war. On the same day, February 4, Stead argued in the *Pall Mall Gazette* that the Treaty of 1839 did not necessitate military aid. On February 5 the *Spectator* wrote that we should doubtless insist that Belgium should not form the arena of the war, but that we should not and could not hinder the passage of troops. We must protest, but nothing more, echoed the *Morning Post*. Belgium, observed Sir Charles Dilke in a much-discussed article in the *Fortnightly Review*, was no longer so popular as she had been.¹ Salisbury's feelings had been further ruffled by friction in Egypt, and he wrote to Lord Lyons (Feb. 5) that it was difficult not to wish for a second Franco-German war "to end this ceaseless trouble."

In March de Lesseps visited Berlin semi-officially and assured the Chancellor of the pacific disposition of the President and the Cabinet, which Bismarck had never doubted; but so long as Boulanger remained a national hero peace hung by a thread. "Germany is making preparations for war," reported the French Ambassador. "An imprudent word might decide Bismarck to crush us as a measure of precaution."² At the end of April a spark seemed likely to set Europe ablaze. On April 20 a Frontier Commissioner of Police named Schnaebèle was invited by a letter from a German Commissioner to discuss matters of administration. On reaching the rendezvous on the

The
Schnaebèle
Outrage

¹ Reprinted in his "Present Position of European Politics," 42-7.

² Bourgeois et Pagès, "Origines et Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre," 221-2.

German side of the frontier, he was promptly seized and carried to prison at Metz. The excuse for this gross outrage was that he had misused his official position and seduced German subjects to espionage, and that his arrest, if ever he crossed the frontier, had been decreed by the High Court at Leipzig. The French Government kept cool, held an inquiry, and sent the report to Berlin. The German Government replied that it was not yet fully informed of the details. The diplomatic discussion was complicated by provocative utterances of Boulanger, for which he was rebuked by the President. The dangerous tension was ended when Bismarck satisfied himself that Schnaebele had been invited to cross the frontier.¹ Schnaebele was released in ten days but was removed from his post, and the incident was closed; but Frenchmen believed that Germany had tried to pick a quarrel, and the German Press loudly proclaimed that Boulanger was master of France and could declare war whenever he wished.

The General, testifies Freycinet, his colleague, did not wish for war, but was flattered that France thought he could lead her to victory. He had indeed played with fire, for he suggested in the Cabinet a partial mobilization or a demonstration on the frontier. The peace-makers were forced to bestir themselves, and Jules Ferry informed the President of his readiness to engineer a Parliamentary crisis. In pursuance of this plan Goblet resigned and Rouvier formed a Ministry without Boulanger, who was appointed Commander of an Army Corps at Clermont-Ferrand. The General remained the darling of the crowd. When he was deprived of his command in the following year for returning to the capital without leave, he stood for the Chamber as the champion of a revision of the Constitution, and was elected by a working-class constituency in Paris by an overwhelming majority. Fortunately

¹ The best account of the Schnaebele incident is given by Albin, "L'Allemagne et la France," 78-100. Cf. "Die Grosse Politik," VI, 182-9.

for the Republic, and fortunately for the peace of the world, he allowed the opportunity to slip, and fled to Brussels on learning that an order for his arrest had been signed. He was condemned in his absence for treason, and a dangerous and discreditable career was terminated by suicide.

While German eyes were watching the histrionic performances of Boulanger with strained attention, Bismarck was more concerned with his eastern neighbour; for while a French attack would not necessarily bring Russia into the field, a Russian attack would be the signal for an explosion in the west. Moreover, the hostility of France was incurable; but there was still hope of the Tsar. In January, 1887, the Tsar asked the Kaiser not to allow the return of Prince Alexander, and the Kaiser promised his veto. In April the Chancellor once more complained at Petrograd of the unbridled Press attacks, and Giers summoned up courage in the official organ to denounce the Germanophobe campaign. The name of Katkoff was not mentioned; but

Katkoff
versus
Giers

it was the editor of the *Moscow Gazette* against whom the protest of Berlin and the warning of Petrograd were directed. Katkoff retaliated so angrily in his paper that the Tsar ordered him to talk over the matter with Giers. The Foreign Minister very properly declined an interview with his enemy, and offered his resignation. The Tsar had no wish to part with his experienced Minister; but he had advisers of different opinions, and felt compelled to throw sops to both parties in turn. A ukase of March 14 ordered alien landowners outside the towns on the eastern frontier to sell their property within three years, unless inherited in the direct line or by the survivor of a married couple if the heir was in Russia before the issue of the ukase. As the landowners in that district were almost exclusively German, the edict was a direct challenge to Berlin, and was answered by a Press campaign against Russian credit.

Despite the toleration of Katkoff's campaign and the

notice to German landowners to quit, the influence of Giers—though he once complained, “I am nothing and nobody, only the pen and mouthpiece of my Imperial master”—was still considerable; and, as usual, it was cast on the side of peace and moderation. The Dreikaiserbund Treaty, concluded in 1881 and renewed in 1884, had now to be prolonged or denounced. Bismarck was naturally anxious not only to keep open the wire from Berlin to Petrograd but to maintain the association between Russia and Austria. Giers was equally desirous to renew the pact, but he lamented that he stood almost alone. The Tsar, he explained, entertained great respect for Francis Joseph, and had no more intention of attacking him than of attacking the Emperor William. In view, however, of the notorious hostility of Hungary, he could not remain in treaty relations with Vienna, and public opinion would not understand it if it were to discover that he had done so. He was ready, however, to maintain the treaty contact with Berlin, and on May 11, after long discussions, Schuvaloff, the Russian Ambassador, formally proposed a dual arrangement.¹ The Chancellor replied that he could not promise neutrality in an Austro-Russian war unless Austria attacked Russia, and, with the assent of his ally, showed him the operative clauses of the Treaty of 1879. Schuvaloff rejoined that Russia in like manner could only promise neutrality if Germany did not attack France. On these lines agreement was easy to reach, and on June 18 Schuvaloff and Herbert Bismarck, now promoted to the post of Foreign Secretary, signed a treaty for three years. That the Chancellor requested his son to sign it prompted Giers to remark that it was more advantageous to Russia than to Germany.

The German and Russian Courts, ran the preamble,

¹ See. “Die Grosse Politik,” V, 211-68; and Goriainoff, “The End of the Alliance of the Three Emperors,” *American Historical Review*, Jan., 1918. Paul Schuvaloff was the brother of Peter Schuvaloff, who represented Russia at the Berlin Congress. The Reinsurance Treaty was revealed in Pribram, “Secret Treaties,” I.

have resolved to confirm the agreement between them by a special arrangement, in view of the expiry on June 27 of the secret Treaty of 1881, renewed in 1884.

I. If one should find itself at war with a third Great Power, the other would maintain a benevolent neutrality, and would try to localize the conflict. This provision would not apply to a war against Austria or France if resulting from an attack by one of the contracting parties.

The
Secret
Treaty

II. Germany recognizes the rights historically acquired by Russia in the Balkan peninsula, especially the legitimacy of her preponderant and decisive influence in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. The two Courts engage to admit no modification of the territorial *status quo* of the said peninsula without a previous agreement, and to oppose every attempt to disturb this *status quo* or to modify it without their consent.

III. The two Courts recognize the European and mutually obligatory character of the principle of the closing of the Straits. They will take care that Turkey shall make no exception to this rule in favour of any Government by lending the Straits to warlike operations. In case of or to prevent infringement, the two Courts will inform Turkey that they would regard her as placing herself in a state of war towards the injured party and as depriving herself thenceforth of the security of her territory under the Treaty of 1878.¹

The Treaty was completed by an "Additional and very secret Protocol."

I. Germany, as in the past, will lend her assistance to Russia to re-establish a regular and legal Government in Bulgaria, and promises not to consent to the restoration of the Prince of Battenberg.

¹ This article appeared in the Treaty of 1881.

II. If the Tsar should be compelled to defend the entrance of the Black Sea in order to safeguard the interests of Russia, Germany engages to accord her benevolent neutrality and her moral and diplomatic support to the measures he may find necessary to guard the key of his Empire.

The existence of the Dual Alliance of 1879 had been at once communicated to the Tsar; but the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 was not revealed to Francis Joseph by his ally. When the monarchs met at Gastein in the summer, the Emperor William merely expressed regret that the Tsar had withdrawn from the Dreikaiserbund. The pact was kept secret by the Tsar's wish, as he had no desire to increase the fury of the Slavophiles; but Bismarck was so little afraid of the charge of perfidy that he expressed the wish that Russia would betray it, and he himself revealed it after his fall. Since Austria had refused an unlimited guarantee in 1879, he had to find other means of guarding Germany against a French attack and its possible consequences; and in promising benevolent neutrality if Russia were attacked he was in no sense contravening or undermining the alliance with Austria, which promised German support only to repel an assault. Moreover, in Bismarck's eyes, the new pact was of advantage to Austria, since Germany would retain a certain hold over Russian policy. Thus from the crisis which broke up the Dreikaiserbund and brought Austria and Russia to the brink of war, the Chancellor's genius extracted securities for the Empire he had founded, purchasing the assurance of Russian neutrality in a war provoked by France by a promise of German neutrality in a war provoked by Austria.

The Reinsurance Treaty produced no outward result, for its existence was unknown to the Russian people not less than to Austria. Though Katkoff's death in August deprived the Slavophil army of its leader, the Press continued to thunder against Germany and to urge an ap-

proach to France. On September 11 Bismarck lodged a sharp complaint, to which Giers replied that he was profoundly distressed by the Press attacks, which were directed as much against himself as against the Chancellor. He had on several occasions begged to resign, but the Tsar despised the Press and refused to take action. Count Tolstoi, Minister of the Interior, was one of the chief offenders, and Pobiedonostseff's influence was deplorable. On the other hand, Giers could pledge his head that the Tsar would never raise his hand against the Emperor William, his son or his grandson. The tension was increased by the fact that there were mischief-makers eager to cut the wires between Berlin and Petrograd. During the early autumn documents found their way into the hands of the French Government, who forwarded them to the Tsar in Denmark without testing their authenticity. A letter from Prince Ferdinand to the Countess of Flanders confessed that he would not have accepted the Bulgarian throne without encouragement from Berlin; while a second letter announced that every few days he was assured by German agents that German policy would change. An unsigned letter, apparently from Prince Reuss, the German Ambassador in Vienna, observed, "We cannot recognize him at present, but we can encourage him." Giers immediately detected the fraud and informed his master that they were forged. The Tsar replied that the affair seemed to him quite improbable, and that he knew Prince Reuss to be incapable of such trickery. He added that he would discuss the matter with Bismarck at their next meeting. Prince Reuss denied that he had ever written the letter to Prince Ferdinand. The latter denied that he had ever written to the Countess of Flanders, who in turn testified that she had received no such communication.¹ On returning home on November 18 *via* Berlin the Tsar heard from the Chancellor's own lips that the incriminating

Forgers
at
Work

¹ The forgeries were attributed to various capitals and various hands. See "Die Grosse Politik," V, 338-50.

letters were unblushing forgeries. Bismarck professed to believe that he had completely eradicated the suspicions of the autocrat, who expressed to Giers his satisfaction with his conversations. He wished, however, to run no avoidable risks, and in the same month he forbade the Reichsbank to make loans on Russian securities, fearing that German money might thus become available for Russian aggression, and taking the risk that his action would drive Russia to the French bourse.

The hostility of Russia and France both to Germany and Great Britain compelled Salisbury and Bismarck to keep in close touch; and Great Britain's association with Austria and Italy in defence of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean made her almost a partner in the Triple Alliance. Salisbury, however, was afraid that the accession of Prince William, which could not be long delayed, might involve a Russophil policy, and on November 10 he expressed a wish for some direct assurance from Bismarck.¹ "From your discussions with Hatzfeldt," replied the Chancellor on November 22, "I gather that a direct exchange of ideas would be useful and would help to remove doubts as to our respective policies. Our nations have so many common interests and so many points where differences could arise, and you and Germany are so trustful of each other, that we can be franker than is usual in diplomacy. You are mistaken in fearing that Prince William might favour an anti-English policy, any more than the Crown Prince would wish to make his policy follow the English lead. Both will only pursue German interests. The way to maintain these interests is so clearly dictated that it is impossible to swerve from it. It would be absurd to assume that the Government would inflict on the people the sufferings of a great war unless it could prove to the nation its necessity. Our army is

¹ Thus the famous autograph letter of Nov. 22 was not an unsolicited approach by Bismarck, much less a request for an alliance, but a response to a desire for assurances. See "Die Grosse Politik," IV, 368-88.

ready, and millions would hasten to the flag if the independence and integrity of the Empire were threatened; but it is for defence and would only be set in motion if attacked. To be more concrete, we should not fight for our eastern interests.

**Bismarck
reassures
Salisbury**

The Sultan is our friend, but we should not fight for him. This does not mean that nothing but an attack would justify a call to arms. Germany has three Great Powers as neighbours and has open frontiers, and she cannot be blind to coalitions which might form against her. If Austria were conquered, weakened, or hostile in feeling, we should be isolated in face of France and Russia, and confronted with the possibility of a Franco-Russian coalition. Our interest commands us to prevent such a situation, if necessary by arms. The existence of Austria as a strong and independent Great Power is for Germany a necessity which the personal sympathies of the rulers cannot alter. Austria, like Germany and England, belongs to the 'saturated' Powers, as Metternich would say, and therefore to the pacific Powers. France and Russia, on the other hand, seem to threaten us—France, true to her traditions and character, and Russia, who now assumes the threatening attitude of Louis XIV and Napoleon. The revolutionary party hopes that war would overthrow the monarchy, while the monarchists believe that it would end the revolution. We are therefore always in danger, and must try to secure alliances. We desire that friendly Powers which have interests in the East to defend should by combination make themselves strong enough to keep the Russian sword in its scabbard, or help if there is a break. We should be neutral so long as German interests are not in danger. Germany will never fight for Russia; but Germany will be compelled to join in the fight if the independence of Austria is threatened by Russian attacks, or if England or Italy were in danger of being overrun by French armies. Such is the course of German policy, from which neither monarch nor Minister can divert it." The letter ended

with the statement that it had been read to and approved by Prince William; and Salisbury's request to see the text of the Austro-German Alliance was granted.

"I thank you for your confidence, which I reciprocate," replied Salisbury on November 30, "convinced that

Reply
of

it is justified by the sympathy and the close community of interest of our two peoples.

Salisbury

Let me explain the grounds of the apprehensions which I expressed to Hatzfeldt. If a Franco-German war breaks out, Russia, if she is wise, would not attack Germany, but would compel the Sultan, by occupying the Balkans or Asia Minor, to accept proposals which would make Russia master of the Straits. Russia would only abstain if she had to reckon with superior opposition. For this England and Italy would not suffice, and British opinion would probably not support a war for Turkey with Italy as sole partner. All would therefore depend on Austria; and unless she were sure of German support she would not venture on war, since Italy and England could not help her in an invasion of Russia. She would therefore remain neutral and try for compensation in Turkey. Austria could only be bold if sure of German help. When we were invited to an agreement on the eight points proposed to Sir E. Malet, we were surprised that the most important question for us, namely, the probable conduct of Germany, was not mentioned.¹ If Austria could be certain of German support in such a war, she could carry through the policy of the eight points. If not, England would be joining in a policy doomed to fail, that is, if Germany, while fighting against France, were neutral towards Russia. You have dispelled my fears by your frankness. You have shown me the Austro-German treaty, and have told Malet of the Kaiser's approval of the understanding between England, Italy and Austria. Finally you have convinced me that Germany's course will not be deter-

¹ The reference is to the second Mediterranean Agreement, then under discussion.

mined by the personal prepossessions of the ruler. The agreement now in preparation between England, Italy and Austria is in full harmony with your policy. The grouping of the Powers, which is the work of the last year, will be a real buttress against Russian aggression." Salisbury's letter was polite and indeed friendly; but its most significant feature was the strong hint that the best way of warding off the Russian danger would be unflinching German support of Austria. "The Tsar," observed Salisbury several years later to Eckhardstein, "sounded me as to my price for benevolent neutrality in case of a war of Russia and France against Germany. As we were pledged to a free hand, I returned a dilatory answer. I acted in the same way with Bismarck, who also sounded me in his letter soon after the Tsar."¹

Germany and Austria had agreed to differ on the Bulgarian question; and while Bismarck, threatened with danger on both fronts, sought safety in the secret treaty of reinsurance with Russia, Austria
and
Italy Kalnoky looked round for partners in the dangerous task of checking Muscovite ambitions in the Near East. Since his return to power in 1886 Salisbury had often expressed his desire for co-operation with Austria, for he was as anxious as ever to erect new bulwarks against the southward advance of our most dangerous rival;² but the help of Italy, whose interests in thwarting Russian ambitions were less direct, had to be purchased at a high price. The foundation of the Triple Alliance had neither extinguished irredentism nor established enduring relations of confidence between the Allies. Bismarck observed to the Crown Prince Rudolf in 1883 that they could not depend on Italian support; and the omission of Francis Joseph to return King Humbert's visit to Vienna was keenly resented in Italy, where the Emperor's consideration for the feelings of the Pope appeared excessive. On

¹ "Erinnerungen," II, 154.

² "Die Grosse Politik," IV, 263-94.

the other hand, Italy's occupation of Massowah in 1885 without informing her allies appeared to Berlin and Vienna to be lacking in courtesy. The situation was modified by the Bulgarian crisis; for Austria, confronted with the danger of war without German help, needed the backing of Italy, while Italy, perturbed by the growing influence of Boulanger, turned for aid to her allies. It was in the light of these fresh factors that the renewal of the Triple Alliance, which was nearing the end of its five years' term, was discussed.¹ Robilant, Italy's Foreign Minister, asked for a guarantee of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean—by which he meant a guarantee against a French descent on Tripoli or the northern coast of Morocco—and added that without it the Alliance would be worthless. He further demanded that if Turkey were to be partitioned between Russia and Austria, Italy should be informed in good time and would not remain a mere spectator—in other words, that she should receive compensation in the Balkans. Kalnoky desired to reject both demands, but was urged to compromise by Bismarck, who feared lest the sulking partner might sell herself to France for the recognition of her aims in Tripoli, which France was willing to accord.

To meet the new situation Robilant proposed an agreement to prevent any territorial change on the coasts of European Turkey which could damage the interests of the Allies. If a fourth Power took action, Italy and Austria—as the most interested parties—would co-operate. “If the *status quo* becomes impossible, and if, owing to the action of a third Power or for any other reason, Italy or Austria are forced to modify it by permanent or temporary occupation, they will only take action after an agreement based on reciprocal compensation.” The demands of Italy in the west proved more difficult; but Bismarck, anxious to humour the country which would

¹ See Pribram, “Secret Treaties,” II, ch. 2, and “Die Grosse Politik,” IV, 181-260.

be his sole ally if Boulanger attacked, informed Kalnoky that he would, if necessary, make a pact with Italy alone. The Austrian statesman slowly yielded ground, fearing Italian hostility in the event of a Russian war, or at any rate the diversion of part of the Austrian army to guard the frontier. But he desired to secure a *quid pro quo*, and asked for Italian help if Austria were attacked. Robilant refused, and Bismarck urged Kalnoky to yield. Finally Robilant offered to renew the agreement of 1882, with additional pacts with Germany and Austria. If Kalnoky refused, Italy would make a treaty with Germany alone. Kalnoky, with Bismarck and Robilant against him, gave way, Italy having withdrawn her demand for Austrian help in a war for Tripoli or Morocco. On February 20, 1887, the Treaty of 1882 was prolonged till 1892, and the two Central Powers made separate agreements with their exigent ally.

The Austro-Italian agreement concerned the East. "Austria and Italy, desiring the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Orient, will try to prevent any change injurious to either. But if, in the course of events, the *status quo* in the Balkans or the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or Ægean becomes impossible, and if, owing to the action of a third Power or otherwise, either finds necessary a temporary or permanent occupation, this occupation shall only take place after an agreement based on the principle of a reciprocal compensation for every advantage, territorial or other, which each obtains."

The German-Italian agreement concerned the West. "If France made a move to extend her occupation, or even her protectorate or her sovereignty in Tripoli or Morocco, and in consequence Italy, to safeguard her position in the Mediterranean, should feel she must undertake action in the said territories or even have recourse to extreme measures in French territory in Europe, the state of war between Italy and France would constitute on the demand of Italy the *casus fœderis*. If in such a

Germany
and
Italy

war Italy should seek territorial guarantees, Germany would not object, and, if necessary, will facilitate that object."

The Treaty of 1887 was a triumph for Italy. In 1882 she was the suitor; but now Austria was in fear of a

Italy's
new
Privileges Russian, and Germany of a French attack, and Robilant could command his own price.

In paying the bill the Central Powers divided their obligations. Austria was compelled to recognize Italy's interest in the Balkans and her claim to compensation if Turkey was partitioned, while Italy refused to promise support if Austria was attacked. Germany, for her part, purchased the continuance of Italy's help against a French attack by an obligation to take part in offensive war should Italy's ambitions in North Africa demand it. In the following year the first military convention between Germany and Italy was signed, Austria allowing Italian troops to cross her territory on their way to the western front.

When the Triple Alliance was thus confirmed and extended, the protocols relating to Great Britain were not renewed; for a few days earlier Italy had concluded an agreement which further guaranteed her position.¹ At the end of January, 1887, Italy asked for a treaty; but Salisbury, while recognizing the identity of interests in the Mediterranean and the Near East, preferred an understanding which would be less binding and which could be kept secret. The agreement was set forth in a Note of Count Corti on February 12 :

I. The *status quo* in the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the Ægean and the Black Sea shall be maintained as far as possible. Care must therefore be taken to prevent any change to the detriment of the two Powers.

II. If the *status quo* proves impossible, no modification shall take place except after agreement.

III. Italy is entirely ready to support the work of

¹ " Die Grosse Politik," IV, 297-316, and Pribram, I.

Great Britain in Egypt. Great Britain is disposed, in case of encroachments by a third Power, to support the action of Italy at every other point of the North African coast, especially in Tripoli and Cyrenaica.

IV. Mutual support in the Mediterranean to the extent that circumstances shall permit shall be afforded in every difference between one of the parties and a third Power.

The compact was accepted by Salisbury in a declaration of the same date. "The statement of Italian policy has been received with great satisfaction, as it enables the Government to express their Anglo-
Italian
Compact desire to co-operate in matters of common interest. The character of that co-operation must be decided when the occasion for it arises. Both Powers desire that the shores of the Black Sea, the Ægean, the Adriatic and the north coast of Africa shall remain in the present hands. If, owing to some calamitous event, it becomes impossible to maintain the *status quo*, both desire that there shall be no extension of the domination of any other Great Power over any portion of those coasts." The arrangement had been made with the encouragement of Bismarck, and it was promptly communicated to Austria, who announced her adherence in a Note from Kalnoky on March 23.¹ "Austria is happy to observe that its principles and objects conform to those which guide her policy. Convinced that these objects would best be secured by our co-operation, she is ready to adhere to the declaration of friendship and of identity of political views recorded in the notes of February 12. Austria congratulates herself on the political *rapprochement* with Great Britain. Though Mediterranean questions do not primarily affect her interests, my Government has the conviction that England and Austria have the same interests in the Eastern Question as a whole, and therefore the same need of maintaining the *status quo* in the Orient and of

¹ "Die Grosse Politik," IV, 319-31, and Pribram, I.

preventing the aggrandisement of one Power to the detriment of others."

The conditional promise of British assistance strengthened Kalnoky's resolve to oppose Russian dictation in Bulgaria, despite Bismarck's declaration that he would not regard an Austro-Russian conflict over Bulgaria as a *casus belli*. On July 7, 1887, the Sobranje elected Ferdinand of Coburg, the clever and ambitious son of Louis Philippe's daughter Clémentine, who accepted the throne subject to the recognition of the Sultan and the sanction of the Powers. When neither was forthcoming, he accepted unconditionally on August 10 and took the oath at Tirnovo on August 14. The Tsar promptly proposed to the Powers to eject the Prince and to appoint a Russian general, regent, or governor of the two Bulgarias, and Turkey issued a circular Note calling attention to the gravity of the offence. Bismarck, true to his watchword: "In Bulgaria I am Russian," at once broke off diplomatic relations with Sofia; but Salisbury warned both Russia and Turkey against intervention, adding that it would be useless to evict the Prince unless the Powers had agreed on his successor. At this moment Bulgaria unexpectedly gained a second champion. The death of Depretis on July 31 brought Crispi to power, and the new Premier at once proposed to recognize Ferdinand instead of expelling him as Russia desired. Believing war to be in sight, he suggested to Great Britain a military convention; and though his suggestion was declined, the Mediterranean fleet visited Italian and Austrian harbours in September, while the Ambassadors of the three Powers at Constantinople were instructed to take counsel together till the crisis was over.¹

Before the close of the year the three Powers drew still closer together.² On December 12 an Austrian Note to Great Britain proposed a second Mediterranean agreement.

¹ Crispi, "Memoirs," II, ch. 5 and 6.

² "Die Grosse Politik," IV, 335-95, and Pribram, I.

"Austria and Italy have agreed to propose to Great Britain the following points, to confirm the principles and to define the attitude of the three Powers: (1) The maintenance of peace. (2) The *status quo* in the Orient, based on the treaties. (3) The maintenance of the local autonomies established by the treaties. (4) The independence of Turkey, as guardian of important European interests, of all foreign preponderating influence. (5) Consequently Turkey can neither cede nor delegate her suzerain rights over Bulgaria to any other Power, nor intervene to establish a foreign administration there, nor tolerate acts of coercion undertaken with this latter object, under the form of a military occupation or the dispatch of volunteers. Likewise Turkey, constituted by the treaties guardian of the Straits, can neither cede any portion of her sovereign rights nor delegate her authority to any other Power in Asia Minor. (6) The three Powers are to be associated with Turkey in defence of these principles. (7) If Turkey resists any illegal enterprises such as indicated in Article 5, the three Powers will immediately agree on measures to procure respect for the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. (8) If Turkey connives at any such illegal enterprise, they will, jointly or separately, provisionally occupy points of Ottoman territory." In a reply of the same date Great Britain accepted the eight points here enumerated. Rumours of the pact led to a question in Parliament, which merely produced the reply that the Government had concluded no agreement which bound the country to undertake military action.

The Mediterranean insurance risk was still further distributed by the inclusion of Spain. A Spanish Note to Italy, dated May 4, 1887, suggested an agreement on the following terms for four years: (1) Spain will not lend herself as regards France, in so far as the North African territories among others are concerned, to any treaty or political arrangement aimed against Italy, Germany and Austria, or any one of them. (2) Abstention from all un-

Austria,
Italy,
England

provoked attack, as well as from provocation. (3) To maintain the *status quo* in the Mediterranean, Spain and Italy will exchange all information concerning their own and other dispositions.

An Italian Note of the same date assented to these propositions, and the accession of Austria to the pact was recorded on May 21.

During the closing months of 1887 the tension between Vienna and Petrograd became more than ever acute.¹ The monarchs assured one another that they would not attack; but the concentration of troops on the Galician frontier, combined with frenzied denunciations in the Russian Press, revealed the danger. Even Giers was excited, and denounced Kalnoky, while the Tsar spoke as if war was ultimately inevitable. It required Bismarck's utmost skill as mediator and moderator to keep the peace, when the military chiefs in the three capitals longed to decide the dispute by an appeal to arms. "The German Empire," ran the German speech from the throne on November 24, 1887, "has no aggressive tendencies, and no needs which could be satisfied by victorious wars. But in defence we are strong, and we shall become so strong that we can confront every danger without fear." These declarations were elaborated in the Chancellor's speech of February 6, 1888, in which, as in 1887, he surveyed the European situation and defined the attitude of his country.² A year ago, he began, he had feared a French attack; but one peace-loving President had succeeded another, and the Ministerial changes were reassuring. "The anxieties of the year have been Russian rather than French; but, like last year, I expect no attack. The Russian Press attacks are as dust in the balance against the authority of the Tsar. At my last interview I satisfied myself again that he had no hostile intentions against us or anyone else. I trust his word absolutely, and therefore the Press does not make me think our relations worse than a year ago. The massing

¹ "Die Grosse Politik," VI, 1-89.

² "Reden," XII, 440-77.

of troops on the German and Austrian frontier is nothing new, for it dates from 1879. There is no reason to attack us, for Russia does not want any more Poles. Why these troops? One does not ask for explanations. They are doubtless to give weight to Russia's voice in the next European crisis. Yet the danger of coalitions is permanent, and we must arrange once for all to meet it. We must make greater exertions than other nations on account of our position. Russia and France can only be attacked on one front; but God has placed us beside the most bellicose and restless of nations, the French, and He has allowed bellicose tendencies to grow up in Russia."

The Chancellor proceeded to explain why he had published the Austro-German Treaty of 1879 on the eve of the debate. "It is not an ultimatum, a warning, or a threat, as some papers say, for the Russian Cabinet was informed long ago. It is the expression of permanent interests on both sides. If we had not made it then, we should have to make it now. Think Austria off the map, and we are isolated with Italy between Russia and France. We cannot think Austria away. A State like Austria does not disappear. If one leaves it in the lurch it becomes estranged and will be inclined to offer its hand to the antagonist of its disloyal friend. If we are to avoid isolation in our exposed position, we must have a safe friend. We shall wage no preventive war. If we were to attack, the whole weight of the Imponderabilia would be on the side of our opponents. Threats and insults have aroused a justifiable embitterment, but we shall not go to war for trifles. We do not angle for love in France or in Russia. The Russian Press and Russian opinion have shown us—an old, powerful and trustworthy friend—the door. We do not press ourselves forward. We have tried to regain the trustful relationship, but we do not run after anybody. For that very reason we shall all the more carefully respect Russia's treaty rights, among them the rights—not recognized by all our friends—which

**Bismarck's
Policy
Explained**

we won for her in 1878. We all believed that the pre-dominant influence in Bulgaria would fall to Russia. We shall not support and we do not advise violence, and I do not think Russia wishes it. Bulgaria is not an object of sufficient magnitude to set Europe aflame in a war whose issue none can foretell. I do not expect an early breach of the peace. But I advise other countries to discontinue their menaces. We fear God and nothing else in the world." The proud peroration was rewarded by a storm of applause, which echoed throughout the Empire, and by the smooth and rapid passage of the last Army Bill which the aged Emperor was to see or the Iron Chancellor to propose.

A few days after Bismarck's historic utterance the Tsar made a final attempt to solve the Bulgarian problem in a Russian sense. Ferdinand, he declared, must withdraw, Bulgaria could freely choose a ruler, and Russia would then no longer interfere. Germany and France supported the plan, but Austria and her friends declined to support the eviction of Ferdinand. Without waiting for a mandate from the Powers, Turkey now declared the Prince's title illegal. Bulgaria acknowledged the communication, but neither Turkey nor Russia took steps to enforce it. The three years' crisis had ended with the confessed defeat of Russia; and indeed the Bulgarian policy of Alexander III deserved to fail. Bismarck had played his game with matchless skill. Peace had been preserved, France and Russia had been held apart, the Austrian alliance had remained intact, and a secret treaty kept open the line to Petrograd. "It was a complicated business," confessed the Chancellor. "The Emperor once said to me, 'You are like a rider who tosses five balls into the air and catches them every time. I should not care to change places with you.'" Kalnoky, too, had played a dangerous game and won. His policy, at once cautious and firm, had succeeded in eliminating Russian influence from Bulgaria, which for the next few years,

**Bulgarian
Crisis
Ends**

under the virile direction of Stambuloff, leaned on Austria and Turkey.

Though the Bulgarian crisis was over, the Tsar had no intention of renewing the old friendly relationship with Vienna; but he was not yet finally estranged from Berlin. In 1888 the Chancellor once more revealed his consideration for the Tsar's

Love
and
Policy

feelings by preventing the marriage of the ex-Prince Alexander of Bulgaria with a daughter of the Crown Prince Frederick, which had been discussed since 1884. He was supported by the old Emperor, who regarded it as a *mésalliance*, but the Crown Princess fought hard for her daughter's right to marry the man of her choice. Bismarck's decision, backed by a threat of resignation, was finally confirmed by the girl's father when he became Emperor, and even Queen Victoria was won over to the Chancellor's side during a brief visit to Berlin. There was always a possibility, he believed, of the Prince being invited to return to Sofia, and in any case the Tsar's confidence in the German Government, which was the chief obstacle to a war, would have been shattered by a close association of his hated enemy with the Royal Family. "The foreign policy of the German Empire since 1871," wrote Bismarck to the Emperor Frederick, "has been the maintenance of peace and the prevention of anti-German coalitions, and the pivot of this policy is Russia." ¹

¹ "Die Grosse Politik," VI, 277-98.

CHAPTER V

THE DUAL ALLIANCE

WHILE the Austro-German alliance was no sooner conceived than concluded, the Franco-Russian alliance was discussed in public and private for many years before official negotiations began. Isolation of France Russia had watched the downfall of Napoleon III, the ringleader in the Crimean war, with unconcealed satisfaction; and the formation of the Dreikaiserbund forbade the young Republic, as it struggled to its feet, to look for Russian sympathy or support. The one ray of hope lay in the possibility that Russia might desire the revival of France as a make-weight against German domination of the Continent. This aspect of the question was clearly present to the mind of Gortchakoff, with whom Chaudordy, an official of the French Foreign Office, discussed the situation in Switzerland in 1873. The French Government desired to know whether Russia would help if Germany reoccupied the territory which it had now evacuated or if new claims for territory or indemnity were put forward. The Russian Chancellor, while naturally unable to promise support, expressed himself in friendly terms and declared that Russia desired to see France as strong as before her defeat.¹

¹ See the French Yellow Book, "L'Alliance Franco-Russe," published in 1918; Daudet, "Histoire Diplomatique de l'Alliance Franco-Russe," and "Alexandre III"; Freycinet, "Souvenirs," II; Elie de Cyon, "Histoire de l'Entente Franco-Russe"; Hansen, "L'Alliance Franco-Russe," and "L'Ambassade à Paris du Baron de Mohrenheim"; Albin, "L'Allemagne et la France, 1885-1904"; Tardieu, "La France et les Alliances"; Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," V; Pribram, "Secret Treaties," II, Appendix B; Welschinger, "L'Alliance Franco-Russe"; *American Historical Review*, April, 1920.

Two years later the war scare of 1875 afforded Russia an opportunity of displaying her good will to France. Though neither Bismarck nor his master desired another war, the military leaders in Berlin spoke freely of a final reckoning with a neighbour who was recovering from her misfortunes more rapidly than had been anticipated, and might be expected to give trouble in the future. The letter of Queen Victoria to the Emperor was not without moral effect, but it was the journey of the Tsar and Gortchakoff to Berlin which, at any rate in French eyes, removed the danger. The Russian intervention and the Chancellor's celebrated telegram from Berlin, "maintenant la paix est assurée," which roused the undying resentment of Bismarck, were welcomed by anxious French Ministers both as an indication of practical sympathy and as a harbinger of more intimate relations in the future. "Soyez forts, Général," said the Tsar to the French Ambassador Le Flô. And Gortchakoff added, "Nous voulons la France aussi forte que par le passé et Paris aussi brillant."

The Duc Decazes, who ruled at the Quai d'Orsay during the scare and who, like President Macmahon, desired a Russian alliance, fell in 1877.¹ He was succeeded by Waddington and Macmahon by Grévy, both of whom believed that France would be safer in humouring Bismarck than in insuring herself against his hypothetical designs. Goutant-Biron was replaced at Berlin by St. Vallier, who was determined to restore friendly relations and was warmly welcomed by the Chancellor. During the tension in the Near East following the Treaty of Berlin, when the Tsar was boiling with indignation against the Central Powers, France could probably have made an alliance with Russia. Gortchakoff was Franco-phil, and the Grand Duke Nicholas, brother of the Tsar

¹ The remarkable Franco-German *rapprochement* of 1878-85 may be traced in "Die Grosse Politik," III, 381-454; E. Daudet, "La France et l'Allemagne," 2 vols.; and Bourgeois et Pagès, "Les Origines et les Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre," 181-219 and 365-95.

and commander in the campaign of 1877, who spent the winter of 1879-1880 in Paris, established cordial relations with French officers. Waddington, however, wisely refused to be involved in Russia's quarrels at the other end of Europe. "I think Russia is inclined to a *rapprochement*," he observed in handing over the Foreign Office to his successor at the end of 1879, "but Bismarck has his eye on us. If a treaty were on the anvil he might reply with war." Accordingly when Freycinet was informally approached from Petrograd, the cautious Premier merely advised the fostering of sympathies between the two Governments, adding that nothing must be known, "for an evil will is on the watch which can wreck our endeavours."¹ Gambetta, who had tacitly abandoned the policy of *revanche* and desired to make Bismarck's acquaintance, was equally opposed to an association which under existing circumstances would be a source rather of danger than of strength. "France must play a secondary rôle in Europe and be very reserved till we have got a very strong army," he remarked to Jules Hansen, a Gallicized Dane, "and then I, like you, shall be a partisan of a Russian alliance."² The Chancellor responded by supporting French designs on Tunis and by ordering the German representative at the Conference on Morocco which met at Madrid in 1880 to go "hand in hand" with France. So little disposition was there at Paris towards a *rapprochement* that early in 1880 Freycinet refused the extradition of Hartmann, who was charged with planning a bomb attack on the Tsar. Since no extradition treaty had been concluded, the French Government was within its rights in refusing to deliver the suspect; but the Tsar

¹ "Life of Dufferin," I, 304. Bismarck told Lord Dufferin on Dec. 14, 1879, that Russian overtures were made through General Obroutcheff, who had been sent to the French manœuvres, but that, as Chanzy reported that Russia was unready for war, the French Government was adverse to adventure.

² Hansen, "L'Alliance Franco-Russe," ch. 1. For the change in Gambetta's opinions see Mme. Adam, "Souvenirs," VI and VII; and Galli, "Gambetta et l'Alsace-Lorraine."

showed his displeasure by temporarily recalling his Ambassador. Jules Ferry, who succeeded Freycinet and dominated French policy during the following years, was even less disposed than his predecessor to link the fortunes of France with those of Russia, for he required and received the good will of Bismarck and of Prince Hohenlohe, the influential German Ambassador, in his task of refounding a French Colonial Empire. In 1884 General Camponon, Minister of War, observed to the German Chargé that the past was past and that Germany and France united would rule the world; and Barrère remarked to Herbert Bismarck, "Il n'y a plus de méfiance chez nous." When Freycinet returned to power after Ferry's fall in 1885 he once more angered the Russian Government by the release of Prince Kropotkin from a French prison before the expiration of his sentence, by the expulsion of the Orleanist princes from France, and by the brusque recall of General Appert, the French Ambassador, to whom the Tsar was greatly attached.¹ The autocrat, whose feelings for the French Republicans were described by Giers as those of contempt and disgust, angrily refused to receive the Ambassador designate, General Billot, or any one else, and recalled his own Ambassador from Paris. "Ambassadors are quite unnecessary under present circumstances," he explained; "Chargés d'Affaires are enough." Meanwhile Herbette, the newly appointed Ambassador to Berlin, declared that his task was to convince Bismarck that "Déroulèdisme" was dead.

The disintegration of the Dreikaiserbund owing to the Austro-Russian quarrel over Bulgaria turned the eyes of the Slavophiles towards Paris. On July 31, 1886, Katkoff opened his campaign with an article in the *Moscow Gazette* which echoed through Europe.² "There is talk of a meeting of the three Ministers at Kissingen. Will the Russian Minister find it necessary to go and make his bow before

¹ The General had Orleanist sympathies.

² Cyon, "Histoire de l'Entente Franco-Russe," 153-4.

the irascible Chancellor? He is believed to govern the world. But is it so? Did the German Empire create itself? Is not the preponderance of this
Katkov and
Déroulède empire the product of the voluntary servitude of Russia? If Germany stands so high, is it not because she has climbed on Russia's shoulders? If Russia were to resume her liberty of action, the phantom of German omnipotence would vanish. We are not asking for a Franco-Russian alliance. We wish that Russia should remain in free and friendly relations with Germany, but also that similar relations should be established with the other nations, and above all with France, who occupies in an increasing degree a situation in Europe worthy of her power. What have we to quarrel about, and what are her domestic concerns to us?" A fortnight later Madame Adam, the friend of Gambetta till he tacitly abandoned the *Revanche*, transferred the *Nouvelle Revue*, which she had founded as the organ of unbending nationalism, to a disciple of Katkov, Élie de Cyon, a Russian doctor, who had settled in Paris during the 'seventies and had become a French citizen. French opinion, disappointed by the fruits of colonial adventure, began to share Clemenceau's conviction that the place for her soldiers was on her eastern frontier. Before the end of the summer Déroulède, author of the *Chants du Soldat* and the outspoken champion of the *Revanche*, visited Russia, where he was received by Katkov and the Slavophiles with open arms. The effect of the campaign quickly became apparent. "The note of the Russian Press," reported the Belgian Minister at Petrograd on December 3, "is extreme friendliness for France, who is considered as a future ally destined to paralyse Germany in the event of an Austro-Russian conflict."¹ Katkov's initial disclaimer of a wish for a definite alliance had been a tactical move. "I hate France," he wrote in May, 1887, "for she has been and is a school of revolutionary propaganda. But now, when Russia is

¹ Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," V, 155.

threatened by Austria and Germany, an alliance is imposed upon us by an ineluctable necessity."

The Tsar himself, moved less by the drift of opinion than by his anger with Austria, invited Freycinet in September to conclude an alliance.¹ The Premier, the President and the majority of Ministers refused the offer and informed the German Ambassador. Despite this rebuff diplomatic relations were resumed in October. Mohrenheim returned to Paris, and Laboulaye, who had spent two years at Petrograd as First Secretary, was accepted by the Tsar. In taking leave of President Grévy the new Ambassador **Grévy and
Flourens** inquired whether he had no message to send. "None whatever," replied Grévy; "we have nothing to expect from him. Nobody wants France, and France wants nobody. If we stay quietly at home no one will come and attack us." The atmosphere at Petrograd was only a little less frosty. "I desire the best relations with France," observed the Tsar on receiving the Ambassador. "The times are difficult, and crises are perhaps at hand. Russia ought to be able to count on France and France on Russia. Unfortunately you are yourselves going through crises which prevent you pursuing a consistent policy and do not admit of collaboration. That is very regrettable, for we need a strong France, and we have need of each other. I hope France will understand this."

The fall of Freycinet at the end of the year brought Flourens to the Quai d'Orsay; and the new Foreign Minister seized the first opportunity of displaying his good will towards Russia. On January 9, 1887, the Bulgarian delegates, in their journey through Europe in search of support in their quarrel with Russia, were unofficially received by Flourens, who advised them in plain terms no longer to thwart Russian aims. At a time when every European statesman except Bismarck was a critic of

¹ "Die Grosse Politik," VI, 91-124. The approach was made indirectly, without the knowledge of Giers, who refused to believe that it was authorized by the Tsar.

Russia's high-handed conduct in Bulgaria, the support of the French Government caused pleasure and gratitude in Petrograd. The way was thus prepared for Russia to render a still greater service to France. At the end of 1886 Boulanger, as Minister of War, resolved to increase the troops on the Eastern frontier, where they were inferior in number to the Germans, and for this purpose ordered the erection of new barracks. Germany replied by recalling 75,000 reservists to the colours, and Herbert Bismarck, the interim Foreign Secretary, expressed himself in unfriendly tones. An inquiry of the Ambassador in Paris as to the reason of this measure brought a vague reply; and Flourens, in fear of an attack, confided his apprehensions to Hansen, whom he knew to be in close touch with the Russian Ambassador. What, asked Flourens, would Russia do if Germany were to ask us for explanations as to our troops and Boulanger's order for new barracks? The question was duly referred to Mohrenheim, who telegraphed to Giers and received the brief reply, "Schuvaloff répondra." Schuvaloff, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, was accordingly instructed to inform the German Government that in the opinion of the Tsar France had a right to do what she liked on her own territory. A few days later, on January 31, 1887, Bleichröder, the great Jewish banker from whom few of Bismarck's secrets were hid, observed to Herbette, the French Ambassador, "There was nothing to worry about, and it was only a misunderstanding without importance." The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* declared that Germany had no intention of asking for explanations, and Herbette telegraphed home that France could be easy.

The tension provoked by the order for barracks was relieved, but the danger of a collision remained. On February 6 Schweinitz, the German Ambassador, asked the Tsar whether he would remain neutral in a Franco-German war, in which case he could do what he liked in the Near East. "Russia was neutral in the three wars,"

replied the monarch, "though it would have been her plain interest to abandon neutrality. To-day Russia must consult her own interests in a greater degree, and cannot constantly aid Prussia, who is besides the ally of the Emperor Francis Joseph." The annihilation of France, he added, would completely alter the European equilibrium, and he was therefore unable to promise neutrality. The Tsar merely wished to keep his hands free, and was not yet prepared for a French alliance, though he wrote that France could count on his moral support. Mohrenheim approved Flourens' intention to propose a defensive alliance. "You must send some one to Petrograd not too much *en vue*, who would ask, 'Would the attitude of France in the case of a war in the East be indifferent to Russia? If not, is a formal entente possible?'" Flourens selected the Marquis de Vogüé; but when he was ready to start Giers reported that the Tsar thought the time inopportune for an alliance, which would alarm other Powers.

While Boulanger remained at the Ministry of War one crisis followed another; for he was loyal neither to the Republic nor to his colleagues. On a Sunday in February the wife of the Foreign Minister visited the daughter of Count Münster, the German Ambassador, in a state of great excitement.¹ Boulanger had written to the Tsar, urging an accord which would keep Germany quiet, and had ordered the French Military Attaché, at that moment on leave in Paris, to return to his post with the letter. "If it is not stopped," she added, "my husband will resign. You would not believe what is in the letter." The Attaché, as in duty bound, informed the Foreign Minister of the event, and the letter never left Paris. A Cabinet was held, and Flourens threatened resignation; but though some of his colleagues would have preferred to get rid of the firebrand, he was allowed to remain on promising to abstain from such dangerous irregularities.

¹ See Beyens' report of Feb. 8, 1887; in Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," V, 171-2.

The Schnaebelen crisis which occurred shortly afterwards made a Russian alliance a burning question. The French

The Ambassador, acting on his own initiative, asked Giers what Russia would do if France were attacked, and Giers replied that the Tsar "dirait son mot." Flourens disapproved the Ambassador's action, fearing it might reach Bismarck's ears; but the trend of French policy was clearly shown in forwarding the Bulgarian letters to the Tsar and in the protest of the two Powers against the Drummond Wolff Convention. "It has delivered France from her isolation," wrote the Belgian Minister in Vienna,¹ "and has advertised the political intimacy of France and Russia, hitherto more or less platonic, while, on the other hand, it has strengthened the ties which unite the four other Powers. This division into two camps portends serious dangers to peace. The ever-growing hostility of Russia to Germany, and the ideas of revenge more vocal than ever in France since her people believe they have found an ally at Petrograd, cause anxiety here as elsewhere." The Belgian Minister at Berlin reported that the French Ambassador made no attempt to conceal his satisfaction. "L'empire des Tsars est à la mode," wrote the Belgian Chargé from Paris on March 4, 1888. "In the theatre, the Press, the street, everything serves as a pretext for demonstrations."

Political sympathy was reinforced by economic need. When Bismarck retaliated against the raising of the tariff and the decree forbidding foreigners to own land on the frontier by closing the German Bourse to Russian loans and encouraging Press attacks on Russian securities, his usual sureness of touch deserted him and he drove his formidable neighbour into the arms of the French Bourse. Russia had hitherto raised her loans mainly in Germany, though Holland and France (through the house of Rothschild) had been minor investors. But the political no less than the economic advantage of supplying Russia with the

¹ Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," V, 200, 202.

ever-increasing sums which she needed became clear to French financiers. An offer of assistance at the end of 1887 from a syndicate formed by Hoskier, a naturalized Dane, was declined; but in the autumn of 1888 the Russian Finance Minister invited a French group to send a plenipotentiary, and in October Hoskier arrived in the Russian capital. The Minister desired to convert the National Debt, and wished to test the French market in order to learn if it was as well disposed as the syndicate affirmed. For this purpose he asked for five hundred million francs at four per cent., and Hoskier undertook to find them. On December 10 the loan was issued at 86.45, and over-subscribed by 110,000 applicants. The Tsar expressed his gratitude to Hoskier for freeing Russia from dependence on Berlin. In the following year three hundred and sixty million francs at four per cent., issued at 93, were subscribed for unifying earlier loans, and the house of Rothschild raised loans of seven hundred millions in March and twelve hundred and forty-two millions in May. Such sums are only lent by one Great Power to another when an alliance is in being or in sight.

The Loan
of 1888

While the financiers were weaving their threads in public, the soldiers were at work behind the scenes. In November, 1888, an incident occurred, unknown to the public, which committed Russia far more than the acceptance of a loan. The Grand Duke Vladimir visited Paris and informed Freycinet, the Minister for War, of his wish to inspect the new French rifle.¹ "I should like to have one and some cartridges to experiment with. You can rest assured it would not leave my hands." The Minister, not a little surprised, consulted his colleagues, who authorized the transaction. Two months later the Military Attaché inquired if French experts would examine a similar type of rifle which might perhaps be manufactured in France for Russia. The Ministers again agreed, scenting an alliance in the wind. Russian artillery officers accord-

¹ Freycinet, "Souvenirs," II, 414-18.

ingly travelled to Paris and were soon in intimate relations with French experts. The next stage was a request by the Russian Ambassador to allow engineers to study the powder factories with a view to erecting similar factories in Russia. Finally, early in 1889, the Military Attaché asked whether France would manufacture 500,000 rifles. "Delighted," replied Freycinet, "but we should like to be assured that they will never fire at Frenchmen."¹ "We will give you full guarantees," was the reply; and Mohrenheim, at Freycinet's wish, confirmed his assurance to the Foreign Minister. The manufacture of the rifles only began in 1890, when Freycinet was Premier; but meanwhile the Russian officers studied the system of mobilization, transport and supply under the guidance of General Miribel, Chief of the Staff, and General Boisdeffre, ex-Military Attaché at Petrograd. At the same time a French engineer was dispatched to Russia to organize the manufacture of munitions.

The formation of the Freycinet Cabinet in March, 1890, was of decisive importance in the story of Franco-Russian relations. In earlier years Freycinet had not been reckoned the friend of Russia; but the reiterated expressions of confidence which he had recently experienced as Minister of War had transformed him into a warm advocate of an alliance, and President Carnot and Ribot, the new Foreign Minister, were no less favourable. The fall of Bismarck and the termination of the Reinsurance Treaty by his successor removed a formidable obstacle to co-operation. In May the Grand Duke Nicholas, whose visit to Paris ten years earlier has already been mentioned, asked to see the Premier, and told him that he was no less interested in the French army than in his own. "If I have any voice in the matter, the two will be one in time of war. And that, if it were known, would prevent war, for no one would care to challenge France and Russia." After inquiries as to the army and navy he parted

¹ Freycinet, "Souvenirs," II, 440-514.

from the Premier with the words: "In me France has a friend."¹

In the same month the French Cabinet had the opportunity of rendering the Tsar a valued service. The Ambassador asked for the arrest of Nihilists who were engaged in making bombs and preparing to start for Russia; and when nine men were seized by Constans, the energetic Minister of the Interior, with powerful bombs in their possession, the Tsar expressed his gratitude. Following up his success, the French Government inquired whether General Boisdeffre, Chief of the Staff, might receive an invitation to the manœuvres, at which the Kaiser was also to be present. The request was graciously granted, and the General was the object of the friendliest attentions. "The most important aspect of his journey," reported the Ambassador, "for which I had desired a general officer to be invited, is that which concerns the Government. The *rapprochement* of France and Russia, which scarcely three years ago seemed an illusion, has gradually become solid enough for a visit like that of the Kaiser to arouse no apprehensions. It is not enough, however, to record this Platonic result; we must draw conclusions—though not on the political plane. Without counting the probable resistance of a sovereign who cherishes his complete freedom, there are two objections. Firstly, a declared entente would consolidate the Triple Alliance, which is now weakening; secondly, we must hide the defect of our Constitution which prevents the Chief of the State concluding treaties, and thus deprives our politics of the advantage of secrecy. The military plane remains. After we have facilitated the arming of the Russian infantry there is only one step to take—and this I hope Boisdeffre's mission would achieve. I think it has been taken. There will now be contact between the General Staffs."²

Mission of
Boisdeffre

¹ Freycinet, II, 440-514.

² Laboulaye to Ribot, Aug. 24. This is the first document in the Yellow Book "L'Alliance Franco-Russe," published in 1918.

The Tsar was not yet converted to an alliance, reported Boisdeffre on his return; but many of his countrymen believed that the Rubicon had been crossed. "The dream obsesses every-one at Paris," wrote the Belgian Minister on September 17. "It comes from the very natural desire to lean on a great nation in resisting attack from the Central Powers; but it has become also a matter of sentiment. The infatuation for Russia has gained all classes. This Power is as popular to-day as Poland under the Second Empire. Many are convinced of the existence of a sort of entente—secret engagements if not a treaty. Thus the arrival of any official personage acquires the proportions of an event, and the Grand Dukes can no longer travel in France without political significance being attached to the visits of courtesy which they pay to the authorities. A new journal, *L'Union Franco-Russe*, has just appeared, and reproduces the dithyrambs of the Paris Press in honour of the Russian alliance. The contrast between the institutions of the two countries is not felt in Paris."¹

While Boisdeffre was establishing contact with the Russian Staff, Freycinet and Barbey, his Minister of Marine, discussed the possibility of sending the northern squadron to the Baltic. The project was supported by the French Embassy in Petrograd, and encouraged by Mohrenheim and the Russian officers in Paris. When the question was raised in the Cabinet, Ribot inquired anxiously what the other Powers would say; but he was speedily converted, and Laboulaye was instructed to sound whether the fleet should add Cronstadt to its programme in its forthcoming visit to Copenhagen, Christiania and Stockholm in September. The Russian Government accepted the suggestion in principle, but, as the Tsar was going south, the date of the rendezvous was postponed. The reports from Petrograd during the winter were so favourable that in January, 1891, France renewed the pro-

¹ Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," V, 274-5.

posal, and the fleet was officially invited to visit Cronstadt in July.

At this moment one of the incidents or accidents which constitute the romance of high politics rendered France more acutely conscious than ever of her need for a powerful friend. The Empress Frederick visited Paris in February, 1891, and resided at the German Embassy. When her visits to the *ateliers* were followed by pilgrimages to Versailles and St. Cloud, bitter memories were revived and hostile manifestations began. On February 26 the Kaiser gave preliminary orders for mobilization, to be carried out if his mother were molested on her departure on the following day. The threat was unknown to the public, and owing to the anxious precautions of the Government, and the departure of the train an hour before the specified time, the danger was averted.¹ A few days later (March 9) Mohrenheim read to Ribot a dispatch from Giers praising the correctness of French action during the visit of the Empress. "The Entente Cordiale so happily established between us," added Giers, "is the best guarantee of peace. While the Triplice ruins itself in armaments, the intimate accord of our two countries is needed to maintain in Europe a just equilibrium of forces." Mohrenheim added that these declarations possessed great importance, and that the Russian Government had never spoken so clearly. The accord, he added, was now as firm as granite. He then asked what the French Government thought of his *démarche*. Ribot replied that they appreciated its importance, that they considered the entente now established indispensable to the security of Europe, and that they were grateful to Russia for choosing the occasion of these recent incidents to reveal its necessity.

The presentation of the Grand Cross of St. Andrew to President Carnot at the same moment was taken in Paris as an emphatic declaration of confidence; but neither the Tsar nor his Foreign Minister had any affection for France.

¹ Freycinet, "Souvenirs," II, 457-9.

"The significance of the distinction has been greatly exaggerated," remarked Giers to the Roumanian Minister. "It has often been given. France suggested a treaty, and we have refused. The Emperor did not wish for an engagement with a Republic which he does not love, and besides, the men in office change too frequently. It would be ungracious not to respond in some measure to the advances and amiabilities which are showered on us."¹ The entente was indeed still at the mercy of an incident.

**The
Russian
Jews**

In May the house of Rothschild withdrew at the eleventh hour from its undertaking to raise a loan, nominally in consequence of the persecution which was driving thousands of Jews across the frontier, and Russia believed that the step would not have been taken without the prompting of the Government. When a much-advertised French exhibition was opened at Moscow a few days later, the Tsar openly manifested his displeasure. The banquet was countermanded, the Tsar forbade his brother Serge, Governor of Moscow, to appear, and the reception was so chilling that the French Committee returned to Paris on the day of the opening. Politically and commercially the exhibition was a failure. Baron Marschall, the German Foreign Minister, believed that the persecution of the Jews was a mere pretext for the withdrawal of the loan, and that the real cause was the rejection of the French request for support in a Franco-German war.

The momentary tension between France and Russia was ended by the renewal of the Triple Alliance.² During Crispi's tenure of office, which began in 1887, the friendliness of Italy to her allies reached its height, while her relations with France became very strained. In 1888 France declined to renew the commercial treaty, and in 1890 Crispi would have resisted the fortification of Bizerta if he had been able to induce Great Britain to join in the struggle. In 1889 he urged Austria to make a military

¹ Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," V, 281-2.

² See Pribram, "Secret Treaties," II, ch. 3.

and naval convention on the lines of her convention with Germany in 1888, but, though pressed by Bismarck, Kalnoky declined. The Austrian Minister was equally unaccommodating in 1890, when Crispi suggested that the Triple Alliance should form a single treaty with common obligations. No change was required, he argued. Austria could not assume responsibility for Tripoli and Morocco, and Italy had never suggested supporting Austria against Russia. Crispi was succeeded early in 1891 by the Francophil Rudini and France Rudini, who immediately entered into conversations with France. The Triple Alliance, he declared, was purely defensive; but when France asked to see the text he refused. He also declined to answer the question whether, if France seized Alsace-Lorraine, Italy would be bound to support Germany. This indiscreet and indeed almost impertinent demand, confided Marschall to the Belgian Minister, completely cured Rudini of his hopes of a *rapprochement* with France.¹ He therefore presented a draft agreement at Berlin, where Caprivi willingly accepted an increase of German obligations. The third treaty of the Triple Alliance was signed on May 6, 1891, for six years, with an extension of another six years unless notice was given. At Italy's wish the two pacts were merged in one, and a Final Protocol was added; each promised all the economic advantages compatible with existing engagements, and binding them to try to secure the extension of British support of the *status quo* in Turkey to western Mediterranean territories.

The renewal of the Triple Alliance, backed by the unconcealed sympathy of Great Britain, made it plain that if Russia wanted to escape from isolation and impotence she could only find a partner in France; and though the Tsar's distaste for republicanism and his distrust of the continuity of French policy were unabated, he was now prepared to consider proposals for co-operation. On July 23 a French squadron entered Russian

¹ April 10, 1891. Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," V, 279.

waters for the first time since the Crimean war, and was received at Cronstadt with a cordiality which far surpassed the warmth of the usual official greetings, **The Cronstadt Visit** and opened a new chapter in European history. The climax was reached when, after the French naval band had rendered the Russian national anthem, the Tsar ordered the naval band to play the Marseillaise, hitherto forbidden in public places, and listened to it standing and uncovered.¹ The sailors who visited Petrograd and Moscow were astonished at the enthusiasm which they evoked. "When the fleet weighed anchor," writes Freycinet, "the *rapprochement* was made. It merely remained to translate it into official language. The Tsar had committed himself." The Cronstadt festivities created a profound impression throughout Europe, and in certain quarters alarm. "Till now," reported the Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, "the German Government never believed in the possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance. It will stimulate the hopes of the *exaltés* in both countries, and accumulate explosive material to which certain people are only too anxious to apply a match. The *rapprochement* is based solely on the common hatred for Germany, and must therefore have an aggressive character." "British opinion," pronounced the Belgian Minister in London, "does not apprehend immediate danger to peace; but the Franco-Russian alliance cannot fail to be aggressive without disappointing the hopes which have given it birth. Both countries will cease to display reserve. One of them will protest with greater energy than ever in regard to Alsace and Egypt, the other will demand new concessions from the Porte."²

Europe was correct in its view of the significance of the event. On the eve of the arrival of the French squadron the French Ambassador reported an intimate

¹ The playing of the Marseillaise was again forbidden after the departure of the fleet.

² Aug. 1. Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," V, 285-6.

conversation with the Foreign Minister. "He spoke of the renewal of the Triple Alliance and of the indirect accession of England, and we asked ourselves if the new situation did not render desirable a further step on the road to an entente. As Giers may reopen the question, please send me instructions." "I told the President and Freycinet of Giers' overture," replied Ribot on July 24. "We think, after the renewal of the Triple Alliance, that we should fortify the guarantees which our entente assures us. We will therefore receive very favourably any proposals they may make. If Russia is thinking of an alliance to pursue certain political aims, we should examine it with care; but I gather the projected accord would be simpler. We think it enough to agree that the Governments will confer on any question threatening peace, and that if peace be menaced by a member of the Triple Alliance, France and Russia would at once take measures to prevent a surprise—in other words, would agree to mobilize as soon as a member of the other group mobilized, the conditions of mobilization to be fixed by the Staffs. Such an accord is all that we wish at present, and circumstances were never more favourable to its conclusion."

Russia
needs
Allies

On August 5 Giers informed Laboulaye that the Tsar accepted the principle of exchange of views, which he considered the natural sequel of what passed during the visit of the French squadron. The Russian Government, reported Laboulaye, seemed to wish not to confine the accord to the preservation of peace in Europe, or to a menace to peace by a member of the Triple Alliance. In other words, Russia desired the help of France against Great Britain as well as Germany and Austria. On August 10 the Ambassador was received by the Tsar, who observed that an entente was decided, but that its terms could not be settled in a hurry. "Mohrenheim must come for consultation, and then I think we shall see our way clearer." While the Ambassador was on his way to

Petrograd Ribot explained the situation to President Carnot. "Giers clearly wishes to avoid a firm engagement as to a military convention. Freycinet, on the other hand, is anxious for the Staffs to agree on the method of co-operation, fearing that Russia would direct all her forces against Austria, and leave France to face Germany and Italy. Moreover, the Tsar does not wish Germany to feel menaced by an alliance with a *revanche* Power."

Four days later Mohrenheim handed to Ribot an official letter from Giers, by which the Dual Alliance was established in principle. The situation created by the renewal of the Triple Alliance and the more or less probable adhesion of England to its political aims, has led to the discussion of guarantees of peace.

**The
Political
Agreement**

1. To define and consecrate the Entente Cordiale which unites them, the two Governments declare that they will confer on every question of a nature to threaten peace.

2. If peace is in danger, and especially if one of the two is menaced by aggression, they agree to concert measures.

Ribot accepted the formula, and declarations were exchanged on August 27; but his desire to appoint experts to work out practical measures found no response in Petrograd. "The Tsar thinks this enough for the present," wrote Giers to Mohrenheim, "and reserves consideration of the military question till his return to Russia, when he will discuss it with the Foreign Minister and the Minister of War." "We could not have secured more," comments Freycinet. "These stipulations, however, were not sufficiently practical. They prescribed joint action but did not determine its conditions. A military convention was needed." The first step, however, was of incalculable importance, and the Premier made discreet allusion to it on September 9 in a speech before

the foreign guests at the autumn manœuvres. "The Government of France, despite superficial changes, is capable of sustained designs, and it brings to the accomplishment of national tasks a consistency not inferior to that of any monarchy. No one doubts to-day that we are strong. We shall prove that we are wise. We shall know how to maintain, in a new situation, the tranquillity, the dignity and the measure which in evil days prepared the way for our recovery."

The Cronstadt demonstration and the agreement to confer were followed by a fresh appeal to the French investor. The house of Rothschild, at the instance of the London branch, declined to assist the Russian Government while it persecuted its Jewish subjects; and Hoskier, the obliging Dane who had proved useful in 1888, was now invited to Petrograd. Money was required no longer for conversion, but for railways and public works; but the moment was unfavourable, owing to the Russian famine, the Argentine crisis, the Baring failure and other untoward circumstances. Hoskier and his friends accordingly invited the assistance of Hambro in London, Hope in Amsterdam, and above all the *Crédit Foncier*. The latter, being under government supervision, had to ask for permission to participate, which was granted by Rouvier, the Minister of Finance. A 3 per cent. loan was issued at 79¾, and a million bonds of 500 francs were offered for sale. The response was overwhelming, 7,500,000 bonds being applied for in France and 300,000 elsewhere. That the loan was over-subscribed eight times seemed flattering to Russia; but large numbers had bought in order to sell. Indeed, so many bonds were immediately offered for sale that the price fell and dragged down other Russian loans in its fall. The situation was saved by the Russian Government itself buying till the price rose to 77. In the long series of French loans to Russia, that of 1891 alone caused a momentary anxiety. By the time that the Dual Alliance was completed in the last

Loans
and
Speculations

days of 1893 the French investor had staked four milliards on the political and economic solvency of his new friend.

Freycinet and Ribot were determined not to rest till they had secured a military convention. They consulted the Russian Ambassador, who advised them **Russia moves Slowly** to approach the Tsar during his holiday in Denmark. Hansen accordingly journeyed to Fredensborg in September and handed an *aide-mémoire* to a member of the Tsar's entourage. He brought back the message that the Tsar would seriously consider the matter on his return home. The next opportunity of pushing forward the project was on the occasion of Giers' visit to Paris in November. The Russian statesman observed that a profound change had occurred in the European situation. There was no longer a question of German hegemony, and Caprivi was right in saying that the equilibrium was restored. When, however, his hosts urged the necessity of a military agreement in time of peace, Giers replied that he could transmit, but not discuss, a proposal that was for the Tsar alone to determine. It was only with difficulty, he added, that his master had been brought to approve the formula of common counsel. In discussing the visit after the departure of the Russian Foreign Minister, Mohrenheim told Freycinet that Giers had been won, but that the Tsar, who liked time to mature his decisions, must not be hustled.

Though a military convention was still far off, the Governments commenced diplomatic co-operation as if they were already political and military allies. It was agreed to inform the Sultan that the Franco-Russian entente was not pointed against Turkey, but to add that she must only count on their good will if she aided them to frustrate the manœuvres of the Triple Alliance. It was further agreed to maintain the Capitulations in Egypt and to preserve the *status quo* in the Mediterranean. In a dispatch to the French Ambassador in Turkey, Ribot

reported and expressed his satisfaction with the conversations, especially in regard to the East. "I said that we could co-operate there at once if we could convince the Sultan that our entente did not menace him. Giers replied that the Tsar would undertake no action against him and that he did not covet Constantinople. I suggested the issue of similar instructions to our respective Ambassadors to impart this information to the Sultan. We must also co-operate in regard to the Holy Places. In Egypt Russia will only give us moral support; but the Sultan will understand that Russia and France are his only friends in defending Egypt against England."

A few days later Giers forwarded his instructions to the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople. "The *rap-prochement* has, as its immediate result, produced everywhere an appeasement and a feeling of security which Europe has lacked for many years. Our Near East policy is the *status quo*, and the prevention of others from exerting influence over the Sultan contrary to our views—such as the recent attempt of the Triple Alliance, aided by England, to intimidate him by the dispatch of fleets in Turkish waters. Encourage him to believe that the equilibrium is now restored, and that France and Russia can guarantee him against aggression by the rival group. The insinuations as to Russia's supposed aggressive intentions are false. Tell the Sultan not only that we do not menace him, but that, so long as he maintains loyal neutrality, we would be ready to defend him. France is equally free from thoughts of aggression. Her chief interest in the East is Egypt, the occupation of which she desires to shorten. Russia hopes that the Sultan will not recognize Ferdinand. France has had no official dealings with the illegal Government which has installed itself at Sofia. The only delicate point in our relations in the East is the Holy Places. Co-operation is impossible, since Russia must defend the Orthodox against attacks of other Confessions, and France is Protector of the Catholics. The agents of

**Diplomatic
Co-operation**

both must therefore act as moderators." A copy of Giers' dispatch was forwarded to Ribot, who enclosed it to Paul Cambon at Constantinople. "Tell the Sultan," he added, "that France is friendly; but if he is feeble or complaisant to the Triple Alliance, France and Russia will consult their own interests. France will keep a portion of her Mediterranean fleet in the Levant."

On December 11 the French Ambassador, the Marquis de Montebello, who had replaced Laboulaye, had his first audience with the Tsar, who, though friendly, made no reference to the alliance. Giers explained that his master appreciated the value of a military convention, but thought there was no hurry and wished to discuss it with a high French officer such as Miribel or Boisdeffre. If this was considered likely to attract attention, a Russian officer could be sent to Paris. Giers added that only the Tsar and himself were aware of what had taken place. Ribot, delighted that the cautious monarch had at last expressed a desire for discussion, forwarded a scheme drawn up by Generals Miribel and Saussier and revised by Freycinet. Defensive war alone was contemplated. Each should aid the other with its whole strength. Simultaneous mobilization should follow mobilization by the Triple Alliance. A review of the forces of the five Continental Powers showed that, though the Dual Alliance possessed more soldiers, the Triple Alliance could concentrate its forces more rapidly. Germany was the principal enemy, and Austria and Italy would collapse if Germany were beaten. France should therefore direct five-sixths of her forces against Germany and one-sixth against Italy. Russia could master Austria with half her army, and should direct the other half against Germany. The Tsar handed the document to General Wannovski for leisurely study, and in due course departed for a prolonged sojourn in Denmark. The delay alarmed and indeed exasperated the statesmen at Paris, who feared that a change of Ministry might at any moment imperil negotiations which had been kept a

profound secret. "The Tsar does not love new faces," remarked Mohrenheim to Freycinet. "If you fall he will take a long time to decide."

The impatience and irritation of the French Ministers increased from month to month. "Europe is tranquil," wrote Ribot in May, 1892, "but for how long? Giers is timid and ill, and is afraid of too precise engagements. You must agree with him and the Minister of War on a draft and then send it to me for the Ministry to discuss. Boisdeffre is ready when needed to discuss technical questions with the Russian staff." "The necessity of a military convention," he added in July, "was recognized in August, 1891; but to this day nothing has been done, partly owing to the illness of Giers and the absence of the Tsar, though the Russian staff is as anxious for it as ourselves. If war broke out I should be blamed for not pressing it." The Ambassador soothingly replied that in the event of war Russia would co-operate, and that a Russian General was drawing up a scheme for the Tsar based on the Miribel memorandum.

Impatience
of France

The Tsar returned from Denmark at the end of July, and General Boisdeffre was invited to the manœuvres in August. He took with him a plan, resting on the principles of the February note, and discussions began with the Minister of War and the Chief of the Staff. Even now the greatest tact was needed. "The Chief of the Staff advises me not to seem in a hurry," reported the General on August 10, "as some people are trying to convince the Tsar that his hand is being forced. The War Minister does not wish for a military convention. The Russians do not share our wish for co-operation if Germany alone attacks. They also fear a change of Ministers in France, which would jeopardize the Treaty, and they are afraid of leakage. The Tsar is difficult to see, and very shy, and he does not understand French well. Giers is desperately ill in bed, and he fears France might be tempted to make war. Germany too might make

war when she learned that a convention was signed." Despite all these difficulties Boisdeffre and Obroucheff, Chief of the Staff, signed a military convention on August 17. "I have read, re-read, and studied it, and fully approve it in its *ensemble*," observed the Tsar next day to the General. Only the President, Ribot and Freycinet were to know. If its existence were communicated to the public, its provisions would leak out. "If it becomes public, for me the Treaty is annulled." "All the Ministers must know," replied the General. "And what harm is there for the world to know of the existence of a treaty, if it does not know its clauses, as in the case of the Triple Alliance?" The Tsar reiterated that the military convention must be kept secret. He believed that peace was not menaced at that moment, but he needed at least two years to complete his railways and munitions and to recover from famine and cholera.

The document was taken to Giers in Finland by Obroucheff, who read it aloud to the sick man. The Foreign Minister expressed approval, but **France suggests Alterations** remarked that he would read it again when his head was better. The prize seemed within grasp; but the French negotiators incautiously proceeded to make three alterations. In the sentence, "If a member of the Triplice mobilizes, France and Russia shall also mobilize," it was proposed to insert, "If any member of the Triplice makes a *general* mobilization." A precautionary mobilization of two or three army corps, for instance by Austria, would thus not constitute a *casus belli*. Secondly, France's obligation to provide 1,300,000 men was changed to "from 1,200,000 to 1,360,000." Thirdly, in place of the clause binding both parties to secrecy, the French, explaining that the President had no power to make treaties without the knowledge of Ministers, suggested as an alternative that the Treaty should only be divulged with the consent of both parties. These modifications, Boisdeffre believed, would prove acceptable and would not delay the signature of the con-

vention; but, innocent though they appeared to their authors, they provided a reason or an excuse for further procrastination. Giers had left for Aix in search of health, where Ribot and Freycinet, impatient to conclude the negotiations, found him in bed, too ill for discussion. The draft was left with him, and he promised his visitors to secure ratification on his return. His illness continued, and at the end of October Ribot asked the invalid, now at Monte Carlo, whether the project approved by the Tsar in August could not be signed with the trifling changes suggested at Paris. Giers replied that he was too ill to discuss the matter with the Tsar; and to the intense disappointment of the French statesmen the question slumbered throughout the winter and spring. The Panama scandal had its share in the Tsar's refusal to hurry. The Freycinet Cabinet fell in February, 1892; but Freycinet remained at the War Office and Ribot at the Quai d'Orsay for another year.

In May, 1893, the French Ambassador suggested to his Government that France should try to insert her three amendments not in the draft signed by the Chiefs of Staff but in an exchange of letters. **A Year's Delay**
This would be the quickest way of reaching the goal; and though it was impossible to renew the discussion at the moment, events might bring it up. A month later the Ambassador pressed for permission to propose his plan on the first favourable opportunity; but in July he had to confess that the new German army law necessitated modification of the figures of 1892. General Miribel accordingly drew up a note in August calling attention to the addition of 70,000 men to the German army. "The incidents of Aigues-Mortes and the presence of the Prince of Naples at the German manœuvres at Metz," reported the Ambassador on September 7, "provided an occasion for speaking to Giers, to whom I gave Miribel's note for the Tsar. We made a mistake last year in seeking to reopen negotiations after the draft was approved by the Tsar. He has acted in the spirit of accord,

and only the form remains unsettled. We shall settle it this winter." After so many disappointments the forecast seemed over-sanguine; but an event was soon to occur which removed the last scruples even of the dilatory autocrat.

In October, 1893, a Russian squadron visited Toulon, returning the visit to Cronstadt after an interval of two years. In Paris men and women ran beside their carriages to kiss or touch the hands of the officers, who were continually compelled to appear on their balconies, and sometimes even cut their gloves in pieces for distribution to the crowd below. Paris, Lyons and Marseilles publicly ratified the work which French statesmen and soldiers had been carrying on behind the scenes for several years. France knew nothing of the military convention or the difficulties which had prevented its signature; but she felt that she had found a powerful friend, who was already an ally in fact if not in name. Even now, however, the stolid Tsar declined to hurry; and it was not till December 17 that he asked to see the French Ambassador, to whom he expressed his surprise and delight at the welcome to his fleet. He was, nevertheless, disturbed by the frequent changes in the Ministries for War and Foreign Affairs, and made no reference to the Treaty. Yet the end was very near. A letter from Giers, dated December 27, brought joyful tidings. "After examining by supreme order the project of August, 1892, and submitting my view to the Emperor, I beg to inform you that the text of this arrangement may henceforth be considered as definitely adopted in its actual form." On the same day the French Ambassador wrote that it was also considered binding by France. After interminable delays Russia had at last taken the final step on her own initiative. The changes proposed in Paris were no longer pressed, and the French were by this time thankful to secure the coveted convention in its unamended form. The document signed by Giers and the Marquis of Montébello on

The
Toulon
Visit

December 31 was revealed by the French Government in 1918, when the Tsardom was overthrown and the alliance at an end.

“France and Russia being animated by an equal desire to maintain peace, and having no other aim than to be ready for a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against one or other of them, have agreed on the following :

The
Military
Convention

1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia will employ all her forces to attack Germany. If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France will employ all her forces to combat Germany.

2. In the event of the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any member of it, mobilizing, France and Russia, at the first news and without the need of preliminary accord, will immediately and simultaneously mobilize the whole of their forces and bring them as near as possible to their Frontiers.

3. The forces to be employed against Germany will be, on the part of France, 1,300,000 men, on the part of Russia 7 to 800,000. These forces will engage with all their might, so that Germany has to fight both on the East and West.

4. The staffs of the armies will co-operate at all times in preparing and facilitating the execution of the measures above contemplated. They will communicate in time of peace all the information relative to the armies of the Triple Alliance which comes to their knowledge. The ways and means of corresponding in time of war will be studied.

5. France and Russia will not conclude peace separately.

6. The present convention will have the same duration as the Triple Alliance.

7. All the clauses will be kept rigorously secret.”

Though nobody doubted that an alliance had been concluded, the momentous secret was not officially revealed to the world till January, 1895.

The Alliance Proclaimed "France has associated her interests with those of another nation," declared Ribot, at this time Prime Minister, "in the interest of peace and the European equilibrium. This alliance, ratified by the universal sentiment of the country, constitutes to-day our dignity and our strength." While some of his countrymen were content with this brief but pregnant announcement, others begged for further enlightenment. "If you have made an alliance, publish it," cried Goblet on June 10, in a debate on sending ships to the opening of the Kiel Canal; "we are strong enough to know and to tell the truth." His curiosity was not to be satisfied. "We have allied the interests of France to the interests of another nation," reiterated Ribot. "We have done it for the safeguarding of peace and the maintenance of the equilibrium of Europe. And if there is nothing changed in the aspirations of our policy, there is nevertheless something changed in Europe since 1891. You, M. Goblet, knew the Foreign Office at a difficult time, and you did not possess the security which we have found in this alliance." A week later Mohrenheim presented to President Faure the insignia of the Order of St. Andrew, and on the same day the French and Russian squadrons entered German waters together and passed through the Kiel Canal. It might have been difficult for a France without allies to share in the celebrations, but with a powerful ally at her side there was no loss of dignity.

Though polite and even friendly to France in his public utterances, the Kaiser was none the less profoundly disturbed by the Franco-Russian alliance. "I perfectly know that you do not dream of attacking us," he wrote to the Tsar on September 26, 1895, "but you cannot be astonished that the Powers get alarmed seeing how the presence of your officers and high officials in an official

way in France fans the inflammable Frenchman into a white-heated passion, and strengthens the cause of chauvinism and *revanche*. If you are allied for better or worse with the French, well then, keep those damned rascals in order and make them sit still."¹ A second admonition followed a month later. "It is not the friendship of France and Russia that makes me uneasy, but the danger to our principle of monarchism through the lifting up of the Republic on a pedestal. The constant appearance of Princes, Grand Dukes, etc., at reviews, burials, dinners, races, with the head of the Republic, makes Republicans believe they are quite honest, excellent people, with whom Princes can consort and feel at home. The Republicans are revolutionists *de natura*. The French Republic is from the source of the Great Revolution, and propagates its ideas. The blood of Their Majesties is still on that country. Has it since then ever been happy or quiet again? Has it not staggered from bloodshed to bloodshed and from war to war till it soused all Europe and Russia in streams of blood? Nicky, take my word, the curse of God has stricken that people for ever. We Christian Kings and Emperors have one holy duty imposed on us by heaven—to uphold the principle (by the Grace of God) *von Gottes Gnaden*. We can have good relations with the French Republic but never be intimate with her. I always fear that in frequent and long visits in France people without feeling it imbibe republican ideas."

"Willy's" warnings were wasted on "Nicky," who accepted the French alliance made by his father without enthusiasm, but with full conviction.² In 1896 the Tsar and Tsarina visited France—the first visit of a crowned head to the Third Republic—and received an ovation.

¹ "The Kaiser's Letters to the Tsar," 21-5.

² "We have rendered Europe a great service," remarked Lobanoff, the new Foreign Minister, to Hohenlohe in Feb., 1895, "in taking on France. God knows what these fellows would have been up to if we did not hold them in."—Hohenlohe, "Denkwürdigkeiten," II, 522.

Finally, when President Faure returned the visit in 1897, it was the turn of the Tsar authoritatively to proclaim that France and Russia were *nations amies et alliées*. In

the following years two additions were made to the edifice. The military convention

was limited to the duration of the Triple Alliance. What, then, it was asked, would happen if that Alliance were dissolved, for instance, by the death of Francis Joseph? Delcassé resolved to fill the gap, and on his visit to Russia in 1899 he secured the Tsar's assent to an agreement recorded in an exchange of letters between Delcassé and Muravieff, dated July 28, 1899. "The Governments, always bent on the maintenance of peace and equilibrium between European forces, confirm the diplomatic arrangement formulated in August, 1891. They decide that the project of the military convention of 1893 shall remain operative as long as the diplomatic accord." After a further interval a naval convention was drawn up in 1912.¹

The conclusion of the Dual Alliance was an event of capital importance not only for France and Russia, but for Europe. That a first-class Power should desire an alliance with France was an emphatic recognition that she had recovered from her catastrophic defeat. The glaring differences of political institutions and ideas were forgotten in the satisfaction of procuring a powerful friend, and the secrecy of its terms enabled eager patriots to hope that it might perhaps contain some assurance with regard to the recovery of the Rhine provinces. On the side of Russia, who had less cause to fret about prestige, the alliance was hailed as good business. Her plans of Far Eastern expansion, among them the Siberian Railway, required unlimited capital, which thrifty France was ready and indeed eager to supply at a moderate rate. From the standpoint of European politics the conclusion of the alliance was a sign that the reign of Bismarck was over.

¹ These documents are printed in the Yellow Book "L'Alliance Franco-Russe."

"The nightmare of coalitions," which haunted his later years, was beginning to take concrete shape. Henceforward Europe was divided into two armed camps, and entered on the path which led straight to the catastrophe of 1914. The Triple Alliance remained stronger than its rival, and so long as it could count on the sympathy of Great Britain its position was unassailable. But if Great Britain should ever be compelled to transfer her support from the older to the younger group, the diplomatic situation would be transformed, and the balance of power would be tilted against the Central Empires.

**The Two
Camps**

CHAPTER VI

WILLIAM II

THE death of the Emperor William I in March, 1888, at the ripe old age of 91, and of his suffering son, the Emperor Frederick, three months later, involved no immediate change in the foreign or domestic policy of Germany; for William II, then in his thirtieth year, was an almost idolatrous worshipper of his grandfather and of the Iron Chancellor.¹ On the other hand, it was an open secret that he had disapproved the liberal opinions of his parents, and his father regarded his eldest son with critical eyes. When in 1886 Bismarck, at the Prince's wish, obtained the Kaiser's permission to admit him to the secrets of the Foreign Office, the Crown Prince sharply expressed his disapproval. "In view of the unripeness and inexperience of my eldest son, combined with his tendency to bragging and conceit, I consider it positively

¹ The Kaiser's personality may be studied in his "Letters to the Tsar" (best edition by W. Goetz); "The Willy-Nicky Correspondence" (edited by H. Bernstein), which contains 57 telegrams of the years 1904-7; "The German Emperor's Speeches," translated by Elkind; and his "Memoirs." For his reign see the encyclopædic work "Deutschland unter Kaiser William II," 3 vols., 1914, from which Bülow's "Imperial Germany" is reprinted. For general summaries see Dawson, "The German Empire," II; Rachfahl, "Kaiser und Reich"; and Bornhak, "Deutsche Geschichte unter Kaiser Wilhelm II." Foreign policy is described in the four volumes of Hammann (Head of the Press Department of the Foreign Office), "Der neue Kurs," "Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," "Um den Kaiser," and "Der missverständene Bismarck"; Reventlow, "Deutschland's Auswärtige Politik, 1888-1914," and "Politische Vorgeschichte des Grossen Krieges"; and Veit Valentin, "Deutschland's Aussenpolitik, 1890-1918." Schiemann's "Deutschland und die grosse Politik" contains his weekly survey of foreign affairs in the *Kreuzzeitung* bound up into annual volumes from 1901 to 1914. Of the many character studies that of Hammann, "Um der Kaiser," ch. 8, is perhaps the best. Rathenau, "Der Kaiser"; Lamprecht, "Der Kaiser"; and Czernin, "In the World War," ch. 3, portray the ruler in his later years.

dangerous to allow him to come in contact with foreign affairs."¹ As soon as the Prince found himself on the steps of the throne he endeavoured to reassure his future subjects, some of whom were alarmed by his enthusiasm for soldiers and military affairs.² "I am well aware of the fact," he declared on the eve of the old Emperor's death, "that by the public at large, and particularly in foreign countries, I am represented as entertaining a wanton and ambitious craving for war. May God keep me from such criminal folly! I repudiate all such imputations with indignation." A few weeks later, when he had become Crown Prince, he announced his admiration for Bismarck. "The Empire is like an army corps that has lost its Commander-in-Chief in the field, while the officer who stands next in rank lies severely wounded. The standard-bearer, however, is our illustrious Prince, our great Chancellor. Let him lead us; we will follow him."

On June 15, the day of his father's death, William II issued proclamations to the army and navy. "These are days of sore trial and affliction in which God's decree has placed me at the head of the army, and it is with deep emotion that I first address myself to my army. We belong to one another." The second proclamation assured the navy that he had felt keen interest in its work and welfare since his earliest youth. Not till three days later did he issue a proclamation "To my people"; but the Speech from the Throne to the Reichstag in the following week reassured those who were alarmed at his having addressed the fighting services before his civilian subjects. "As regards foreign politics I am determined to keep peace with everyone, so far as it lies in my power. My love for the army will never lead me into the temptation to endanger the benefits which the country derives from peace. Germany is in no need of fresh military glory, nor does she

¹ Bismarck, "Gedanken und Erinnerungen," III, 2.

² "His photograph," remarked Gallifet wittily, "looks like a declaration of war."

require new conquests." The alliance with Austria and Italy, he concluded, would be maintained, and his personal friendship with the Tsar would be carefully fostered. Germans observed with delight that the cordial relations of the first William with the Chancellor were continued by the second. At the end of the year the Kaiser wrote to his "dear Prince" to assure him that the thought of his standing faithfully by his side filled him with joy and comfort, and hoping to God that they might long be permitted to co-operate for the welfare and greatness of the Fatherland.

During the brief reign of the Emperor Frederick the German Ambassador in Vienna reported a remark of Kalnoky to the effect that it might have been better to follow the advice of the General Staffs in Berlin and Vienna in the previous autumn and to shatter the power of Russia before it became dangerous. The Crown Prince read the dispatch, and wrote *Ja* at the side of this passage. The Chancellor was horrified at the revealing monosyllable, and at once wrote a letter of warning and complaint—

**Bismarck's
Warning** "since the decision of peace and war will soon be in your hands." The power of Russia, he explained, could never be really overthrown. Even France had recovered four years after her disaster. Russia, after attack and defeat, would be a second France. Moreover, an attack on Russia would involve a war on two fronts. The Crown Prince replied that he had exaggerated the importance of the annotation. It only meant that the political and military opinions diverged, and that the latter were, on their merits, not without justification. The military authorities were right in calling attention to the favourable opportunity; but he never dreamed of subordinating the political to the military control, and he had always supported the pacific policy of the Chancellor. Henceforth he would abstain from writing political observations on the dispatches.¹

¹ "Die Grosse Politik," VI, 301-9; and Bismarck, "Gedanken," III, ch. 10.

The old Emperor on his death-bed whispered to his grandson that he must always remain friends with Russia, and the fact that the round of visits on which William II entered only a month after his accession began with Petrograd seemed to show that he had taken the solemn admonition to heart. The Chancellor drew up a memorandum for his guidance, pointing out that Germany should not obstruct Russia in anything that was not vital to Austria. For instance, she should not oppose her designs on the Black Sea, the Straits, or even Constantinople. If Austria desired to prevent them she must find other allies for that particular task. Germany could not face a war on two fronts for the question who should rule Constantinople. On the other hand, the Kaiser should neither offer Russia any concession nor ask any favour. "We want nothing and we fear nothing from her, but we wish to live in friendship." In a word, the visit was to be a family affair, and politics should be kept in the background. These suggestions were carried out by the Kaiser, who was accompanied by his brother and Herbert Bismarck. The visit was an unqualified success, and the German Ambassador reported that the satisfaction of the Tsar increased from hour to hour and that even the Tsarina was delighted. Yet in the spring of the following year the Tsar toasted the Prince of Montenegro as Russia's only true friend.¹

Visit to Russia

If the new ruler was thus ready to continue the Chancellor's policy in the East, the two men were equally in agreement as to the necessity of intimate relations with England. At different times Bismarck had made more than one approach to Beaconsfield and Salisbury, but he had never presented such a definite request for an alliance as that which he instructed Hatzfeldt to convey on January 11, 1889.² "The peace of Europe can best be secured by the conclusion of a treaty between Germany

¹ "Die Grosse Politik," VI, 311-41.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 399-419.

and England, pledging them to mutual support against a French attack. A secret treaty would ensure success in such a war, but its publication would prevent it. Neither France nor Russia will break the peace if they know for certain that they would have England against them." Salisbury asked for time for consideration and consultation, and on March 22 he gave his answer to Herbert Bismarck, who had come to London to settle the Samoa problem. An alliance would be a blessing for both countries and for the peace of Europe. He had discussed the proposal with Lord Hartington and his colleagues, all of whom shared his opinion, but who regarded it as inopportune, since it would break up the Parliamentary majority and overthrow the Ministry. "Unfortunately we are no longer living in the times of Pitt when the aristocracy ruled and we could pursue an active policy. Democracy is now the ruler and with it party government, which has made every Ministry absolutely dependent on the *aura popularis*." He added that he was very grateful for the suggestion, and he hoped that he would live to see the time when he could accept it. "Meanwhile we leave it on the table, without saying yes or no. That is unfortunately all I can do at present."

A day or two after this conversation Herbert Bismarck had a scarcely less interesting interview with Chamberlain. "His friendliness to Germany has never been so marked as it was yesterday," the Chancellor was informed. He went so far as to say *Sine Germania nulla salus*, and argued that both countries must do their utmost to remove all points where difficulties might arise. From Samoa he passed to South-west Africa, which was not worth a rap to Germany, and which she would do well to give up. Of course there would have to be compensation. "What would you say if we gave you Heligoland, which is useless to England and perhaps worth having for you, if only for the prestige? The exchange would be popular and be sure of a majority in Parliament. I shall myself defend it in the House

through thick and thin." At Chamberlain's suggestion Hatzfeldt mentioned the conversation to Salisbury, who did not commit himself, and remarked that they could return to the subject another time if the Ambassador wished. The Kaiser was delighted, and looked forward to signing the agreement during his forthcoming visit to England; but the Chancellor decided that the next step should be left to the British Government, and the determination of the fortunes of the island was postponed for a year.

The Kaiser's first visit to England took place in August, when he arrived at Osborne with a squadron and was appointed honorary Admiral of the Fleet. Delighted with the distinction, he appointed his grandmother honorary Colonel of the First Dragoon Guards, a deputation of whom was summoned from Berlin. "The hearts of the officers and men," he declared in presenting them to the Queen, "beat more proudly at the thought that they belong to a regiment which has the honour of being called the Queen of England's Own." He was delighted with the cordiality of his welcome, flattered by the interest which his personality excited, and loud in his admiration for the fighting services. "You have seen the greatest fleet that England ever assembled," declared the Prince of Wales in proposing a toast. "Every land must be ready for all eventualities, and I am convinced that the great German army will serve to maintain the peace of the world." "I appreciate very highly the great honour of my appointment as an Admiral," replied the Kaiser. "I greatly rejoice to have been present at a review of the navy, which I regard as the most magnificent in the world. Germany has an army commensurate with her needs, and if Great Britain has a navy corresponding to her requirements Europe cannot fail to regard it as a most important factor for the maintenance of peace." After attending a sham fight at Aldershot the Kaiser appointed the Duke of Cambridge honorary Colonel of the 28th Infantry Regi-

Osborne
and
Aldershot

ment, like Wellington before him. "The British troops have filled me with the greatest admiration," he declared. "At Malplaquet and Waterloo Prussian and British blood was shed in a common cause." The visit was thoroughly successful, and gave a feeling of confidence to both countries. "Neither England nor Germany thinks of war," wrote the *Morning Post*, "but it becomes daily clearer to both that if a war is forced on them they must stand or fall together. No paper alliance is required." "He created a very favourable impression," writes Lord George Hamilton, at that time First Lord of the Admiralty. "He had great receptibility and the power of absorbing himself in whatever he was inspecting. He informed me that he knew Brassey's Annual almost by heart. He spent a whole day at Portsmouth examining the various establishments and talking to the officers in charge of them."¹

The fall of Bismarck in March, 1890, two years after the death of his old master, was due to personal rather than to political causes. "He will be his own Chancellor some day," remarked the Kaiser and old statesman in 1886. For the first year the *condominium* worked with little friction; but in 1889 there were signs of a break, and in October the Tsar startled the Chancellor, during a visit to Berlin, by asking if he was sure he would remain in office. The young Emperor believed himself to possess not only the right but the capacity to rule, while Bismarck's masterful temperament and incomparable achievements made him in his own eyes, and in the eyes of the world, the uncrowned King of Germany. "I discovered," writes William II, "that my Ministers regarded themselves as Bismarck's officials." He had innumerable enemies, among them Waldersee, Moltke's successor as Chief of the General Staff, who intrigued against him in high places. The conflict is described in a spirit of passionate resentment by the fallen dictator in the third volume of

¹ "Parliamentary Reminiscences," II, 136-7.

his Reflections, and more calmly in a long letter from the Kaiser to Francis Joseph¹ and in the opening chapter of his Memoirs. Differences of opinion in regard to the renewal of the anti-socialist legislation of 1878, the International Congress on the conditions of labour, and the danger of Russian military measures on the frontier melt into insignificance compared with the dominating issue of the struggle for power. "The real question," observed the Grand Duke of Baden, who took the part of his nephew, to Hohenlohe, "was whether the Bismarck or the Hohenzollern dynasty should reign."² To this question there could be only one answer. The two men parted with bitterness in their hearts, and Bismarck cried aloud that he could not lie down like a hibernating bear. Though an official reconciliation was staged in 1894, and visits to Friedrichsrh

Dropping
the
Pilot

and Berlin were exchanged, each continued to speak of the other with contemptuous anger.³ The Kaiser assumed the burden of personal rule with a light heart, despite his youth and inexperience; for he was fortified by a confidence in himself which nothing could shake. "There is only one master in this country, and I am he. I shall suffer no other beside me." "I see in the people and the land which have descended to me a talent entrusted to me by God, which it is my duty to increase. Those who will help me I heartily welcome; those who oppose me I shall dash to pieces." In language recalling the mystical effusions of Frederick William IV, he declared that he was responsible for his actions to God and his conscience alone. Yet, though he was the ablest of the Hohenzollerns since Frederick the Great, he was unequal to the autocratic rôle to which he aspired;

¹ Published from the Austrian archives in *Oesterreichische Rundschau*, Feb., 1919, and reprinted in "Deutscher Geschichtskalender," Lieferung 54.

² "Denkwürdigkeiten," II, 466.

³ When Bismarck revealed the Secret Treaty of 1887 the Kaiser wrote to the Tsar that people would now see that he had acted rightly in dismissing "this unruly man with his mean character."

and he was fortunate in his choice of the second Chancellor of the German Empire.

Caprivi had attracted the attention of Moltke in early life and had distinguished himself in the war of 1870, and it was a high compliment to the soldier when he was appointed in 1883 Chief of the Admiralty in succession to Stosch.¹ After five years' work with the fleet he returned to his first love and received the command of an army corps; but he was not forgotten, and when William II resolved to be his own master his thoughts turned to the man whose talent for organization was admired by his grandfather, who had not an enemy in the world, and who had held aloof from political controversy. His ability was recognized by Bismarck himself, who wished to see him Chief of the General Staff and believed him fitted for political tasks as well. "I have often wondered who could be my successor," remarked the Chancellor in 1878 after a long conversation with Caprivi on a railway journey; "to-day I have seen him." When the storm began to threaten in 1890 Bismarck proposed to resign the Prussian Premiership, and suggested Caprivi as his successor. The General's summons to the highest post in the Empire was unexpected; but his simple religious faith convinced him that he would receive the guidance of which he stood in need, and the Kaiser comforted him with the words, "I will assume responsibility for affairs." In his first speech in the Prussian Diet, with disarming candour, he confessed his political inexperience; and he defined his task to be that of leading the German people, after the age of great men and great deeds, back into the prose of common life.² For this period of transition he was well suited, and in the avoidance of blunders the four years of his Chancellorship compare favourably with

¹ See Caprivi's "Reden," 1894, Einleitung; the Kaiser's "Memoirs," ch. 2; Hammann, "Der neue Kurs"; Eckardt, "Berlin, Wien, Rom," and "Aus der Zeit von Bismarck's Kampf gegen Caprivi"; Gothein, "Caprivi"; and Bismarck, "Gedanken," III, ch. 9.

² Ins Alltagsdasein zurückführen.

the record of his successors. "He is the greatest German after Bismarck," wrote the Kaiser to Francis Joseph, "loyal to me and firm as a rock."

During the twenty-eight years of Bismarck's dictatorship the foreign policy of Prussia and the German Empire was directed by a single brain and will; for though the ruler was consulted on the larger issues, the Minister could always, as in 1866 and 1879, carry his point by the threat of resignation. From 1890 onwards German policy was never again controlled by a single hand, and in the years immediately following it represented an unstable compromise between the views of the Emperor, the Chancellor, Marschall von Bieberstein,¹ the Foreign Minister, and a mystery man in the Foreign Office.

Baron von Holstein had commenced his diplomatic career under Bismarck at Petrograd, and, after serving in London and Washington, was installed in the Prussian Foreign Office shortly before the Franco-German war. He was summoned to Versailles during the siege of Paris, and remained in the Embassy in Paris, ingratiating himself with the Chancellor by helping in the overthrow of Arnim. Recalled to Berlin in 1876, he worked loyally with Bismarck, for whom he professed unbounded admiration; but the Chancellor warned Prince William before his accession to be on his guard.² After his fall Bismarck regarded him as an enemy, if not a traitor, and loudly lamented that the virtual control of German policy should have fallen into such hands. "Holstein, who for ten years was taken seriously by nobody, now does everything," wrote Lothar Bucher, echoing the opinion of his chief to Busch in the autumn following the catastrophe.³ It was untrue to suggest that he "did everything." "I was far from being the director of German policy," he wrote to Maximilian Harden after his own

Baron
von
Holstein

¹ For Marschall see Bettelheim, "Biographisches Jahrbuch," XVII.

² The Kaiser's "Memoirs," ch. 1.

³ Busch, "Bismarck," III, 343.

fall many years later, adding that he had no share in several of the most sensational incidents of the reign.

Though merely a *Vortragender Rat* in the Political Department of the Foreign Office, **A Dangerous Influence** he was nevertheless the most powerful influence in the formation of German policy for the fifteen years following the fall of Bismarck. The public knew nothing of him, and he scarcely ever met the Kaiser; but his mysterious activities filled thoughtful observers with apprehension. "He was the great unknown," writes his colleague Otto Hammann, the Director of the Press Department of the Foreign Office. "There was something abnormal and unhealthy in his nature, though he was intensely patriotic. He possessed many subterranean connexions, and worked a great deal in secret. He loved to supply diplomatists who enjoyed his special confidence with suggestions by private telegrams. He pulled the unseen wires to which the figures danced." A similar portrait is drawn by Baron von Eckardstein, who was in close official and personal relations with him for ten years.¹ "He was called *l'éminence grise* and the *Reichsjesuit*. He was one of the most mysterious personages who ever worked behind the scenes of German policy. He often withheld reports from his official superiors. He belonged to the category of people who cannot see things under their nose. The more natural and obvious the thing appeared the greater was his suspicion. He would break off negotiations directly the other party was ready to adopt his wishes. He only desired a thing so long as the others did not." The influence of this mysterious personage, who was to refuse the Foreign Office when Bülow became Chancellor, was fully recognized in the Chancelleries of Europe. In later years King Edward referred to him indignantly as "that infernal mischief-maker," and the Kaiser denounces him in his Memoirs.

¹ "Erinnerungen," I, 13. The most vivid portrait is drawn by Harden, "Köpfe," I, 91-145.

The first fruits of what William II described as "the new course" were seen within a few days in the momentous decision not to renew the secret re-insurance treaty with Russia. Towards the end of 1889 Alexander III instructed Giers

Germany
and
Russia

to consider whether the secret treaty of 1887 should be renewed, and on the advice of his Minister he decided to renew it.¹ Bismarck was naturally of the same opinion, all the more since the death of his old master had introduced elements both of personal and political insecurity into the higher councils of the German Empire. "I should like to continue the agreement of 1887," he observed to Schuvaloff, "and there is no need to limit its duration." The Tsar wrote on his Ambassador's report: "I think Bismarck sees in our entente a sort of guarantee that no written agreement between France and Russia exists." Shortly after this conversation Bismarck fell; but the Kaiser at once invited Schuvaloff to continue the negotiations, since there was no change in German policy. The discussions were to be transferred to Petrograd; but a few days later instructions were sent to the German Ambassador to refuse renewal. There was no change in their relations, explained Caprivi; but German policy must be transparent, and did not admit of a secret agreement.

The Tsar was surprised but not annoyed. "In my secret heart I am well content that Germany has been the first to refuse renewal," he wrote on Giers' report, "and I do not particularly regret the ending of the Entente." His slow mind was already beginning to move in the direction of a French alliance; but his Foreign Minister expressed his surprise to the German Ambassador that Caprivi's objections had prevailed over the Kaiser's assurances. He proposed an exchange of notes, expressing the cordiality of relations; but the Tsar, supported by Schuvaloff, thought it best to accept the situation,

¹ See Goriainoff, "The End of the Alliance of the Three Emperors," *American Historical Review*, Jan., 1918.

and declared that it would be undignified to inquire why Germany had refused to renew the pact. When the Kaiser and Caprivi visited Russia for the manœuvres in August, Giers explained that Russia could never accept Ferdinand as ruler of Bulgaria, and that the closing of the Straits remained a binding obligation. The Chancellor replied that Germany agreed, and Giers asked for a written confirmation of his report of their conversation; but Caprivi, while reiterating the peaceful and friendly intentions of Germany, declined to put pen to paper. The personal relations of the two rulers were amicable; but Germany under her second Chancellor had entered on "the new course," and Russia was quickly to follow her example.

The non-renewal of the Treaty has been the subject of eager discussion ever since Bismarck revealed the story in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* on October 24, 1896, and angrily complained that the telegraph wire to Petrograd had been cut.¹ Bismarck makes Mischief
Hohenlohe, the Chancellor, gravely condemned the breach of State secrets, and added that the decision of 1890 was wise and had not damaged relations with Russia. Marschall von Bieberstein explained that Germany might have been simultaneously faced with a demand for military support from Austria and for benevolent neutrality from Russia, and would have had to decide who was the aggressor. To these and other critics Bismarck replied that he was in no way ashamed of his Treaty, which the Triplice *en bloc* could have equally well made and which had only been kept secret by the wish of the Tsar, and that by preventing Russia joining in a French attack the pact was advantageous to Austria by contributing to avoid a conflict which would involve for her a *casus belli*. Schuvaloff believed that Caprivi's veto was in part due to the cordial relations of the young Kaiser to Russophobe England. Caprivi himself, of

¹ Broad hints had already been given by him. See Hofmann, "Fürst Bismarck," I, 99-116; II, 4-6 and 370-90.

whom Schuvaloff declared that he acted "too honourably," defended his action on the ground that the double obligation was "too complicated," and that if the secret became known it would wreck the Austrian alliance. The real author of the decision, however, was not Caprivi, but Holstein, who was convinced that France and Russia would never combine owing to the difference in their political institutions and ideas. The Kaiser argues in his Memoirs that the alliance had lost most of its value, since the Russians had ceased to wish for it. Whatever the motives and the wisdom of the decision, it constituted a complete break with the traditional policy of Germany. Whether, as Bismarck maintained, the renewal of the pact would have prevented the Franco-Russian *rapprochement*, which was already in progress, from blossoming into an alliance is uncertain; but its lapse rendered that evolution inevitable.

Shortly after the termination of the Russo-German Treaty of 1887 a second step of importance was taken which was also, though in less degree, distasteful to the fallen Chancellor. The Kaiser had been profoundly impressed by Chamberlain's suggestion in 1889 to hand over Heligoland at a price; for the cutting of the Kiel Canal, which began in 1887, increased its strategic significance. The simple transaction outlined by Chamberlain grew into a complex settlement involving large portions of the Dark Continent. On June 17, 1890, a treaty was signed by which Germany recognized a British Protectorate over Witu and the Somali coast, transferred Uganda, which had been forced by Peters to place itself under German protection, to the British sphere of influence, agreed to a British Protectorate over Zanzibar, excepting the coastal strip which had been leased to the German East African Society, and recognized the basin of the Upper Nile to the borders of Egypt as within the British sphere. Great Britain, in return, promised to urge the Sultan to sell the coastal strip to Germany, who

Heligoland
and
Zanzibar

was also empowered to extend inland to the Great Lakes. On the other side of the continent Germany obtained the narrow corridor to the Zambesi, henceforward known as the Caprivizipfel. And last, but not least, she obtained Heligoland.¹

Each of the partners could maintain that he had rendered a service to his country and secured solid advantages at the cost of trivial sacrifices. Heligoland, argued Salisbury, was of no strategic value and did not even possess a garrison. If we were at war with Germany, it would be seized before our fleet could arrive. If we were at war with other Powers, we should have to send a fleet for its defence, and thus divide our forces. Its value to us was purely sentimental. "We have made an agreement which removes all danger of conflict and strengthens the good relations of nations who, by their sympathies, interests and origin, will always be good friends." In return we had founded an East African empire, of which Zanzibar was the key. The Prime Minister's view of his bargain was neatly expressed in Stanley's verdict that we had exchanged a trouser button for a suit of clothes. A few voices were raised in protest; but in 1890 no one dreamed of war with Germany, and the Two Power standard, proclaimed in the Naval Defence Act of 1889, envisaged France and Russia. If the Cabinet failed to forecast the effect of the cession on German naval ambitions, public opinion could hardly be blamed for missing the significance of an historic event.²

While the Treaty found few critics in the country which had unwittingly made the larger sacrifice, Caprivi had to meet vigorous attacks in the Press and the Reichstag. In his first speech in the Reichstag³ he had confessed

¹ See Hagen, "Geschichte und Bedeutung des Helgolandsvertrages"; Reventlow, "Auswärtige Politik," 39-52; and the Kaiser's "Memoirs," ch. 2.

² Lord George Hamilton still thinks the decision wise on the ground that we should not have fortified it sufficiently to defend itself, and that it would have divided our fleet in 1914.—"Reminiscences," II, 140-2.

³ "Reden," 95-114. Feb. 5, 1891.

that he was "no colonial enthusiast," and, indeed, he looked at possessions overseas with the same cool and critical gaze as Bismarck. He made a spirited defence, nevertheless, when the colonial party complained that he had need-
Caprivi's Colonial Policy
lessly sacrificed the prospects of a great Central African empire. Germany, he pointed out, could not surrender Zanzibar, for she had never owned it. To the argument that it might ultimately have been secured he replied that the British position in the island was stronger than the German. Witu, again, was no sacrifice, for it was worthless. On the other hand, it was a substantial achievement to free German possessions from the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar, for as long as his flag flew over the territories the natives would not believe that Germany was their ruler. Bismarck himself had said that Salisbury was more valuable than Witu and England more important for Germany than Zanzibar or East Africa. The colonial enthusiasts were bluntly told that they must cut their coat according to their cloth. "We must ask ourselves how much colonizing strength we possess, how far the available money and human resources will go. Germany has too many irons in the fire. It is no use having her hands full of things of which she cannot make use. The worst thing that could happen to us would be to give us the whole of Africa, for we have got quite enough as it is." A friendly England, the barter of worthless territory for a long strip of the coast in full sovereignty, the acquisition of Heligoland, which England might have given to France in a similar colonial deal—here was a balance-sheet which he was not ashamed to recommend to his countrymen.

The Kaiser felt even more satisfaction than his Chancellor and dwelt with special pleasure on the acquisition of Heligoland. "Without a battle, without the shedding of a tear," he declared on visiting his new possession, "this beautiful island has passed into my possession. We have acquired it by a treaty freely concluded with a

country to which we are related by blood. I drink to the illustrious lady to whom we are indebted for the transfer."

**Bismarck's
Criticisms**

Bismarck declared that he would not have signed the Treaty, arguing that if Germany had waited till England needed her support against France or Russia, smaller sacrifices would have been necessary. Heligoland, he added, would be difficult and expensive to fortify; but he was not opposed in principle, and still less was he surprised. "I expected it," he observed to Hofmann, the obsequious editor of the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, which conveyed the reflections of the oracle of Friedrichsruh to a listening world. "The Kaiser was always hot when Heligoland was mentioned. He always agreed grudgingly to postponement."¹ The impatience was unintelligible to Bismarck, who believed Germany to be safer without battleships, which would endanger the friendship of Great Britain. If an English army landed in Germany, he used to observe, it could be "arrested." William II, on the other hand, not only possessed since boyhood a love of the sea and an inexhaustible interest in the technical side of navies, but considered that a formidable fleet was essential to the power and prestige of the Empire; and he recognized that such a fleet could hardly be built while Heligoland belonged to a foreign Power. Nor could he be blamed for refusing to be satisfied with the fleet which he found on his accession, which was inferior in tonnage not only to Great Britain and France but to Russia and Italy, and was qualitatively in even worse plight. One of the new ruler's first acts was to replace Caprivi, who had no thought beyond coast defence, by an Admiral,

¹ See Busch, III, 353; Bismarck's "Gedanken und Erinnerungen," III, ch. 11; and Hofmann, "Fürst Bismarck," I, 60-7, 315-9. Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador in London, records Eckardstein, was held responsible by the colonial enthusiasts for the Treaty which he negotiated and signed; but Salisbury's demands in Africa rose when Sir E. Malet reported the Kaiser's eagerness for Heligoland.—"Erinnerungen," I, 309-10. Eckardstein's memoirs have been admirably translated and abridged by George Young under the title of "Ten Years at the Court of St. James's."

Count Monts, who proceeded, by his master's orders, to draw up a plan for four large armoured vessels for the high seas.

During the first seven years of the reign of William II the relations of Potsdam and Windsor were not only friendly but intimate—indeed, to Bismarck's critical eye, rather too intimate. "Instead of fostering the conviction that in case of

The
Anglophil
Kaiser

need we could do without England and Austria, we followed a policy of expensive *pourboires* which made us seem in need of help, whereas both of them require our help more than we require theirs." ¹ In March, 1890, on a visit of the Prince of Wales to Berlin, the Kaiser, wearing the uniform of an English Admiral, returned to his favourite theme of the brotherhood of arms at Waterloo, and expressed the hope that the German army and the English fleet would keep the peace of the world. "Ein politisch Lied, ein garstig Lied," muttered old Moltke to Hohenlohe as he listened; but the Imperial orator did not trouble himself about the feelings of France so long as he could give vent to his admiration for his mother's land. In 1891 the visit to his relatives assumed a more formal character; for an invitation from the City transformed the member of the Royal Family into the guest of the nation. After three years of probation the British people had learned to like the Kaiser, though Salisbury felt no confidence in him; ² and he in return never wearied of professing his good will for England. "I have always felt at home in this lovely country," he declared at the Mansion House, "being the grandson of a Queen whose name will ever be remembered as a noble character and a lady great in the wisdom of her counsels. Moreover, the same blood runs in English and German veins. I shall always, so far as it is in my power, maintain the historic friendship between our nations. My aim is above all the maintenance of peace. Only in peace can we

¹ Bismarck, "Gedanken," III, 133.

² Lord G. Hamilton, "Reminiscences," II, ch. 15.

bestow our earnest thoughts on the great problems the solution of which I consider the most prominent duty of our time."

Firmly anchored in the Triple Alliance and in the friendship of Great Britain, William II and his Chancellor declined to take too tragically the visit of the French fleet to Cronstadt, which followed the Kaiser's visit to England. "How can we prevent two people shaking hands?" asked Caprivi. "We could not prevent Cronstadt, and we did not wish to do so. That war is an inch nearer I do not believe. I cannot prophesy. War may come—and a war on two fronts. But no Government can wish nowadays to provoke a war; and I am absolutely convinced of the peaceful intentions of the Tsar." But though there was no cause for apprehension, the conclusion of a Franco-Russian

<p>German Army Increased</p>	<p>alliance—for such was the interpretation universally placed upon the demonstrations—suggested increased precautions against attack. In his first summer of office Caprivi had added 18,000 men to the peace strength, and on November 23, 1892, he introduced a proposal for a further 70,000, bringing the army to 479,000, exclusive of 77,000 non-commissioned officers. At the same time, compulsory service was reduced from three to two years. The Bill was recommended in a two-hour speech, which distantly recalled Bismarck's celebrated orations of 1887 and 1888, not only in its broad sweep but in its principles and conclusions.</p>
---	--

"I cannot say that war is in sight," began the Chancellor. "The German Government lives in normal and friendly relations with all other Governments. Not one of them has made it difficult for me to maintain the honour and dignity of Germany, and we, for our part, have wanted nothing which could make difficulties for the rest. You have been told that the German nation is saturated, and we have no aim but to maintain the Treaty of Frankfurt. The Kaiser truly declared that Heligoland was the last piece of German soil that we coveted. We have got it,

and we covet nothing more. We want no more French soil or French subjects. Nor is there any real antagonism between ourselves and Russia; and Russia, I believe, wants nothing from us. The Tsar is one of the strongest factors of peace, and I know that he appreciates my pacific and loyal policy. There is, on the other hand, a prejudice against us in wide Russian circles of the nature of an elemental force. We hope that it may diminish, but as yet there is no sign. Russian armaments are steadily increasing, and even the Tsar may find himself in a position where he has no choice but to fight. I am blamed for cutting the wire to Petrograd. I deny it. We have taken every care to preserve it; but we do not wish it to take the current out of the wires which connect us with Austria and Italy. No doubt Russia and France have drawn together.

Caprivi
on
Cronstadt

It began before my time. There may be an alliance. A French paper asked the other day, 'Flirt or alliance?' If France does not know, we cannot. But if two friends are playing with fire, sparks may fly over to us, and we must keep our fire-engines ready. We shall attack neither; but we must be ready to meet attack. A war on two fronts is possible. We have confidence in the Triple Alliance—one of the greatest of Bismarck's achievements; but its troops are inferior in numbers to those of Russia and France. In the event of war Germany will have to take the chief burden on her shoulders."¹ The speech, though in no sense alarmist or provocative, was serious in tone; but after long debates lasting through the winter the Army Bill was rejected by the combined votes of the Catholics, the Radicals and the Socialists. The precedent of 1887 was followed, with the same result. A dissolution was rewarded by a majority for the Bill of 201 to 185; and the largest increase of the army since the foundation of the Empire was carried through without further opposition. Even now, however, the army was no larger than that of France and far smaller than that of

¹ "Reden." Cf. Hammann, "Der neue Kurs," ch. 3.

Russia. The expense was met by the reforms of Miquel, the Minister of Finance.

Meanwhile the friendship with Great Britain was kept in good repair. The Kaiser crossed to Cowes every summer for the regatta, and members of the Royal Family could count on a warm welcome in Berlin. When the Duke of Edinburgh visited his nephew in 1893, the Kaiser raised one of his usual pæans to the British fleet. "For the German navy it is not only a model of technical perfection, but its heroes, Nelson and the rest, have ever been and will ever be the guiding stars of German naval officers and crews. Should it ever happen that the two navies have to fight side by side against a common foe, the famous signal, 'England expects every man to do his duty,' will find an echo in the patriotic heart of the German navy." Caprivi was heart and soul with his Imperial master in his Anglophil sentiments, though his professions of devotion were less exuberant; and Hatzfeldt, whom Bismarck described as the best diplomatic horse in his stable, proved a skilful agent of a policy which he thoroughly approved. "I fully agree," wrote the Chancellor to the Ambassador soon after the passage of the Army Bill, "that the aim of our policy is gradually to win England for an official adhesion to the Triple Alliance. In any case everything must be avoided which could provoke a rupture of the friendly relationship now happily prevailing. A real and lasting estrangement would jeopardize the Triple Alliance through its effect on Italy, and indeed might force us to fall back on Russia." In the later months of the year agreements relating to the delimitation of the Kilimanjaro district and the hinterland of the Cameroons were amicably concluded, and during the winter the boundaries of Togoland were similarly fixed.

The sky began to darken in 1894, and Anglo-German relations were never to regain the confidence and intimacy of the opening years of the reign of William II. The partition of Africa, which had caused sharp friction in

1884-5 but had subsequently proceeded with unbroken harmony, now began again to ruffle the temper of the Chancelleries. The settlement of the western frontier of the Cameroons in 1893 left the eastern frontier to be delimited with France. A Franco-German treaty in March, 1894, enabled French territories on the Niger and the Congo to join, advanced France to the Shari river, and made Lake Chad the eastern frontier of the Cameroons. France was delighted with her bargain; but Great Britain was annoyed, since territory left to Germany by the Anglo-German Treaty in order that France should not have it had been assigned to that Power.

It was soon to be Germany's turn to complain; for a treaty concluded on May 12, 1894, between Great Britain and the Congo Free State leased the Bahr-el-Ghazel district on the upper Congo
and
Nile Nile, which we regarded as a British sphere of influence, to King Leopold for life, with remainder to ourselves—an arrangement which at once secured Leopold's recognition of our claim and regularized the Belgian occupation of certain districts. In return he leased to Great Britain a strip of territory west of Tanganyika 25 kilometres wide for the proposed Cape to Cairo telegraph and railway. The Bahr-el-Ghazel territory, thus handed over to the Congo State, was not ours to give; but a worse offence was that the lease of the Tanganyika strip was inconsistent with the Congo-German Treaty of 1884. France protested against the former part of the pact, and Germany against the latter, which in consequence was annulled; and though Germany had legal right on her side, the incident left an unpleasant memory. The friendship of Windsor and Potsdam, however, was too firmly established to be broken by the first colonial friction; and in June the Kaiser was appointed Colonel of the First Regiment of Dragoon Guards. "This makes me a member of the staff of English officers," he declared in grateful tones to a deputation of the Regiment at Berlin.

The opening of the Kiel Canal in June, 1895, repre-

sents perhaps the happiest moment in the reign of William II. All the Powers were invited to send a squadron to share in the festivities, and, to the horror of prophets of the *Revanche*, France, at the wish of her ally, accepted the invitation like the rest.¹ The Kaiser's speeches were tactful as well as eloquent, emphasizing the value of the canal for commerce and recognizing to the full the

Kiel
Canal
Opened

need of the world for peace. "Seas do not separate," he declared at Hamburg before the ceremonies began; "they unite. All the peoples are eagerly watching our proceedings. They have an intense wish for peace, for only in peace can commerce develop." Three days later, on June 21, after laying the last stone in the canal, he welcomed his numerous guests. "It is not only for our own national interests that we have worked. We open the gates of the canal to the peaceful intercourse of the nations. I welcome the participation of the Powers, whose representatives we see amongst us and whose magnificent ships we have admired, with all the greater satisfaction because I think I am right in inferring from it the complete appreciation of our endeavours, the very object of which is to maintain peace." A German battle-fleet was not yet in being, and there was no reason to suspect the sincerity of the Imperial host's devotion to peace. "The speech finds a joyful echo in my heart," commented the Tsar; and Franco-German relations under Hanotaux were as friendly as they had been ten years earlier under Jules Ferry. The host had a friendly welcome for all his guests; but his warmest words were reserved for Great Britain. "Ever since our fleet was established," he declared in a speech on a British battleship, "we have tried to form our ideas in accordance with yours and in every way to learn from you. The history of the British navy is as familiar to our officers and seamen as to yourselves. I am not only

¹ See Bourgeois et Pagès, 253-5, for the conditions on which Hanotaux accepted the invitation. Maurras' "Kiel et Tanger" reflects the repugnance of the Nationalists.

an Admiral of the Fleet but a grandson of the mighty Queen. I hope you will express our heartfelt thanks to Her Majesty for her graciousness in sending you here."

The Kiel festivities were quickly followed by the end of the Anglo-German honeymoon. In the autumn of 1894 Caprivi had been thrown by his master to the Agrarian wolves, who accused him of sacrificing the country to the towns in the commercial treaty concluded in 1894 with Russia, which reduced the duties on food, inaugurated a decade of freer exchange, and eased relations with Russia, whose paper Caprivi now allowed the Reichsbank once again to hold. His place was filled by Hohenlohe, who had wished to succeed Bismarck in 1890; but he was now seventy-five, and though his distinguished career as Bavarian Premier, Ambassador to France, and Governor of Alsace-Lorraine had given him a wider political experience than that of any German statesman except Bismarck, the liberal-minded South German Catholic was never acclimatized among the Prussian Junkers.¹ He proved a dignified figure-head; but he cared little for power, and his influence was smaller than that of any of his predecessors or successors. Like Caprivi, he accepted the Bismarckian doctrine that Germany was satisfied and that *Weltpolitik* was not worth the risks that it involved; but his opinions were of little practical importance. At no period of his reign was the Kaiser so much his own Foreign Minister as during the three years that elapsed between the fall of Caprivi and the installation of Bülow in the Wilhelmstrasse; and it was precisely in this period that German policy assumed a new and dangerous orientation. The wholesale breach with Bismarckian tradition and the adoption of a "forward" policy took place not on the fall of the great Chancellor but on the fall of his successor.

A month after the Kiel festivities the Kaiser paid his

¹ See Hohenlohe's "Memoirs" and the Kaiser's "Memoirs," ch. 3.

annual visit to Cowes; but on the present occasion there were such discords, both personal and political, in the Anglo-German melody that four years were to elapse before he again crossed the North Sea. His visits had at first given equal pleasure to hosts and guests; but his irritating familiarities and overbearing ways grated on the nerves of his uncle. "The regatta used to be a pleasant

recreation for me," complained the Prince to
**The
Kaiser's
Manners**
 Eckardstein, who was not merely a Secretary of the German Embassy but a *persona grata* at Court; "but now, since the Kaiser takes command, it is a bother. He is the boss at Cowes. Perhaps I shall not come next year." The guest spoke with equal unrestraint of the uncle, and referred to him at a dinner on board the *Hohenzollern* as "an old peacock." The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, who was present, confided to Eckardstein his astonishment at such language and indeed at the Kaiser's conduct as a whole.¹

Of greater importance were the political differences which had arisen or increased since the previous year. Nations remain friends only so long as neither attempts to thwart the cherished aspirations of the other, and German activities in South-East Africa had provoked the same annoyance and mistrust which the clumsy diplomacy of Granville and Derby had produced in Germany ten years earlier. For the first time a section of the British Press displayed a coolness bordering on hostility to the Queen's guest. The *Standard's* suggestion that the Kaiser must be more accommodating, and that he should seek wisdom from his grandmother and prove himself worthy of his descent, was naturally resented by the object of its criticism, and was followed by a Press duel between the two countries. At this moment, moreover, a new source of discord had been discovered. On resuming office in July Salisbury inherited the Armenian problem, on which British and German views were in fundamental disagreement. He had never been pro-Turk, and after the failure

¹ "Erinnerungen," I, 205-14.

of the Constantinople Conference in 1876 he had proposed to the Cabinet to abandon our traditional policy towards Turkey and to work for partition.¹ The plan was dismissed by Disraeli as "immoral" and rejected by the Cabinet; but Salisbury's experiences of Turkish obstinacy and procrastination after the Congress of Berlin convinced him that Turkey would never reform. The Armenian massacres of 1894 confirmed his conviction, and led him to consider not only the temporary alleviation of Christian sufferings, but more radical methods of dealing with the Turk.

When Salisbury returned to power in 1895 Germany appealed for support for her Italian ally in view of her difficulties with Abyssinia. The Prime Minister replied that to grant Italy the desired facilities in the Red Sea would excite Italy's
African
Difficulties French jealousy; but he was prepared to recognize her claims to the reversion of Albania and Tripoli. Hatzfeldt replied that the proposal would not assist Italy in her hour of need, and involved a partition of the Ottoman Empire, to which Germany was opposed. Moreover, Italian occupation of Albania would sharpen Austro-Italian rivalry in the Adriatic, and the reopening of the Balkan question would endanger Russo-German friendship. Salisbury rejoined that in his opinion the time had come for the Powers to agree as to their claims in the event of the disruption of Turkey, and asked for a statement of German desires. Germany replied that she attached the greatest importance to the integrity of Turkey, and forbade the Ambassador ever to discuss disruption.²

At the end of July Salisbury asked Eckardstein to find out when the Kaiser would arrive at Cowes, as he wished to discuss the Eastern Question with him; and the interview was fixed for August 8 on board the *Hohenzollern*.

¹ "Life of Salisbury," II, 134.

² As no British version of these negotiations has appeared, we have to rely on German sources. See Hammann, "Der missverstandene Bismarck," 43-6; and Eckardstein, I, 205-14; cf. Sir Valentine Chirol's article in the *Times*, Sept. 11, 1920.

The Kaiser was informed of the latest details of the discussions in London, and was warned that the Prime Minister

The
Cowes
Interview

would probably make proposals relating to the Eastern Question. As the differences between the two Governments had already

been clearly disclosed, the Kaiser had no cause to welcome the interview, and his mood was further ruffled by an unfortunate accident which resulted in his visitor reaching the rendezvous an hour late. If the Kaiser's record of the conversation may be believed, Salisbury explained once more that he could not help Italy in the Red Sea, but would support her expansion in Albania and Tripoli. The Kaiser replied that France would forcibly resist Italian expansion in North Africa; that Italy could not be promised Albania if Austria was to remain a member of the Triple Alliance; and that he was altogether opposed to the dismemberment of Turkey. At this point Salisbury restated his thesis that the Armenian massacres proved the impossibility of preserving the Ottoman Empire, which was thoroughly rotten. The Kaiser minimized the atrocities and argued that Turkey was capable of improvement. The disagreement was complete, and the Kaiser records that, as he did not wish to part from the Prime Minister in an unfriendly spirit, he proposed that the conversation should be continued on the following day. Salisbury, however, either because he had not understood the invitation or for some other reason, returned to London without seeing him again.¹

The conversation left the worst possible impression on both sides. Several years later Bülow spoke of the disastrous effect on the Kaiser of Salisbury's proposals, which had never ceased to rankle, and the memory of which became increasingly painful as his intimacy with Abdul Hamid developed. Salisbury, for his part, com-

¹ A summary of the Kaiser's record of this conversation, which Sir Valentine Chirol was later allowed to read in Berlin, was communicated in 1901 to Salisbury, who remarked that it showed the expediency of having a witness to conversations with the Kaiser if he made it his practice to attribute his own proposals to his interlocutor.

plained to Eckardstein that his master seemed to forget that he was not a Minister of the King of Prussia but Prime Minister of England. A final touch of displeasure was added to the visit by a flamboyant speech on the anniversary of the battle of Wörth, delivered on board the cruiser of that name, and the *Standard* bluntly expressed the general sentiment that such utterances should be reserved for German soil. For the first time the guest and his hosts parted from one another with mistrust and ill-feeling.

The immediate cause of the estrangement was the difference between the British and German attitude towards Turkey; but it was Africa which had loosened the bonds before the visit to Cowes, and it was Africa which was now to strain them almost to breaking-point. President Kruger had visited Berlin in 1884 and was well received by Bismarck. "If a child is ill," he observed in his homely language, "it looks round for help. This child begs the Kaiser to help the Boers if they are ever ill." The appeal evoked no response, for the Treaty which Kruger had just signed in London forbade alliances with foreign States without British approval; but when Germany became a great African power a few years later, it occurred to him that he might find in her a valuable associate in resisting British pressure. His confidence was strengthened in 1894 when two German warships were dispatched to Delagoa Bay as a demonstration against British interference with Portugal. "Till now," wrote the *Volksstem* in Pretoria, "the Germans have allowed the English to do what they like with us. At length they seem to have realized the folly of this policy. In the name of the people of the Transvaal we thank them." When the British Government complained that Germany was counter-working us in the Transvaal, Marschall replied that she wished to keep open Delagoa Bay for economic reasons and to support the independence of the Transvaal.

How compromising the flirtation between Berlin and

Pretoria had become was revealed by the German Consul at Pretoria on January 27, 1895, on the birthday of the Kaiser. Speaking in accordance with instructions he expressed a hope that the President was aware that Germany was a real friend. German South-West Africa, he added, had no greater political interest than to support the Transvaal in its efforts to maintain political equilibrium in South Africa. The President's reply recalled his visit to Berlin, and praised the German settlers in the Transvaal, who, unlike the English, readily obeyed the laws. "Our little Republic," he concluded, "only crawls about among the Great Powers; but we feel that if one of them wishes to trample on us the other tries to prevent it." The two speeches constituted a political demonstration of the first importance. The British Ambassador at Berlin complained to Marschall that Germany was fostering a spirit in the Transvaal contrary to its position in international law. The Foreign Secretary replied that the aim of Germany's policy was to defend against all attacks the material interests which she had created for herself by the construction of railways and the development of commercial relations with the Transvaal. For this purpose it was essential that it should be maintained as an independent State, in accordance with the Treaty of 1884, and German interests demanded the *status quo*. If Great Britain also desired to preserve it, she must oppose the activities of Rhodes and Jameson, who were endeavouring to absorb the Transvaal in British South Africa. The action of the Transvaal Government was due to the fact that Great Britain had not frowned on these tendencies. The British Ambassador rejoined that Jameson was aiming at an economic, not a political, union of South Africa. "That, too, is contrary to German interests," retorted the Foreign Secretary.

Throughout 1895 Great Britain and Germany stood in open antagonism in South Africa, each resolved to counterwork the encroachments of the other. Kruger's request to be allowed to annex the territory between Swaziland

and the sea was declined on the ground that we should be unable to defend British interests in Swaziland. Great Britain proceeded to annex the district herself, and in April appropriated Amatongaland, another little coastal strip which might have given the Transvaal an outlet to the coast. Meanwhile the two German ships lay in Delagoa Bay, which was connected with Pretoria in the summer by the completion of a line from Lorenzo Marques. In a speech at the opening of the railway the Governor of Cape Colony, while declaring that Great Britain had never wished to interfere in the Transvaal, emphasized the community of South African interests. The speech provoked a blunt announcement from Pretoria that the President attached no importance to these declarations, and a lively agitation was set on foot in the Transvaal to regain the right of concluding treaties. Complaints and recriminations continued throughout the autumn, and the British Government felt compelled to make a sharp protest in Berlin. "Two days ago," wrote the Kaiser to the Tsar on October 25, "Malet, on paying his farewell visit to the Foreign Office, used very blustering words about Germany behaving badly to England in Africa, that they would not stand it any longer, and that after buying off the French by concessions in Egypt they were at liberty to look after us. He was even so undiplomatic as to utter the word war, saying that England would not shrink from making war upon me if we did not knock down in Africa."

The Storm Brewing

A rising of the Uitlanders against the exasperations of the Kruger régime was generally expected. As early as October Marschall informed the British Government that a *coup* was preparing, and on December 24 the German Consul in Pretoria telegraphed that mischief was brewing and that the Transvaal Government was anxious, to which Berlin replied urging Kruger to avoid provocation. On the same day, December 30, the German colony in Pretoria appealed to the Kaiser for protection, and the Consul begged leave to summon marines from Delagoa

Bay. On December 31 the German Government asked the Portuguese to allow a landing corps of fifty men from

**The
Jameson
Raid**

Delagoa Bay to proceed to Pretoria for the defence of its nationals. Meanwhile on December 30 Jameson's troops crossed the frontier from Mafeking. On January 1 the German Ambassador informed the Prime Minister that no attack on the independence of the Republic could be tolerated. Salisbury replied that he recognized the danger and damage of the raid to various European interests in South Africa, and that he was doing everything possible to avert violent action against the Transvaal. On the same day Sir Frank Lascelles, who had recently succeeded Sir Edward Malet in Berlin, was instructed to say that the Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary were sharply opposed to the raid and that the High Commissioner had been ordered to call Jameson back. Marschall proceeded to invite the French Ambassador forthwith to examine with him how far France would co-operate in limiting "the insatiable appetite" of England, adding that it was necessary to demonstrate that England could no longer count on Franco-German antagonism and seize whatever she wished. He next instructed Hatzfeldt to inquire what steps Great Britain would take to cancel the new and illegal situation; but before the Ambassador could obey his orders the raid had come to an ignominious end, and Jameson and his freebooters were under lock and key. The news of the collapse reached Berlin on January 2, and on January 3 the Kaiser dispatched the following telegram to Kruger: "I heartily congratulate you on the fact that you and your people, without appealing to the aid of friendly Powers, have succeeded by your unaided efforts in restoring peace and preserving the independence of the country against the armed bands which broke into your land." "I express to Your Majesty my deepest gratitude for Your Majesty's congratulations," replied the President. "With God's help we hope to continue to do everything possible for the existence of our Republic."

The Kaiser, the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister share the responsibility for launching this high explosive into the already ruffled waters of Anglo-German relations, and it is immaterial in **The Kaiser's Anger** whose brain the idea arose.¹ On the following morning Marschall sent for the *Times* correspondent, and explained that the telegram was a State action and that it was necessary to give England a lesson. The Kaiser was equally aware what he was doing, and steps were taken to safeguard the fleet. Before the news of Jameson's surrender arrived, he wrote a letter to the Tsar which reveals his excitement and indignation. "The Transvaal Republic has been suddenly attacked in a most foul way, as it seems not without England's knowledge. I have used very severe language in London and have opened communications with Paris for common defence of our endangered interests, as French and German colonists have immediately joined hands to help the outraged Boers. I hope you will also kindly consider the question, as it is one of the principles of upholding treaties. I hope all will come right, but come what may I will never allow the British to stamp out the Transvaal." In the light of this temperamental utterance the Kaiser's statement in his Memoirs that he disapproved the telegram is not convincing.

"The whole German people," writes Reventlow, "stood behind the telegram as it understood it. There was a cry of relief, At last!" Great Britain, or at any rate British subjects, appeared to be engaged in a deep-laid plot to swallow a little Republic with which Germans were connected by ties of sympathy as well as commerce. Some cool heads, like Hammann, regretted the implication of the message that Germany would have been ready to aid the Transvaal if invited, and Tirpitz condemned it on the ground of British strength and German impotence; but

¹ Conflicting versions are given by Admiral Hollmann, in Eckardstein, "Erinnerungen," I, 271-8; Hammann, "Der missverstandene Bismarck," 47-51; and the Kaiser's "Memoirs," ch. 3.

even Bismarck, though always more inclined to carp than to bless, remarked that the British Government

could very well have sent the telegram itself.
British Indignation The applause of Germany was balanced by the indignation of the British Empire.

"The nation will never forget this telegram," wrote the *Morning Post* in prophetic words, "and it will always bear it in mind in the future orientation of its policy." The reply of the Government took the form of ordering a flying squadron of six cruisers to Delagoa Bay, summoning part of the reserve fleet for service, and sending a torpedo-flotilla to the Channel, while Kruger was informed that Great Britain would at any price oppose foreign interference. The German Government, which had no wish for war, saw that it had gone too far. On January 6 Marschall explained to Sir Frank Lascelles that the Kaiser had no unfriendly intentions in sending the telegram, and complained of the Press attacks. The relations of Germany and the Transvaal, he informed the Reichstag in a conciliatory speech on February 13, were founded on the Commercial Treaty of 1885, which gave most favoured nation treatment and secured commercial and industrial freedom to German subjects. British attempts to make South Africa a closed economic unit would damage German interests. Germany, on the other hand, had no wish to intervene in the Transvaal, and did not desire a Protectorate. The Boer distrust of British policy was due not to German prompting, but to the aims of certain British subjects. Relations with the British Government had never ceased to be friendly, and the British Government had done its best to stop the raid.

Excuses and explanations were useless, for the Kruger telegram was the most disastrous error of the early years of the reign of William II. The Franco-Russian *rapprochement*, which had begun before the accession of William II and which he had been unable to check, suggested an Anglo-German intimacy in compensation. For some years he had followed the path of wisdom; but the

friction of 1894 and 1895 had diminished his popularity in England, and on January 3, 1896, he threw what was left of it to the winds. It was doubtless annoying to watch the insidious sapping and mining of the defences of the Transvaal; but it was not a sovereign State. The telegram merely hastened its doom by increasing the British resolve to remain the paramount Power in South Africa, and by fostering British suspicions of Kruger, who not only oppressed British subjects, but intrigued with a foreign Power. Moreover, the German Government was well aware that it could not in any case have rendered assistance to the Boers, since the British navy was in unchallenged control of the sea. Marschall, remarks Reventlow, thought in terms of law, not of force, hypothetically threatening what he could not perform. He learned his lesson, for there were no more German attempts to interfere in South Africa. Yet the mischief could not be undone. The Boers continued to regard Germany as a powerful friend; and the more ignorant of them may well have believed that German aid would be forthcoming in the struggle of which British and Boers began openly to speak after the lightning-flash of the raid had illuminated the dark places of South African politics.

"The raid was folly," observed Salisbury to Eckardstein in 1899, "but the telegram was even more foolish." The British and German Governments were before long to resume their friendly intercourse, and within a few weeks Berlin gave welcome encouragement to the reconquest of the Sudan; but the British people never forgot or forgave what they took for a wanton challenge to our position in South Africa, and the German people were angered by the fury which the action of their impulsive ruler provoked. Henceforth the Kaiser's references to Great Britain in his letters to the Tsar are almost invariably disparaging. "The *coup be bourse* in the Transvaal has miscarried," he wrote on February 20. "They have behaved very improperly to me, but that leaves me un-

Germany's
disastrous
Blunder

touched, whereas their mobilizing their celebrated squadron against us, who have hardly anything to speak of, makes them supremely ridiculous." The Triple Alliance itself was weakened by the shock. At the height of the crisis the German Government had vainly sounded the Powers as to co-operation; and Italy accompanied her refusal with the momentous declaration that in the event of Great Britain joining in a Franco-German war she would refuse to recognize the *casus fœderis*, since the Italian fleet would be unable to defend her coasts.¹ Friendship with England, publicly declared Rudini, who had succeeded Crispi as Premier, was the necessary complement to the Triple Alliance.

Though Africa was the source of the most acute differences between Great Britain and Germany, there were other fields in which the policy of the two countries pursued divergent paths. Japan's conflict with China in 1894 ended with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed in April, 1895, by which China, defeated on land and sea, surrendered the Liao-tung Peninsula and Formosa, and undertook to pay an indemnity of thirty millions.² A month before the conclusion of the Treaty Germany vainly advised the victor not to claim territory on the mainland; but when France and Russia—"to prevent the shifting of the balance of power to Russia's disadvantage," as Hanotaux explained—associated themselves with Germany, Japan reluctantly relinquished Port Arthur and its peninsula in return for an increased indemnity and a promise from China that she would not cede the territory thus restored. Each of the three European Powers received concessions from a grateful Chinese Government; but the balance-sheet of the enterprise was not completed in the year that witnessed the intervention. The Siberian railway, commenced in 1891, was rapidly advancing across

¹ See Pribram, "The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary," II, 110.

² See Reventlow, "Deutschland's Auswärtige Politik," 83-7; Bourgeois et Pagès, "Origines et Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre," 248-53; and Rosen, "Forty Years of Diplomacy," I, ch. 15.

Asia, and Russia had already fixed her eye on a terminus at Port Arthur. The Japanese, argued Lobanoff, would spread "like a drop of oil on blotting-paper." But though a Japanese foothold on the mainland might well seem intolerable to a Power which aspired to the hegemony of the Far East, and France naturally supported the aims of her ally, the association of Germany with her two rivals surprised onlookers both in Asia and Europe, including Bismarck, who described it as a leap in the dark. Hohenlohe, however, was anxious to restore cordial relations with Petrograd, and on visiting the Tsar soon after the triple intervention he assured him that the object of Germany's policy had been to manifest her good will towards Russia in Eastern Asia.¹

The Tsar, well satisfied with the result of the combination, confided to the Chancellor that he had informed the Kaiser that he would have no objection if Germany took a coaling station on Chinese soil. Hohenlohe replied that his master had already communicated this information to him in confidence, and added that the English claimed the Tsusan islands. "Yes," rejoined the Tsar, "they always want everything for themselves. When somebody takes anything, they want to take a good deal more." Here was the price of German aid, of which the public was unaware; but against the advantages of a Russo-German entente in the Far East and the prospect of a German settlement in China had to be set the lasting enmity of Japan. "We shall remember," remarked a Japanese statesman with ominous brevity. The rapid growth of the island empire since it had thrown off the trammels of feudalism had escaped the notice of all the European Powers except Great Britain, who gave a striking demonstration of her confidence and good will and admitted Japan to the comity of nations by the Treaty of July 16, 1894, surrendering ex-territorial jurisdiction in five years and allowing her to frame her tariff freely, and

Germany
alienates
Japan

¹ Hohenlohe, "Denkwürdigkeiten," II, 521.

a year later by declining to take part in the coercion that followed her victory over China. Thus Germany had associated herself with the two European Powers most hostile to Great Britain, in opposition to a rising Power in the Far East which enjoyed our sympathy and support. With a lack of imaginative foresight hardly less than that displayed in the Kruger telegram, the path had been chosen which led straight to the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the retaliation of 1914.

On November 4, 1897, two German missionaries were murdered in the province of Shantung, and on November

Germany
occupies
Kiao-chau

ber 14 four German cruisers entered the bay of Kiao-chau, landed marines, and proclaimed the territory a German possession.¹

After negotiations with China Germany secured the punishment of the offenders, financial compensation for the mission, a lease of Kiao-chau for ninety-nine years, and leave to build a railway to join the projected Chinese system. She had already attempted in 1895 to secure a coaling station at the mouth of the Yang-tse. "We needed a foothold in Eastern Asia," explained Marschall, "for without it we should be in the air alike on the economic, maritime and political plane. In the economic sphere we need a door into China, such as France possesses in Tonkin, England in Hongkong, and Russia in the north." German trade was indeed growing rapidly, and German ships needing the smallest repairs had to dock in Hongkong or Japan. Henceforth Germany possessed one of the best ports in China, with a good harbour, a tolerable climate, and coal in the vicinity. A neat German town arose at Tsingtau, fortified against a sudden *coup de main*; but its connexion with Germany was at the mercy of Great Britain, and its security depended on the goodwill of Japan, which German statesmen, blind to her strength and careless of her interests, made no attempt to obtain.

The spirit of challenge which had begun to characterize

¹ See the Kaiser's "Memoirs," ch. 3.

German policy was exhibited not only in the seizure of Kiao-chau but in the Imperial commentaries to which it gave rise. A naval squadron was dispatched under the command of Prince Henry to enforce the submission of China to German demands. Its vocation, declared the Kaiser in bidding him farewell, was to make clear to the Europeans in China, to the German merchant, and, above all, to China herself, that the German Michael had planted his shield firmly in the soil. "Should anyone attempt to affront us or infringe our good rights, then strike out with mailed fist, and, if God will, weave round your young brow the laurel which nobody in the German Empire will begrudge you." Prince Henry's reply, couched in Byzantine phraseology, announced that his whole desire was "to proclaim abroad, to all who will hear as well as to those who will not, the gospel of Your Majesty's anointed person." The German Government assured Salisbury that Germany had no desire to displease England, and that Kiao-chau, in the north of China, was far removed from the regions in which she was directly interested. Salisbury offered no protest; but he announced that, should a demand be made for exclusive privileges, or should other countries seek to take possession of Chinese ports, the Government would protect our vast interests in China.

Prince
Henry's
Voyage

In pursuance of the secret agreement between the Kaiser and the Tsar, the German signal for the spoliation of China was speedily followed by Russia.¹ At the end of 1897 the Chinese Government informed the British Minister at Peking that it had authorized the Russian fleet to winter in Port Arthur. In answer to British inquiries at Petrograd, Muravieff innocently explained that, as Vladivostok was ice-bound, China had offered hospitality. A similar reply was given to an inquiry from Japan, and it was added that the port was only lent temporarily as a

¹ The seizure of Port Arthur was due to Muravieff, who was supported by the Tsar, but opposed by the other Ministers.—Rosen, "Forty Years of Diplomacy," I, ch. 16.

winter anchorage. When two British gunboats also anchored in Port Arthur, Muravieff, scenting suspicion, repeated that the wintering of Russian ships in that harbour had no political importance; but four days later the tone of the Russian Government had changed, and the Ambassador informed Salisbury that the presence of the British ships had produced "a bad impression" at Petrograd. The Prime Minister softly replied that we possessed a treaty right to enter the port, but they had gone thither without orders from home and would doubtless soon leave for another port. Russia's next step was to declare that China had given her "the first right of anchorage," and Muravieff now stated in ominous tones that the presence of British ships at Port Arthur was regarded in Petrograd as so unfriendly that rumours of war were afloat. Salisbury explained, with a meekness which angered many of his followers, that only one British

**Port
Arthur
Occupied**

vessel was in Port Arthur, that it had been sent without orders from the Cabinet, and that it would be leaving in a few days. The ship left a day or two later, and Russia secured from helpless China a lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan, with the right to build a railway to the peninsula. The Prime Minister, like humbler mortals, was indignant at the high-handed action and at the equivocation which had preceded it; but as he had no intention of opposing it by arms, he contented himself with a lease of Wei-hai-Wei as a naval base to restore the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili. "I congratulate you most heartily," wrote the Kaiser to the Tsar. "We two will make a good pair of sentinels at the entrance of the Gulf." A year later Germany purchased the Caroline Islands from Spain.

The seizure of Port Arthur would have been difficult if not impossible without the good will of Germany, who championed Russian against British interests in the Far East. In addition to the friction in Africa and Asia already described, and to the dissension in the Near East,

which will be studied later, two new causes of estrangement between Great Britain and Germany emerged in the middle of the 'nineties. German industry, advancing by leaps and bounds, was beginning to force an entrance for its low-priced goods into England, and the bitter cry of "Made in Germany" arose from the victims of commercial competition. Lord Rosebery spoke gravely of the effects of the rivalry, in which Germany was steadily gaining ground; and the exasperation found vent in an hysterical article in the *Saturday Review* on September 4, 1897, which complained that the two countries were rivals in every quarter of the globe, and argued that if Germany were annihilated to-morrow every Englishman would be the richer. It was not realized that the journal no longer exercised the smallest political influence, and the legend that Great Britain's hostility originated in commercial jealousy was impossible to destroy. Tirpitz himself always stoutly maintained that it was the competition not of ships but of goods which changed the political face of Europe.

The growing coolness of Great Britain aided the conversion of the German people to their ruler's view that a rich and powerful empire required a fleet for the defence of its territory, the safeguarding of its commerce and the support of its diplomacy. On January 18, 1896, shortly after the Kruger telegram, the Kaiser delivered a significant address on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the foundation of the Empire. "The German Empire has grown into a world empire. Everywhere in distant parts of the earth dwell thousands of our countrymen. German goods, German knowledge, German energy cross the ocean. The value of German goods at sea runs into thousands of millions. Yours is the grave duty to help me to bind this greater Germany closely to our homeland." The speech aroused widespread attention and criticism. "The proclamation of another German Empire in the future," commented the *Times*, "compels us to ask some serious questions. In what regions hitherto

lacking owners is it to be created, or how and from whom is it to be conquered?" In Germany itself the ideal of *Weltpolitik*—a phrase unknown to Bismarck—was now being vigorously proclaimed by the Pan-German League founded in 1893, with Karl Peters as its first President, and Hasse, a Leipzig Professor and member of the Reichstag, as its second. Its more irresponsible members demanded that Greater Germany should embrace all the Germanic peoples—German Austria, German Switzerland, Flemish Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg; and though such fantastic notions were never widely adopted and were repudiated by the directors of national policy, they increased the *malaise* of Europe and fostered the apprehension that Germany was changing from a "saturated" to an aggressive Power.

When a modest programme of shipbuilding was rejected in March, 1897, owing to the opposition of the Centrum, the Kaiser gave vent to his angry disappointment. In June, on the occasion of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, Prince Henry represented his country at a naval review at Spithead; and the vessel which he commanded made a poor show beside the ships of other countries. "I greatly regret," telegraphed the Kaiser, ever ready to preach a political sermon, "that I cannot give you a better ship, to compare with some of the splendid warships which other nations will send. This is one of the regrettable consequences of the attitude of those unpatriotic men who have hindered the supply of necessary vessels. But I will never rest till I have raised my navy to the same standard as that of my army." On another occasion he used the oft-quoted words, "The trident belongs in our hands." He now appointed as head of the Admiralty a man of first-rate ability, who was filled with a conviction of the greatness of Germany's mission in the world not inferior to his own. Admiral von Tirpitz had pushed his way up from the bottom of the ladder, largely owing to his work on the torpedo arm,

**Germany's
Sea Power**

and attracted the notice of William II before his accession. In 1896 he was appointed Commander of the Far East cruiser squadron, with a commission to seek out a place on the Chinese coast for a military and economic base; and, after advising the selection of Tsingtau, the strongest man in German politics since Bismarck was called home to the crowning work of his life.¹

On June 28, 1897, a fortnight after the appointment of Tirpitz, Bernhard von Bülow succeeded Marschall von Bieberstein as Foreign Minister, a post held by his father before him.² The new Minister had begun his diplomatic career in Rome in 1874, whence he passed to Petrograd, Vienna and Paris. His chief, Hohenlohe, declared in 1879 that he might well become German Chancellor, and he attracted the friendly notice of Gambetta. After spending the next few years as First Secretary at Petrograd and Minister at Bucharest, he was appointed in 1894 to the Embassy in Rome, where his personal charm, his wide culture, and his Italian wife made him a popular and influential figure. The Kaiser told Bülow that his task would be to conduct Germany into the realms of *Welt-politik* and to secure the building of a fleet. The monarch had at last secured the services of an experienced diplomatist, a brilliant debater, an accomplished Parliamentary manager, and a convinced Imperialist. "The times are past," declared the new Foreign Secretary in his first speech in the Reichstag, "when the German left the air to one of his neighbours, the sea to another, and reserved the sky for himself." For the twelve following years the Kaiser, Bülow and Tirpitz worked harmoniously together, and the

**Bülow
succeeds
Marschall**

¹ See Tirpitz' "Memoirs"; the Kaiser's "Memoirs," ch. 9; and Hassell, "Alfred von Tirpitz."

² Bülow has explained his policy in his book, "Imperial Germany," and in his "Reden," 3 vols. Cf. Spickernagel, "Fürst Bülow"; Tardieu, "Le Prince de Bülow"; the Kaiser's "Memoirs," ch. 4; Münz, "Von Bismarck bis Bülow"; Hammann, "Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," and "Um den Kaiser"; J. Haller, "Die Ära Bülow." Hamel, "Aus Bülow's Diplomatischer Werkstatt," analyses the differences between the first and second edition of his "Deutsche Politik."

three men must be held jointly responsible for a policy which changed the face of the world.

In November, within a few months of his assuming office, Tirpitz introduced the first Navy Bill, which presented a programme to be completed in

Tirpitz'
Navy Bill

seven years. He was assured at the Admiralty that the Reichstag would never accept a term of years, and Beningsen, the National Liberal leader, advised yearly credits. Tirpitz, however, resolved to secure continuity of construction, and to resign if he failed. The second novelty was that, while his predecessors had aimed at coast defence, a small battle fleet in home waters, and fast cruisers scattered over the globe ready to defend German commerce and attack the commerce of enemies, the new system was to begin with a High Seas Fleet and to think about commerce defence if and when Germany secured some foreign bases. In commending his proposal to the Reichstag, he declared that if it were carried out the German fleet would in 1904 cease to be a *quantité négligeable*. Hohenlohe defended the proposal as "the result of the political development of Germany," and Tirpitz secured the approval of Bismarck and his Press by a timely visit to Friedrichsruh. At the age of eighty the fallen Chancellor had accepted an invitation from Ballin to revisit Hamburg; and, after making a tour of the harbour and inspecting a giant liner, he remarked, "I am stirred and moved. Yes, this is a new age, a new world." The support of the Princes of the Empire and of the Ministers of the Federal States, of the Hanse towns and of the Universities, was sought by the indefatigable Minister, who also commissioned a translation of Mahan's "Influence of Sea-Power on History." A new spirit had entered the Admiralty, and a new spirit was soon to dominate the German nation.

The Navy Bill was warmly supported by the Conservatives and National Liberals, and fought by the Radicals under Richter and by the Socialists, who complained that the Reichstag was parting with its control of the purse for

a term of six years; but the support of a majority of the Centrum decided the issue. The third reading was carried in April, 1898, and the German navy, as a factor in high politics, came into existence.

**The
Navy
League**

The programme consisted of 12 battle-ships, 8 armoured vessels for coast defence, 10 large and 23 small cruisers. A Navy League was founded to educate the people to a perception of the need for sea power; and in a speech at Danzig on September 23, 1898, the Kaiser uttered the fateful words, "Our future lies on the water."

CHAPTER VII

ARMENIA AND CRETE

IN addition to the causes of estrangement between Great Britain and Germany described in the previous chapter, there was a sharp divergence of sentiment and policy in regard to Turkey. A vein of idealism has run through British statesmanship since Canning championed the cause of Greek independence; and the same spirit of disinterested humanitarianism that led to the support of Greek and Italian nationality was aroused by the Turkish atrocities in the Balkans in 1875, and by similar outrages twenty years later in Asia Minor.

I

It was mentioned in the first chapter of the present work that the newly awakened interest of the Christian Powers in the Armenians at the Congress of Berlin proved not a blessing but a curse. The Sultan's suspicions of their loyalty were aroused, and a Turkish Minister grimly observed that the way to get rid of the Armenian question was to get rid of the Armenians, while no Power except Great Britain exerted itself to secure the execution of the promised reforms. Russia possessed the power but not the will to aid, and Turkish inertia once again triumphed, even Gladstone giving up the struggle in 1883.¹ Without

¹ In addition to the Blue Books, see Bryce, "Transcaucasia and Ararat" (edition of 1896); Whates, "The Third Salisbury Administration"; Lepsius, "Armenia and Europe"; Crispi, "Memoirs," III, ch. 9; Argyll, "Our Responsibilities for Turkey"; Sir E. Pears, "Abdul Hamid"; E. T. Cook, "Lord Rosebery's Foreign Policy"; Ritter von Sax, "Geschichte des Machtverfalls der Türkei"; Sidney Whitman, "Turkish Memories"; Lynch, "Armenia," 2 vols.; Djemal, "Memories of a Turkish Statesman," ch. 9.

indulging in spectacular massacres, the Turkish Government pursued its usual course of rendering the lives of its Armenian subjects intolerable; and it was inevitable that the bolder spirits should turn to thoughts of defence and retaliation. In 1880 a committee was formed in Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, where there was a large Armenian colony, and in the following years committees began to appear in Western Europe. In 1890 an Armenian association was formed by Englishmen to bring the Armenian question before the public and to advise the leaders of the persecuted race. As the prospect of intervention raised by the Treaty of Berlin receded and the hope of reform died away, the national movement became more vocal, and acts of violence were committed, despite the warning of British and American friends that the appeal to force would be answered by massacre. The vast majority in town and country were untouched by the revolutionary spirit; but the thought of committees plotting in the dark, with the sympathy of foreigners and perhaps of foreign governments, maddened the Sultan, who remembered the process by which Bulgaria had been detached from his empire. Suspects were imprisoned; and when in 1891 the Hamidieh irregular cavalry was formed of savage Kurds and armed with modern weapons, the Armenians became aware that they were living in the crater of a volcano.

The massacres began in the Sasun district in the vilayet of Bitlis in the summer of 1894. Some villagers refused the irregular tribute levied on them by the Kurds who lived higher up in the mountains, and blood was shed. The Turkish authorities sent gendarmes to collect the taxes; and when the Armenians explained that they could not pay unless protected against the Kurds, who took everything that they possessed, the Governor charged them with rebellion and demanded troops. A large body of regulars arrived in the Sasun area, and, aided by Hamidieh cavalry, carried fire and sword among the hapless villagers. Entire villages were burned, and men, women and children

Massacre
at
Sasun

slaughtered with every circumstance of barbarity. When the news of the tragedy reached Europe through the reports of the British Vice-Consul at Van, Sir Philip Currie, our Ambassador at Constantinople, made energetic protests, and Lord Rosebery, appalled by "horrors unutterable and unimaginable," demanded an inquiry and the punishment of guilty officials. The Sultan, strong in his knowledge that the Powers were incapable of combination, replied in a tone of injured innocence that no undue severity had been applied in the suppression of the rebellion. "Just as there are in other countries nihilists, socialists and anarchists, endeavouring to obtain concessions of privileges which it is impossible to grant them, and just as steps have to be taken against them, so it is with the Armenians." While conceding the demand for an inquiry, he made it clear to his critics that he was in no mood for apology. The British Consul was forbidden to visit the scene of the massacre. The Mufti of Mush, who had incited the troops, and the Commander of the forces were decorated, while an official who had protested was dismissed.

When it was announced that the object of the Commission was "to inquire into the criminal conduct of Armenian brigands," Sir Philip Currie was ordered to invite the French and Russian Ambassadors to join in a formal protest against an inquiry which could be nothing but a farce; and Abdul Hamid was informed that the British Government "reserved to themselves entire liberty of action with regard to the whole matter." The Sultan gave way to the extent of allowing a British consul to join the Commission. Lord Kimberley, the Foreign Secretary in the Rosebery Government, thereupon invited the Powers to approve of the French and Russian Consuls at Erzerum being added—France and Russia alone having consuls in the neighbourhood. France consented, subject to the approval of the Sultan. Russia was equally favourable, though explaining that she was averse to raising any

**The
Sham
Inquiry**

political question and was actuated by no *arrière-pensée*. Austria and Italy readily agreed to the joint representation, while Germany replied that, though only indirectly interested in the question, she had advised the Sultan to appoint a commission satisfactory to the Powers. After agreement had thus been reached, it was proposed that the Consuls of the three Powers should send delegates instead of going in person; and the British Government reluctantly agreed to this *diminutio capitis*. The first sitting, which was held in January, 1895, showed that the Turks were determined to render the inquiry useless. Witnesses feared to denounce the misconduct of Turkish officials before a Turkish Commission, and Government witnesses produced stories that were manufactured for the occasion. Yet, despite these obstacles to the elucidation of the truth, it was discovered that the Armenians had not revolted against the Government, and that the Turkish troops, instead of keeping the peace, had joined the Kurds in a savage assault.

It was now the task of the British Government, which alone had its heart in the work, to devise methods of preventing the recurrence of atrocities. A scheme of reform was drawn up by Sir Philip Currie suggesting the appointment of a Vali for five years, approved and removable only by the Powers; a council of delegates; the local officials to be Moslem and Christian in accordance with their relative numbers; a court for each Vilayet, composed of two Moslems and two Christians; a mixed gendarmerie; and, finally, measures of protection against the incursions and levying of forced tribute by the Kurds. It was a business-like scheme, and Turkey resorted to her usual methods of protest and procrastination. The Sultan told Sir Philip that he did not see the necessity of such reforms; complained of British attacks on an old ally; denied that Armenians were lying in prison without trial; warned him that if false reports continued to be believed in England it would endanger good relations; and added

The
British
Scheme

that his Mussulman subjects could not remain indifferent to the injuries they received at the hands of the Armenians, apparently encouraged and protected by England. The Turkish Ambassador in London, who coolly inquired of Lord Kimberley by what right Great Britain claimed to interfere in Turkey's internal affairs, was reminded of the Treaty of Berlin and the Cyprus Convention.

The Sultan's next step was to appoint a commission to inquire into Armenian affairs, and Great Britain was invited to communicate direct with the Commission instead of putting forward a scheme of her own. But the continued persecution of the Armenians throughout Asia Minor persuaded France and Russia to instruct their Ambassadors to join Sir Philip Currie in elaborating a scheme on the basis of his own Memorandum. Great Britain in vain proposed to make all the higher appointments subject to the approval of the Powers; but the scheme presented on May 11, consisting of forty articles, and covering the whole field of administration, justice and finance, was far too drastic for the Sultan's taste. He asked for time for consideration, and appealed to Germany, who declined to intervene; but as reports of renewed barbarities arrived, Great Britain at the end of the month urged the Powers to insist on a reply, informing the Russian Ambassador at the same time that in the event of further delay she would employ "measures of restraint."

Kimberley's intentions were excellent, but he had drawn the bow too tight. Prince Lobanoff, who had succeeded Giers as Russian Foreign Minister, cared nothing for the Armenians, and explained that he could not agree to a new Bulgaria in Armenia. Fearing, or pretending to fear, a general rising of the race, two millions of whom lived within the frontiers of Russia, he replied that he would have nothing to do with coercion. Fortified by knowledge of Russia's decision, the Sultan rejected virtually the whole of the reform scheme. While accepting an increase of Armenians in the administration, he

**Kimberley
versus
Lobanoff**

refused a High Commissioner, a Commission of Control, the veto of the Powers on the Valis, the proposals for the reform of justice, the gendarmerie and police, and ignored the clauses relating to taxation and finance. On receiving this negative reply Lobanoff explained to the British Ambassador that he had never regarded the reform scheme as an ultimatum, repeated that Russia would take no part in coercion, and added that he could not allow the creation of a district in which the Armenians would have exceptional privileges and which would form the nucleus of an Armenian State. The British Government, though now unsupported by any of the Powers, did not flinch, and on June 19 Kimberley proposed that the Sultan should be asked to state his intentions with regard to the reforms within forty-eight hours. While the Russian Government was considering the proposal, the Rosebery Ministry fell, and on the following day Russia refused to agree to the demand.

Salisbury, who combined the Foreign Office with the Premiership, was as eager as Kimberley to save the Armenians from their oppressor. - He encouraged Gladstone to deliver a flaming denunciation in August, and he informed the Turkish Ambassador that he entirely supported the policy of his predecessor.¹ When the Sultan replied by restating his criticisms of the reform scheme, Salisbury inquired how far Russia would go in the direction of coercion. Lobanoff rejoined that he wished to co-operate with Great Britain, so long as no autonomous State was contemplated, and Salisbury explained that he had no such aim, and that the problem was to establish effective supervision in accordance with the Treaty of Berlin. The Queen's Speech of August 15 referred to the "horrors which have moved the indignation of the Christian nations of Europe generally and of my people especially." In his speech on the Address the new Prime Minister, fresh from

Salisbury
threatens
Turkey

¹ There is some interesting correspondence with Salisbury and Gladstone in G. W. E. Russell, "Life of Canon MacColl," ch. 8.

his meeting with the Kaiser at Cowes, addressed a public warning to Turkey. "If, generation after generation, cries of misery come from various parts of the Turkish Empire, I am sure the Sultan cannot blind himself to the probability that Europe will at some time become weary of the appeals that are made to it. He will make a calamitous mistake if he refuses to accept the assistance and to listen to the advice of the European Powers in extirpating from his dominions an anarchy and a weakness which no treaties and no sympathy will in the long run prevent from being fatal to the empire over which he rules." Such menaces left the Sultan cold, for Great Britain stood alone.

**Isolation of
England**

On September 11 the Tsar confessed to Hohenlohe that he was tired of the Armenian question.¹ Russia had now passed beyond the stage of refusing to support coercion and had imposed her veto on action by anybody else. The Emperor and himself, Lobanoff explained, were strongly against force being used by any or all the Powers. The significance of the warning was enhanced by an intimation from the Sultan that if Great Britain insisted on European supervision of the reforms he would place himself in the hands of Russia. His next step was to issue a *contre-projet* which withdrew the concessions already granted, and reserved to Moslems the whole of the administration.

When Lobanoff realized that the British Government had no desire to create an Armenian State and no intention of applying coercion, he consented to support the mild proposals which alone had a chance of being accepted. As the Sultan refused European supervision, Salisbury proposed a mixed Commission of Surveillance, containing three Europeans; and Russia, obediently followed by France, offered the Sultan the choice between the Commission and the main provisions of the scheme presented in May. Abdul Hamid, preferring a paper scheme to the presence of European supervisors, chose the former, and on October 17 an *iradé* sanctioned the reforms. The sur-

¹ Hohenlohe, "Denkwürdigkeiten," II, 521.

render on paper was complete; but it followed a far more terrible outbreak than that which had set the Concert in motion a year before. The greatest massacre of Christians that had occurred for centuries began on September 30 with an attack on a procession in Constantinople bearing a petition to the Government. Wholesale massacres occurred at Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis, Kharput, Diarbekr, Sivas, Aintab, Marash, and, most terrible of all, at Urfa, where three thousand men, women and children were burnt in the cathedral. The Consular reports left no doubt that the campaign was carefully organized; that the holocaust often began and ended to the call of the bugle; that soldiers took part in the killing; that the authorities instigated or remained passive spectators of the tragedy; and that not a single foreigner was injured. While pretending to accept the guidance of the Powers, the Sultan had encouraged and probably ordered the solution of the Armenian problem by the time-honoured methods of the East. When Russia vetoed the application of force by Great Britain she signed the death-warrant of myriads of the Christian subjects of the Turk for whom she had gone to war in 1877.

**The Great
Massacre**

While twenty-five thousand Armenians were dying by the sword, by fire, by water, by torture, by violation, by hunger, by cold, Salisbury protested vigorously to the Porte, which replied that the Armenian revolutionary movement and the support of the Christians by the Powers had excited his Mussulman subjects; that whatever bloodshed had occurred the Armenians were the aggressors; and that the Government was doing its best to restore order. The alleged revolt, moreover, was employed as an excuse for not promulgating the reforms which had been sanctioned, and the Sultan invited Great Britain to advise the Armenians to be quiet, and "to allow him to execute the reforms which could not be put in force till tranquillity was restored." The Powers contented themselves with sending ships through the Dardanelles for the protection

of their subjects. Lobanoff suggested that the Sultan should be allowed time to restore order, and advocated "as little interference as possible in Turkish affairs at the present moment"; and Goluchowski, who had recently succeeded Kalnoky as Austrian Foreign Minister, declared with equal cynicism that the situation did not require even the consideration of the measures of coercion which Great Britain considered desirable. At the Guildhall banquet on November 9 Salisbury announced his disbelief that the reforms would be executed, and renewed his warnings of the summer; but Abdul Hamid was master of the situation, and carried out his sinister programme in leisurely fashion without a hitch. Sir Philip Currie gallantly endeavoured to galvanize his colleagues into motion, but in vain. Christendom was paralysed in 1895 by disunion and indifference, as it had been paralysed in 1453, and a gifted and unoffending race paid the penalty. Though Armenian revolutionaries had formed secret societies in a few cities, they were detested by most of their fellow-countrymen, who were unarmed and knew their own weakness much too well to risk revolt.

At the end of 1895 a halt was called in the campaign of extermination; but the interval was not employed to prevent a recurrence of the atrocities.

Lobanoff supports Turkey Lobanoff unblushingly announced that he "saw nothing to destroy his confidence in the good will of the Sultan, who was doing his best. It was therefore desirable to assist him in the arduous task of introducing the reforms, to give him the necessary time, and to increase his authority and prestige in the eyes of his subjects." The timid Goluchowski, who admitted that the Sultan could stop the massacres whenever he pleased, was equally determined not to raise the Eastern question. Germany never pretended to care what became of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. France followed her ally, and Italy, though far less callous, did not count. The United States, while sharing Great Britain's sympathy and indignation, and generously

aiding in the task of relief, was not a signatory of the Treaty of Berlin, and held aloof from European complications. Thus Salisbury stood alone, as Kimberley before him, and with the fear of a European conflagration before his eyes he could do nothing but warn and protest. The Queen's Speech at the opening of the session of 1896 merely recorded the acceptance by the Sultan of the principal reforms, regretted "a fanatical outbreak on the part of a section of the Turkish population resulting in a series of massacres which have caused the deepest indignation in this country," and promised to publish dispatches and reports.

The paralysis of Christendom played into the hands of the Armenian revolutionaries, who warned the embassies at Constantinople that unless the massacres were stopped and the reforms introduced they would provoke disturbances. Spring melted into summer, and on August 26 a band seized the Ottoman Bank at Galata and barricaded themselves within, hoping to shock Europe out of its indifference. They were persuaded by the Russian dragoman to withdraw on promise of safety and were hurried on board a steamer, but their crazy and criminal act had given the Sultan the excuse which he needed for renewing his attack on the hated race. News of the coming *coup* had reached the Government, which proceeded to arm the Kurds and the dregs of the city with clubs and knives. Directly after the attack on the bank the army of destruction was let loose, and for two days the capital ran with blood. On the second afternoon the British Chargé informed the Sultan that he would land British sailors, and the Ambassadors followed with a joint Note. The organized massacres immediately ceased, though sporadic slaughter continued. This Turkish Batholomew, in which six to seven thousand Armenians were clubbed or stabbed to death in the streets of the capital in broad daylight and under the eyes of the Ambassadors, roused Europe more than the greater massacres of Asia Minor. It was

**The
Constantinople
Massacre**

widely believed, both by Europeans and Turks, that the fleets of the Powers would steam up to the capital and depose the Sultan; yet nothing more alarming occurred than the Ambassadors' refusal to illuminate their houses on the Sultan's birthday a few days later.

British opinion was stirred to anger not only by the devilry of the Turk, but by the impotence of a mighty empire. In a series of inspired sonnets England's impotent William Watson called down the curses of Anger heaven on Abdul Hamid, "Immortally, beyond all mortals, damned"; and Gladstone, again emerging from his retirement at the age of 87, passionately denounced "the Great Assassin" in a speech at Liverpool, and pleaded for the recall of Sir Philip Currie from Constantinople and the expulsion of the Turkish Ambassador. When the mischief was done the six Ambassadors presented a joint Note, citing evidence of the official organization and supervision of the massacre, and demanding investigation and punishment. The Porte naturally denied that the mob had been set in motion by the Government, and a tribunal, appointed to try all who had been concerned in the riots, punished Armenians and allowed their murderers to go free. The explosion of fanaticism in the capital was followed by reverberations throughout Asia Minor, and the new attacks provoked retaliation. Every Armenian who declined to turn the other cheek to the smiter furnished the Sultan with a fresh excuse for flouting the Powers. A month after the blood-bath of the Bosphorus the Sultan replied to the Ambassadors that the Armenians enjoyed greater privileges than subject populations in other countries, and that they desired not the reforms which he had accepted but autonomy, to which he could never consent and which the Powers would never allow. The Note concluded by summoning the Powers to expel Armenian agitators from their territory. But diplomatic insolence was as powerless as wholesale slaughter to stir the Powers. Indeed, the Tsar, meeting Hohenlohe at Breslau on September 6,

expressed the opinion that England was responsible for the whole movement, adding that, though he was very fond of England and the English, he mistrusted their policy.¹ Salisbury abhorred the cruelties of the Turk scarcely less than Gladstone, but he dared not allow the tragedy to provoke the still greater catastrophe of a European war. His policy was endorsed by Lord Rosebery in a speech at Edinburgh on October 9, in which he replied to Gladstone's Liverpool speech and resigned the leadership of the Liberal party. "Against the policy of solitary intervention in the affairs of the East I am prepared to fight tooth and nail. Mr. Gladstone speaks of the phantasm of a European war. I believe it is no phantasm at all. I believe there was a fixed and resolute agreement on the part of all or nearly all the Great Powers to resist by force any single-handed intervention by England. Isolated action means a European war. Concerted action of the Powers is the only way you can deal with the Eastern Question."²

The eighteen years following the Treaty of Berlin convinced Salisbury and most of his countrymen that in supporting Turkey against Russia we had "put our money on the wrong horse." Turkey had not reformed herself, and the Powers had neither compelled her to carry out her promises nor allowed Great Britain to undertake the duty which they shirked themselves. Our protests excited the anger of the Sultan, and our threats aroused his contempt. We failed to rescue the Armenians, and we lost whatever influence at Constantinople we had possessed. Russia had no more love of the Turk in 1894-6 than in 1877-8; but she was now turning her eyes towards the Pacific, and had no intention of spilling her blood for another ungrateful Christian community. Moreover, she had no wish to see Turkey regenerate herself by reforms

Salisbury's
Confession

¹ Hohenlohe, "Denkwürdigkeiten," II, 527.

² Reprinted in Coates, "Life and Speeches of Lord Rosebery," II, ch. 30.

which would strengthen her resistance to Russia's ultimate ambitions. And finally, she was not sorry for the opportunity of turning the tables on her rival. When Alexander II desired to emancipate the Christian subjects of the Sultan, he had been thwarted by Beaconsfield; and when Kimberley and Salisbury became their champions, it was the turn of Russia to pronounce the veto. The Anglo-Russian struggle, which dated from the Crimean war, was still in progress, and the Armenians were sacrificed, like the Macedonian Christians before them, to a world-wide antagonism. The Sultan had discovered that he could do what he liked in his own house, and he found ample compensation for the loss of British friendship in grasping the outstretched hand of the Kaiser.

II

Abdul Hamid had triumphed in his wrestling match with Great Britain. Organized massacres came to an end; but the misrule under which the Armenians, like his other Christian subjects, continued to groan was unchecked and almost unregarded. In Crete, on the other hand, owing to its geographical position and the co-operation of Russia, Salisbury was enabled to emancipate a Christian population without the risk of war, and the Concert of Europe regained a portion of the prestige which it had squandered in the bloodstained highlands of Asia Minor.¹

For ten years after the Pact of Halepa Crete lived quietly under Greek governors; but in 1889 the waters were ruffled by a violent quarrel between "Liberals" and "Conservatives." When the former, after a sweeping victory at the polls, excluded the latter from all posts in the public service, some Conservative deputies brought forward a motion for union with Greece in order to

¹ See W. Miller, "The Ottoman Empire," ch. 18; Bérard, "Les Affaires de Crète"; and Whates, "The Third Salisbury Administration."

embarrass their opponents. Tricoupes, the Greek Premier, endeavoured from Athens to discourage the agitation; but the word "union" rekindled racial enmity, and the strife of Christian with Christian gave place to the fiercer struggle of Christian and Mussulman. A Turkish Commissioner was dispatched from Constantinople; yet neither money nor threats availed to calm the tempest. Villages were burned, murders were committed, Moslem peasants crowded into the coast towns, and Christian refugees sought refuge in Athens. A few Turkish troops were sent, and Tricoupes vainly urged the intervention of the Powers, and above all of Great Britain. A Firman virtually repealed the Pact of Halepa, announced the formation of a gendarmerie from the mainland provinces, and gave preference for official posts to Turkish-speaking candidates. The insurrection was suppressed, three Mussulman Governors in succession ruled the island, and the Assembly ceased to meet.

In 1894 insurrection broke out afresh, and was suppressed in 1895. A Christian Governor was now appointed, but the Moslems protested against the selection, and he was in turn succeeded by a Moslem. Tension continued through-
**Christians
and
Mussulmans**
out the year, and on May 24, 1896, a conflict flamed out in the streets of Canea. Salisbury proceeded to act on the advice which Tricoupes had addressed to him seven years before, and brought the demands of the Cretan Christians before the Concert. Mainly owing to the efforts of the British Government, a convention was accepted by Turkey, reviving the Pact of Halepa and providing that the Governor should be a Christian, appointed for five years with the approval of the Powers. Two-thirds of the public posts were to be reserved for Christians. The Assembly was to be elected biennially and to meet within six months. A commission of European officers was to reorganize the gendarmerie, and a commission of European jurists to reform the tribunals. On paper the programme was satisfactory, but

the will to carry it out was lacking. The Sultan selected a Christian Governor; but the late Moslem Governor remained in the island as Commander-in-Chief, with superior authority, and the delay in the organization of the gendarmerie aroused suspicions. The Moslems resisted the reforms, and on February 4, 1897, they broke loose in Canea. A large part of the Christian quarter was burned, and the flames of civil war enveloped the island. The Christians proclaimed union with Greece, and two days later Prince George, the second son of the

King, hurried across with a torpedo flotilla to prevent Turkish reinforcements from landing. A Note to the Powers argued that as the arrival of fresh Turkish troops would be followed by new atrocities, the Greek Government had decided to prevent it. The Cretans desired union with Greece, which indeed was the only solution of the question. A few days later Colonel Vassos landed west of Canea with 1,500 men to occupy Crete in the name of the King, and issued a proclamation that he was bringing peace and legality to the island. The cautious Tricoupes was dead, and the inflammable Delyannis was again in power. Moreover, Greece had spent large sums on supporting refugees, and the demand for intervention was irresistible. The thrones of Balkan kings are proverbially insecure, and the prudent George dared not risk his crown by thwarting the will of his excitable people.

The five Powers whose ships were at that moment in Cretan waters, surprised and annoyed by the Greek *coup*, telegraphed to their Admirals to occupy Canea. Goluchowski suggested that a naval cordon should be drawn round the island, and that the Christians and Mussulmans should be left to fight out their quarrels without reinforcement either from Athens or Constantinople; but Salisbury refused to encourage a war of mutual extermination. Prince George obeyed an order from the Admirals to withdraw his flotilla, but Vassos attacked and captured a Turkish fort. When the Admirals warned him against

attacking Canea and other towns which they had occupied, the Colonel replied that he had been sent to occupy Crete and would carry out his instructions. An attack on Turkish troops was interrupted by a bombardment from the fleets; and when a Note, promising autonomy on condition that Greek troops and ships left the island, produced no result, the Admirals blockaded the island and again bombarded the insurgents from Suda Bay.

Since the Sultan was unable to send troops to Crete, he mobilized an army on the Greek frontier. The Powers were agreed in desiring to prevent war; but while Germany and Austria wished to compel Greece to withdraw Vassos from Crete, Great Britain argued that the future of the island should be determined before pressure was exerted. Russia was no longer an obstacle in the path of reform, for Lobanoff was dead, and the Queen of Greece was a Russian princess. It was a triumph for Salisbury when on March 2 Notes from the Powers were delivered both at Athens and Constantinople. King George was informed that Crete could not be annexed to Greece, but would receive absolute autonomy. In return the troops and ships were to be withdrawn within six days, or they would be ejected by the Powers. The Note to the Porte demanded complete autonomy for Crete, and promised that it should not be transferred to Greece. The Sultan had no choice but to accept; yet Greece, intoxicated by excitement and self-confidence, refused to withdraw her soldiers from the island. The proposal that they should remain as the nucleus of a gendarmerie, though agreeable to Salisbury, was rejected. The refusal to evacuate Crete, though hailed with delight by the Athenian mob, angered the Powers, each of whom sent six hundred men to the island. A strict blockade was established. The Admirals informed the inhabitants of the "irrevocable" decision of the Powers to grant complete autonomy, and ordered them to lay down their arms. The proclamation produced no effect, for the Cretans demanded union, not autonomy.

Autonomy
for
Crete

Meanwhile Turkey and Greece had mustered considerable forces on the frontiers of Thessaly. The Sultan, while naturally desiring to chastise the Greeks, showed no eagerness for a war from which he knew that he would be allowed to derive no territorial advantage. The Greeks, on the other hand, who had not fought Turkey since the War of Independence, felt unbounded confidence in their military and naval prowess, and it was impossible for the King—still in some degree a stranger in the land—to resist the shrill cries raised by the National Society. At this moment a sympathetic telegram from one hundred British Liberals to the King, and a pamphlet of Gladstone commending her “marvellously gallant action,” encouraged Greece to hope for British aid; money poured in from abroad, and a band of red-shirted “Garibaldians” took their place in the fighting line. As in 1886, Greek rifles went off by themselves on the frontier, and on April 5 the Powers warned both Turkey and Greece that whoever began hostilities would be held responsible and would be

**Greco-
Turkish
War**

allowed no advantages from victory. Greece was deaf and blind; and on April 8 the irregulars crossed the frontier into Macedonia and Epirus. The bands were quickly driven back; but on April 17 the Sultan declared war. Responsibility, he declared, rested with Greece. The war was indeed of her making; but its ultimate cause was Turkish misrule in an island Greek by religion, language and political sympathy.

In 1891 Tricoupes had proposed to Serbia and Bulgaria a joint campaign against the Turks, to be followed by the partition of Macedonia. The plan was betrayed to the Porte by Stambuloff, and during the years that followed no further attempt at combination was made. Greece now again attempted to purchase Bulgarian help by the offer of a partition of Macedonia and a port on the Ægean, but in vain. The Sultan quieted Sofia and Belgrad by opportune grants of bishoprics and schools in Macedonia; and an Austro-Russian Note to the Balkan Courts warned them

not to interfere. The way was thus clear for inflicting on Greece the signal humiliation which she had courted. The Greek navy, though superior to that of Turkey, accomplished nothing; and the land campaign was over in a month. On the day after the declaration of war Edhem Pasha drove his enemy from the Malouna Pass and encamped in the plain of Thessaly. Panic seized the Greeks, who fled from Larissa, and the Athenian populace marched on the palace. Delyannis resigned, and the throne was saved by Rhallis, the new Premier. The defeated forces rallied at Pharsalos, and at Velesino Smolenski, the only General who distinguished himself in the campaign, repulsed the advance guard of the Turkish army. It was but a momentary gleam in the sky; for on May 4 Edhem Pasha forced back the whole Greek line from Volo on the coast to Pharsalos. The Crown Prince Constantine fell back on a strong position at Domokos, from which, however, he was dislodged without difficulty on May 17. The road to Athens now lay open to the invaders, and the capital surrendered itself for a second time to panic. On May 19 a truce was arranged for Epirus, where the campaign had been no less disastrous, and on May 20 for Thessaly.

Greece had been saved from annihilation by the intervention of the Powers. On assuming office Rhallis had informed the Ambassadors that the troops in Crete would be withdrawn and that he would be glad of mediation; and Salisbury, who had been waiting for the opportunity, at once began to work for an armistice. The Powers approved, though Germany insisted that Greece should first pledge herself to be satisfied with autonomy for Crete. Though the other Powers did not regard the condition as essential and Greece refused to accept it, the Kaiser insisted, and Greece gave way on May 10. Two days later the Powers informed the Sultan that Greece had entrusted her interests to the Concert, and would evacuate Crete and accept autonomy of the island; and they asked that the

**The Powers
Mediate**

Turkish commanders should be ordered to halt. Sir Philip Currie was at the same time instructed to decline any proposal for leaving conquered Greek territory in Turkish hands as security for an indemnity, though alterations of the strategic frontier might be considered. Turkey had been attacked and had won; and her demands, which included the restoration of Thessaly and an enormous indemnity, struck even the Kaiser as exorbitant. The Sultan was informed that nothing beyond strategic rectifications and a moderate indemnity could be allowed; and as the Concert was for once unanimous, he submitted and ordered the cessation of hostilities. The Treaty of Peace, signed at Constantinople on December 4, provided for an indemnity of four millions, which was to be raised under the supervision of an International Commission.¹ The Turkish frontier was brought closer to Larissa, but only a single Greek village was transferred. Thanks to Great Britain and to the gentler mood of Russia, Greece emerged from her rash adventure with nothing worse than a few scratches. The situation was none the less profoundly disheartening to friends of the Eastern Christians. "First, 100,000 Armenians slaughtered," lamented Gladstone, "with no security against repetition. Secondly, Turkey stronger than at any time since the Crimean War. Thirdly, Greece weaker than at any time since she became a kingdom. Fourthly, all this due to the mutual distrust and hatred of the Powers."

The Cretan settlement proved much more difficult, and many months were spent in the search for a Governor-General. France suggested a former President of the Swiss Confederation, who declined the honour. Austria championed a Luxemburg officer, who failed to secure unanimity. Then Russia proposed two Turks and a Montenegrin prince; but Salisbury refused a Turk, and the Montenegrin candidate could not be spared by his cousin Prince Nicholas. At the close of the year Russia

¹ See Morison and Hutchinson, "Life of Sir Edward Law," ch. 6.

boldly put forward Prince George of Greece, and Salisbury at once expressed that he had "much pleasure" in supporting his candidature. France and Italy approved; but Germany and Austria frowned on the plan. The Kaiser argued that the man who had led the torpedo flotilla would work for annexation, and then the other Balkan States would demand compensation, as in 1885-6. Austria added that as the proposal would be rejected by Turkey, it should not be made. After several weeks of deadlock the Kaiser informed the British Ambassador that he should withdraw from the Concert, and Bülow, in more picturesque language, explained why Germany "laid her flute on the table." Germany had no interests in the Mediterranean, and the other Powers might appoint whomsoever they pleased. Austria followed suit. The discordant instruments in the orchestra were thus peacefully eliminated; but the Sultan's opposition to Prince George was unchanged.

While these interminable discussions were in progress, Crete was suffering from her old maladies. When the Greek troops were withdrawn the British Consul urged that the Turkish troops should follow them; for the Cretan Christians were prepared to accept autonomy if they were removed. The Sultan, on the other hand, proposed to reinforce his garrisons; but the Powers protested, and, following the British initiative, ordered their Admirals to prevent a landing. When Germany and Austria withdrew their forces, the Admirals of the four Powers asked for an increase of their land forces, which only amounted to 2,500 men; and the coast towns were allotted to the Powers severally, Canea alone being in joint occupation. The strife between the Christians in the interior and the Mussulmans on the coast continued to rage; and the Admirals reported that they would probably come into collision with the Turkish garrisons if the Sultan persisted in refusing their recall.

The deadlock was at last removed on September 6,

Crete's last
Troubles

when a British force was attacked by Mussulmans in the harbour of Candia and suffered more than fifty casualties, while the British Vice-Consul was murdered. The fight spread to the whole town, in which the Mussulmans were in the majority, and hundreds of Christians perished. Admiral Noel, cutting the knot which the Chancelleries had failed to untie, terminated the conflict by bombarding the town, and sent an ultimatum to the Turkish Governor demanding the removal of the garrisons and the disarming of the Mussulmans. The paralysis of the Concert was at an end. British reinforcements were sent, and Russia was informed that if the Powers declined to co-operate Great Britain would act alone. Russia agreed to insist on the withdrawal of the garrisons, and the Powers accepted Salisbury's suggestion that each should, if necessary, expel the troops from its own district. On October 5 the Sultan was invited by a joint Note to withdraw his troops and officials and to hand over the island to the four Powers, who guaranteed his suzerain rights and the well-being of Christians and Mussulmans alike. The evacuation was to begin in a fortnight and be completed within a month. If the demands were not accepted, other steps would be taken. After pleading in vain for permission to retain garrisons in the fortified towns,

**The Turk
Disappears**

he accepted the Note without reservations, and the withdrawal of Turkish troops began. On November 5 Admiral Noel assumed the administration of Candia, and the Commander was escorted to the harbour. The Turkish flag floated over a fort on the islet in Suda Bay—a symbol at once of past domination and present impotence.

These forcible proceedings were witnessed by the Turcophil Kaiser with indignation. "You know why I laid down my flute," he wrote to the Tsar on October 20.¹ "Because I felt and saw that a certain Power was using us all as catspaws to get us to help her to take Crete or Suda Bay, and I would not be one of the party praying

¹ "The Kaiser's Letters to the Tsar," 60-2.

the said Power to kindly look after the welfare of those poor darling Cretans. These recent events have shown me that my suspicions were right and that this Power means mischief and to use force. They want to expel the Mussulmans, who are the landed proprietors, and give the property to the Christians who were their labourers, and who revolted against their masters. That is the Cretan question in a nutshell—downright robbery. What an effect this act of pillage has had on the Mohammedan world you have no idea. The Powers in Crete have played a foolish and most dangerous game. Remember what you and I agreed upon at Peterhof, that the Mohammedans were a tremendous card in our game in case you or I were suddenly confronted by a war with the certain meddlesome Power. If you go on following the lead of the other Power in Crete, the effect will be deplorable on your own Mohammedan subjects and on Turkey. Therefore I implore you to save the Sultan from a dangerous situation and to solve the Cretan question in a manner acceptable to him."

Now that the four Admirals were the masters of the island, the Tsar, on whom the warnings of the Kaiser produced no effect, revived the candidature of Prince George, adding that he was the only ruler whom the Cretans would be likely to accept. The Powers agreed, and the Sultan's renewed protest was brushed aside. On November 26 the Ministers of the four Powers at Athens offered the High Commissionership to the Prince for three years under the suzerainty of the Sultan. The National Assembly was to meet, an autonomous Government to be established, and a gendarmerie to be created. Each of the four Powers promised to advance £40,000 to inaugurate the machinery of administration. The Prince landed on December 21, and the Admirals departed; and though troops of the four Powers remained, the Prince became at once the sole responsible authority. Many of the richer Mussulmans migrated to Turkey in fear of Christian domination, but peace had at last descended on the distracted island. A

Prince
George's
Rule

mixed commission drew up a constitution, and 1899 witnessed the first assembly of autonomous Crete. The Prince appointed a Council of Five, one of whom was a Mussulman. In everything but name Crete was an independent Christian State. The census of 1900 showed the Mussulmans to be only one-ninth of the population. The flag, the postage stamps and the smaller coins were Cretan. The Prince's mandate was renewed, and for the first five years of his reign the island enjoyed a tranquil prosperity which it had not known for generations. By 1905 Prince and people had tired of one another, and the Opposition, led by Venezelos, who for a time had been one of the five Councillors, took to the hills. In 1906 the Prince resigned, and his father, who was invited by the Powers to select a successor, chose Zaimis, a respected ex-Premier. The task of the Powers came to an end when the international troops began to withdraw in 1908. Everyone was aware that the union of Crete with Greece would occur in the next successful struggle, whenever it came, between the Christian and the Turk.

III

The crises in Armenia and Crete led to the intervention of Europe; and the intervention of Europe revealed the disunion of the Powers. In the former

**The Powers
Disunited** Great Britain and Russia were opposed to one another, while in the latter they co-operated; but on both occasions Great Britain and Germany found themselves in different camps. The Concert had indeed preserved the peace of Europe; yet its machinery creaked and groaned, and Great Britain emerged from her struggle with Turkey, which lasted from 1894 to 1898, relatively weaker than she entered on it. For while her relations to the Dual Alliance continued to be chilly, her friendship with the Central Empires waned; Austria and Russia patched up their quarrel in the Balkans; and Germany established herself as the

acknowledged patron of Turkey. Italy alone remained a friend; and Italy was disheartened by the catastrophic failure of her Abyssinian adventure.

The death of Alexander III at the end of 1894, and of Giers at the beginning of 1895, cleared the path for the reconsideration of the policy which had transformed Bulgaria from a grateful *protégé* to an angry opponent of Russian influence in the Near East. The attitude of the Tsar had always seemed crazy to Prince Lobanoff, the new Foreign Minister, a man of greater ability and strength of purpose than his predecessor.¹ The desire for reconciliation was even greater on the other side; for the vain and ambitious Ferdinand had wearied of playing second fiddle to the masterful Stambuloff, whom he replaced in 1894 by the Russophil Stoiloff, and who was murdered by political enemies at Sofia in the summer of 1895. Moreover, the Princess Louise of Parma, whom he had married in 1893, presented him with a son in 1894, and the Prince had now a dynasty to secure. A Bulgarian mission in July, 1895, to lay a wreath on the grave of Alexander III, received a friendly welcome; and when in February, 1896, the Prince announced that his son would be baptized in the Orthodox Church, the Tsar accepted the invitation to be his godfather, and congratulated the father on his "patriotic resolve." For the only time in modern history a baptism was an international event. The Duke of Parma had consented to the marriage of his daughter on condition that the children should be brought up as Catholics, and now that the pledge was broken the Princess left her husband. The Pope inflicted minor excommunication, which involved that permission must be given every time that he received the sacrament, and the formal piety of Vienna treated him as an apostate. "The West has excommunicated me," declared the Prince in magniloquent terms to his Parliament; "the Eastern

**Murder of
Stambuloff**

¹ An interesting portrait of the autocratic Lobanoff is drawn by Rosen, "Forty Years of Diplomacy," I, ch. 12.

dawn illuminates my dynasty and lights up our future." The price was high, but the reward was great. Russia now secured for the prodigal son the recognition which the other Powers had long been prepared to accord, and the Sultan accepted him as Governor of Eastern Roumelia. A round of visits followed, but Francis Joseph declined to receive him for several years. Thus Bulgaria had slipped away from Austria and re-entered the Russian fold, where she remained till 1913. When Roumania and Bulgaria seemed likely to come to blows in 1900, and Austria concluded a military convention with the former, Russia adjusted the balance by a military convention with the latter in 1902.¹ The twenty-fifth anniversary of the war of liberation was enthusiastically celebrated in the Shipka Pass. Lobanoff had played his cards well, and Russia, recovering from her sulks, had regained her foothold in the Balkans.

No one could complain of the reconciliation with Bulgaria; but more questionable schemes also flitted through the brains of Russian statesmen. The divergence of British and Russian policy in Armenia was only an aspect of their world-wide antagonism, and Lobanoff dreamed of a European coalition against the rival empire which should give Constantinople to Russia, Egypt to France, and Gibraltar to Spain. It was only a dream, and the dreamer passed away in the summer of 1896; but the desire to checkmate British policy in Turkey amounted to a serious resolve. Great Britain has never obtained credit on the Continent for her disinterested humanitarianism, and it was believed in Russia, from the Tsar downwards, that the crafty English had engineered a commotion in regard to Armenia in order to embarrass Russia. Prince Uktomsky's journal, indeed, explained British interest in that part of the world by the desire to establish overland communications between India and

¹ Printed in Lalov, "Les Documents Secrets des Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Russie," 14-17.

the Mediterranean. Why should not Russia seize the moment when British policy had annihilated British influence to solve the question of the Straits?

Nelidoff's dispatches from Constantinople in the later months of 1896 argued that the time had come to secure the right of sending warships out of the Black Sea, and advised that the Sultan should be promised a guarantee of his territory in return for recognition of the right of egress.¹ To aid the Sultan in making up his mind, he added, both shores of the Bosphorus should be seized. The Tsar approved the plan, and the Ambassador was summoned to Petrograd. The admiral commanding at Odessa was ordered to visit Constantinople, studying *en route* the fortifications of the Bosphorus, and to work out a scheme for a military coup. An elaborate Memorandum was drawn up by Nelidoff, setting forth the anarchy in Turkey and the ferment in the capital after the Armenian attack on the bank. Armenians were probably hatching another plot, which would provoke another massacre. The Sultan might be deposed, and the army might mutiny. The Armenians would then rise. Europe would intervene and carry out reforms which would threaten Russia's security in the Black Sea and her communications with the Mediterranean. The more stable was Turkey the worse was the outlook for Russia. It was therefore necessary to anticipate the intervention of the Powers by seizing both shores of the Upper Bosphorus and securing the freedom of the Straits. The project must be speedily resolved and speedily accomplished. Ships and men must be ready at a moment's notice, and he would give the signal by a cipher telegram to Sebastopol. Before the ships reached the Bosphorus he would ask the Sultan's permission to take possession of the heights on condition that Russia would look after Turkish interests. The other Powers at the same moment would

Nelidoff's
Proposals

¹ The incident was revealed in Dillon's "Eclipse of Russia," 231-44. His account is confirmed by Baron Rosen, "Forty Years," I, ch. 14.

be invited to enter the Dardanelles if they wished, and if they did the Russian Mediterranean squadron would accompany them. The result of the coup would be the permanent occupation of the Upper Bosphorus and the neutralization of the Dardanelles, which would be thrown open to the warships of all nations. Russia would justify her action by fears for the security of her nationals. No Power, declared Nelidoff in conclusion, would forcibly oppose the seizure of territory or the construction of a Russian Gibraltar at the northern end of the Bosphorus.

Witte frustrates Plot When the bolt had been shot Russia could without anxiety take part in a conference on Turkey. This audacious scheme was approved by every member of a council called to consider it except Witte, the Minister of Finance, whose industrial and financial projects required unbroken peace, and was ratified by the Tsar; and Nelidoff returned to his post with authority to give the signal whenever he wished. At the eleventh hour, however, the project was defeated by the combined efforts of Witte and Pobiedonostseff, once the Tsar's tutor; and Europe did not learn till twenty years later of the guilty secret and of the danger from which it had narrowly escaped.

The death of Alexander III, the recognition of Ferdinand, the identity of views in regard to Armenia, and other factors restored the wire between Vienna and Petrograd, which had been broken since the revolution in Philippopolis. Nicholas II visited Francis Joseph in the summer of 1896, and the compliment was returned in the following spring. On the latter occasion the Foreign Ministers reached an agreement, which was ratified by their masters. On his return from Petrograd Goluchowski summarized the cardinal points of the understanding in a dispatch of May 8 to the Austrian Ambassador.¹

The Conference held at the Winter Palace has established a common line of action, which, while taking

¹ Pribram, "Secret Treaties," I, 184-95.

account of the security and vital interests of the two Empires and eliminating the danger of a rivalry disastrous to the peace of Europe on the seething soil of the Balkan Peninsula, Austro-Russian
Pact permits us to view more calmly the complications which may occur. Having agreed as to the necessity of maintaining the *status quo* as long as circumstances will permit, Count Muravieff and I were pleased to record that there existed no divergence of principle to prevent an understanding which would guard against eventualities which may soon occur even against our wishes.

1. It was agreed that in case the maintenance of the *status quo* becomes impossible, Austria and Russia discard in advance all idea of conquest in the Balkan Peninsula, and they are decided to secure respect for this principle by every other Power.

2. It was equally recognized that the question of Constantinople and the adjacent territory, as well as that of the Straits, having an eminently European character, is not of a nature to be made the object of a separate understanding. Count Muravieff declared that, far from striving for any modification of the present state of things, Russia held to the complete maintenance of the Treaty provisions, which gave full satisfaction to her in prohibiting, by the closing of the Straits, access to the Black Sea to foreign war vessels.

3. On the other hand, the establishment of a new order of things in the Balkan Peninsula, outside Constantinople and the Straits, would give rise to a special stipulation between Austria and Russia, who declare themselves disposed to co-operate on the following lines :—

a. The possession of Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novibazar may not be made the object of any discussion, Austria reserving the right of substituting, when the moment arrives, for the present

status of occupation and of right of garrisoning that of annexation.

b. The territory between Jannina and the lake of Scutari, with a sufficient extension on the east side, shall form an independent state under the name of the principality of Albania.

c. The rest of the territory to be disposed of shall be the object of an equitable partition between the different Balkan States, on which Austria and Russia reserve the right of being heard. While inclined to consider as far as possible the legitimate interests of the participants, they are resolved to safeguard the principle of the present equilibrium, and, if need be by the rectification of frontiers, to exclude every combination which would favour the establishment of a marked preponderance of any particular Balkan principality.

d. Having recorded that our two Cabinets have no other aim in the Balkan Peninsula than the maintenance and pacific development of the small States established there, we agreed to pursue in future in this field a policy of perfect harmony, and to avoid in consequence everything which might engender friction or mistrust.

A few days later Muravieff replied in a Note to the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, which approved the statement of the principles of Austro-Russian policy, but took objection to some of the concrete proposals. "The Treaty of Berlin assures to Austria the right of military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The annexation of these two provinces would raise a more extensive question, which would require special scrutiny at the proper times and places. As to the Sanjak of Novibazar, there would also be the necessity to specify its boundaries, which have never been sufficiently defined. The eventual formation of a principality of Albania and the equitable partition

**Muravieff's
Criticisms**

of all the territory to be disposed of between the different Balkan States also touch on questions of the future which it would be premature and very difficult to decide at present. I trust Count Goluchowski will remark, in spite of some slight differences of interpretation to which I have felt it my duty to call your attention, the perfect conformity in our way of looking at things." The entente thus concluded in 1897 formed the basis of Austro-Russian policy in the Balkans till 1908, when it was destroyed by the ruthless hands of Aehrenthal.

While Russia opposed the cause of reform in Armenia and supported it in Crete, Germany opposed it in both, and skilfully seized the opportunity of entrenching her influence at Constantinople. The Kaiser resembled Bismarck in his callous indifference to the sufferings of the Christian subjects of the Turk; but he discarded the great Chancellor's lifelong principle of leaving Russia a free hand in the Near East. At the very moment that he was laying the foundations of a high seas fleet he pushed forward in the East and made Germany the dominant influence at Constantinople. Both aims were entirely legitimate; but each of them involved the antagonism of a great Power, and their simultaneous pursuit created the coalition which was one day to shatter the proud fabric of the German Empire.

While Western Europe was ringing with condemnation of the Great Assassin, William II ostentatiously grasped his bloodstained hand. He sent his portrait to the Sultan, and as soon as the **Kaiser and Sultan** Powers showed that they meant business in Crete he withdrew from the Concert. The arrival of Marschall von Bieberstein as Ambassador in 1897 brought to Constantinople a skilled and resolute diplomatist no less determined than his master to win the confidence of Turkey and to make her a political and economic outpost of the Triple Alliance. The path had already been prepared not only by the work of Von der Goltz but by the judicious investment of German capital.

Despite British preponderance for a generation after the Crimean war, only a few short railways were built in Asia Minor, and it was not till 1888, when Constantinople was linked up with Central Europe, that the project of a trunk line through Asia Minor began to take practical shape. For half a century far-sighted Germans, among them List and Moltke, had dreamed of German settlement or German influence in Asiatic Turkey. In return for a loan a group of financiers, mainly German, headed by the Deutsche Bank, obtained a concession for ninety-nine years to administer the line of 57 miles from Haidar Pasha (opposite the capital) to Ismid, which had been built by a British company, and to continue it to Angora, with a substantial kilometric guarantee and preferential right of extension. Angora was reached in 1892, and in 1893, in return for another loan, a concession was granted from Eski-Shehr (midway between Haidar Pasha and Angora) to Konia, which was reached in 1896.

Germany's predominant influence in Turkey was confirmed and proclaimed by a spectacular voyage of the Kaiser to Palestine and Syria in the autumn of 1898, taking Constantinople on the way.¹ The Imperial pilgrim delivered pious allocutions at Jerusalem and Bethlehem; but his main object was to strengthen German influence among the Mohammedans, to whom he rightly attributed an important rôle in the drama of *Weltpolitik*. "Turkey is very much alive, and not a dying man," he wrote to the Tsar. "Beware of the Mussulmans if you touch their national honour or their Khalif." The climax of the visit was reached in a speech at Damascus, where he used the memorable words, "May the Sultan and the three hundred million Mussulmans scattered over the earth be assured that the German Emperor will always be their friend." On returning to Berlin he summarized the impressions of his journey to the municipal authorities who welcomed

¹ The journey is illustrated in the Kaiser's letter to the Tsar of Nov. 9, 1898.

him home. "Wherever we went, on all seas and in all countries and all cities, the German name is respected as it has never been before. My hope is that this will continue, and that our journey will have helped to open up fresh fields where German enterprise and German energy can display their activity, and further that I have succeeded in advancing the noble work of securing the general peace of the world." The visit had indeed been an unqualified success. Germany had won the confidence of Abdul Hamid, and in the following year the Anatolian Railway Company secured in principle the right to extend its line from the heart of Asia Minor to the sultry shores of the Persian Gulf. And Turkey, for her part, had found a friend in the strongest Power in Europe, whose interests were opposed to partition and whose moral support would enable her to resist unwelcome pressure from London or Petrograd.

Patron of
Islam

CHAPTER VIII

FASHODA

THE growing tension between London and Berlin was unaccompanied by any diminution in the antagonism between

Franco-British Rivalry London and Paris. Anglo-French relations were as strained during the decade which followed the signature of the Drummond

Wolff Convention as in the five years which preceded it.¹ Indeed, the danger of a rupture was more imminent in the later than in the earlier period, for in the 'nineties Egypt was only one among the causes of friction. *Weltpolitik* was now in fashion, and both countries were determined to play their full part in the hazardous game. Great Britain, with her unchallengeable command of the sea, was the best equipped for the race; but France had recovered her self-confidence, had secured an ally, and was resolved to find compensation overseas for the loss of the Rhine provinces. Africa remained the chief theatre of the struggle; but the prizes were numerous, and the diplomatic conflict was fought out in various parts of the world.

Among the minor causes of rivalry was the group of islands in the south Pacific known as the New Hebrides. As the owner of New Caledonia France cast hungry eyes on the neighbouring archipelago, while Christian missions and commercial possibilities aroused in equal degree the interest of Australasia. In 1886 France coupled a proposal that she should take possession with a promise

¹ Lémonon, "L'Europe et la Politique Britannique," and Schefer, "D'une guerre à l'autre," summarize Anglo-French relations. For French colonization see Rambaud, "La France Coloniale."

that she would send no more of her criminals to the Pacific and would protect the missions. New Zealand and New South Wales were eager to free the Pacific from the convict curse; but opinion in Aus-
The New
Hebrides
 tralasia as a whole, and above all in Victoria, was sharply opposed to annexation by France, and Lord Rosebery replied that he could not consent to a change. Despite this communication two French men-of-war were dispatched from New Caledonia with two hundred soldiers and artillery, two military posts were established, and the French flag was hoisted. In response to a request for explanations, France replied that the expedition had no political significance, that it was sent to protect French subjects, and that it was unauthorized by the Government. Lord Rosebery's apprehensions that he might be confronted by a *fait accompli* were not removed by this statement, and two British men-of-war were dispatched to watch proceedings. In the following year a mixed commission of British and French naval officers was appointed to protect the life and property of the settlers; and this makeshift arrangement, which failed to preserve harmony among the whites or to secure the well-being of the natives, postponed the introduction of a real system of European control for twenty years.¹

France had conquered Tunis with the approval of Great Britain; but the memory of the coup of 1881 continued to rankle in Italy, and towards the end of the 'eighties rumours of the fortification of Bizerta began to spread.² In 1889 the French Government assured both Italy and Great Britain that it had no intention of fortifying the harbour. These soothing assurances produced no effect on Crispi, who in 1890 informed Salisbury that Bizerta was in fact being fortified, argued that a new French naval base would threaten the balance of power in the Mediter-

¹ Cook, "The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery," 12-16.

² See Crispi, "Memoirs," II, ch. 12, and Billot, "La France et l'Italie." Billot was French Ambassador in Rome.

anean, and urged the British Government to protest. Salisbury replied that he had made inquiries and had been

**Crispi and
France**

told that the works in progress were not of a military character. A month later Crispi was informed by the Italian Consul that the Bey had agreed that the dynasty should end at his death. This time he carried his complaints to Berlin. "We shall lose our liberty in the Mediterranean, and Italy will be subjected to a perpetual menace. If it cannot be prevented, the friendly Powers must at any rate join in demanding that Italy should receive a satisfactory guarantee against danger. In the event of war, a purely French Tunis would be of great importance, and Bizerta would threaten Sicily. If Germany does not prevent this change Italy will feel the Triple Alliance to be useless. Let Berlin warn Paris that the execution of the Treaty of July 9 may lead to war. If nothing is done, France will proceed to seize Tripoli." Caprivi sounded London and Vienna as to a joint protest, and, in the event of being unable to prevent unrestricted French sovereignty over Tunis, the ear-marking of Tripoli for Italy.

The existence of the offending Treaty was denied by Ribot, and Salisbury was inclined to accept his word; but the fiery Crispi returned to the charge. It was impossible, he wrote to Salisbury, to prevent Tunis falling completely under French sovereignty, and she would seize Tripoli as well unless she were prevented. If Italy, on the other hand, were to hold Tripoli, a fortified Bizerta would be no menace either to Italy or Great Britain. "It is a question of our salvation and of your supremacy in the Mediterranean." The letter, reported the Italian Chargé, made a deep impression on the British Premier, who bade him telegraph that on the day the *status quo* in the Mediterranean was changed Italy's occupation of Tripoli would become an absolute necessity, if the Mediterranean was not to become a French lake. "But the time has not come. He begs you wait. He does not believe in the

Treaty of July 9. Turkey would declare war on Italy if she took Tripoli, and Russia would then enslave Turkey in the process of defending her. An attack on Tripoli would be the signal for the dis- ^{Fortification of Bizerta} memberment of Turkey. That will come about later, but public opinion in England is not yet prepared for it. Italy will lose nothing by waiting. She will have Tripoli in the end; but the huntsman does not fire till the stag is within range of his rifle. Meanwhile, he will urge France not to alter the *status quo* in Tunis." A few days later Salisbury himself wrote in similar terms to the Italian Premier. "Tunis is destined to France, but not for a long time. Great Britain and Italy cannot allow Tripoli to share the fate of Tunis; but patience is needed. If Italy occupies Tripoli in time of peace, she will be reproached for reopening the Eastern question." Crispi in vain urged Salisbury to join in a warning that the Protectorate in Tunis could not be allowed to become full sovereignty. Though the Treaty of July 9 was a mare's nest, the fortification of Bizerta, despite French denials, was a reality; but after the fall of Crispi early in 1891 no further opposition was attempted.

The annexation of Burma in 1885 made Siam a buffer between British dominions on the west and French Indo-China on the east, and was followed by a dragging and at one moment a dangerous dispute as to the boundaries of their respective spheres of influence. In 1889 Waddington made a proposal to which Salisbury returned no response. In 1892 the Ambassador returned to the charge with a new proposition making the Mekong the dividing line. This time the Premier replied that the idea deserved serious examination, and referred it to the Secretary of State for India. Three months later, when Waddington asked for an answer, Salisbury announced that his colleague had not yet reported. "As we are still a long way from Mekong he probably does not consider the question urgent." At this period the Prime Minister could have obtained better terms than he was subsequently to accept; but he was now

succeeded by Lord Rosebery, in whose term of office the question brought the two countries to the verge of war.

The crisis of 1893 arose, not from a disputed frontier but from the fact that France had certain grievances against Siam, for which she could obtain no redress by peaceful measures. Lord Rosebery admitted that her grievances were substantial, and urged Siam to concede her demands; but he kept a watchful eye lest France, in the pursuit of her own interests, should injure British trade, or, by aggression on Siamese territory in the north, become coterminous with Burma.¹ In April, 1893, France resolved to enforce her demands, and a British ship was ordered to Bangkok to watch events. When France threatened a blockade to enforce an ultimatum, Lord Rosebery, while advising Siam to yield, dispatched a second ship to the mouth of the Menam, and ordered a third to be ready to follow. On July 1 he informed the French Government that the British Minister at Bangkok had been ordered to advise Siam to arrange her difficulties with France in a friendly manner. "But in view of the possibility that on the approach of a French fleet a rising might occur, it was necessary that some ships should be on the spot to protect British commercial interests." Till July 12 the *Swift* remained alone off the capital, while the other vessels lay at the bar of the river. A French gunboat was also stationed off Bangkok, and on July 13 Lord Rosebery was informed that no other French vessels would be sent up the river. On the following day, however, two French gunboats forced the defences at the mouth of the Menam, and Lord Rosebery promptly ordered the waiting vessels to follow them to Bangkok. A fortnight later a French ultimatum was delivered, a blockade was proclaimed, and friendly vessels were given three days to clear.

When on Sunday, July 30, the French Admiral notified that the blockade arrangements applied to ships of war,

¹ Cook, "The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery," 38-50.

the British Minister telegraphed that the *Linnet* was preparing to leave. Lord Rosebery instantly replied that the *Linnet* "must on no account leave," and Lord Dufferin was ordered to explain at the Quai d'Orsay that it was impossible to allow British subjects to be left at the mercy of an unruly Oriental population. The Ambassador was received by the Foreign Minister on July 31, and politely informed that the blockade would be raised at once. Meanwhile the captain of the *Linnet* was told that the French Admiral had not demanded his withdrawal, but merely an alteration of position. On August 1 Siam accepted the French demands, and on August 3 the blockade was raised. The crisis had been short but sharp, and Lord Rosebery has confessed that on the critical Sunday he had faced the risk of war. There was, indeed, no antagonism of interests at Bangkok to justify or provoke a collision; but if the French Government had not promptly given way the guns might have gone off of themselves. Lord Rosebery's vigorous stand received both praise and blame. On the one hand it was asserted that he enhanced British prestige by resisting an indefensible demand, while on the other it was argued that he risked a terrible conflict over a trifle. The Governments now proceeded to discuss the boundaries of the buffer which Great Britain was anxious to retain between Burma and Indo-China. France desired that Great Britain should not cross the Mekong; but the request was refused, since a province east of the river was formerly tributary to Burma. The negotiations made slow progress, and early in 1895 Great Britain occupied the district in question. It was not till January 15, 1896, that a "Declaration" fixed the boundaries of the buffer state. The final settlement was regarded by Salisbury's critics as unduly favourable to France, but it ended the antagonism of the two nations in the Far East.

The friction in the Pacific and the Far East was a trifle in comparison with their sleepless rivalry in the Nile

Lord
Rosebery's
Policy

basin.¹ There were Liberals in England, even in the 'nineties, who sincerely desired to withdraw from Egypt, as there were men in France like Clemenceau who opposed the dispersion of energies which should be concentrated on the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. But the *Zeitgeist* was too strong for them. In the famous speech of October 2, 1891, in which "the Newcastle programme" was launched, Gladstone expressed the hope that Salisbury would "take some step to relieve us from the burdensome and embarrassing occupation of Egypt," but at the same time expressed his fear that the question would

be "handed over to his successor to deal with." The words pointed to evacuation, England in
Egypt

but when the Liberal leader resumed office a few months later no more was heard of it. Indeed, when Abbas, who succeeded his father in 1892, appointed an Anglophobe Premier, Lord Rosebery sharply vetoed the nomination and reminded him that the Government expected to be consulted about such important matters as a change of Ministers. The Khedive sulkily surrendered, and the French Government protested against the "high-handed proceeding." The only result of the young Khedive's bid for independence was the increase of the British garrison, which was urged by Baring and promptly sanctioned by the Cabinet.²

Shortly after the brief crisis at Cairo Lord Rosebery was confronted with a grave decision at the other end of the Nile. The British East African Company, which had undertaken to administer Uganda when it passed under British control in 1890, found the task beyond its financial capacity, and in the summer of 1892 it decided to withdraw its administrator, Colonel Lugard. Lord Rosebery, who did not wish to leave without a master territory giving access to the Nile valley, desired to assume

¹ French policy during the years leading up to Fashoda is authoritatively described by Hanotaux himself in "Fashoda"; cf. Freycinet, "La Question d'Egypte."

² See Lord Cromer, "Abbas II,"

the administration without delay and to build a railway from the coast; but the Cabinet was divided. "These wretched missionaries," complained Gladstone to Rhodes, "are dragging us into the centre of Africa. Our burden is too great. We have too much of the world." Sir Gerald Portal was dispatched to inquire into the situation, the Company meanwhile consenting to postpone evacuation. On receiving his report the Cabinet bought out the Company and assumed the administration in April, 1894; and in July, 1895, a few days before the fall of the Government, it was announced that the territory between Uganda and the sea would be a Protectorate and that a railway would be built as soon as possible!

The protest of Germany against the Anglo-Congolese Treaty of May 12, 1894, has been mentioned in an earlier chapter; but the most formidable opposition came from France.¹ On June 7 the leaders of the French Colonial group interpellated the Government. The reply of the Foreign Minister showed how gravely the Treaty was viewed in Paris. Only the Sultan, argued Hanotaux, could dispose of the Sudan. In signing the Treaty, the Congo State had violated its own neutrality. The pact upset the balance of power in Africa and in the world, and was contrary to the interests and rights of France. Germany had secured the cancellation of the clause which concerned her, and France, for her part, must declare that, in so far as it concerned her, the Convention was null and void. In case of need, she must answer occupation by occupation. Since agents of the Congo State scoured the Bahr-el-Ghazel, the agents of other Powers could visit the same regions. "The Commander of the Upper Ubanghi has been ordered to return to his post and will leave France at once. The first detachments of his mission have already arrived. They will be reinforced if the Chamber grants us credits. The head of the mission has received the instructions and the resources necessary to

Anglo-
Congolese
Treaty

¹ Cook, "The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery," 31-3.

assure the defence and maintenance of our rights." After this vigorous declaration, which distantly foreshadowed the Marchand mission, the Chamber unanimously adopted an equally unambiguous resolution. "France, relying on the fact that the Anglo-Congolese Convention is in manifest contradiction to the Berlin Act and that it threatens the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, considers it contrary to law and null." The Foreign Minister followed up his speech by formal protests in London and Brussels.

The British Press was angered by the outburst in France; but the Governments kept cool, and amicable

**Congo
Treaty
Cancelled**

discussions were opened at the Quai d'Orsay. An argumentative dispatch from the French Foreign Minister restated the objections raised in his speech of June 7, and added that "the special position of the Congo State towards France rendered great caution necessary in the engagements which that State might think it right to make, at the risk of giving rise to claims on the part of a Power who, as a signatory of the Act of Berlin and of previous treaties, as well as on account of her proximity, had interests and rights to protect which could not be annulled by an agreement to which she was not a party." The British Government, concluded the dispatch, had not offered any reasoned reply to the French criticisms, the validity of most of which had been recognized by Lord Dufferin. Kimberley's reply, a week later, acknowledged the friendly tone of the dispatch. In answer to the criticism that the agreement ignored the rights of the Sultan and the Khedive on the Upper Nile, he explained that those rights would not be disregarded whenever Turkey and Egypt might be in a position to assert them.¹ The guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire in the Treaty of 1856 could not apply to the equatorial provinces of Egypt, which were acquired later; but Great Britain was ready to consider any well-substantiated Turkish

¹ "Egypt," No. 2, 1898. Appendix I.

claims. To the contention that the Congo State had abused its neutrality, he replied that there was nothing in the Berlin Act to prevent a neutral Power from extending its territories, and that the boundaries of the State had never been laid down in an international convention. Despite this forcible rejoinder, Great Britain released Leopold from the Treaty and did not insist on the lease.

On August 14, the day on which this reply was dispatched, France and the Congo State signed a treaty by which the latter agreed not to occupy part of the territory leased to it by Great Britain, and recognized French rights to the basin of the Upper Ubanghi. France now resolved to explore her eventual possessions and to impose her provisional authority. She should have proceeded more openly; but Anglo-French relations did not encourage confidences. Ever since France secured the right bank of the Ubanghi in the negotiations of 1885-7 she had turned her eyes to the Upper Nile, for the sources of the tributary of the Congo were close to Egypt's river. When Belgium, in spite of treaties, crossed the fourth parallel, established positions on the Upper Ubanghi, spread over the Nile basin, and tried to block French expansion to the north and east, a small credit was voted by the French Chamber in 1892 to reinforce French posts on the Upper Ubanghi and to connect them with the coast by telegraph and river communications. In

May, 1893, it was decided to give the com-
mand to Colonel Monteil, but the mission
did not start. Meanwhile Belgium pushed forward, brushing aside French protests with the terse rejoinder that possession was title. It was not till July 17, 1894, when the Anglo-Congolese Treaty had awakened public opinion to the possibilities and dangers of the territories between the Congo and the Nile, that Monteil embarked. When he arrived in West Africa, however, the Franco-Belgian Treaty was signed, and he was ordered to the Ivory Coast. Colonel Liotard was appointed Commissioner in the Upper Ubanghi, with instructions to

Monteil and
Liotard

extend French influence in the Bahr-el-Ghazel and up to the Nile; but, as he was unprovided with means of action, he did little beyond planting a few posts.

After the Anglo-Congolese Treaty had thus been torn to shreds, Great Britain brought forward the question of her sphere of influence on the Upper Nile as laid down in the Anglo-German Convention of 1890. France consented to negotiate and, at the wish of the British Government, proceeded to discuss at the same time all outstanding questions in Central Africa. Negotiations were begun in the autumn at the Quai d'Orsay by Dufferin and Hanotaux, with the aid of experts from the respective Colonial Offices. At the end of the year an agreement was reached on various African questions; but, except for an agreement

on the boundaries of Sierra Leone, the
Fruitless
Negotiations scheme was rejected by both the French and British Governments. Hanotaux has revealed that France secured the definition and limitation of British claims in the equatorial regions of the Nile, and that the disputed provinces were in some degree under the supervision of both Powers; but the settlement which satisfied the Foreign Minister appeared to his colleagues to involve needless sacrifices. As the scheme has never been published it is impossible to estimate its merits; but from its rejection dates the race for the Upper Nile which culminated in the earth-shaking crisis of Fashoda.

The French Colonial group had aroused a good deal of interest in Africa, and at the opening of 1895 the Government was urged to take up a position on the Nile and to prevent fresh British encroachments. Rumours of French activity in the regions between the Congo and the Nile led to the historic declaration by Sir Edward Grey on March 28, on which British policy was to rest till France reluctantly accepted our claims nine years later. "Rumours have come with regard to the movements of expeditions in various parts of Africa, but we have no reason to suppose that any French expedition has instruc-

tions to enter, or the intention of entering, the Nile valley. And I will go further and say that, after all I have explained about the claims we consider we have under past agreements, and the claims which we consider Egypt may have in the Nile valley, and adding to that the fact that those claims and the view of the Government with regard to them are fully and clearly known to the French Government, I cannot think **The Grey Declaration** it possible that these rumours deserve credence, because the advance of a French expedition under secret instructions right from the other side of Africa into a territory over which our claims have been known for so long would be not merely an inconsistent and unexpected act, but it must be perfectly well known to the French Government that it would be an unfriendly act, and would be so viewed by England."

The Grey declaration aroused anger and astonishment in French official circles. In the first place the Monteil mission had been diverted many months earlier from the Nile to the Ivory Coast, and no fresh decision as to a mission to the Upper Nile had been taken. Secondly, it warned France off a vast district which belonged not to Great Britain, but to the Sultan of Turkey, in which France had as much or as little right as anyone else. And thirdly, it accompanied a legally indefensible claim by a threat of war. The French Ambassador at once informed Kimberley that he could not conceal the painful impression which would be created in France. While negotiations were in progress, he complained, one party had declared that it could admit no question as to its rights in the territory under discussion. The Foreign Secretary replied that, on the contrary, Great Britain would have a right to complain if a French expedition entered the territory during negotiations, and he hoped France would assure him that the rumours were unfounded. Baron de Courcel rejoined that no news of an expedition had been received, and complained that the declaration constituted a *prise en possession* of the whole basin of the Upper Nile. Kim-

berley replied that the mere reiteration of a claim to a sphere of influence over the Nile basin, which had already been made fully known to France, could not be so regarded. The British Government, moreover, had assured the French Government that if Egypt should hereafter reoccupy the Sudan it would recognize her right to its possession.¹

Such is Kimberley's report of the conversation; but the French Ambassador's version suggests that the Foreign Secretary poured water into his subordinate's wine.² According to Baron de Courcel Kimberley explained that a declaration by an Under-Secretary was less solemn than by the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minister; that it was a claim which France was free to accept or reject; and that the question remained open. The Sudan, he added, once restored to Egypt, would share her destinies. "I look forward to the end of our occupation, when it will no longer be a bone of contention. The good understanding of the two countries is worth more." So much importance was attached by the Quai d'Orsay to this record of a momentous conversation that it was shown to Kimberley, who, after modifying certain details, confirmed its accuracy. "Thus Sir Edward Grey was corrected by Lord Kimberley," writes Hanotaux, "for he admitted the principle of a French counter-claim, as he had done during the negotiations, and he recognized the impossibility of basing any exclusive rights on a temporary occupation."

The French case in answer to the Grey declaration was set forth in a speech by the Foreign Minister to the Senate on April 5. The Sudan and equatorial Africa, declared Hanotaux, were occupied by the Mahdi, but belonged to the Sultan and the Khedive. At that moment there was probably not a single European in those vast regions. The Anglo-German agreement of 1890 recognized a British sphere of influence on the right bank of the Nile as far

¹ "Egypt," No. 2, 1898. Appendix 4.

² Hanotaux, "Fachoda."

as the confines of Egypt, while on the left bank no limit was fixed; but France had protested. The British claims, to which her adhesion was desired, had never been even approximately defined. **The French Reply**

"Would it not be better to abstain from public declarations which are only statements of the arguments of one of the parties, and which might frustrate an agreement by stultifying the discussion in advance? When I think of the immense extent of the territories involved, and of the absolute lack of information as to what is going on there, I ask myself whether it is not premature to attempt to settle the whole question beforehand by a paper delimitation. While defending definite rights, founded on indisputable titles, I should for my part consider it a very unfriendly proceeding to enclose the discussion beforehand in a narrow circle from which it could not escape. Between two Powers which respect each other and whose relations are always courteous there can be no question of aggression or injunction where complex problems are concerned, for which so many different solutions may be usefully considered. No one can look upon these first delimitations vaguely sketched on imperfect maps as possessing the immutable character given by long usage to the frontiers of European States. Nor can anyone claim to hamper the enterprise of the courageous men who go forth to explore these new countries. But when the time comes for settling finally the fate of these distant countries, I think that, by providing that the rights of the Sultan and the Khedive are respected, and by assigning to each party concerned what is due to it according to its works, two great nations will be able to arrive at an arrangement which will reconcile their interests and satisfy their common aspirations towards civilization and progress." The speech of the French Foreign Minister was a polite but firm refusal to recognize the new "Monroe Doctrine" in the valley of the Nile; and France proceeded on her way in equatorial Africa, with the watchword "first come, first served" inscribed upon her banner.

The return of the Unionists to power in the summer of 1895 with a strong Ministry and a large majority inaugurated the most critical period of Anglo-French relations since the fall of Napoleon. There was no longer any talk of the evacuation of Egypt; and the new Government not only associated itself with the Grey declaration but at once formed plans for the reconquest of the Sudan. A final effort to secure the assent of France was made when the Kruger telegram revealed in a flash the hostility of

Germany. Salisbury informed the French Ambassador that Great Britain desired to destroy Mahdism, and that an expedition to Dongola was under consideration. Would France agree on condition that there should be no advance beyond Dongola except after consultation with her? Baron de Courcel favoured the suggestion of an understanding, which was also approved by Berthelot, the Foreign Minister in the Bourgeois Cabinet; but his colleagues rejected his advice, and Berthelot resigned.

An event which occurred in the heart of Africa on March 1, 1896, provided the British Government with a convenient if not convincing excuse for the expedition. Italy had sought compensation for Tunis by occupying Massowah on the Red Sea, where the Khedive had long maintained a garrison, now isolated by the Mahdist revolt, and which Great Britain was glad to see in friendly hands.¹ She slowly advanced towards the highlands of Abyssinia, but in 1887 a column was annihilated by Abyssinians at Dogali. The Treaty of Ucciali, signed in 1889, made the King of Italy the intermediary for Abyssinia's relations with foreign Powers; and Italy henceforth regarded the country as a Protectorate. But Menelek, arguing that the text empowered him, but did not compel him, to employ Italy as his intermediary, denied the Italian claim. An Anglo-Italian pact of 1891 settled the boundaries of the two spheres of influence. Kassala was placed within the

¹ Italy's activities in Abyssinia are fully described by Billot, "La France et l'Italie," I; cf. Stillman, "Francesco Crispi."

British zone, but Italy was allowed to occupy it for military reasons. Abyssinia was recognized by Great Britain to be in the Italian zone; but France, who was engaged in a tariff war with Italy, regarded Abyssinia as a pawn in her game against Great Britain and Italy.

The proclamation of a Protectorate over the Somali coast in 1890 increased Italy's interest in Abyssinia; but Menelek believed that she was intriguing with his rebel vassals, and he was annoyed by her pretensions to a Protectorate. In 1896 General Baratieri had nearly 30,000 Italian troops under his command; and, although Menelek had recently compelled an Italian garrison to surrender, he made overtures for peace on the basis of Italy's withdrawal from the territory recently occupied and the revision of the Treaty of Ucciali. Baratieri, knowing that he was about to be superseded, rejected the overtures and attacked the Abyssinian army of 100,000 men at Adowa. The Italians lost seven thousand in killed, wounded and prisoners; and had the Abyssinians pursued, they would have been annihilated. Baratieri retreated to Massowah, Crispi was hurled from power, the Treaty of Ucciali was cancelled, and Italy's ill-advised endeavours to conquer or dominate Abyssinia came to an abrupt conclusion.

While the Italian troops were being chased from the highlands of Abyssinia, the Dervishes had surrounded Kassala. In addition to the danger of the Italian garrison, the Egyptian Government was expecting a forward movement of the Dervishes from Berber, and the military authorities of Egypt urged that an immediate advance was essential. Accordingly on March 16 it was announced in the House of Commons that an advance would take place from the frontier post at Wady Halfa to Dongola. The movement, it was explained, would assist the Italian garrison at Kassala by creating a diversion, and would save Egypt from a menace which would become formidable if allowed to grow. The announcement was followed by spirited debates. Labouchere expressed his pleasure at the

Italy in
Abyssinia

defeat of the Italians in an unwarrantable invasion of Abyssinia, and protested against an expedition which would anchor us in Egypt for a century. Sir William Harcourt, as Leader of the Opposition, denounced the step as perilous, and foretold a further advance on Khartum. In reply to a vote of censure moved by Mr. Morley, Chamberlain argued that the advance was due to the Italian disaster and the resulting ferment among the Dervishes. The evacuation of Egypt, he urged, could not in any case take place till the lost provinces had been recovered. Mr. Balfour wound up the discussion by a similar argument that the condition of Egypt could not be regarded as satisfactory till control over the Sudan had been restored.

It was obvious, though it was not explicitly stated, that the advance to Dongola was the beginning of the reconquest of the whole of the Sudan and that it postponed the evacuation of Egypt to the Greek Kalends. It was thus interpreted in France, and the new Foreign Minister, Bourgeois, called the attention of the British Ambassador to the gravity of the results which a **Franco-Russian Obstruction** campaign in the Sudan might produce. The warning was repeated on April 2 in the Chamber. "We cannot remain indifferent to the consequences of an enterprise which tends to adjourn *sine die* the fulfilment of engagements. We must maintain the European character of the Egyptian question." With this object in view France and Russia, after vainly asking for explanations and attempting to reopen the Egyptian question, cast their votes on the Caisse against granting £500,000 (one-fifth of its reserve) towards the expenses of the expedition. Germany held the key to the position, and, as she had recognized the British claims to the Upper Nile in the agreement of 1890, a majority approved the grant. The French bondholders, however, appealed to the Mixed Tribunals and obtained a veto on the allocation. The British Government responded by finding the money, and Dongola was occupied in September after two battles

in which the native Egyptian displayed discipline and courage. Salisbury now explained that, though the advance would not be continued for the present, Khartum could not be left permanently in Dervish hands.

The Bourgeois Government, not content with opposing a grant from the Caisse, developed the attack on British policy along parallel lines. Negotiations with Abyssinia were begun, and the task was entrusted to Marchand which had once been assigned to Monteil. His instructions were signed by the Colonial Minister on February 24, 1896. "Last September you submitted a plan of an expedition in the Upper Ubanghi to extend French influence to the Nile. If we are to anticipate the English, we must arrive there first." This momentous decision did not in form conflict with the expedition to Dongola, for no British Minister had as yet announced a decision to go further. But it was in direct contravention of the Grey declaration; and though France declined to admit the validity of that famous pronouncement, she was well aware that she must reckon with the consequences of ignoring its veto.

When the resources of French diplomacy and enterprise had thus been mobilized, the Bourgeois Ministry fell on April 29, 1896, and Hanotaux returned to the Foreign Office in the Méline Cabinet. Though a convinced supporter of French Colonial ambitions, he considered that the Bourgeois policy had marched too rapidly and he endeavoured to limit its risks. That Germany, Austria and Italy approved the advance to Dongola was a further motive for caution. Instructions were promptly dispatched to the French representatives in Petrograd, Constantinople and Abyssinia to hold their hands; and though the Marchand mission was not recalled, fresh orders were sent to Liotard, the Governor of the Upper Ubanghi, to whom Marchand was subordinated. "The Marchand mission is not a military enterprise. There is no thought of conquests. The policy which you have

pursued for two years and of which our establishment in the Nile valley should be the crown, must be strictly followed." Thus Hanotaux endeavoured to repair the wire to London by returning to the policy of peaceful penetration. The improvement in the situation, however, was purely superficial; for the new Foreign Minister had neither the power nor the desire to abandon a dangerous path. To deny that the Marchand mission was a military enterprise might ease diplomatic tension for the time; but the intrepid explorer carried with him the flag and the hopes of France, and no cunningly devised formula could disguise the fact that it was a deliberate challenge to the official policy of the British Empire.

At this moment a fresh source of friction arose in the annexation of Madagascar.¹ After many years of diplomatic friction and many months of desultory fighting a treaty was signed in 1885, which transferred the foreign relations of the island to the control of France, admitted a French resident to the capital, and ceded the bay of Diego Suarez with the surrounding territory. The Queen was to retain her position, and France was not to interfere in internal affairs. There was no mention of a Protectorate; and though Great Britain consented to recognize the new situation in 1890, in return for concessions in Zanzibar, the Government of Madagascar refused to allow France the influence she expected to exercise. Such a situation could not last; and in 1894 an ultimatum demanded the recognition of French authority throughout the island. The demands were only accepted in part, and a war of conquest commenced. In September, 1895, the capital was occupied, and in 1896, after a rebellion had been suppressed, the island was annexed, and the victorious Gallieni remained as the first Governor. Great Britain grudgingly surrendered the Capitulations; but the virtual suppression of British trade by high tariffs further embittered the relations between London and Paris.

¹ See Hanotaux, "L'Affaire de Madagascar."

The year 1897 witnessed a lull between the laying of the train in 1896 and the explosion of 1898; but there were ominous rumblings of the coming storm. France and Russia, not content with their success in preventing the use of the surplus of the Caisse for the Dongola expedition, actually complained of the Egyptian Government accepting the money from Great Britain without their consent. The reply of the British Government to this barefaced attempt at dictation was given on the meeting of Parliament by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who announced that a further advance was essential. "Egypt can never be permanently secure so long as a hostile Power is in occupation of the Nile valley up to Khartum." England, he added, would not be worried out of Egypt by hindrances and difficulties. The French and Russian Press fumed, but no official action was taken. During the year the desert railway was carried south from Dongola, and stores were collected for the grand advance.

Meanwhile France endeavoured to improve her diplomatic position. Hanotaux had always maintained friendly relations with Germany, like Jules Ferry before him. In April, 1897, the Chancellor Hohenlohe, who visited Paris every year to consult his dentist, had a cordial interview, and in July the boundaries of Togoland were amicably settled. Shortly afterwards an Anglo-French agreement on Tunis was reached, which contained some trifling concessions to British trade. Franco-Italian
The relations of France and Italy were *Rapprochement* also becoming more friendly. After the disaster of Adowa and the fall of Crispi the Francophil Rudini recognized the French position in Tunis by giving up the Capitulations, and terminated the ten years' tariff war by a commercial treaty in 1898. The renewal of Franco-Italian harmony was fostered by the arrival of Camille Barrère, one of the most accomplished of French diplomats, as the French Ambassador at the end of 1897.

While Kitchener and Marchand were slowly feeling their way from the north and the west towards the Upper

Nile, Salisbury succeeded in eliminating a source of possible danger to British plans. When the advance on Dongola was launched, Mr. Rennell Rodd

Mission to Abyssinia was sent from Cairo to convince Menelek that it involved no evil designs on his territory or independence. Addis Abeba had witnessed a good deal of Franco-Russian intrigue during the long diplomatic struggle for the valley of the Nile, and the Emperor's capacity for mischief had been recently increased by his triumph at Adowa. The Rodd mission was completely successful. The Treaty signed on May 14, 1897, secured a pledge of neutrality during the operations against the Khalifa, and a promise from the ruler "to do all in his power to prevent the passage through his dominions of arms and ammunition to the Mahdists, whom he declares to be enemies of his empire." In return for this assurance of benevolent neutrality, the Somaliland frontier was modified in his favour. No attempt was made to settle the boundary between Abyssinia and the British Egyptian sphere on the north and west; for such questions could be more profitably discussed after the anticipated destruction of the Dervish power. About the same time Colonel Macdonald was ordered to advance north from Uganda in order to join hands with the Anglo-Egyptian forces when the time came for them to advance south from Khartum, and another expedition was equipped to plant a chain of posts from the Victoria Nyanza along the White Nile. Owing, however, to difficulties with the native troops and physical obstacles neither of the enterprises accomplished its aim.

The Lower Niger attracted French ambitions no less than the Upper Nile, and French agents were busy in the hinterland of the British colonies on the coast. Early in 1897 the disputed claims were referred to a Joint Commission in Paris; but French expeditions continued to push forward. Africa, lamented the Prime Minister at the Guildhall banquet, had been created to plague Foreign Secretaries. He added that there was a limit to the exer-

cise of conciliation, and that we could not allow our most elementary rights to be trampled on. Countries which we regarded as our property, echoed the strident voice of Chamberlain, had been invaded. This situation we could not accept, and a frontier force had been organized which would be necessary "whether or not the difference reached a satisfactory solution." After an interval of many months the Niger Commission in Paris resumed its deliberations in the autumn, when Hanotaux engaged in intimate conversation with the British Ambassador. The French negotiators proposed to enlarge the basis of the sought-for accord by including the left bank of the Niger, and asked for the north and east shores of Lake Chad in return for concessions in the navigation of the Niger and other privileges. Sir Edmund Monson replied that the conference could only deal with the right bank, as the left had been settled in 1890, and that claims east of the lake must avoid undue expansion toward the Nile. "If other questions are adjusted," wrote the Ambassador to Hanotaux (Dec. 10), "the Government will make no difficulty about this condition. But in doing so they cannot forget that the possession of this territory may in the future open up a road to the Nile, and they must not be understood to admit that any other European Power than Great Britain has any claim to occupy any part of the valley of the Nile. The views of the British Government upon this matter were plainly stated by Sir Edward Grey and were formally communicated to the French Government. Her Majesty's present Government entirely adhere to the language that was on this occasion employed by their predecessors." The Ambassador assured Salisbury of his great satisfaction in making this communication, as his dispatches had shown how necessary it was to remind the French Government of the British views as to the Nile valley. It would not, he believed, prejudice the chances of a satisfactory arrangement in West Africa.¹

West
African
Problems

¹ See "Egypt," No. 2. 1898.

The name of Marchand was not mentioned in the communication; but Salisbury's explicit confirmation of the Grey declaration constituted a fresh and solemn warning. Hanotaux replied that to mix up the Niger and the Nile would only prejudice the work of the Niger Commission. "The French Government cannot refrain from repeating the reservations which it has never failed to express every time that questions relating to the valley of the Nile have been brought forward. The declaration of Sir Edward Grey gave rise to an immediate protest by our representative, and I myself, in the name of the Government, made declarations to which I consider I am all the more justified in referring from the fact that they have called forth no reply from the British Government." Thus once again the two Governments restated their divergent views on a subject which, rightly, they considered to be of vital importance, in the most uncompromising manner.

The Niger negotiations proceeded throughout the winter, on the basis that possession created rights. The British attitude appeared to Hanotaux at once stubborn and threatening. Lord Selborne, Under-Secretary for the Colonies, in a speech at Bradford, was particularly menacing. "We wish for peace, but not at any price. We did not fight about Madagascar, because our interests there are so small; but can we say the same of West Africa?" The language of the Colonial Secretary in Parliament on February 18, 1898, was equally threatening; but on the same day the British delegates on the Niger Commission recognized French claims, which had been denounced as exorbitant, and which secured the union of the Senegal, the Niger and the Ivory Coast settlements. Four months were needed to complete the agreement, which was signed at Paris on June 14, and delimited the spheres of influence from Senegal to the Nile basin. The pact cleared up the whole complex of boundary questions in West Africa, and, in the opinion

of Hanotaux, gave France what she wanted without serious sacrifices; but it was attacked by the French colonial enthusiasts and ratification was delayed.

The question of the Nile valley alone remained, and Hanotaux desired to solve it before the expected collision occurred. Kitchener's advance began in March, and the fierce battle of the Atbara on April 8 liberated the province of Berber and announced the approaching doom of the Khalifa. Marchand was believed to be near Fashoda, if indeed he had not already arrived. But on the day following the signature of the Niger Convention the Méline Ministry fell, and Delcassé entered on his seven years' tenure of office at the Quai d'Orsay, for which his earlier experience as Minister of the Colonies had in some degree prepared him. **Marchand at Fashoda**

Marchand reached Fashoda on July 10, but his arrival was unknown till two months later. The decisive struggle with the Mahdist forces was timed for the beginning of September, and on August 2 Salisbury drew up instructions for the period following the capture of Khartum. No large scale military operations for the occupation of the southern provinces were contemplated, but flotillas were to be sent up the Blue and the White Nile. If the former encountered Abyssinians it was to report and wait for orders. The latter was to be commanded as far as Fashoda by the Sirdar, who was to take with him a small body of British troops. "In dealing with any French or Abyssinian authorities who may be encountered, nothing should be said or done which would in any way imply a recognition of a title to possession on behalf of France or Abyssinia to any portion of the Nile valley."

On September 1 the Anglo-Egyptian army came in sight of Omdurman, and at daybreak on September 2 the Dervish force of about 30,000 men attacked with reckless courage. By nine o'clock in the morning the charges had been broken, and the army moved forward towards the capital. An unexpected sally from behind

the hills jeopardized the right wing for a time; but when Kitchener entered the capital in the afternoon the Khalifa, with the sorry remnants of his host, escaped from the other end of the city. In a battle of machine-guns against spears the losses of the victors amounted only to a few hundreds, while the Dervish casualties were reckoned at nearly 20,000. The native troops, according to the customs of war in the Sudan, dispatched hundreds of wounded men as they advanced across the plain after the battle was over. At night the British and Egyptian flags floated over the palace where Gordon had perished in 1885, and Kitchener emphasized the defeat of the Khalifa by the destruction of the Mahdi's tomb.

Delcassé offered Sir Edmund Monson his sincere congratulations on the victory, "despite the differences about Egypt of the two Governments." He supposed a flotilla would steam southwards, and it would probably fall in with Captain Marchand. The latter had been instructed to consider himself an emissary of civilization, without authority to decide on questions of right, which must be discussed between the two Governments, and he hoped the British commander might be instructed to avoid a conflict. The Foreign Minister expressed his desire that all causes of difference should be amicably settled, and his conviction that this could be achieved by frank discussion.¹ On receiving a telegraphic report of the conversation Salisbury ordered the Ambassador to state that all the territories which were subject to the Khalifa had passed by right of conquest to the British and Egyptian Governments. "H.M. Government do not consider that this right is open to discussion, but they would be prepared to deal in the manner suggested by his Excellency with any territorial controversies in regard to regions not affected by this assertion." Delcassé merely remarked that the phrase "territories subject to the Khalifa" was

¹ This is the first conversation also described in the French Yellow Book, "Affaires du Haut-Nil et du Bahr-el-Ghazal." 1898.

rather vague, and that he had no accurate knowledge of their extent.

Meanwhile news had reached Kitchener that the French flag was flying at Fashoda, five hundred miles south of Khartum; and on September 10 he steamed south from Omdurman with five gunboats, two hundred British and Sudanese troops, and artillery.¹ On September 18, when within a few miles of the village, he dispatched a letter to inform "the Chief of the European expedition" of his victory at Omdurman and his approaching arrival. Marchand replied, warmly congratulating the Sirdar on his victory, and informed him that he had occupied part of the Bahr-el-Ghazel and the Shilluk country on the left bank of the Nile as far as Fashoda. On August 25 he had driven off a Dervish attack from the river, and on September 3 had signed a treaty with a local chief placing the Shilluk country on the left bank of the Nile under the Protectorate of France, subject to ratification by the French Government. "I offer you my best wishes on your arrival on the Upper Nile," he concluded, "and shall be happy to welcome you at Fashoda in the name of France."

On reaching Fashoda on September 19, a few hours after receiving this polite but unbending reply, Kitchener was visited by Marchand, whom he congratulated on his long and arduous journey. The presence of the French at Fashoda and in the valley of the Nile, he proceeded, was regarded as a direct violation of the rights of Egypt and Great Britain, and he must protest against their hoisting of the French flag in the dominions of the Khedive. He begged Marchand not to resist the re-establishment of Egyptian authority, as the British-Egyptian forces were much more than a match for his eight officers and a hundred and twenty men, and he offered to convey him and his followers north on a gunboat. Marchand replied

**Kitchener
meets
Marchand**

¹ See his report and the correspondence with Marchand in "Egypt," No. 3. 1898.

that he could not retire or haul down his flag without orders, and begged that the matter should be referred to Paris, which, he felt sure, would at once order his retirement. Thus the French flag continued to fly, and the Egyptian flag was hoisted a few hundred yards away. Kitchener followed up his verbal protest by a written argument against the occupation of any part of the Nile valley, adding that the government of the country had been resumed by Egypt and that a British commandant of Fashoda had been appointed.

On the day before the meeting of Kitchener and Marchand an important interview took place between Delcassé and the British Ambassador. Did Great Britain, inquired the Foreign Minister, maintain that Marchand had no right to be at Fashoda? Sir Edmund Monson replied that France well knew that an incursion into the basin of the Nile would be regarded as an unfriendly act. Why, then, was this mission dispatched? Delcassé rejoined that France had never recognized the British sphere of influence in the Upper Nile, and had indeed protested against it. The Bahr-el-Ghazel had long been outside the influence of Egypt, and France had as much right at Fashoda as England at Khartum. Only a mandate from the Sultan could justify the British claim. Sir Edmund ended the conversation by remarking that the situation was very serious. The British Government would not consent to a compromise. It had no desire to pick a quarrel, but it naturally resented a step which it had cautioned France not to take. Delcassé assured his visitor that every member of the Cabinet was anxious for good relations with England. If England was equally anxious there could be no danger.

A Cabinet Council was held on September 27, and the British Ambassador was invited to the Quai d'Orsay the same evening. Marchand had told Kitchener that on arriving at Fashoda he had dispatched two copies of his Report, one through the French Congo, the other through

Abyssinia. This document it was indispensable to obtain as quickly as possible, and they would be grateful if instructions could be forwarded to Marchand to send a copy direct to Cairo. Sir Edmund asked whether he was to conclude that Marchand would not be recalled before his Report was received. Delcassé replied that he was ready to discuss the question in a most conciliatory spirit, but that the Ambassador must not ask him for the impossible. Salisbury consented to forward the message, but added that much uneasiness would be created by a prolongation of the existing state of affairs. The public was anxious to know what was going on, but it would be enough if the imminent departure of Marchand could be announced. On September 30 Sir Edmund again visited Delcassé, who informed him that he could not evacuate Fashoda without discussion or conditions, adding a wish that the delimitation of the French colonies of the Congo and the Upper Ubanghi might be discussed.

The conversations had hitherto taken place in Paris; but on October 6 Baron de Courcel sought out the Prime Minister at Downing Street, and in a long and inconclusive interview insisted on the strong feeling that prevailed in France.

France
holds out

Salisbury assured him that the strength of feeling in England was not less remarkable, and referred his visitor to the assertions of British claims in 1890, 1894, 1895 and 1897. The Ambassador suggested that both sides should announce that negotiations on the delimitation of the spheres of influence were in progress, and claimed that France should have a considerable part of the left bank of the Nile. The conversation was resumed on October 12. France, declared the Baron, desired an outlet on the Nile for the commerce of her Ubanghi province, and asked for a position on the navigable portion of the Bahr-el-Ghazel. She had established posts in the province for some time, and had the right to them attaching to long and undisputed occupation. To Salisbury's suggestion that Marchand should retire beyond the water-

shed between the Ubanghi and the affluents of the Nile, the Baron replied that the watershed was difficult to determine, and he renewed his suggestion for a general agreement on the territories between Lake Chad and the Nile. The Prime Minister, finding his language indefinite and rhetorical, declined to discuss such questions till they were formulated in precise phraseology, and the second interview, like the first, concluded without definite result. The conversations in London and Paris made it clear that the French Government realized that Fashoda must be evacuated, but that it wished to save its face by negotiations. But while France was ready for conditional evacuation, Great Britain insisted on unconditional surrender.

The patience of the Prime Minister was not shared by the British Press or by public opinion. At the very moment that he was listening to the Lord Rosebery "rhetorical" arguments and appeals of the French Ambassador, Lord Rosebery intervenes addressing a meeting at Epsom. The question, he declared, was of supreme gravity. "In face of a deliberate warning that a particular act would be considered as an unfriendly act, it has been deliberately committed. Behind the policy of the Government is the united strength of the nation. No Government that attempted to recede from or palter with that policy would last a week. The nation will make any sacrifice and go any length to sustain them. On the other side of the Channel there is an element of great gravity too; there is a question of the flag. I honour the flag. But the flag is a portable affair. It can be carried by irresponsible people, and I have some hope that the flag in this case is not necessarily the flag of France but the flag of an individual explorer, and is therefore not carrying the full weight of the Republic behind it. M. Delcassé has shown a conciliatory spirit. I hope that this incident will be pacifically settled, but it must be understood that there can be no compromise of the rights of Egypt. Great Britain has been treated rather

too much as a negligible quantity in recent years. Let other nations remember that cordiality can only rest on mutual respect for each other's rights, each other's territories, and each other's flag."

These trumpet tones were echoed by Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a speech at Tynemouth. "It would be a great calamity that after a peace of more than eighty years, during which I had hoped that unfriendly feeling had practically disappeared, those friendly relations should be disturbed. But there are worse evils than war, and we shall not shrink from anything that may come." Chamberlain announced the calling up of the reserves and other precautions, which were not to be interpreted as threats; but he claimed all the territory which we had "freed at great price from anarchy and misrule." A few softer notes were heard, and the *Daily News* pleaded for consideration for "the legitimate ambitions of France"; but the multitude preferred the crude chauvinism of the *Daily Mail*. Opinion was intoxicated by the victory of Omdurman and exasperated by the long delay. A cartoon in *Punch* embodied the angry impatience of the man in the street. "What will you give me if I go away?" asks the little organ-grinder. "I will give you something if you don't," replies a muscular John Bull with a menacing frown. France was well aware that war might come at any moment, and she feverishly prepared for the worst.

British
Impatience

Marchand's report was duly dispatched to Paris via Cairo; but the decision of the French Cabinet was not determined by its contents. France yielded to force, and on November 4 Baron de Courcel informed Salisbury that Fashoda would be evacuated. The Prime Minister joyfully announced the end of the crisis. "There will be plenty of discussion," he added; "but a cause of dangerous controversy has disappeared, and we can only congratulate ourselves." Marchand refused to return home through Egypt, preferring the long route through Abyssinia. It

was a spectacular humiliation for a Great Power; for Great Britain had secured unconditional evacuation by threat of war. The object of the Marchand mission, declares Hanotaux, was to possess a valuable pawn in negotiating the same sort of compromise as regards the Nile as had been reached in reference to the Niger. It was a dangerous game to play, even if the negotiations had preceded the victory of Omdurman, as Hanotaux had desired. Salisbury had proved himself too yielding for the taste of the country in the Far East; but in the Nile valley he was adamant, and France had only herself to thank for the results of neglecting repeated and peremptory warnings. France had one enemy already, and she could not afford another. To quarrel with Great Britain was to play into the hands of Germany, and to destroy any

**Delcassé's
Decision**

chance of ultimately recovering the Rhine provinces. "A conflict," declared Delcassé to the Chamber with simple truth, "would have involved sacrifices disproportionate to the object." The French fleet was weak, and her enemy could have taken the whole of her colonial empire if she had wished. Having once chosen his path, the Foreign Minister resolved to harvest from British friendship what he could not obtain from the thwarting of her will. While France was still smarting under humiliation, he told his friends that he wished to remain at the Quai d'Orsay till he had restored the *bonne entente* with England. His wish was to be gratified; but a rough road had to be traversed before the rivals clasped hands in 1904.

The demand that arose in certain quarters for the establishment of a Protectorate over the Sudan was rejected by the Prime Minister, who announced at the Guildhall banquet that it would only be declared if absolutely necessary. He added that the position of Great Britain in Egypt had been changed, since "a stricken field was one of the stages on the road to history." The status of the Sudan was defined in an Anglo-Egyptian Convention signed on January 19, 1899. The British

and Egyptian flags were to be used together except at Suakin, the supreme military and civil command to be vested in a Governor-General appointed by the Khedive with the consent of the British Government, the country to be governed by martial law till further notice, the jurisdiction of the mixed tribunals to be recognized nowhere except in Suakin, the import and export of slaves to be prohibited, and the Brussels Act in respect to fire-arms and liquor to be enforced. The Sudan was to be free from the international complications which rendered the occupation of Egypt a perpetual strife, and to be ruled by a benevolent despot from Khartum. A year later the remnants of the Khalifa's army were mown down by machine-guns by Sir Francis Wingate in Kordofan, and the Khalifa himself preferred death to surrender. The character of the new regime was described by the Prime Minister without circumlocution on the meeting of Parliament. "We hold the Sudan by two titles—first as having formed part of the possessions of Egypt, and then by the title, much older and much less complicated, which is called the right of conquest. In the first written communication to the French Government I was careful to base our title on the right of conquest, because I think it is the most useful, the most simple, and the soundest of the two."

**The
Khalifa's
Death**

Logical French critics pointed out that if Great Britain appealed to the right of conquest, Marchand could do the same, and that if the claim in law was good, there was no need to throw the sword into the scale. The joint sovereignty, they argued, was a British Protectorate in everything but name; and the Treaty was juridically null, since the firman of 1892 forbade the Khedive to cede or alienate territory or privileges. No Power, however, raised a voice in protest, and official France was perforce dumb. Though the crisis was over, bitter feelings remained and found expression in both countries. The Colonial Secretary gave free vent to his anger in a speech

on January 18, 1899. The exclusion of British trade from Madagascar in 1896, he complained, was a breach of faith. The conduct of France in regard to the Newfoundland fisheries, he added, was a typical example of a malicious policy which apparently aimed at combining the maximum damage to others with the minimum advantage to herself. It was at this moment that France secured a harbour in the Persian Gulf from the Sultan of Muscat, and that Great Britain compelled him to substitute a coaling-station.

After the great surrender Baron de Courcel was succeeded by Paul Cambon, who was destined to play a leading part in the reconciliation of the nations which had been within sight of war.

**Spheres of
Influence**

On January 2, 1899, the new Ambassador expressed a wish to resume the African conversations of his predecessor. Salisbury was now ready to negotiate, and the Declaration of March 21 gave satisfaction to both parties. The position of France on the Niger and the Congo was improved. While under the pact of 1890 France only touched Lake Chad on the north, she now touched it on the east and at one point on the south. Salisbury proposed a formula by which each should recognize as the sphere of the other all territory on either side of a given line; but Delcassé rejected a proposal which would consecrate British pre-eminence in Egypt and the Sudan, and would recognize the right to dispose of countries which did not belong to the signatories. He therefore proposed, and Salisbury accepted the formula: "France engages to acquire neither territory nor influence east, nor Great Britain west, of the agreed line." The line of partition followed the watershed of the Nile and the Congo, Wadai falling to France, Darfur, Bahr-el-Ghazel and Kordofan to Great Britain. The latter provinces formed a free commercial zone, and France thus obtained commercial access to the Nile. Though the Nile valley was naturally left to Great Britain, France was not required to recognize British claims in Egypt. Great Britain made no sacrifices, but she recognized France's

right to expand from West Africa towards the Sahara and the interior. Despite the frustration of her hopes in the Sudan, she was to own an even larger share of the surface of the Dark Continent than her rival. "The work," declared **France's African Empire** Cambon many years later, "went quickly and smoothly, for Lord Salisbury knew his own mind. Then I suggested that there were several other matters which might be settled in an equally friendly spirit. He shook his head and smiled. 'I have the greatest confidence in M. Delcassé,' he said, 'and also in your present Government. But in a few months' time they will probably be overthrown, and their successors will do exactly the contrary. No, we must wait a bit.'"¹ The period of waiting was to extend to four years, filled with grave decisions and crowded with unexpected events.

¹ Interview in *The Times*, Dec. 22, 1920.

CHAPTER IX

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

THE dangerous tension between Great Britain and the Dual Alliance arising from competing interests and ambitions in Asia and Africa, and culminating in the incidents of Port Arthur and Fashoda, turned the thoughts of British statesmen once more towards the Power with which they had till recently lived in the friendliest relations. The Kruger telegram was neither forgotten nor forgiven; but there had been no repetition of the ill-advised attempt to interfere in South Africa. Moreover, the steady support of British policy by the Triple Alliance during the reconquest of the Sudan, and the Kaiser's telegram of congratulation on the Atbara victory, were doubly welcome at a time when France and Russia were piling obstacles in our path. The *détente* opened the way for a *rapprochement*; and the unsuccessful effort of Great Britain to transform the *rapprochement* into an alliance forms the main theme of this chapter.

Though Salisbury was Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, Chamberlain was the most forceful personality of the Unionist Cabinet formed in 1895, and his restless activities ranged far beyond the walls of the Colonial Office. The Colonial Secretary was not altogether satisfied with his chief's yielding attitude in the Far East. His views were shared by his Liberal Unionist colleague, the Duke of Devonshire, who complained that he was bombarded with complaints from the cotton industry about the danger to Lancashire's Chinese market. At the end of February, 1898, at a small dinner-party at the house of Alfred Rothschild, Chamberlain and the Duke begged

Baron von Eckardstein, the popular First Secretary of the German Embassy, to arrange a meeting between the Ambassador and Chamberlain.¹ Hatzfeldt and Chamberlain met next day, and informal conversations, extending over the whole field of Anglo-German relations, were continued two or three times a week throughout March.

Chamberlain's suggestion of an alliance found a sympathetic response in the Ambassador; but the Wilhelmstrasse objected that the system of party government in England rendered it difficult to guarantee the permanence of such an arrangement. When Chamberlain replied that Parliament could approve, Bülow rejoined that the publication of an Anglo-German treaty would destroy the good relations between Berlin and Petrograd. The negotiations reached a deadlock early in April, and Chamberlain believed that Russia had got scent of the discussions; but at the suggestion of Alfred Rothschild, and with the approval of Hatzfeldt, Eckardstein visited the Kaiser at Hamburg. After listening to the report, the impressionable monarch expressed agreement with the views of the Embassy; but a week later Hatzfeldt informed Eckardstein that it was useless to continue negotiations, since the Kaiser and Bülow had turned against an agreement. Unmoved by the rebuff from Berlin, Chamberlain returned to the charge; for his heart was hot within him, and on May 13 his wrath boiled over in a speech to his constituents. "As to the manner in which Russia secured Port Arthur, the promises made and broken a fortnight later, I will only quote the proverb, 'Who sups with the devil must have a long spoon.' In future we have to reckon with Russia in China and Afghanistan. But what can we do in our isolation? Some of our critics say we should have made an arrangement with Russia; but it takes two to make an agreement. What Russia asked we could not give, and we could give nothing to head her off. And if an agreement were reached, who

¹ Eckardstein, "Erinnerungen," I, 292-6.

could guarantee its fulfilment?" The moral of the speech was co-operation with Germany.

On May 30 the Kaiser discussed the new situation in a "private and very confidential" letter to the Tsar.

"With a suddenness wholly unexpected to me am I placed before a grave decision which is of vital importance for my country, and which is so far-reaching that I cannot foresee the ultimate consequences. The traditions in which I was reared by my beloved grandfather of blessed memory as regards our two houses and countries have, as you will own, always been kept up by me as a holy bequest from him, and my loyalty to you and your family is, I flatter myself, above any suspicion. In the beginning of April the attacks on my country and person, till then showered on us by the British Press and people, suddenly fell off, and there was, as you will have perceived, a momentary lull. This rather astonished us at home and we were at a loss for an explanation. In a private inquiry I found out that H.M. the Queen herself through a friend of hers had sent word to the British papers that she wished this unnoble and false game to cease. Such an unwonted step naturally led us to the conclusion that something was in the air. About Easter a celebrated politician *proprio motu* suddenly sent for my Ambassador and *à brûle pourpoint* offered him a treaty of alliance with England! Count Hatzfeldt, utterly astonished, said he could not quite make out how that could be after all that had passed between us since '95. The answer was that the offer was made in real earnest and was sincerely meant. My Ambassador said he would report, but that he doubted very much whether Parliament would ever ratify such a treaty, England till now always having made clear to anybody who wished to hear it that it never by any means would make an alliance with any Continental Power whoever it may be! After Easter the request was urgently renewed, but by my commands coolly and dilatorily answered in a colourless manner. I thought the affair had

The Kaiser's
Comment

ended. Now, however, the request has been renewed for the third time in such an unmistakable manner, putting a certain short term to my definite answer and accompanied by such enormous offers showing a wide and great future opening for my country, that I think it my duty to Germany duly to reflect before I answer. Before I do it, I frankly and openly come to you, my esteemed friend and cousin, to inform you, as I feel that it is a question, so to say, of life and death. We two have the same opinions, we want peace, and we have sustained and upheld it till now! What the tendency of the alliance is you will well understand, as I am informed that the alliance is to be with the Triple Alliance and with the addition of Japan and America, with whom pourparlers have already been opened! What the chances are for us in refusing or accepting you may calculate yourself! Now as my old and trusted friend I beg you to tell me what you can offer me and will do if I refuse. Before I take my final decision and send my answer in this difficult position, I must be able to see clearly, and clear and open without any back-thoughts must your proposal be, so that I can judge and weigh in my mind before God, as I should, what is for the good of the peace of my Fatherland and of the world. You need not fear for your Ally in any proposal you make should she be placed in a combination wished by you."

The Tsar replied that three months ago Great Britain had made him offers with a view to destroying the Franco-Russian alliance "in a masked way." Soon afterwards he had secured Port Arthur, The Tsar's
Reply reached an agreement with Japan about Korea, and was on the best of terms with the United States. Germany could count on the friendship of Russia, but the Kaiser must settle for himself what value to attach to the British offer.¹ The letter con-

¹ The letter has not been published, but Hammann supplies a summary from the Berlin Foreign Office. Nothing is known of the British offer mentioned by the Tsar.

firmed Bülow and Holstein in their decision to avoid an alliance and to deal with separate issues on their merits. The door, however, was left open, and in June Salisbury discussed with Hatzfeldt a *rapprochement* in a form which should not challenge Russia. No advance, however, was made or could be made, as the Kaiser and his advisers at that time considered the good will of the Russian Court too valuable to endanger. "Since I communicated with you in May," wrote the Kaiser to the Tsar on August 18, "England has now and then reopened negotiations with us, but has never quite uncovered its hand. They are trying hard, as far as I can make out, to find a continental army to fight for their interests. But I fancy they won't easily find one, at least not mine! Their newest move is to wish to gain France over from you."

The lack of response to the British feelers left no soreness, for no formal offer was made or even considered by the Cabinet. Co-operation was possible
England, without alliance, and at this moment a field
Germany,
Portugal was opening in which the countries might pursue their interests without fear of collision, and where Germany might find compensation for what she described as her "sacrifice" in renouncing all claims in South Africa, and where Rhodes might further enlarge the British Empire. The finances of Portugal were, as usual, in confusion, the interest on British and German loans was in arrear, and the German Government proposed a deal. In the expectation that Portugal would approach one or other of them, and desiring that she should not turn to France, the two countries agreed to reply that they could only finance her jointly, and that as security for a large loan the colonies should be pledged or ceded. A secret treaty was signed in October, 1898, which divided the colonies into spheres of influence, Southern Mozambique, Northern Angola, Madeira, the Azores and Cape Verde Islands falling to Great Britain, while Germany's share consisted of Southern Angola and Northern Mozambique. Partition

was only to be carried out if Portugal desired to sell.¹ At the close of the year the two Governments made discreet public references to the argument. Germany, declared Chamberlain, was a dangerous competitor, but there were many important questions in which the two countries could agree without an alliance. "There are many points where we can co-operate," echoed Bülow, "without damage to and with integral maintenance of other relationships." The Portuguese pact, however, remained a dead letter, for the country escaped financial collapse. Salisbury disliked the Treaty of 1898, and in the following year the Marquis de Soveral, a *persona gratissima* at the British Court, persuaded him to renew the old mutual guarantee against attack in an exchange of notes described as the Treaty of Windsor.

This pact removed the soreness created by the British ultimatum of 1890, which vetoed the Portuguese claim to sprawl across South Africa; and, though it was not verbally inconsistent with the Anglo-German Treaty, Germany was not officially informed of it till many years later. When references to it in speeches when the British fleet was at Lisbon in 1900 caused a German inquiry what treaty was in question, Lord Lansdowne replied that it renewed the long-standing alliance and did not infringe the pact of 1898.

Treaty of
Windsor,
1899

A further step along the path of co-operation was taken when Rhodes visited the German capital in the spring of 1899.² In conversation with a friend of Rhodes, the Director of the German Colonial Department spoke of the hostility of the South African statesman to Germany. The Englishman thereupon offered to suggest a visit, and was assured that the empire builder would be received by the Kaiser. Rhodes welcomed the opportunity, for the Cape to Cairo railway was very near his

¹ Cf. Eckardstein, "Erinnerungen," II, 205. The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1872 gave Great Britain the pre-emption of Delagoa Bay.

² Eckardstein, "Erinnerungen," I, 314-15; Basil Williams, "Cecil Rhodes," 309-11.

heart. The reconquest of the Sudan and the extension of Rhodesia northwards left only the middle of the route to be arranged with the Congo State or Germany, according as it passed east or west of Lake Tanganyika. The trans-African telegraph was an easier problem financially, but equally required foreign assent. The Anglo-Congolese Treaty of 1894, which had provided a strip through Congo territory, had been cancelled, and henceforth Rhodes placed his chief hopes in German East Africa. Early in 1899 he discussed the line with Kitchener and Cromer in Egypt, and visited Brussels and Berlin on his way home. On leaving King Leopold's study he caught hold of the British Military Attaché, who happened to be passing, and hissed in his ear, "I tell you that man is Satan."

The interview with the Kaiser was extremely cordial, beginning with friendly chaff about the Kruger telegram,

Rhodes in
Berlin

which, as Rhodes explained, had diverted the wrath of his countrymen from his own head, and ending with a promise of every facility for carrying the telegraph wires through German East Africa. The conversation was renewed at an Embassy dinner, after which the Kaiser gave orders that "when Mr. Rhodes gets into our territory he does not require a military escort for his workers, as that would put him to unnecessary expense." Details took time to work out, and the agreement was not signed till the autumn. In return for permission to carry the telegraph through German territory, the Chartered Company promised not to build a railway line to the Atlantic except through German South-West Africa. It was also agreed that, if Germany could not finance a railway through German East Africa, Rhodes should undertake the task. The Englishman was delighted not only with his bargain but with his host, whom he described as "a big man, a broad-minded man." "Your Emperor was very good to me," he wrote to a German friend. "I shall not alter my determination to work with the German colonies in Africa." His gratitude and confidence were generously

expressed in a codicil to his will, providing that the Kaiser should choose a number of Rhodes scholars for Oxford University every year. The visit was one of the factors in the Kaiser's friendliness to Great Britain during the Boer war, and a telegram of congratulation after the relief of Kimberley showed that the fascination of the famous Afrikander was still undimmed.

The Anglo-German negotiations concerning Portuguese Africa had proceeded in perfect harmony; but the discussion of the Samoan problem generated a good deal of heat. Holstein, declares Eckardstein, detested Salisbury, whom he credited with the desire to injure Germany and involve her in trouble by his devilish ingenuity. Hatzfeldt, who knew him better, repudiated this caricature; but the Ambassador's nerves were upset by the excursions and alarms of Berlin. Indeed, his relations with the Prime Minister became so strained in the summer of 1899 that the two men did not meet for weeks. The tripartite condominium under which Samoa had lived since 1889 had proved unwork- **The Samoa Settlement** able, the United States and Great Britain favouring one solution and Germany another. Salisbury was annoyed by threats through unofficial channels, and the blundering Holstein hinted that the Kaiser would break off diplomatic relations if a satisfactory agreement were not reached forthwith. Salisbury very properly declined to negotiate further with a pistol at his head, and ironically observed to the Duke of Devonshire that he was daily expecting an ultimatum. "Unfortunately it has not yet come. If it does not, Germany will lose a first-rate opportunity of getting rid not only of Samoa but of all her colonies, which seem too expensive for her, in a respectable way. And we should then be able to unite with France along the line of colonial compensations." Hatzfeldt now invited Eckardstein, who had temporarily withdrawn from the diplomatic service, to get in touch with Chamberlain. The Baron joyfully accepted the task, and secured the approval of Berlin

for his proposal to surrender German claims in Samoa in return for compensation elsewhere. After two months of negotiation an agreement was reached by which Germany ceded her rights in Samoa in return for the British Solomon Islands and a portion of the Gold Coast. The pact was approved by Holstein but opposed by Tirpitz, who won Bülow and the Kaiser to his side. The situation was completely changed by the outbreak of the Boer war, which strengthened Germany's position as a bargainer; and she finally secured Savaii and Upolu, ceding the German Solomon Islands in return. The United States received the island of Tutuila, and the British flag disappeared from the Samoan archipelago.

While Great Britain and Germany were chaffering about a group of islands in the Pacific, the leading States of the world had gathered at The Hague, **The Hague Conference** in response to an invitation from the Tsar, to discuss the reduction of armaments. The action of Nicholas was welcomed by leading Englishmen, among whom Stead held a foremost place, as a disinterested offer of service to humanity; and it was rumoured that an encyclopædic work by Bloch, a wealthy Polish banker and pacifist, on the future of war had attracted the ruler's attention. The genesis of the Hague Conference, as revealed by Witte many years later, was of a much more prosaic character.¹ Early in 1898 the War Minister, Kuropatkin, drew up a memorandum for the Tsar, stating that as France and Germany had improved their artillery, Russia and Austria could not lag behind. The cost, however, would be deterrent, and both countries would profit by an agreement not to buy new guns. On being asked for his opinion, the Finance Minister replied that Austria would think that Russia was insolvent, or that she wished to spend the money on some unavowed object. The proposal, moreover, would injure Russian credit. A far better plan, argued Witte, would be for all the Powers to economize on their

¹ Dillon, "The Eclipse of Russia," 269-78.

armaments. The reasoning convinced the Tsar, and the revised proposal was draped in diplomatic phraseology by the Foreign Office. On August 24 Muravieff presented to each of the diplomatic representatives accredited to the Russian Court a copy of the Tsar's rescript.

The invitation was accepted by all the Governments to which it was addressed, and the first Hague Conference, attended by every European State, the United States and Japan, opened on May 18, 1899.¹ But it quickly appeared that the main object for which it had been summoned could not be achieved. When Russia proposed that there should be no increase of **Germany's** armies or military budgets for five years, **Veto** the representative of Germany rose to explain that his country was not suffering from an intolerable burden and that it refused even to discuss the reduction or arrest of armaments. The declaration struck a felon blow not only at the Conference itself, but at the preservation of European peace; for the unchecked growth of armaments by land and sea augmented the potential danger of every State to its neighbours, and increased the tension in which rulers and ministers, diplomatists and financiers, Parliaments and the Press, lived and worked. German apologists subsequently explained that they could not afford to remove any portion of defensive armour with an angry France on one side and the Slav Colossus on the other. It would, indeed, have been difficult to reduce the principle of the Tsar's rescript to figures, and it might have proved impossible; but it was owing to the German veto that the task was not attempted. The decision, moreover, was due not merely to legitimate apprehensions for the security of her frontiers, but to the doctrine of national self-sufficiency which she had come to embrace with almost ecstatic fervour. The suggestion of any limitation on his unfettered control of the army and navy seemed to the Kaiser now and ever afterwards

¹ See J. B. Scott, "The Hague Peace Conferences"; Zorn (one of the German delegates), "Die beiden Haager Friedenskonferenzen."

an almost blasphemous challenge to his prerogative. The Conference had thus to content itself with an anæmic *vœu* that the restriction of expenditure on armaments was desirable for the material and moral welfare of mankind. On the other hand, it accomplished some useful work by attempting to humanize the rules of war, though Great Britain declined to recognize the immunity of private property at sea, to which the United States and Germany attached importance. Of far greater significance was the creation of a permanent Arbitration Tribunal, mainly owing to the skill and courage of Sir Julian Pauncefote, the British Ambassador at Washington and First British Plenipotentiary.

The General Act of the Hague Conference was signed on July 29 by twenty-six of the twenty-eight participating Powers. But armaments continued to increase, and on October 9 the British Empire was at war. The events of the struggle in South Africa concern the historian of modern Europe as little as its causes; but the reaction of the struggle on European politics was profound. The position of Great Britain at the opening of the conflict was one of "splendid" if not risky isolation. France and Russia seemed incurably hostile; Germany was less unfriendly, but scarcely a friend; the United States, though our outspoken sympathy in the Spanish war had softened the angry memories of Venezuela, stood aloof from the controversies of Europe; Japan had not yet made her choice between London and Petrograd; Austria and Italy took no active part in *Weltpolitik*. This loneliness was intensified both by the setting and by the incidents of the war. The world knew little and cared less for the grievances of the Uitlanders in the Transvaal, who, despite the annoyances and humiliations of which they complained, contrived to pile up enormous fortunes. The Raid was unforgotten, and our failure to probe responsibility to the bottom and to punish Rhodes confirmed the suspicion that high political and financial circles had

England at
War

designs on the independence of the Boer Republics. More than one nation, again, had felt the lash of Chamberlain's sharp tongue, and the fact that the negotiations were in the hands of the arch-Imperialist did not conduce to a patient hearing of the British case. Thus the ultimatum from Pretoria seemed to onlookers in Europe the natural rejoinder to the dispatch of troops from England and India. When it was discovered that untrained Boers could on occasion defeat British regulars, sympathy turned to enthusiasm, and the efforts of the two little States to defend their independence against a mighty Empire were watched with breathless interest and rewarded with unstinted applause. To hostile eyes England appeared as the great bully who had already swallowed half the world, and was about to gobble up two peasant Republics endowed with unlimited stores of mineral wealth. With scarcely an exception the Press of Europe sympathized with the Boers; and the Emperor Francis Joseph's observation to the British Ambassador at a diplomatic reception, "In this war I am on the side of England," was the more appreciated in British official circles because it was a voice crying in the wilderness.¹

**British
Prestige
Suffers**

The rally of the self-governing Dominions to the cause of the Mother Country, though welcome evidence of Imperial solidarity, afforded no adequate compensation for the scowls and jeers of Europe; and the first result in the sphere of high politics of the outbreak of war was to restore the wire between London and Berlin. After an absence of four years the Kaiser had instructed Hatzfeldt in the early summer to make discreet inquiries in regard to an invitation. The indispensable Eckardstein sounded the Prince of Wales, who replied that he had no objection, but that his nephew must deliver no more bombastic speeches in the course of his visit. Soon after the Queen's invitation for the autumn had been received the impulsive monarch threatened that he would not come

¹ Rumbold, "Final Recollections," 359-60.

unless the question of Samoa were promptly settled; but his annoyance blew over when Chamberlain and Eckardstein discussed the problem in friendly conversation. The visit had been suggested from Berlin; but after the outbreak of war the hosts were much more anxious than the guest that it should be paid. From the British point of view it was in the highest degree desirable that the Boers in the field and on their farms should know that German support would not be forthcoming, and that the rumour of a European coalition about to intervene on their behalf was an idle dream.

At the Lord Mayor's banquet the Prime Minister announced that our relations with Germany were as good as they could be, and on November 19 the

**The Kaiser's
Visit**

Emperor and Empress arrived in England. The visit was a complete success, and on this occasion the Kaiser and his uncle enjoyed each other's society. But it was much more than a personal reconciliation of the courts after the explosion of the Kruger telegram. Bülow accompanied his master, and high politics were discussed. The way had been prepared by the conversations in the spring of 1898 and in the early autumn of 1899, when in the course of the Samoa negotiations Chamberlain warned Eckardstein that if he could not reach agreement with Germany he would make a deal with France and Russia. Holstein, immured in the twilight world of the Wilhelmstrasse, believed the threat to be bluff; but Hatzfeldt had sharper eyes, and encouraged his subordinate to discuss an alliance. When the Kaiser reached England, Chamberlain broached his favourite project, and met with an encouraging response. "I had two long talks with the Kaiser," he wrote to Eckardstein on December 1, "which confirmed my earlier opinion of his extraordinary insight into European problems. Bülow also made a great impression on me. He expressed a wish that I should say something about the common interests of the United States, Germany and England. Hence my speech at Leicester yesterday."

It was not surprising that the Leicester speech should echo round the world. Chamberlain was the most forceful personality in British politics, and since the outbreak of the Boer war the eyes of Europe were upon him. He began by complaining of the abuse of the foreign Press, which had not spared the almost sacred person of the Queen. "These attacks on Her Majesty have provoked a natural indignation which will have serious consequences if our neighbours do not mend their manners." After this resounding rebuke to France, and a warmly phrased tribute to the friendliness of the United States, he turned to the topic which was uppermost in his thoughts. "There is something more which I think any far-seeing English statesman must long have desired, and that is that we should not remain permanently isolated on the Continent of Europe; and I think that the moment that aspiration was formed it must have appeared evident to everybody that the natural alliance is between ourselves and the great German Empire. We have had our differences, our quarrels, misunderstandings, but at the root of things there has always been a force which has necessarily brought us together. What interest have we which is contrary to the interest of Germany? I can foresee many things which must be a cause of anxiety to the statesmen of Europe, but in which our interests are clearly the same, and in which that understanding of which I have spoken in the case of America might, if extended to Germany, do more perhaps than any combination of arms to preserve the peace of the world. At bottom the character of the Teutonic race differs very slightly indeed from the character of the Anglo-Saxon race. If the union between England and America is a powerful factor in the cause of peace, a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence in the future of the world. I have used the word alliance, but it matters little whether you have an alliance which is committed to paper

Chamberlain
suggests
Alliance

or whether you have an understanding which exists in the minds of the statesmen of the respective countries. An understanding is perhaps better than an alliance."

Though the speech was encouraged by the rulers of Germany, it found no responsive echo in the Fatherland. German opinion was pro-Boer, and the suggestion of an alliance with the wolf while busily engaged in devouring the lamb was rejected with scornful anger. The outcry was too much for the supple Bülow, who was counting on the succession to the Chancellorship, and whose heart

Germany
holds back

had never been and never was to be in a British alliance. The Reichstag speech which restored the Foreign Secretary to the favour of his countrymen aroused the scorn of Chamberlain, who had no mercy for flinching or hedging. "I won't say anything of the way Bülow has treated me," he wrote to Eckardstein, "but it is useless to continue the negotiations for an alliance. Whether they can be resumed after the end of the war, which has stirred up so much dust, remains to be seen. I am truly sorry that all your earnest efforts seem vain. Everything went so well, and Salisbury was quite friendly again and with us." It was in vain that Bülow sent a confidential explanation of the offending utterance to the Colonial Secretary through Eckardstein, pointing out that his position was very difficult and that his attitude was unchanged. Events, moreover, had occurred and were about to occur which further diminished the prospect of a *rapprochement*.

On October 18, 1899, a week after the Boer ultimatum, the Kaiser had utilized the launching of a vessel at Hamburg to issue another stirring appeal to the deaf ears of his people. "Bitterly do we want a strong navy. Hamburg appreciates the absolute necessity for our foreign interests of a strong protecting force and how indispensable it is to increase our fighting force at sea. Yet the realization of this need extends but slowly in our Fatherland, which unfortunately still wastes its strength

in fruitless party strife. With deep anxiety I have had to observe what slow progress interest in and understanding of great questions of world-wide importance have made. If the strengthening of the navy, in spite of constant entreaties and warnings during the first eight years of my reign, in the course of which I was not even spared scorn and mockery, had not been persistently refused, how differently we should have been able to promote our thriving commerce and our overseas interests. Still my hopes that the **German Sea Power** Germans will nerve themselves have not yet vanished. For strong is the love of Fatherland that beats in their hearts. And, indeed, it is a wonderful structure that my father and grandfather and their great Paladins helped to erect. In all the glory of its magnificence it stands there, the Empire which our fathers yearned to see and of which our poets have sung." It was the last time that the Imperial preacher had to complain of his people's lack of interest in the darling project of his heart. Everyone now saw what was coming. "The Kaiser is expected to propose a new programme," reported the Belgian Minister on November 21, "as he is strongly impressed by recent events—the Spanish war, Fashoda, South Africa. The moral is that Germany is exposed to the risk of being despoiled of her laboriously constructed colonial empire, and, even worse, losing her foreign trade and mercantile marine. The fleet of the 1898 programme will suffice to defend the German coast, but not for action at a distance. The programme will probably pass, for the considerations which have struck the Kaiser seem to have produced the same impression on the majority of Germans."¹

The Reichstag, declares Tirpitz in his Memoirs, required to be "nursed"; and having successfully administered the first dose in 1898 he had determined in the summer of 1899 to repeat the experiment at latest in 1901. The financial provision had proved inadequate; it seemed

¹ Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," I, 50-1.

desirable to equalize the number of ships built each year; and above all the atmosphere had been improved by the lessons of Cuba, Manila and Fashoda. His views were shared with deep conviction by the Foreign Secretary, who on December 11 invited the Reichstag to reflect on the perils of the time. "We must be prepared against surprises by land or sea. We must have a fleet strong enough to prevent the attack of any Power. Storms may arise at any moment. Events since 1898 have shown the wisdom of the First Navy Bill. All the Powers are increasing their fleets. Without a large increase of our own we cannot maintain our place in the world beside France and England, Russia and America. We are the objects of envy, political and economic. The times of our political anæmia and economic and political humility must not recur. In the coming century the German people will be the hammer or the anvil."¹ Such ringing words had not been heard in the Reichstag since the fall of the Iron Chancellor.

A few days later the Government received unexpected assistance in their educational campaign from the stoppage and searching of three German merchantmen for contraband on the east coast of Africa. Two were allowed to proceed, but the *Bundesrath* was taken to Durban to a Prize Court. The German note of protest was as shrill as any patriot could desire, and Salisbury expressed his astonishment at its tone. Hatzfeldt was ill and away from his post, and the situation looked ugly, for the German Government seemed to have lost its head and was believed to be ready to break off diplomatic relations. Eckardstein, who had returned to official life as First Secretary of the Embassy on the occasion of the Kaiser's visit, reported that the Cabinet wished to prevent the repetition of the offence; but on his next visit to the Foreign Office he learned to his dismay that a German Admiral was expected in London with an ultimatum of forty-eight hours in his

¹ Bülow, "Reden," I. Dec. 11, 1899.

pocket. Salisbury, nevertheless, was in a very accommodating mood. No official report about the cargo of the *Bundesrath*, he observed, had been received; but it seemed clear that it carried no contraband. "I shall not await the report of the Prize Court, but I shall release the ship at once, pay compensation, and promise not to trouble German ships again."

Salisbury's
Soft Answer

It was a handsome surrender, and on January 19 Bülow announced that England had apologized, tendered compensation, and given orders to prevent recurrence. "Germany," he added, "who has so often shown her freedom from aggressive tendencies, has a special right to considerate treatment." No great damage had been done to the relations of the Courts and the Chancelleries, and when the Prince of Wales was shortly afterwards shot at in Brussels on his way to Copenhagen, the Kaiser hurried from Berlin to congratulate him on his escape. On the other hand, the repercussion of the *Bundesrath* incident on German mentality was profound and enduring. It was these January days of 1900, far more than the propaganda of the Kaiser, Tirpitz and the Navy League, which brought home to the German people their powerlessness at sea. "It's an ill wind that blows nobody any good," observed Bülow when the news arrived, and Tirpitz suggested that an Order should be given to the British commander. "The Chancellor ordered champagne," relates the Kaiser in his Memoirs, "and we three drank to the British navy, which had proved such a help."

The moment had now arrived for the introduction of the Second Navy Bill. "We hesitated for a long time," records Tirpitz, "whether to bring the idea of the English menace into the preamble. I should have preferred to have left England out of it altogether; but such an unusual demand, namely, the doubling of our small naval force, made it scarcely possible to avoid pointing at least at the real reason." Germany, it was explained, must have so strong a battle fleet that war, even for her most powerful

naval opponent, would be attended by such dangers that its supremacy would be at stake. The programme doubled that of 1898, and contemplated the construction of thirty-four battleships in sixteen years, thus bringing the total to thirty-eight ships of the line. The coast vessels of the first programme were to be dropped, but fourteen large cruisers instead of ten, and thirty-eight small cruisers instead of twenty-three were to be built, while the torpedo boats were to be increased to eighty. That the demand for six cruisers was dropped was of no importance, since for technical reasons it was at that moment impossible to build them. The new Bill, unlike its predecessor, left the provision of credits to the annual Budget, which not only humoured the sticklers for Parliamentary control, but enabled larger or costlier types to be adopted if desired.

The second Bill met with less opposition than the first, and the steady support of the Centrum secured it against danger.¹ The Socialists continued their opposition, but of the bourgeois leaders Richter alone carried on the fight. "After a long and excited session of the Budget Committee," relates Bülow, "he came and said to me privately, 'You will succeed. You will get a majority. I would never have believed it.' I explained why his opposition was inexplicable to me, for the German democracy had for decades demanded efficiency at sea. Herwegh stood at the cradle of the German fleet, and the first German warships had been built in 1848. I pointed out why we must protect our commerce and our industries on the ocean. He listened attentively, and said at last: 'You may be right, but I am too old, and I cannot take part in this new turn of affairs.'"² The Kaiser was delighted at the success of his efforts. "The ocean is essential for Germany's greatness," he declared at the launching of a

¹ Bassermann, the leader of the National Liberals, now began his steady and powerful support of a large navy. See the first speech in his "Reden," I.

ship in July, 1900; "but the ocean proves that on it and beyond it no great decision can be taken without the German Kaiser." Bülow's satisfaction was expressed, as usual, in terms better calculated to reassure foreign opinion. "Show me a single case in which our policy was anything but moderate," he exclaimed on June 12, on the third reading. "Adventure and aggression are not in our minds. But we will not be brushed aside or run over. We want security that we shall be able to develop in peace, both in the political and economic field." Interest, honour and dignity, he declared in after years, compelled Germany to win for her international policy the same independence that she had secured for her policy in Europe.

The isolation of Great Britain and the sympathy felt throughout Europe for the Boer Republics naturally led to rumours of mediation or intervention.¹

After concluding his autumn holiday in Biarritz in October, 1899, Muravieff visited Paris on his way home and discussed the situation with the French Government. Before the Foreign Minister had left the capital some Anglophobe newspapers announced the imminence of Russian intervention, and Russian papers spoke of a Franco-Russian understanding against Great Britain. No details of the discussions in Paris have been published; but Jules Hansen, the Gallicized Dane who did odd jobs for the French Foreign Office, had journeyed to Berlin on the outbreak of war to discover whether Germany would share in intervention.² Bülow declined to receive him; but, though he had seen nobody of importance, he tried to persuade the British Government that Germany had suggested intervention to France. The attempt failed, for Eckardstein had warned Downing Street against his intrigues. French public opinion would have welcomed

¹ See Hammann, "Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," ch. 3, and "Der Missverständene Bismarck," 73-5.

² Eckardstein, "Erinnerungen."

almost any means of displaying its sympathies with the Boers; but there is no reason to credit the French Government with hostile intentions. President Loubet and the Premier, Waldeck-Rousseau, two of the steadiest heads in France, were anxious to allow the country to recover from the fever of the Dreyfus crisis; and Delcassé, though he had no love for England, had realized that colonial expansion was difficult if not impossible without her assent. On the other hand, he had only recently paid a visit to Petrograd, and could scarcely meet Russian suggestions with a blank negative.

After his visit to Paris Muravieff met his master, who had been staying with his wife's relatives in Hesse, and accompanied him to Potsdam on November 8. During the few hours' conversation no mention of mediation appears to have been made, and a few days later the Kaiser and Bülow started for England. No action was taken till the early disasters had embarrassed Great Britain, and the stopping of the *Bundesrath* had inflamed

German opinion; but at the end of February, 1900, after renewed discussion with France, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin asked whether Germany would join France and Russia in a joint *démarche* in London with the object of restoring peace.¹ The reply was sent through the Ambassador in Petrograd that Germany could not expose herself to complications so long as she had to reckon with French hostility. She therefore inquired whether France and Russia would be ready to join her in a guarantee of each other's European possessions. This seemingly innocent query produced the result which was expected if not indeed desired; for France was not to be trapped into a recognition of the Treaty of Frankfurt. The incident was related by Eckardstein to his friend Alfred Rothschild, who informed the Government. The

¹ Bourgeois et Pagès, "Origines et Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre," 288, do not doubt that the Russian proposal was suggested by the German Government, but they supply no evidence for their belief.

Russian Chargé assured the Foreign Office that Berlin was constantly trying to induce France and Russia to join her, and that Russia had hitherto refused; but the communication produced as little effect as an anonymous and undated memorandum in French presented to the Prince of Wales in Copenhagen, suggesting that Germany had more than once whispered to France and Russia that they should stab England in the back. No further suggestions came from Petrograd till October, 1901, when the Russian Chargé in Berlin presented a memorandum asking for the German view in regard to mediation. The German Government replied that it was always ready to help to end the war, but that collective action would bear the appearance of a threat, and added that it would be better if mediation was proposed by a single Power, for instance Russia. The reply was verbally conveyed by the Under-Secretary to the Chargé, who replied that he expected nothing else.

Germany's
Negative
Replies

Several years later, in the *Daily Telegraph* interview, the Kaiser claimed credit for having frustrated a Franco-Russian attempt at intervention; and there is no doubt that his insistence on a mutual guarantee effectively prevented co-operation. Whether he was willing to take action if France had accepted his condition we do not know; and whether the intervention would have been in the form of a menace or a mere offer of friendly services we cannot tell. When the revelation was made the *Temps* semi-officially replied that the project was not to humble England in the dust, but merely to offer mediation. The German people, like the French, would have applauded vigorous action on the part of their Government; but the persistent refusal of the Kaiser and Bülow on other occasions to associate themselves with the pro-Boer sentiments of their countrymen suggests that they never contemplated action designed to thwart Great Britain in the fulfilment of her military task. The Kaiser declares in his Memoirs that Queen Victoria thanked him warmly for

declining to join in the suggested pressure. "The idea of coercive intervention," declared Bülow in the Reichstag, "never crossed our minds, and no Power contemplated anything but friendly mediation. The Powers which academically ventilated mediation always explicitly disclaimed all thought of forcing England to make peace against her will." To this we may add the emphatic testimony of Sir Frank Lascelles, the British Ambassador, that the German Government never took any hostile step during the Boer war.¹ Looking back on this period after his fall, Bülow quietly observes that German neutrality was necessitated by the national interests. "Even if, by taking action in Europe, we had succeeded in thwarting England's South African policy, our relations would have been poisoned for many a long day. Her passive resistance to the international policy of new Germany would have changed to active hostility. Even in the event of defeat in the South African war, England could have stifled our sea power in the embryo."

A letter from the Tsar to King Edward, written after the repulse of the second Russian feeler in Berlin, confirms the view that the project of intervention was never of a very alarming character.²

**The Tsar's
Appeal**

"Pray forgive me," he wrote in May, 1901, "for writing to you upon a very delicate subject, which I have been thinking over for months; but my conscience at last obliges me to speak openly. It is about the South African war, and what I say is only said as by your loving nephew. You remember, of course, when the war broke out what a strong feeling of animosity against England arose throughout the world. In Russia the indignation of the people was similar to that of the other countries. I received addresses, letters, telegrams, etc., in masses, begging me to interfere, even by adopting strong measures. But my principle is not to meddle in other people's affairs, as it did not con-

¹ *Pall Mall Gazette*, Nov. 6, 1917.

² Published by Sir Sidney Lee in *The Times*, May, 1922.

cern my country. Nevertheless all this weighed morally upon me. So sad to think it is Christians fighting against each other. How many thousands of gallant young Englishmen have already perished out there! Does not your kind heart yearn to put an end to this bloodshed? Such an act would universally be hailed with joy." No one could take offence at such an appeal. King Edward, after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, gently replied that the end could hardly be far off, and that when peace and order had been restored, the territories would enjoy in full measure the tranquillity and good government which England had never failed to assure to the populations which had come under her sway. When the Kaiser renewed to his uncle the warning which he had given to his grandmother, that a Franco-Russian coalition was forming to attack the British Empire, and added that his own personal influence alone could stay the avalanche, the British Government refused to take the communication seriously.

Whatever the secret thoughts of the Kaiser during the different phases of the dragging struggle, his actions were consistently friendly. His statement in the *Daily Telegraph* interview that in the darkest days of the struggle he worked out a plan of campaign with the aid of his Generals and sent it to Queen Victoria was promptly contradicted by the Chancellor in the Reichstag, who explained that the communication was nothing more than a series of military aphorisms. Whatever its exact nature, it was intended as a sign of good will. A more substantial service was the refusal to receive Kruger when, in the autumn of 1900, he fled from Pretoria and was greeted with tumultuous applause in Paris, where he was accorded an interview with Delcassé. On reaching Cologne on December 2 he was informed that the Kaiser could not receive him; but the greetings in the first German city were so encouraging that he resolved to push on to Berlin in the hope that the ruler might change his mind. The

**Kruger in
Europe**

German Minister at Luxemburg was accordingly dispatched in hot haste to Cologne to veto the project. When the action of the Government was sharply attacked in the Reichstag, Bülow, who had recently succeeded Hohenlohe as Chancellor, replied that a visit would have been of no advantage either to Germany or to Kruger. The visit to Paris had done him no good, for Delcassé had refused to take action. "We, like other countries, feel sympathy with the Boers; but we must not be guided by our feelings. There is no need to ask or say which side is right. We are ready, on a basis of mutual consideration and complete equality, to live in peace and friendship with England. We are not called upon to play Don Quixote or to tilt at English windmills." He had done his best, he added, to prevent war, urging Kruger (through the medium of the Dutch Government) in May, June and August, 1899, to compromise. He had told him that it was useless to apply to Germany, and had advised him to seek American mediation.

The favourable impression created in Great Britain by the Kaiser's refusal to receive the fallen President was confirmed by his conduct on the death of **Queen Victoria's Death** his venerated grandmother. Directly he heard that the Queen's life was in danger he hurried across to Osborne, arriving two days before the end.¹ His practical sympathy produced a profound impression on the Royal Family and in the country, and was all the more appreciated since it was well understood that if he had consulted his popularity among his subjects he would have stayed at home. During his fortnight's residence he conferred the Order of the Black Eagle on Lord Roberts, who had recently surrendered the command in South Africa to Lord Kitchener. Observers noted with pleasure the cordiality of his relations with his uncle, and the new King displayed

¹ As his carriage drove out of the station a man called out, "Thank you, Kaiser." "That is what they all think," remarked the Prince of Wales, "and they will never forget this coming of yours."—The Kaiser's "Memoirs," ch. 4.

his good will by presenting the Garter to the Crown Prince, who accompanied his father. "The visit has produced a complete revulsion in the popular sentiment," reported the Belgian Minister.¹ "The change began with his visit in 1899. But the sympathy for the Kaiser does not extend to the German people, where the grant of the Black Eagle to Lord Roberts is sharply criticized. The English see in the Germans dangerous economic rivals. The visit has had an excellent effect on the relations of the Courts, but it has not modified the feelings of the peoples."

The friendship of the German Government was of peculiar value, for at no time during the reign of William II had German influence stood higher relatively to that of the other Great Powers. His commanding position was emphasized by the acceptance of Count Waldersee as commander of the international expedition for the suppression of the Boxer movement in China in 1900 and the relief of the The Pekin
Legations Legations in Peking. Since Russia contributed the largest number of troops, she naturally desired the chief post; but Great Britain and Japan objected to strengthen her existing predominance in the Far East. Russia, in turn, was equally opposed to a Japanese or British lead. The Kaiser saw his opportunity and seized it. He invited Salisbury to propose a German commander, and when the Prime Minister hesitated he sounded the Tsar, who in like manner declined to commit himself. The Kaiser, records Hammann, burned to see his old favourite Waldersee at the head of the expedition, and he proceeded to announce that the Tsar had placed the appointment in his hands. Lamsdorff wished to correct the statement, but the Tsar decided to take no action. The appointment was the result rather of pushful diplomacy than of the unanimity of the Powers; but the peoples knew nothing of the means by which the prize had been secured, and interpreted the choice as a spontaneous tribute to the position which

¹ Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," I, 76-7.

Germany had won for herself. The lustre of the diplomatic achievement, however, was dimmed by an Imperial admonition to the departing troops to give no quarter and take no prisoners, which, though inspired by the assassination of the German Ambassador in Peking, would have been more suitable on the lips of an Assyrian conqueror than of a Christian monarch at the opening of the twentieth century.

Anglo-German co-operation for the relief of the Legations was followed by Anglo-German co-operation in defending China against territorial or

The Yangtse Agreement

commercial encroachments from the north. The Yangtse Agreement, recorded in an exchange of Notes on October 16, 1900, provided that the Yangtse basin and all other portions of China where the signatories could exert influence should remain open to the trade of every nation, and that the integrity of China was to be maintained. If a third Power sought territorial privileges, the signatories were to discuss common action. The undertaking of Germany to defend the *status quo* against Russian menaces was considered of such value that no claim for special rights in the Yangtse basin was put forward by Great Britain. The other Powers adhered to the pact, for Russia had herself proclaimed the integrity of China and had promised the evacuation of Manchuria. Moreover, Bülow succeeded, or believed himself to have succeeded, in excluding Manchuria from the agreement—a surrender on the part of Salisbury which caused the Duke of Devonshire to remark that it was not worth the paper on which it was written.

Such was the situation on the eve of the Queen's death and the visit of the Kaiser. Since France and Russia were as unfriendly as ever, the thoughts of the Colonial Secretary returned to the project of an Anglo-German alliance which had slumbered since the end of 1899.¹ In

¹ See Eckardstein, "Erinnerungen"; Hammann, "Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," ch. 5; "Memoirs of Hayashi."

the middle of January, 1901, Chamberlain and Eckardstein were the guests of the Duke of Devonshire at Chatsworth, where the discussion was renewed. The time of splendid isolation, argued Chamberlain, was over. England was ready to solve outstanding questions, especially Morocco and the Far East, with one or other of the two European groups. The Cabinet would prefer Germany, but, if such an agreement proved impossible, we should arrange with France and Russia, even at the cost of the greatest sacrifices. It was Bülow's wish that the Kaiser should not discuss an alliance or other pending questions in order that he might not commit himself; but Eckardstein informed him of the Chatsworth conversation, and the monarch engaged in intimate conversation with Lord Lansdowne. According to Hammann, he avoided the discussion of an alliance, but his visit created an atmosphere favourable to negotiation.

At this moment a fresh obstacle to intimacy arose. While the Kaiser was still our guest, the Government learned that Russia was about to fortify her settlement in Tientsin. Lord Lansdowne suggested a joint protest on the strength of the Treaty of 1900, and though the Wilhelmstrasse denied its applicability, the Kaiser wished to adopt the proposal, remarking to Wolff-Metternich, his new ambassador, that he could not always be oscillating between Petrograd and London without the danger of falling between two stools. A more serious difference of interpretation arose when Japan informed the British Government that Russia was pressing Peking to ratify a secret treaty between Alexeieff, her chief representative in the Far East, and a Chinese general, which was detrimental to European interests in North China. Japan accordingly proposed to stiffen Chinese resistance by an identical declaration in Peking. When Lord Lansdowne asked the German Government for its opinion, he received the reply that the Yangtse Treaty did not apply to Manchuria, but that Germany was ready to warn China against

Germany
declines
Co-operation

territorial or financial commitments to third Powers. Lord Lansdowne welcomed the promise to join in a warning, and made no reference to the interpretation of the Treaty. The difference of opinion, however, leaked out, and on March 15 the Chancellor announced the divergence in the Reichstag. "It is clear from the text that it does not include Manchuria, and we made it clear in the negotiations. Nothing can be more indifferent to us than what happens in Manchuria. There are no real German

**Divergent
Interpreta-
tions**

interests there. We only watch over German interests in China, and we leave it to England to look after her own." Germany, he added, declined to play the part of a lightning-conductor. The statement was promptly contradicted by Lord Cranborne, the Under-Secretary, who declared that, since no limitations were mentioned in the Treaty, it included North China. According to Hammann, Salisbury had suggested 38° latitude as the northern limit of the sphere covered by the Treaty, but this was altered in order to veil German indifference to Manchuria, and the words "where they can exert influence" were substituted. This formula was adopted to prevent the disappointment which would arise if Manchuria were expressly omitted. Lord Lansdowne admitted that the phrase imposed a limitation, but related it to the article concerning the open door, not to that concerning the integrity of China. Japan now publicly proclaimed that she had joined the pact unconditionally; but the difference between the British and German interpretations remained, and each partner was annoyed with the other.

Despite the refusal of Germany to co-operate against Russian encroachment in Manchuria, Lord Lansdowne remarked to Eckardstein on March 18 that he was considering the possibility of a defensive arrangement, which he believed several of his most important colleagues would approve. If the Cabinet took it up, and if Germany were in favour of it, he would make an official offer. The formula "defensive arrangement" was chosen because

Holstein, though favourable to a *rapprochement*, detested the word "alliance." Eckardstein replied by suggesting an Anglo-German-Japanese pact to maintain integrity and the open door in China, which he knew his friend Hayashi, the Japanese Ambassador, to favour. On March 20 Holstein proposed a still larger scheme. If Germany were to guarantee the British ^{Towards an Alliance} Empire, Great Britain should join the Triple Alliance and bring Japan in with her. The negotiations, he added, should take place in Vienna. By March 25, a week after the first conversation, the chief points were fixed. The *casus fœderis* was to arise if either party were attacked. A separate alliance was to be made by both with Japan with reference to the Far East. When Lord Lansdowne was informed of Holstein's desire that the negotiations should take place in Vienna, he remarked that he must first clear up the situation with regard to Germany.

Once again, as in 1898 and 1899, the work of the negotiators in London was complicated and thwarted from Berlin. The Kaiser believed that England wanted to use the German sword against Russia. Waldersee had returned from the Far East with the belief that Great Britain wished to use Germany as a buffer against Russia, and urged the Kaiser to withdraw his troops and to guarantee the indemnities by the immediate raising of the maritime customs. Accordingly an agent arrived with a demand to settle the claims of German subjects in South Africa to compensation and to raise the maritime customs in China. As the British Government had already promised investigation and full compensation for German claims in South Africa as soon as the military situation allowed, and had declined to consent to the raising of the Chinese customs, Lord Lansdowne was naturally annoyed. A few days later the King received a letter from the Kaiser, denouncing his Ministers as "unmitigated noodles." The King complained to Eckardstein of his master's conduct. "You know my view that England and

Germany are the natural allies. But we cannot take part in the Kaiser's buck-jumping. Besides, some of our Ministers, especially Salisbury, have a great suspicion both of him and Bülow. I have tried to dispel it, but there is an end to everything. Moreover, the scoldings and threats of the *Flottenverein* do not help us to feel confidence." Despite these obstacles, the negotiations continued. The invalid Hatzfeldt returned from Brighton, and Salisbury from the Riviera. The Prime Minister was ready for an

**Obstruction
in Berlin**

alliance with Germany alone. Lord Lansdowne suggested the discussion of separate questions as a preliminary to an alliance, but the exasperating Holstein replied that England must first promise help, not only if Germany were attacked by two Powers, but also if she were compelled to support one of her allies. When Lord Lansdowne asked for a statement in writing, he declined to supply it.

By the middle of June Chamberlain had lost hope. "If the people in Berlin are so short-sighted," he complained to Eckardstein, "there is no help." The negotiations for an alliance once more fell through; but in July a final opportunity for a *rapprochement* was presented by the Moroccan mission to London. French designs on Morocco were becoming apparent, and Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British representative at Tangier, visited Eckardstein in the German Embassy. France, he declared, was aiming at a Protectorate, and Lord Lansdowne was in favour of co-operation to preserve the *status quo*. The way might be prepared by an Anglo-German commercial treaty with Morocco after an agreement between the two countries as to the distribution of concessions. All measures, commercial, financial and political, should be carried out jointly. The Baron reported the offer to Berlin, but obtained no response. He had discussed the question with Chamberlain and Rhodes in 1899 and with Chamberlain and Devonshire at Chatsworth in January, 1901, and had worked out a plan. Great Britain was to have Tangier and the Mediterranean coast outside the

Spanish zone, Germany to have coaling stations on the Atlantic, and together they were ultimately to partition the country.

As the year wore on the chances of a solid agreement faded away. In November Richthofen, who had succeeded Bülow as Foreign Secretary, lamented to Eckardstein that Holstein did not know what he wanted, and that Bülow had been against it from the first. Holstein had long been convinced that Salisbury was an enemy, and that nothing could be accomplished while he remained at the helm; but there were reasons of a less personal character which led the rulers of Germany to refuse the proffered alliance. In the first place, they believed that close union with Great Britain would endanger, if not destroy, her good relations with Russia by involving her in her partner's quarrels. And, secondly, the unpopularity of Great Britain during the Boer war rendered them chary of making an alliance with the nation whose offences were trumpeted forth by almost every paper in the Fatherland. It was in order to diminish the shock that Holstein had desired to transfer the negotiation to Vienna, and suggested the Holstein
makes
Conditions adhesion of Great Britain (with Japan) to the Triple Alliance rather than a separate Anglo-German pact. Neither of these dangers was imaginary, but the rejection of the British approaches involved a far greater peril. Holstein, the blind leader of the blind, regarded the antagonism of Great Britain to France and Russia as an immutable factor in the European situation, and dismissed as bluff Chamberlain's broad hint that if we could not find support in one camp we must seek it in the other. Two years after the rejection of the latest British offer, King Edward's visit to Paris was to open the eyes even of the moles of the Wilhelmstrasse.

The British and German nations knew nothing of the negotiations or of their failure; but the temper both of the Governments and of the peoples was further ruffled by an oratorical duel between the Chancellor and the

Colonial Secretary. The continuance of malignant attacks on the conduct of the troops in South Africa prompted Chamberlain on October 25, 1901, to observe that we should never approach what those nations who now accused us of barbarism did in Poland, the Caucasus, Bosnia, Tonkin, and in the war of 1870.

The German Army

The rebuke aroused a storm of indignation, and an orator declared in the Reichstag amid cheers, "Who insults the German army insults the German people." The cool-blooded Chancellor was well aware that most of the stories of the British "mercenaries," which had provoked Chamberlain to wrathful protest, were legends; but he felt bound to pick up the glove which had been thrown down, and tried, though in vain, to secure an apology from the Cabinet. In defending his own policy, he declared on January 8, a Minister should leave other countries alone. "The German army stands far too high and its scutcheon is too bright to be affected by unfair judgments. We may say, as Frederick the Great said of someone who attacked him and the Prussian army, 'Let him alone, and do not get excited; he is biting granite.'" In his next public utterance Chamberlain proudly rejoined that he had no wish to give lessons to foreign statesmen, and no desire to receive them.

After nearly four years of intermittent negotiation it was clear that an Anglo-German alliance was impossible; and the active brain of the Colonial Secretary immediately turned to the alternative. On February 8, 1902, King Edward entertained his Ministers and members of the Diplomatic Corps; and after dinner Eckardstein observed Chamberlain and the French Ambassador in earnest conversation for half an hour. He caught the ominous words "Morocco" and "Egypt"; and he was not surprised when the Colonial Secretary later in the evening remarked to him that Bülow had now for the second time censured him in the Reichstag. "I have had enough of such treatment, and there can be no more talk of co-operation with Germany." When the other guests had gone the King

retained the Baron and added some significant words. The attacks of the Press and the speech of the Chancellor, he declared, had aroused such anger that, at any rate for a long time, there could be no talk of co-operation. "More than ever we are urged by France to unite with her in all colonial disputes." The Baron informed Bülow and the Kaiser of the King's words, but they hardly seemed to appreciate their importance. On a visit to Highbury in September, 1902, the Baron found his host filled with angry resentment. Every negotiation with Berlin, he exclaimed, proved a bad job. Eckardstein inquired if it were really intended to unite with France and Russia, and received the reply, "Not yet; but it may come." A visit to Lord Lansdowne in Ireland confirmed the statement that Cambon's discussions with the two Ministers had led to no result, since the problem of Morocco was complicated by the question of Gibraltar.

The Anglo-German negotiations of 1901 had considered the admission of Japan as a partner in the new league; but when the British approaches to Berlin were repulsed, London and Tokio determined to make a pact of their own. Japan, like Great Britain, was beginning to feel the risks of isolation; but the Elder Statesmen differed as to the means to meet the peril. Prince Ito desired a frank discussion with Russia, and proceeded on a fruitless visit to Petrograd with this object. The larger party, on the other hand, was convinced that a satisfactory agreement with Russia was impossible, and preferred an alliance with her rival. Negotiations were accordingly carried on in London by Lord Lansdowne and Baron Hayashi, the Japanese Ambassador, and in January, 1902, a treaty was signed for five years. The two Governments recognized the independence of China and Korea; but they authorized each other to safeguard their special interests by intervention if threatened either by the aggression of another Power or by internal disturbances. If either Power, in the defence of such in-

**The
Japanese
Alliance**

terests, became involved in war, the other would maintain strict neutrality. If, however, either were to be at war with two Powers, its partner would come to its assistance. The Treaty was received with satisfaction in both countries, though warning voices pointed to the risks which were involved. The admission of Japan to alliance on equal terms with a great European Power gave her a position to which no Oriental state had ever attained. In the second place it virtually assured her that in the event of war with Russia she would only have a single foe to meet. The advantage to Great Britain was less obvious, all the more since Japan declined to extend her obligations to India. But the addition of her growing armaments to our potential strength in the Far East was a tangible gain. The allies might well feel that they would be a match for any hostile combination, and would be able to defend their commercial and political interests, which the aggressive policy of Russia appeared to threaten. Though the new friend was far away and her full strength was unrevealed, the prestige of Great Britain throughout the world was strengthened by the knowledge that she no longer stood alone.

On the termination of hostilities in South Africa by the surrender of the Boers in June, 1902, it appeared as if something of the old friendliness between Great Britain and Germany might be restored. Lord Roberts and Mr. Brodrick, the Minister of War, accepted an invitation to the army manœuvres; and the Kaiser declined to receive the Boer generals, who had come to Europe to collect funds for their stricken fellow-countrymen, unless they were presented by the British Ambassador—a condition which they declined to accept. In November the Kaiser paid a family visit to Sandringham for the King's birthday; and Mr. Balfour (who had succeeded his uncle as Prime Minister at the close of the war), Lord Lansdowne and the Colonial Secretary were invited to meet him. At the Guildhall banquet Mr. Balfour referred scornfully to

**The
Kaiser's
Visit**

the "fantastic imaginings" of the Press with regard to the visit; but the rebuke was speedily followed by armed co-operation against a recalcitrant South American State.

At the opening of the century Venezuela was in the grip of President Castro, who showed as little consideration for the subjects of the Great Powers as for the rebels who challenged his despotic rule. In the summer of 1903 Lord Lans-

Castro at
Bay

downe's patience was exhausted, and the Government, convinced that he would yield to force alone, decided on a blockade. As Germany had similar grievances and similar claims, her co-operation was officially invited, and the Governments undertook to support each other's demands. When Castro continued to turn a deaf ear to remonstrance and menace, an ultimatum was presented on December 7, the warships at La Guayra were seized, and the coast blockaded. After a brief resistance the President proposed the submission of a portion of the claims to arbitration, and the dispute was referred to the Hague tribunal. Though the Governments co-operated harmoniously, their association was viewed by large sections of British opinion with profound distaste, and Ministers found it prudent to minimize their commitments. The unfriendliness was noted in Germany with surprise and resentment. "We have acted in full agreement and perfect loyalty," declared Bülow in the Reichstag on January 19, 1903. "All the more curious is the hostility of a portion of the British Press, which is only explicable by a certain embitterment resulting from the violent attacks of the continental Press during the Boer war. I am glad to say that no change has occurred in the relations between the monarchs and the Cabinets, who meet in the old friendly manner."

The Venezuelan adventure was scarcely concluded when the British Cabinet was confronted with a problem of far greater importance to Anglo-German relations.¹

¹ A semi-official account of the Bagdad Railway negotiations, from the beginning till 1914, is given in the *Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1917.

In 1902 the Bagdad Railway Company received a concession to build a line from Konia to the Gulf, with a kilometric guarantee; but as the security was not specified and no terminus was selected, the document was little more than a draft. The final convention was signed on

**The Bagdad
Concession**

March 5, 1903, extending the railway from Konia to Basra, via Adana, Mosul and Bagdad, with branches to Aleppo, Urfa, Khanikin and other cities north and south of the trunk line. The concession included conditional permission to work all minerals within twenty kilometres each side of the railway, to construct ports at Bagdad and Basra, and to navigate the rivers in the service of the railway. It was a princely gift, and it required British good will to turn it to full account. Chamberlain had remarked to the Kaiser during his visit in 1899 that he would like to see Great Britain co-operating with German enterprise in Hither Asia. But while French financiers took shares, German efforts to secure British assistance were unavailing; and Georg von Siemens, the founder and director of the Deutsche Bank, who journeyed to London in 1901, received no encouragement from the Foreign Office.

Shortly after the signature of the Convention of March 5, rumours began to spread that British co-operation was contemplated if not actually assured; and on April 8 the Prime Minister announced that the matter was under consideration. Germany had suggested that British capital and control should be equal to that of any other Power, and that Great Britain should sanction the increase of the Turkish customs; that the Indian mails should be carried by the railway, and that Great Britain should employ her good offices to secure a terminus at or near Koweit. Whether or not we co-operated, he argued, the railway would be built. German and French financiers were in agreement, and we had to consider whether it was desirable that the shortest route to India should be entirely in foreign hands; whether the terminus should be at Koweit, in our

own sphere of influence; and finally whether British trade would benefit if British capital were represented. "I think that this great international artery," he concluded, "should be in the hands of three Powers rather than of two or one. It is to our interest that countries which we cannot absorb should not be absorbed by others." This announcement, which clearly indicated the leanings of the Prime Minister, stimulated the campaign against co-operation; and on April 23 he informed the House that the invitation had been declined. The Cabinet had desired the whole line, including the portion already constructed, to be international, with equal rates, equal powers of control, construction and management for Germany, Great Britain and France. The German proposals did not offer sufficient security for these principles, and we were therefore unable to meet their wishes. The decision was greeted by Unionist opinion with relief as an escape from the embrace of a Power whose ambitions were beginning to excite apprehension; but it was regretted by champions of an Anglo-German understanding as a needless widening of the gulf that was beginning to yawn between the two peoples.

The Bagdad discussions were quickly followed by the revival of an unsettled controversy. The grant by Canada in 1897 of a preference of $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. on imports from the Mother Country had **Canadian Preference** led to formal protests from Belgium and Germany against the breach of the most-favoured-nation treatment secured to them respectively by the Treaties of 1862 and 1865. Salisbury replied by giving the year's notice required to terminate the Treaties, and suggested a new agreement, allowing the self-governing colonies to make their own arrangements for inter-Imperial trade. According to German law the general or higher tariff automatically came into force on the termination of a commercial treaty; but in 1898 the German Government, in order to afford time for negotiations, continued for a year most-favoured-nation treatment to every part of the

British Empire except Canada.¹ This provisional arrangement was renewed in 1899, 1900 and 1901, the law of the latter year prolonging the provisorium till the end of 1903. On March 18, 1903, Lord Lansdowne inquired what action Germany intended to take after December 31. Baron Richthofen, the Foreign Secretary, replied that he hoped to prolong most-favoured-nation treatment to Great Britain, but that if Germany were differentiated against in important parts of the Empire, and if, in particular, South Africa followed the example of Canada, he was doubtful if public opinion would sanction it. Sir Frank Lascelles rejoined that a tariff war would inflict incalculable injury on both countries, adding the friendly warning that if any serious damage were done to British trade by cancelling most-favoured-nation treatment, the Government would be compelled to retaliate. At this point a new factor was introduced by the insertion of a clause in the Canadian tariff imposing a surtax of ten per cent. on the goods of any country which discriminated against imports from Canada. In explaining this decision to the German Government Lord Lansdowne pointed out that it was only taken after the failure of every effort to secure fair treatment of Canadian produce, and would be revoked if Germany restored most-favoured-nation terms. Since the British market was too valuable to risk for considerations of logic or pride, and since German trade with Canada continued to increase despite the preference to the Mother Country, no more was heard of retaliation. The controversy, nevertheless, had added to the store of ill-will which was steadily accumulating between the two countries, and which was driving the controllers of British policy in the direction of France.

¹ "Correspondence with the Governments of Belgium and Germany," 1903. Cd. 1630.

CHAPTER X

THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE

I

WHILE the relations between Great Britain and Germany were drifting from bad to worse, warmer airs began to blow between Great Britain and France.¹ The idea of a *rapprochement* was born on the day of Delcassé's appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs in June, 1898. Though originally Anglophobe, like all prominent statesmen except Clemenceau, he informed the first visitor at the Quai d'Orsay of his intention to restore cordial relations. The decision to evacuate Fashoda cleared the ground for a new orientation, which would facilitate colonial expansion without abandoning the hope of revising the Treaty of Frankfurt; but to the soreness created by Fashoda and the Dreyfus case a new and powerful irritant was added by the Boer The Boer
War war. The pioneers of reconciliation, however, abated neither hope nor effort. Work of enduring importance was accomplished by Sir Thomas Barclay, to whom it occurred that it would be of service if the British Chambers of Commerce were invited to meet in the French capital in 1900, the year of his Presidency of the Chamber in Paris. Salisbury saw no objection, and Delcassé approved. The meeting was a great success, and English visitors flocked to the Exhibition.

¹ See G. H. Stuart, "French Foreign Policy, 1898-1914"; Reynald, "La Diplomatie Française, l'Œuvre de Delcassé"; Millet, "Notre Politique Extérieure, 1898-1905"; Tardieu, "La France et les Alliances"; Mévil, "De la Paix de Francfort à la Conférence d'Algéciras"; Pinon, "France et Allemagne."

Though Kruger's visit took place shortly after, the seed had been sown, and the gross caricatures of Queen Victoria disappeared. No real advance was possible during the Boer war; but the accession of King Edward and the resignation of Salisbury inaugurated a new era.

In the spring of 1903 the King visited Paris for the first time for more than three years. "The visit was his

King
Edward's
Visit

own idea," testifies Paul Cambon.¹ "I informed my Government, and Lord Monson was not a little astonished by an inquiry from the Quai d'Orsay as to how the King would wish to be received. He telegraphed to the King, who answered that he desired his reception to be as official as possible, and that the more honours that were paid to him the better." "When the cavalry descended the Champs-Élysées," writes Tardieu, an eye-witness, "embarrassment and uncertainty weighed on the public. The Nationalists had announced their intention of hooting, but the King, who had not thought of the danger of a hostile demonstration, won the day. The population gave him a reception not indeed enthusiastic, but at first respectful and soon sympathetic. The path was open."

The speech which won the heart of France struck a personal note rare in royal utterances. "It is scarcely necessary to tell you with what sincere pleasure I find myself once more in Paris, to which, as you know, I have paid very frequent visits with ever-increasing pleasure, and for which I feel an attachment fortified by so many happy and ineffaceable memories. The days of hostility between the two countries are, I am certain, happily at an end. I know of no two countries whose prosperity is more interdependent. There may have been misunderstandings and causes of dissension in the past, but that is all happily over and forgotten. The friendship of the two countries is my constant preoccupation, and I count on you all who enjoy French hospitality in

¹ Interview in *The Times*, Dec. 22, 1920. The King's travels are recorded by J. A. Farrer, "England under Edward VII."

their magnificent city to aid me to reach this goal." The royal visitor was entertained at a State banquet at the Elysée, and accompanied the President to a military review at Vincennes and to the races at Longchamp. The visit terminated the acute estrangement of the two countries which dated from the Fashoda crisis.

Three months later President Loubet returned the King's visit, and was lodged at St. James's Palace. "I hope," declared the royal host, with a warmth unusual on such occasions, "that the welcome Loubet in
London you have received to-day has convinced you of the true friendship, indeed I will say the affection, which my country feels for France." The toast of the Lord Mayor at the Guildhall was no less cordial. The visit was a spectacular success, and the King, in reply to the President's farewell message, telegraphed: "It is my most ardent wish that the *rapprochement* between the two countries may be lasting." The next step was a convention by which "differences of a juridical order, particularly those relating to difficulties of interpretation of existing conventions, shall—provided they affect neither the vital interests nor the honour of the contracting Powers and cannot be solved through diplomatic channels—be submitted to the permanent Court of Arbitration in accordance with Article 16 of the Hague Convention." "The Convention," wrote Paul Cambon to Sir Thomas Barclay, to whom it was mainly due, "will cut short a quantity of daily difficulties and incidents of which one can never foresee the outcome." ¹

Delcassé had accompanied President Loubet to London, where he discussed the new situation with Lord Lansdowne. The conversations thus inaugurated lasted eight months, and success was rendered possible by the very magnitude of the field of controversy. At the end of the year Lamsdorff brought to Paris an autograph letter from the Tsar expressing satisfaction at the *rapprochement*

¹ Barclay's "Anglo-French Reminiscences" give an excellent account of the transition from hostility to friendship.

between his ally and Great Britain. "The immediate origin of the entente," records Lord Cromer, "is to be found mainly in the local situation in Egypt. Egyptian finance was then in a flourishing condition; but owing to the international fetters imposed in circumstances which had wholly ceased to exist, the country was unable to derive any real profit from the surplus funds.

**Egypt and
Morocco**

The position had, in fact, become intolerable." France was no less eager to clear her path in Morocco. From the death in 1727 of Muley Ismail, the Louis XIV of Morocco, the country had known little of order or security, and the conquest of Algeria gave France a neighbour's interest in its tranquillity. The frontier was roughly fixed by treaty in 1845, and in 1877 Muley Hassan petitioned for a permanent military mission to aid the reorganization of the country. In 1880 the Powers met in conference at Madrid, when Bismarck informed the French Government that Germany had no interests in Morocco, and that the German delegate would model his attitude on that of France. The practice of extending consular protection to natives, which gave a pretext for interference, was limited, and all the signatory Powers obtained most-favoured-nation treatment.

The occupation of Tunis on the east and Gambia on the south made many Frenchmen desire to round off their West African dominions by incorporation of the whole or part of Morocco, and the surrender of Fashoda created the demand for a substitute. In 1900 Abdul Aziz, who had succeeded his father, Muley Hassan, in 1894, at the age of thirteen, took over the reins of government; but though the young ruler was intelligent and attractive, his passions for bicycles and motor-cars, fireworks and photography, and countless other temptations of European civilization, emptied the Treasury and disgusted his conservative subjects. The uncertain Algerian frontier and the savagery of the tribes led to continual friction, and the French authorities, military and civil, uttered loud com-

plaints.¹ A Moorish Mission which visited London at King Edward's accession was warned by Lord Lansdowne that France would have to defend her interests if the Sultan could not keep order; and the Mission, on visiting Berlin, found no encouragement. On July 20, 1901, a convention was signed with the French Government revising the Treaty of **France and Morocco** 1845, and associating the two Governments in measures for policing the frontier. A Franco-Moorish commission was appointed to carry out its provisions, and Delcassé informed the Sultan that it would depend upon him to keep France mindful of his sovereignty. A second Convention was signed at Algiers, under which France supplied a few instructors for Moroccan troops to keep order on the frontier, while a French bank advanced a small loan. Despite this aid a revolt against the Sultan broke out and continued throughout 1903. Pacific penetration, however, required to be supplemented by the good will of possible competitors. In 1900 Delcassé secured the benevolent neutrality of Italy by the recognition of her claims to Tripoli. He next turned to Spain, offering a partition if the *status quo* should prove impracticable; and on November 10, 1902, it was agreed that Spain should have the reversion of the north, including Tangier and Fez, while her sphere of influence in the south should be extended. When the Treaty was ready the Sagasta Cabinet fell, and Silvela, fearing the British frown, declined to sign; whereupon Delcassé, changing his course, approached Great Britain.²

If Egypt and Morocco thus provided the elements of a bargain, the principle of barter might prove equally fruitful in other parts of the world. Great Britain was anxious to sweep away the grievance of the "French shore" of

¹ See the *Livre Jaune*, "Affaires du Maroc, 1901-5."

² "It was good—too good," remarked Silvela. "Could we accept it without England's permission?"—See R. Millet, "Notre Politique Extérieure, 1898-1905," ch. 14. Pinon "France et Allemagne," 286-91, prints the Franco-Spanish Treaty; cf. Maura, "La Question du Maroc au Point de vue Espagnol."

Newfoundland, and France entertained some minor ambitions in West Africa which it was in our power to satisfy. The other differences presented less difficulty, and the outbreak of the Japanese war emphasized the need of a settlement. The most important of the agreements signed on April 8, which collectively form the Treaty of

**Egypt and
Morocco**

1904, was the Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco. Great Britain declared that she had no intention of altering the political status of Egypt, and France undertook not to obstruct our action by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other way. France, in turn, declared that she had no intention of altering the political status of Morocco, and Great Britain promised not to obstruct her action in that country. In both countries commercial liberty was to prevail for at least thirty years. No fortifications were to be permitted on the Moroccan coast opposite Gibraltar. France was to come to an understanding with Spain in regard to Morocco, and the contracting parties agreed to afford one another diplomatic support in carrying out the Declaration. A Khedivial Decree, annexed to the Declaration, laid down regulations relating to the Egyptian debt, and gave the Egyptian Government a free hand in the disposal of its own resources so long as the punctual payment of interest on the debt was assured. The Caisse de la Dette remained, but the surplus of 5½ millions in its possession was to be transferred to the Government. Financial liberty for Egypt was balanced by the settlement of the juridical position of the Suez Canal in time of war in accordance with the wishes of France.

The settlement of the Newfoundland fishery dispute was the second outstanding achievement of 1904. The controversy dated from the Treaty of Utrecht, which, while recognizing that the island should thenceforth belong to Great Britain, gave to the French "the right to catch and dry fish" on part of the coast henceforth known as the French shore. The interpretation of this Treaty and its

successors gave rise to endless disputes and dangerous friction. France now renounced her privileges under the Treaty of Utrecht and its successors, and retained the right of catching all kinds of fish in territorial waters on the French shore during the fishing season. French fishermen might enter any harbour on the French shore and obtain bait or shelter on the same conditions as the inhabitants, but subject to the regulations for the improvement of the fisheries. Compensation was to be paid to the fishermen obliged to abandon their establishments on the French shore. Thus the main cause of friction, the right of landing on the French shore, was at length removed. The surrender of the privilege was balanced by three concessions in West Africa. The frontier fixed in 1898 between the British colony of the Gambia and Senegambia was slightly modified in order to give France access to the navigable portion of the river; the Los Islands, commanding Konakry, the capital of French Guinea, were ceded; and the 1898 boundary between British and French Nigeria, which compelled French convoys from the Niger to Lake Chad to follow a circuitous and waterless route or to pass through British territory, was modified. France thus obtained 14,000 square miles and uninterrupted access from her territories on the Niger to those on Lake Chad. A third document contained a Declaration concerning Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides. In the former the two Powers confirmed the agreement of 1896, in which they undertook to refrain from armed intervention or the acquisition of special privileges in the basin of the Menam. France now recognized that all Siamese possessions on the west of this neutral zone and of the Gulf of Siam, including the Malay Peninsula and the adjacent islands, should come under British influence, while Great Britain recognized all Siamese territory on the east and south-east of the zone as henceforth under French influence. As regards Madagascar the British Government abandoned the protest which had been maintained since 1896 against

Newfound-
land
Fisheries

the tariff introduced after the annexation of the island. The difficulties in the New Hebrides arising from disputes as to land title and the absence of jurisdiction over the natives were to be referred to a commission, the scope and procedure of which were to be determined by a special agreement.¹

At the close of his covering dispatch Lord Lansdowne argued that, desirable as were the agreements on their intrinsic merits, they should be regarded not merely as a series of separate transactions, but as forming part of a comprehensive scheme for the improvement of the relations of the two countries. The antipathies and suspicions of the past had given place to friendship. "And it may perhaps be permitted to the Government to hope that, in thus basing the composition of long-standing differences upon mutual concessions, and in the frank recognition of each other's legitimate wants and aspirations, they may have afforded a precedent which will contribute something to the maintenance of international good will and the preservation of the general peace." The other Powers subsequently adhered to the Khedivial decree, and "the Egyptian Question" ceased to be an international problem. The Treaties were received in England with a chorus of praise, broken only by a shrill protest from Lord Rosebery.

The French Yellow Book, issued on May 26, explained our partner's view of the bargain. Both Governments, declared Delcassé, recognized that great moral and material interests demanded an amicable settlement. In Newfoundland France had only abandoned privileges which were difficult to maintain and in no way necessary, while the essential right of fishing in territorial waters was preserved and the right of fishing for and purchasing bait along the whole extent of the French shore was explicitly recognized. In West Africa the British concessions were of considerable importance. The Niger-Chad frontier had been im-

¹ The New Hebrides Convention, establishing an Anglo-French condominium, was signed in 1906.

proved, and the keys of Konakry were now in French hands. "Under our influence Morocco would be a source of strength for our North African Empire. If subject to a foreign Power, our North African possessions would be permanently menaced and paralysed. The moment had arrived to decide who was to exercise preponderant influence in Morocco. Delcasse's
Satisfaction

The present state can only last on condition that it is sustained and improved. On the importance of securing from England the promise not to hamper us it is superfluous to insist. We should complete our work of civilization, thus showing ourselves the best friends of Morocco, since we are the nation most interested in her prosperity. This will greatly strengthen French power without prejudice to acquired rights, and will ultimately benefit everybody." The sacrifice in Egypt was small. No change was to be made in the political status; all necessary guarantees for French financial interests had been obtained. He noted with special pleasure our adhesion to the execution of the Suez Canal Convention of 1888.

The reconciliation of Great Britain and France had been preceded by the reconciliation of France and Italy. After the Anglo-French Convention of March, 1899, delimiting spheres of influence in North Africa, the Italian Government asked for and received explanations from Paris; and the Foreign Minister, Visconti Venosta, the last survivor of the school of Cavour, suggested that these assurances should be reiterated in a more explicit manner.¹ On December 14, 1900, accordingly, Barrère informed the Foreign Minister, "in view of the friendly relations which have been established between France and Italy, and in the belief that this explanation will conduce further to improve them," that the Convention of March, 1899, left the vilayet of Tripoli outside the partition of influence which it sanctioned, and that France had no intention of

¹ The dispatches and agreements were published in a *Livre Jaune*, 1919, and are reprinted in Pribram, II, 226-57; *c/.* R. Pinon, "L'Empire de la Méditerranée."

interrupting caravan communications. Visconti Venosta replied that French action in Morocco aimed at the exercise and safeguarding of the rights resulting from its proximity to her empire; that such action would not prejudice the interests of Italy as a Mediterranean Power; and that, in the event of a modification of the political or territorial status of Morocco, Italy would reserve the right to develop her influence in Tripoli.

The quarrel of twenty years was thus healed in the usual manner by the recognition of spheres of influence in other peoples' property. The text was naturally kept secret, for Tripoli was a Turkish province; but the *rapprochement* was advertised to the world by the visit of an Italian squadron to Toulon in the spring of 1901. The renewal of the Triple Alliance was due in 1902, and the negotiations of Rome with Vienna and Berlin were accompanied by discussions between Italy and France. In March, 1902, Prinetti, the Foreign Minister, explained to Barrère that the text of the Treaty could hardly be modified, but that assurances could be given which would remove French apprehensions. At an interview with Bülow at Venice shortly after their conversation, Prinetti vainly attempted to secure the modification of the text; but it would have been impossible to reveal the amended text to France, who for that reason preferred a direct arrangement. Without waiting for the conclusion of his negotiations with Barrère, Prinetti sent a telegram to Paris, dated June 4, 1902. "In the renewal of the Triple Alliance there is nothing directly or indirectly aggressive towards France, no engagement binding us in any eventuality to take part in an aggression against her, no stipulation which menaces her security and tranquillity. The protocols or additional conventions to the Triple Alliance, of which there has been much talk of late, which would alter its defensive character, and would even have an aggressive character against France, do not exist." On receiving this momentous communication, the substance of which

was shortly announced to the Chamber and the parties, Delcassé expressed to the Italian Ambassador "the deepest gratitude of the French Government for their highly loyal proof of the policy of peace." Delcassé's announcement seemed to the Central Powers to suggest subterranean intrigues; but it in no way contravened the letter of the Triple Alliance, which had never pledged Italy to co-operate in an attack on France. The German Chancellor, according to his wont, poured oil on the troubled waters, wittily observing that in a happy marriage the husband did not mind his wife indulging in an innocent extra dance. On June 28 the Triple Alliance was renewed. But henceforth Italy had one foot in each camp, and the new orientation was to determine her attitude at the Conference of Algeiras and on even more important occasions. Count Monts, the German Ambassador in Rome, prophetically reported that Italy was an untrustworthy ally, who in a Franco-German collision would fail to keep tryst.

After Prinetti's declaration of principle, the discussion of a detailed formula was begun and the results were recorded in an exchange of letters between the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador, dated November 1. Each undertook to maintain neutrality not only in a case of direct or indirect aggression, but also if the other, "as the result of a direct provocation, should find itself compelled, in defence of its honour or security, to take the initiative of a declaration of war." In that eventuality each would previously communicate its intentions to the other, which would thus be enabled to determine whether direct provocation existed. Each further assured the other that no military obligation in disagreement with this declaration existed or would be contracted. The agreement remained a secret; but the visit of President Loubet to Victor Emmanuel in 1904—the first visit of the head of a Catholic State since the downfall of the Temporal Power—announced to the world the termination of the feud between the Latin sisters.

Loubet
visits
Rome

II

After receiving the blessing of Great Britain on her work in Morocco, France turned to the task of reform with new zeal.¹ Delcassé instructed the French Minister to declare that the French presented themselves at Fez as friends. Far from diminishing the Sultan's prestige, they wished to increase it. In communicating the message the Minister added: "I am certain that you recognize the pressing necessity of reforms, which will increase the authority of the Government and in which France will help you." To assist these reforms France advanced in June twenty-two million francs guaranteed on the customs, and the news was at once telegraphed to all the Powers. The kidnapping of Perdicaris, an American citizen, by Raisuli at the same moment facilitated "peaceful penetration" by revealing the need of a strong hand. At the close of the year the French Government resolved to present a complete scheme of reforms to the Sultan, and on December 15 Delcassé drew up his instructions for Saint-René Taillandier, who was selected for the mission to Fez. A strong Morocco, argued the Foreign Minister, could only be secured by the close union and confidence of the two Governments. France had shown her helpfulness by the loan and by providing officers to reorganize the garrisons. The first need was the restoration of order, and French officers would therefore aid in the training of police. Roads and telegraphs were also required and a State bank would be useful. On reaching Fez in February, 1905, the envoy reported the Sultan as saying that while most of the suggested reforms were practicable, some were very difficult to accept and must be discussed with the Maghzen.

**Mission
to Fez**

¹ See the *Livre Jaune*, "Affaires du Maroc, 1901-5"; the German *Weissbuch* on Morocco, 1906; Morel, "Morocco in Diplomacy"; Hammann, "Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," chs. 7-8; Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," II.

The discussions commenced; but before they were concluded a third party roughly intervened.

The attitude of official Germany towards the Anglo-French Treaty had at first been friendly. At Delcassé's reception on March 23, 1904, Prince Radolin asked if he might put "an indiscreet question." Was it true that an agreement had been signed or was on the point of being signed between France and England? "Neither one nor the other," replied the Foreign Secretary; "but we have been conversing for some time with the London Cabinet with a view to the friendly settlement of the questions which interest our two countries. An understanding has been recognized to be possible, and will probably be reached." "Newfoundland is said to be in question?" "We have spoken of it." "And Morocco?" "Also. But you know our point of view on that subject. We wish to maintain the political and territorial *status quo*; but if it is to last it must be improved. Last year repeated aggressions offered us legitimate reasons for intervention. I resisted, but each time with greater difficulty. We have had to reinforce and increase our troops at considerable expense. The Sultan has experienced the value of our aid. It must be continued; but it will be given in such a way that everyone will derive advantage, since security is essential for commerce. Needless to add, commercial liberty will be strictly respected." "And Spain?" "We shall respect her interests and legitimate aspirations." Prince Radolin, added the Foreign Minister in reporting the conversation, "found my declarations very natural and perfectly reasonable." On April 18, after signing the Treaty, Delcassé instructed the French Ambassador to inform the Wilhelmstrasse that Lord Lansdowne and himself had been concerned exclusively with the interests of their own countries, without detriment to those of any other Power. He did not think it necessary to present a copy of the Treaty, since it was known to all the world.

Official comment was favourable. "German com-

mercial interests are in no danger," wrote the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, "and greater stability would benefit us all." The French Ambassador reported that the principal organs recognized that German commercial interests had nothing to fear. There was nothing to complain of, wrote Professor Schiemann, if French policy did not deviate from pacific penetration, and if the open door were maintained. "We have no cause to imagine that the Treaty has a point against any other Power," echoed the Chancellor. "It seems to be an attempt to remove a number of differences by peaceful methods. We have nothing, from the standpoint of German interests, to object to in that. As to Morocco, the kernel of the Treaty, we are interested in the economic aspect. We have commercial interests, which we must and shall protect. We have,

**Pan-German
Discontent**

however, no ground to fear that they will be overlooked or infringed." Two days later, in closing the debate, the Chancellor denounced the Pan-German. "Reventlow said that the Treaty, above all the Moroccan clauses, had been received in Germany with shame and consternation, since we ought not to allow other Powers more influence there than ourselves. That can only mean that we should demand a slice of Morocco. If it is refused, are we to fight? He is silent." It was natural that the Pan-German should grumble at the Chancellor's self-effacement. "Morocco is a German concern," wrote the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* on April 11, "owing to our increasing population and our need of naval bases. If Germany does not peg out claims, she will retire empty-handed from the partition of the world. Is the German Michael to get nothing? The time has come when Germany must secure Morocco from the Atlas to the sea." The Pan-German annual Congress on June 3 pronounced Germany to be humiliated and demanded the Atlantic coast; but the Kaiser informed King Edward on his visit to Kiel that Morocco had never interested him.¹

¹ Eckardstein, "Erinnerungen," III, 88.

The dispatch of the French envoy to Fez with a comprehensive programme of reforms in his portmanteau was the signal for a change of front at Berlin. On January 4, 1905, when it was rumoured that a Moorish mission would visit Berlin, the German Minister at Madrid remarked to the French Chargé that a mission to protest against the Franco-Spanish agreements would be well received, and on February 11 the French Chargé at Tangier reported to Delcassé an ominous communication from his German colleague. "After the Anglo-French arrangement of 1904," observed Kühlmann, "we **Kühlmann's Declaration** supposed the French Government was waiting for the Franco-Spanish agreement before putting us in possession of the new situation. But now that everything is settled, we see that we have been systematically kept aloof. The Chancellor tells me that the German Government was ignorant of all the agreements concerning Morocco, and does not acknowledge himself to be bound by them in any way." Delcassé instructed his Ambassador at Berlin to complain of this language, and to remind the Government that he had answered Prince Radolin's inquiries on March 23, 1904; that, except Russia, Germany alone was informed before the Treaty was signed; that no request for explanations had been made; and that the Ambassador at Berlin had informed the Government of the Franco-Spanish Treaty before it was published. The Under-Secretary who received the complaint replied that he knew nothing of Kühlmann's declaration, but added that Germany was not bound by the Anglo-French or the Franco-Spanish Treaties.

After the dispatch of the French mission to Fez, Holstein suggested that the Kaiser should visit Tangier, and the Chancellor approved the plan.¹ Germany demanded commercial equality and the independence of the Sultan, wrote the French Ambassador on March 22 in reporting on the new situation. A written declaration

¹ Hammann, "Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," ch. 8.

as to the effect of the Franco-British and Franco-Spanish accords on Germany's commercial interests might be useful, for France was now under the menace of a disagreeable surprise. His apprehensions were increased by a warning in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* that the French negotiations at Fez did not square with the avowed policy of maintaining the *status quo*. The object

**Bülow on
Morocco**

of the coming demonstration was explained by the Chancellor in the Reichstag on March 29. "A year ago the Kaiser told the King of Spain that Germany does not strive for territory in Morocco. It is therefore useless to attribute to the Tangier visit any selfish purposes directed against its integrity or independence. No one who does not pursue an aggressive goal can find cause for apprehension. We have economic interests, and in Morocco, as in China, it is our interest to keep the open door." The Kaiser's sentiments were expressed in a message to President Roosevelt on March 6 asking him to join in urging the Sultan to reform his Government, and promising in that event that they would support him against any nation which sought exclusive control. France and Spain, he argued, were a political unity, who wished to divide up Morocco and close her markets to the world; and if Spain occupied Tangier and France the hinterland they would dominate the roads to the Near and Far East. The President declined to interfere as American interests were too small; but he expressed his friendliness to Germany and his belief that her policy was pacific.

On March 31 the Kaiser, who had reluctantly yielded to Bülow's desire for a political demonstration,¹ landed from his yacht at Tangier and addressed the German Colony. "I am happy to salute the devoted pioneers of German industry and commerce who aid me in my task of maintaining the interests of the Fatherland in a free

¹ See the Kaiser's "Memoirs," ch. 4, and Schön, "Memoirs of an Ambassador," 19-24. Spickernagel says that the Kaiser improvised the speeches.—"Fürst Bülow," 65.

country. The Empire has great and growing interests in Morocco. Commerce can only progress if all the Powers are considered to have equal rights under the sovereignty of the Sultan and respect the independence of the country. My visit is the recognition of this independence." The theme was developed in a speech to the Sultan's uncle and plenipotentiary. "My visit is to show my resolve to do all in my power to safeguard German interests in Morocco. Considering the Sultan as absolutely free, I wish to discuss with him the means to secure these interests. As for the reforms which the Sultan contemplates, it seems to me that he should proceed with great caution and consider the religious sentiments of the people, so that public order is not troubled." To this version, communicated by Kühlmann, the text forwarded by the French Chargé added two introductory sentences. "It is to the Sultan in his capacity of independent sovereign that I pay my visit to-day. I hope that under his sovereignty a free Morocco will remain open to the peaceful competition of all nations, without monopoly or annexation, on a policy of absolute equality." The reason for this dramatic change commonly given at the time in France and Great Britain was that the Kaiser took advantage of the collapse of Russia in the Far East to coerce her ally. The motive was frankly avowed by the Pan-German Press, but it was not the main ground of the action of the Government. The French Press spoke openly of making a second Tunis, and Germany believed that unless she called a halt Morocco would be swallowed up before her eyes. Moreover, the apprehensions aroused by the mission to Fez were confirmed by the existence of secret treaties.

A treaty had been signed by Lord Lansdowne and Paul Cambon on April 8, 1904, at the same time as the documents published to the world. If either Government found itself compelled by the force of circumstances to modify its policy in regard to Egypt or Morocco, the

engagements relating to commercial liberty, the free passage of the Suez Canal and the prohibitions of fortifications on the Straits of Gibraltar would remain. Each Government promised not to oppose the other if it desired to abolish the Capitulations. The third

**The Secret
Treaties**

article contained the kernel of the agreement. The Mediterranean coast from Melilla to the Sebu river, whenever the Sultan ceased to exercise authority over it, should come within the sphere of influence of Spain and be administered by her, she, on her part, pledging herself to commercial liberty, and to abstain from fortifying the Straits or from alienating any part of the territory. When Spain adhered to the Anglo-French declaration in the following September, and declared herself "firmly attached to the integrity of the Moorish Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan," a similar Convention was signed which frankly contemplated partition. The two treaties were not published till 1911; but since they were known to a number of persons in London, Paris and Madrid, and communicated to Petrograd, their provisions were quickly known at Berlin.¹ Germany's case was that, if she did not act, she would one day wake up to find Morocco closed to her commerce.

The fundamental error was that Delcassé had not purchased Germany's assent in advance. The good will of Italy had been bought by recognition of her claims to Tripoli, that of Great Britain by assent to her position in Egypt, that of Spain by the hypothetical reversion of the northern littoral. "By incredible blindness," wrote René Millet,² "the Government took precautions with everybody except the only one of its neighbours whom it had serious cause to fear." Despite the provocation to which it was a reply, the Tangier demonstration was a no less colossal blunder, for its inevitable result was to turn a limited obligation into a general defensive under-

¹ Valentin, "Deutschlands Aussenpolitik," 54.

² "Notre Politique extérieure," 224.

standing. It was promptly announced that a British squadron would visit Brest in July, that a French squadron would return the visit at Portsmouth, and that King Edward would visit Paris in May on his way to join the Queen at Marseilles.

After the Tangier demonstration the Kaiser delivered a series of ominous speeches on his western frontier. "I hope peace will not be broken," he declared at Karlsruhe on April 27. "I hope the events now in progress will keep the attention of our nation awake and strengthen its courage. I hope we shall find ourselves united if it becomes necessary to intervene in world politics." Similar ominous phrases were employed at Mainz and Saarbrück. The Tangier warning was the first act of a drama of which the invitation to an inter-
Towards a
Conference
national conference was the second. On

April 11 the Chancellor, in a circular dispatch, defended his policy and suggested a new conference of the signatories of the Treaty of Madrid. The Morocco Treaty, he complained, was never communicated to the German Government by tongue or pen. Germany, however, did not move, as the Treaty recognized the *status quo*, and he therefore assumed that France would consult the Treaty Powers if she aimed at changes limiting their rights. "It was necessary to act when the Moroccan Government asked us if France was in truth the mandatory of the Powers, when we learned of parts of the programme, and when great papers pointed at Tunis as a model." A conference, he concluded, was the best solution, since Germany sought no privileges by separate agreement, and her interests were identical with those of other Powers.

The French Envoy had been busily engaged in discussions at Fez since February, and on April 11 he reported that the Sultan consented to his troops being organized on French models at Tangier, Rabat, Casablanca and Ujda. But the atmosphere rapidly changed when a German Envoy, Count Tattenbach, reached Fez

on May 13, and on May 28 Abdul Aziz rejected the French proposals. Though Delcassé argued that to submit to a conference was to ask the Sultan to put himself in tutelage and leave the path he had followed for years—a course he could not imagine possible—Abdul Aziz rejoined that he could only accept the French proposals if ratified by the Powers; and on May 30 he invited the signatories of the Treaty of 1880 to meet at Tangier.

Strengthened by the support of Great Britain and Russia, and by the assurance of Austria that she would side with the majority, Delcassé held out stubbornly against a conference. But his game appeared to his colleagues to be fraught with danger. Prince Henckel

**Germany's
Threats**

von Donnersmarck visited Paris, saw the Premier and some of his colleagues, and explained his mission in an interview with the *Gaulois*.¹ "You do not seem to suspect the gravity of the events which are in preparation, and I have crossed the frontier to enlighten you. The Emperor and the people are irritated to see the repulse of their efforts for relations of courtesy and a policy of isolating Germany. Is this the policy of France or the personal conception of Delcassé? If you think that your Foreign Minister has engaged your country in a too adventurous path, show it by separating yourselves from him, and above all by giving your foreign policy a new orientation. The Emperor does not wish for war, but if you are beaten you will be bled white." The air was thick with rumours of a German ultimatum and talk of the unpreparedness of the army. At the same moment it was announced that the Sultan had rejected the French proposals. It was the most dangerous moment in Franco-German relations since Boulanger. The decisive Cabinet was held on June 6. President Loubet remained faithful to the Foreign Minister, but all his colleagues were hostile. Delcassé argued that France could not go to a conference without humiliation, and asserted that two days ago he had re-

¹ Published after Delcassé's resignation.

ceived an offer from Great Britain, who would mobilize the fleet and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. The Premier replied that the acceptance of the British offer would mean war, and that the Conference must be held. His colleagues supported the Premier, and the Foreign Minister, after warning them that their pusillanimity would encourage German insolence, withdrew and resigned.¹

"The British offer," on the strength of which Delcassé was prepared to risk a war, existed only in his imagination, though the legend is still repeated by him and is to this day believed abroad. He asked for a promise of armed support, but failed to obtain it. Lord Lansdowne, however, explained both to the French and German Ambassadors that public opinion, which saw in the "theatrical" Tangier journey an unfriendly act against Great Britain as well as France, could not be expected to remain indifferent, and might demand intervention if France were attacked.² Such a warning against aggression was very different from a solemn undertaking to engage in hostilities. Delcassé's mistaken interpretation of the British official attitude was due to the *obiter dicta* of certain highly placed personages, who expressed their individual convictions.

On the fall of Delcassé the Prime Minister took over the Foreign Office, and on June 11 explained his policy to the German Ambassador. "I dislike a conference," he observed, "but if I accept there must be a preliminary understanding. Yet if that is secured a conference is needless. We have no interest in infringing the sovereignty or integrity of Morocco, but our common frontier of 1,200 kilometres makes us the party most concerned in law and order. You seem resolved to block

¹ The story was told by Stéphane Lauzanne in *Le Matin* in October, and is set forth in detail in Mévil, "De la Paix de Francfort à la Conférence d'Algéciras." This book is virtually Delcassé's apologia.

² Hammann, "Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," 135-6.

all our proposals, and we cannot accept a conference where that would happen. We must therefore first know how Germany regards reforms." Bülow's attitude was in part due to the urgent advice of Marschall in Constantinople, who was doing his best to win the sympathies of Islam, to support the Sultan of Morocco. The Chancellor accord-

The ingly replied that Germany could only
Chancellor's discuss the programme when France accepted
Warnings the Conference, which would enable Morocco to satisfy the just desires of France, who would thus obtain the sanction of Europe. The reorganization of the army and police would be by mandate—to France on the Algerian frontier, and in other parts, especially on the Atlantic, to other Powers. Financial reform would be international, and the Bank of Morocco would be supplied and controlled by the Powers. Without accepting or rejecting the Conference, Rouvier again explained his attitude to the Ambassador on June 21. "Our proposals to the Sultan are not what Germany believes. We have not tried to secure control of internal or external affairs, nor have we sought to introduce the Tunis regime. It never occurred to us to infringe Morocco's treaty obligations to German commerce. If our proposals are accepted all the Powers will benefit. We think a conference dangerous without previous agreement, and useless with it. But we do not definitely decline." It would indeed have been dangerous to do so, as the French Ambassador suggested after a conversation with the Chancellor. "He was very courteous, but emphasized the necessity not to let this *question mauvaise, très mauvaise*, drag on, and not to linger on a road *bordé de précipices et même d'abîmes*. His insistence on an immediate solution struck me deeply, and should influence your decisions. He added, however, that, if France accepted the Conference, German diplomacy would adopt an attitude which would satisfy us."

This menacing conversation was followed by a Note on the following day. Germany was glad to take note of French denials of a desire to control Morocco, all the

more because the Moorish Government itself interpreted the French proposals in a different sense. If France solved the problem alone, she would probably be compelled by the force of things to reach by degrees a position to which she said she did not aspire. The French proposals regarding the army and finance, which Morocco had communicated to Germany, would gravely impair her sovereignty, and would be in the interest of France rather than the other Powers. Such an exceptional position for a single Power was incompatible with Article 17 of the Treaty of Madrid, which gave every signatory most-favoured-nation treatment, a principle which, in German eyes, extended beyond the economic sphere. A conference was desirable not to minister to Germany's *amour-propre* or to defend the dignity of France, but to escape from a bad situation.

While the German Government was pressing France by arguments and threats, the Kaiser was imploring Roosevelt to join in the appeal.¹ "Rouvier, who has shown himself distinctly friendly to Germany," he wrote on June 11, "has indirectly informed the German Chargé that England has made a formal offer to France to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with England which would be directed against Germany. At present the leading statesmen of France are opposed to such an alliance, because they still hope to reach a satisfactory agreement with Germany. Indirectly Germany has been given to understand that the French Government desire to give her a portion of Morocco under the name of a sphere of interest, France taking the greater part for herself; but Germany cannot accept. My people are sure England would now back France by arms in a war against Germany, not on account of Morocco but of German policy in the Far East. The British Government has asked for time to consider the question of a conference. I feel sure you could now give a hint in London and Paris that you

**Roosevelt's
Mediation
Requested**

¹ See Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt," I.

would consider a conference the most satisfactory means to bring the Moroccan question to a peaceful solution. If not inclined, your influence could prevent England joining in a Franco-German war, started by the aggressive policy of France." "It looked like war," relates Roosevelt, "so I took active hold of the matter through Speck and Jusserand and got things temporarily straightened up. I showed France the great danger of a war, and the little use England could be, and that a conference would not sanction any unjust attack on French interests. I would not accept the invitation unless France was willing; but, if I did, I would, if necessary, take a strong ground against any attitude of Germany which seemed to me unjust and

unfair. At last France told me on June 23
Roosevelt as that she would agree." Now that the Presi-
Peacemaker dent had secured the French assent to a conference, he turned to the other party to the dispute. Nobody would understand or pardon a war for frivolous reasons, he observed to Speck. "I entreat the Kaiser to show himself satisfied with this genuine triumph. It would be most unfortunate now to raise questions about details." So skilfully did the President conduct his mediation that he earned the gratitude of both parties, and Mr. Root has expressed the opinion that his noiseless mediation in the Morocco crisis was of greater importance than his spectacular intervention between Russia and Japan.

On July 8 the French Premier and the German Ambassador exchanged a Declaration defining the conditions on which France accepted the Conference, and the German Ambassador formally declared that Germany did not contest the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904. "France, convinced that Germany will not pursue any aim which would compromise the legitimate interests of France or her rights resulting from her treaties, and in harmony with the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan, the integrity of the Empire, economic equality, the utility of police and financial reforms by international accord, the

recognition of the situation created by the Algerian frontier and the special interest of France in the maintenance of order, accepts the invitation." On July 12 the British Government also agreed to the Conference. On August 1 the Premier handed to the Ambassador a programme of reforms relating to the police, finance, and adjudication of public works, and on August 26 Radolin accepted the programme. Further discussion took place with Dr. Rosen, the German Minister at Tangier, who was sent to Paris. The Premier expressed his hope that, in Radolin's words, there would be *ni vainqueur ni vaincu*, and the accord signed by Rouvier and Radolin on September 28 seemed to realize this aspiration.¹ The organization of the police, except on the Algerian frontier, was to be international. A State bank was to supply credits for the police, the troops and public works. Morocco was not to alienate any public service to the profit of particular interests, and the principle of adjudication without distinction of nationality was to be adopted for public works. The Conference was to be held at Algeciras, and both missions were to leave Fez.

Preliminary
Agreement
Reached

On December 16 the Premier informed the Chamber that the Sultan had accepted the programme and the place of meeting, and spoke with satisfaction of the work that he had accomplished. France's frontier rights were recognized by Germany and excluded from the Conference, and he looked forward with confidence to the meeting at Algeciras.² Almost at the same moment the Chancellor described the situation to the Reichstag in a speech which made no attempt to conceal his anxieties. "The Triple

¹ The compromise was facilitated by a telegram from Rominten, where the Kaiser told Witte of the Pact of Björko, and Witte urged his host to conciliate France in Morocco.

² Caillaux declares, in his book "Agadir," that Rouvier twice vainly tried to settle the question by buying off Germany, first in November by offering Mogador and the hinterland, and secondly in December when Pollet, a naval officer, negotiated with Kühlmann, the First Secretary at Tangier. Both approaches were declined, as Germany wished for a satisfaction of principle and for the humiliation of France.

Alliance will maintain peace and the *status quo* in Europe. That was its origin, and that is its object. Yet Germany must be strong and in case of need maintain herself without Allies. In the Middle Ages the richest monasteries had the thickest walls." He proceeded

**Bülow's
Defence**

to an elaborate defence of his policy in Morocco, which he defined as the preservation of economic equality in an independent State. "German rights could not be cancelled by a Franco-English Treaty; for the Treaty of Madrid gave all the signatories most-favoured-nation treatment, and Germany had a legal right to be consulted in any change in Morocco. If it be said that our commercial interests are not enough to justify serious representations, I reply that it is not a trifle when treaty rights and prestige are involved. I greatly hoped that the adjustment between our rights and the Franco-English Treaty could have proceeded harmoniously, and I spoke in conciliatory terms, saying we had no reason to believe that it was pointed against us. My expectation that the other parties, before proceeding to carry out their plans in Morocco, would approach us was not fulfilled. Our moment came when France sent an envoy to Fez with a reform programme which would have made Morocco a second Tunis. This clearly injured our rights under the Treaty of 1880 and threatened our economic interests. If we silently surrender our economic rights in Morocco it would encourage the world to similar conduct in other and perhaps greater questions. The charge that we desire to attack France or to compel her to side with us against England is nonsense. I take full responsibility for the journey to Tangier, which Bebel calls the journey of provocation, but which was useful in bringing to general knowledge the international character of the question. *Cet animal est très méchant: quand on l'attaque, il se défend.*"

On the resignation of Mr. Balfour on December 4, Campbell-Bannerman formed a Liberal Ministry, and explained its policy at a meeting at the Albert Hall on

December 22.¹ The references to foreign affairs were brief but clear. "I wish emphatically to reaffirm my adhesion to the policy of the *Entente Cordiale*. Even more important than any actual amicable instrument is the real friendship between ^{Campbell-Bannerman's} Policy the two peoples, and one of the objects of our policy will be to maintain that spirit of friendship unimpaired. As regards Russia we have nothing but good feeling towards that great people. In the case of Germany also I see no cause whatever of estrangement in any of the interests of either people, and we welcome the unofficial demonstrations of friendship which have lately been passing between the two countries. With other European Powers our relations are most friendly. Our relations with Japan are sufficiently known to the world by the recent Treaty, and with the United States we are bound by the closest ties of race, tradition and fellowship. This is a most pleasing outlook, which I trust will not be marred by any events that can occur. Our general foreign policy will be opposed to aggression and to adventure, and will be animated by a desire to be on the best terms with all nationalities."

A few days after the new Prime Minister's reassuring survey, the Military Correspondent of the *Times* wrote an article on the hostility of Germany to France, ending with a warning to Berlin that a war might unchain animosities in unexpected quarters.² On the following day, December 28, Major Huguët, the French Military Attaché, in discussing the article, remarked that the French Embassy was worried because Sir Edward Grey had not renewed the assurances given by Lord Lansdowne.³ Colonel Repington reported the conversation to the Foreign Secretary, who was engaged in his constituency, and who replied that he had not receded from anything Lord Lansdowne had said.

¹ "Speeches," 179.

² Repington, "The First World War," I, ch. 1.

³ Haldane, "Before the War," 29-30.

The Ambassador, after returning from his holiday, informed Sir Edward on January 10 that the French Government considered the danger to be real, and asked whether Great Britain would think she had so much at stake as to be willing to join in resisting an unprovoked attack. If this were even a possible attitude, conversations would be desirable between the General Staffs as to the form of co-operation in the northern portion of France. The Foreign Secretary replied that he could

Sir Edward Grey promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the wholehearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose.¹ "I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France on the question of Morocco, public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France. I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador. I made no promise and I used no threats. That position was accepted by the French Government; but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, 'If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain, should a sudden crisis arise, justifies you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts.' There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose. I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted Lord

¹ Speech of Aug. 3, 1914.

Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith), who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorized that on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose." The military conversations began on January 17, and continued at intervals till 1914. Almost at the same moment the British Military Attaché at Brussels began similar, though unofficial, discussions with the Chief of the Belgian Staff.

The Conference of Algeciras, which was attended by twelve States in addition to Morocco, opened on January 16. The President, the Duc d'Almodovar, began by excluding from discussion the sovereignty of the Sultan, the integrity of Morocco, and commercial liberty as principles universally accepted. King Edward remarked to Cambon: "Tell us what you wish on each point, and we will support you without restriction or reserves."¹ The two main questions of the police and a State bank were reached early in February. France's demand for the police mandate and her revised offer to share it with Spain were rejected by Germany, who first proposed that the Sultan should select officers from the minor Powers, and later that she should choose from "foreign" nations. These suggestions were in turn rejected by France and Spain, and at the same moment discussions on the State bank reached a deadlock. A rupture was generally expected; but pacific influences were at work behind the scenes. In urging France to accept the Conference President Roosevelt had promised her fair play, and in the middle of February he intervened on her behalf in secret negotiations with the Kaiser.² He supported a Franco-Spanish mandate for the police, and when the Kaiser objected that it would place that arm entirely

The
Conference
Opens

¹ See the *Livre Jaune*, "Affaires du Maroc, Protocoles et Comptes Rendues de la Conférence d'Algéciras," and Tardieu, "La Conférence d'Algéciras."

² Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt," I, 489-505.

in their hands, Roosevelt pointed out that the mandatories would be responsible to all the Powers. At this moment Bülow began to realize that Holstein's policy was leading straight to war, and took the control out of his hands. A second mediatory influence came from Austria, who proposed that France should organize the police in four of the eight ports open to commerce, Spain in three and Switzerland or Holland in one. Roosevelt disapproved of the plan as suggesting partition, and a second Austrian proposal of a Franco-Spanish mandate under a Swiss Inspector-General was at last accepted at the end of March. The main difficulty having been overcome the delegates were anxious to be gone, and on April 7 the Act of Algeciras was signed.

From 2,000 to 2,500 police were to be distributed among the eight ports, and Spanish and French officers, with thirty to forty non-commissioned officers, were to act as instructors. The Swiss Inspector-General was to reside at Tangier.

Police and Bank
The State Bank of Morocco, with the exclusive privilege of issuing bank-notes, was to fulfil the functions of Treasurer and Paymaster of the Empire, to make advances to the Government up to a million francs, and to open credits for the police and public works. The capital was to be divided into as many equal parts as there were signatories, each Power having the right to subscribe. The total capital was to be fifteen to twenty million francs. In addition to the board of directors and a High Commissioner appointed by the Moroccan Government, four censors, nominated by the Banks of England, Germany, France and Spain, were to see that the intentions of the Act were carried out and to make an annual report. Public services were not to be alienated to private interests, and foreigners might acquire land and build in any part of the country. On the Algerian frontier France and Morocco were jointly to carry out the regulations of the Act concerning Customs and the traffic in arms, while Spain and Morocco were to execute them in the Riff

country. The final article declared all existing treaties, conventions, and arrangements between the signatory Powers and Morocco to remain in force; but in case their provisions were found to conflict with those of the Act, the stipulations of the latter were to prevail. The United States added a Declaration that in signing the Act and the Protocol it assumed no responsibility for its enforcement. The British delegate brought forward the question of limiting the importation and sale of alcoholic drinks, and the Conference, at his suggestion, referred the matter to the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, adding its sympathy with the proposals. Declarations expressing the hope that the Sultan would gradually abolish the system of slavery and prohibit the public sale of slaves, and that he would reform the administration of the prisons, were read to the Conference by Sir Arthur Nicolson and adopted by all the delegates except the Moroccan representatives, who complained that neither of the questions had been on the programme.¹

The Conference of Algeciras was a prolonged duel between France and Germany. The former was openly backed by Russia, Great Britain and Spain, while the United States supported her cause behind the scenes. Germany, on the other hand, though she championed the principle of international responsibility dictated by her interests, received scanty support from her friends, since Austria was determined not to quarrel with France, and Italy was fettered in advance by her secret arrangement respecting Morocco and Tripoli. It was, nevertheless, a drawn battle. While France obtained the all-important police mandate for herself and her partner, Germany established her contention that the problem was the concern of all the Powers. Both Governments professed their satisfaction. Bourgeois, the Foreign Minister, declared to the Chamber that the special rights and interests of France had been preserved by concessions which neither aban-

¹ See the White Book, "Morocco," No. 1, 1906.

doned the fruit of past efforts nor jeopardized the prospect of the future. In the crucial issue of the police he had accepted a neutral Inspector-General, who would merely watch the result of the service. He concluded with a tribute of gratitude to the unshakable firmness of Russia; "and England, our equally faithful friend, sustained our cause."

Algeciras, writes Reventlow, was a German defeat; and he sharply censures the Chancellor for threatening war without intending it.¹ The German **Encirclement** or **Insurance** Government, on the other hand, professed itself satisfied. The Kaiser telegraphed his thanks to Goluchowski, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, for his support at the Conference, where he had proved himself "a brilliant second on the duelling-ground," adding that he could count on a similar service in a similar case. The Chancellor welcomed the settlement as equally satisfactory for Germany and France and useful for all civilized countries. Germany had not desired to go to war on account of Morocco, for she had no direct political interests and no political aspirations; but to allow her treaty rights to be disposed of without her consent was a question of prestige. Though both sides pretended to be satisfied with the results of the wrestling match, the Conference proved no more than a breathing-space between the rounds; and its enduring result was to tighten the bonds between Great Britain and France, which the German plenipotentiary at Algeciras vainly pressed Sir Arthur Nicolson to loosen. Bülow had had a good hand but had played it badly. The process which Germans describe as encirclement, and Englishmen as insurance, had begun.²

¹ "Politische Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," 117-29; *cf.* the pungent criticism of Haller, "Die Aera Bülow," 15-30.

² The term "Einkreisungspolitik" was invented by Holstein.

CHAPTER XI

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE

WHILE British and French statesmen were joyfully burying the hatchet, the antagonism between Great Britain and France's ally remained. The Anglo-German Treaty of 1900 and the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 proclaimed from the housetops our suspicion of Russian aims in the Far East; and our responsibility for the defence of India led us to watch her activities in the Middle East with jealous eyes. A plan drawn up by Salisbury for adjusting relations throughout Asia was rejected at Petrograd. Her conterminous frontier and the weakness of Persia afforded her opportunities of exerting political and economic pressure; and in the closing years of the nineteenth century the rivalry of the two Powers at Teheran was unconcealed. The position was analysed by Lord Curzon's Apprehensions Lord Curzon in a lengthy dispatch dated September 21, 1899, in response to a request from the Cabinet for the views of the Government of India.¹ "Ever since the first visit of the late Shah to Europe Persia has been drawn increasingly into the vortex of European politics. She is one of those countries which must inevitably have attracted the attention of Europe, partly from increasing infirmity, but still more from the opportunities suggested by their latent though neglected sources of strength. Closely pressing upon Persia and Afghanistan is the ever-growing momentum of a Power whose interests in Asia are not always in accord with our own, while the Gulf is beginning to attract the interest of other and sometimes rival nations. For the present our

¹ Published as a White Paper in 1908.

ambitions are limited to prevent the interest we have built up from being undermined. We have no desire to disturb the political *status quo* as long as it can be maintained; but we press for an early decision and for early action since, unless we bestir ourselves, there is good reason for fearing that the already trembling balance may be disturbed to our disadvantage. The advance of Russia across the deserts that form the natural barrier between West and East Persia could not be regarded without uneasiness by the Government of India; for Russian pledges to respect the interests and independence of Persia are quite insufficient to save Persian or British interests from erosive agencies."

Even more vital to the safety of India and the prestige of the Empire was the maintenance of our position in the Persian Gulf, where the East India Company had opened a factory in 1763 and a Political Agent had resided since 1812.¹

The Persian Gulf We had rooted out the nests of pirates and destroyed their fleets, suppressed slavery, surveyed and buoyed the Gulf, and kept down plague. The racial chiefs referred their disputes to the Resident at Bushire, and had bound themselves to have no dealings with any other Power. We had a protectorate over Bahrein and preferential relations with Koweit. Despite our well-known interests, however, Russian emissaries—officers, "explorers," doctors "studying plague"—swarmed in the Gulf. The termination of the Boer war restored to Great Britain her freedom of action; and on May 15, 1903, Lord Lansdowne made the most momentous declaration of British policy since Sir Edward Grey's pronouncement in 1895. "Firstly, we should protect and promote British trade in the Gulf. Secondly, we should not exclude the legitimate trade of others. Thirdly, we should regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British

¹ See Lovat Fraser, "India under Lord Curzon," and Chirol, "The Middle Eastern Question."

interests, and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our disposal." The announcement, he added, was made in no minatory spirit, because he knew of no such proposal. This emphatic warning was reinforced by Lord Curzon's naval demonstration in the Gulf in November, 1903.¹ British prestige was enhanced by the journey, which proclaimed, not only to those who saw the squadron and heard the voice of the Viceroy but to listeners far away in Teheran, Petrograd and Berlin, the determination of Great Britain to defend her position in the Gulf from challenge or attack.

The struggle against Russian encroachments was waged not only in Manchuria and Persia but on the lofty plateaux of Tibet, where the priestly hierarchy which governs the country under the shadowy suzerainty of China has done its best to close the gates against any approach from the south. In March, 1899, Lord Curzon described the situation to the Secretary of State.² "We seem to be moving in a vicious circle. If we apply to Tibet, we either receive no reply or are referred to the Chinese Resident. If we apply to the latter, he excuses his failure by his inability to put any pressure on Tibet." The exasperation provoked by this studied insolence was intensified by the Tsar's simultaneous reception at Petrograd in September, 1900, of a Siberian Buddhist named Dorjiev, whose journeys taught Tibet to look to Russia for protection and Russia to regard Tibet as a pawn in her world-wide game against Great Britain. When a third attempt to communicate with the Dalai Lama broke down, the Viceroy proposed that the Political Officer for Sikkim should set up pillars where the Tibetans had encroached, and that, if these pillars were overthrown, we should occupy the Chumbi valley. The approval of the Cabinet having been secured, the Political Officer pro-

India and
Tibet

¹ His speeches are printed in "Lord Curzon in India," 500-7.

² The Blue Books on Tibet are unusually detailed. Colonel Young-husband has told his own story fully in "India and Tibet."

ceded in the summer of 1902 to the north of Sikkim and ordered the Tibetans inside the frontier to withdraw. On January 18, 1903, the Government of India, in a weighty dispatch, proposed an expedition to Lhasa. It was far more than a mere border dispute or the amelioration of trade; it was a question of our entire future political relations with Tibet, and how far we could allow another Great Power to exercise influence there. The Russian border nowhere touched Tibet, and no Power had any connexion with Tibet except China, Nepal and India. To the protests of the Russian Ambassador Lord Lansdowne replied that where an uncivilized country adjoined a civilized, a certain local predominance was inevitable, but that this did not involve designs on its independence.

The Younghusband Mission crossed the frontier at the end of 1904 and marched into Lhasa on August 3, whence the Dalai Lama had fled. A month later Tibet signed a treaty undertaking to observe the pact of 1890, to erect boundary pillars, to open marts at three places, to maintain an agent at each in order to forward communications, to keep open the roads leading to them, and to raze all forts on the routes to the capital. The ninth and last article was designed to terminate the Russian menace. Tibet engaged that, without the previous consent of the British Government, no portion of Tibetan territory should be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation to any foreign Power; no such Power should be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs; no representatives or agents of any foreign Power should be admitted; no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights should be granted to any foreign Power or the subject of any foreign Power, unless similar or equivalent concessions should be granted to Great Britain; no Tibetan revenues should be pledged or assigned to any foreign Power or the subject of any foreign Power. Having thus secured all his political and economic requirements, Younghusband accepted the request that the indemnity,

which had been fixed at £500,000, should be paid at the rate of one lakh annually for seventy-five years—a change which involved the occupation of the Chumbi valley during a similar period. With this important modification the Treaty was signed on September 7 in the presence of the Amban, who undertook to sign when permission had been obtained from Peking. Seals were affixed by the Acting Regent, the Council, the three great monasteries and the National Assembly. On the same day a separate Agreement was signed empowering the British trade agent at Gyantse to visit Lhasa to discuss trade affairs.

The British Cabinet repudiated the clause relating to the indemnity, which disobeyed their instructions that it should be a sum payable in three years; and Tibet was informed that the agreement The Lhasa
Treaty allowing a trade agent to proceed to Lhasa was regarded as needless, since the Cabinet had given repeated assurances to Russia that no lengthy occupation of territory and no intervention in internal affairs was sought. The twofold object of the mission appeared to have been attained. The monks had learned that the British arm was long enough to reach the Forbidden City, and on the outstanding questions of boundary, trade and communication, our demands had been accepted. Secondly, in Mr. Brodrick's words, the risk of Tibet having political relations with other States had been removed. Indeed, the champions of Lord Curzon claimed that nothing but his unsleeping vigilance had prevented the establishment of a Russian Protectorate over Tibet.

When the Russian menace on the northern section of the glacis has been warded off, there remained a danger on the north-west; and a pointed warning was uttered in Mr. Balfour's speech of May 11, 1905, on Imperial Defence. Russia, he declared, was making steady progress towards Afghanistan, and railways were under construction which could only be strategic. War was improbable, but these factors altered the position. India

could not be taken by surprise and assault. A war on the North-West Frontier would be chiefly a problem of transport and supply. We must therefore allow

**Russia and
Afghanistan**

nothing to be done to facilitate transport. Any attempt to make a railway in Afghanistan in connexion with the Russian strategic railways should be regarded as an act of direct aggression against us. "I have, however, not the smallest grounds to believe that Russia intends to build such a railway. If ever attempted, it would be the heaviest conceivable blow at our Indian Empire. As long as we say resolutely that railways in Afghanistan should only be made in time of war, we can make India absolutely secure. But if we, through blindness or cowardice, permit the slow absorption of the country, if the strategic railways are allowed to creep close to our frontier, we shall have to maintain a much larger army."

Friction in China, Persia, Tibet and Afghanistan had increased the inherited tension between Great Britain and Russia, and the outbreak of war in the Far East ushered in a period of dangerous strain. Since the Dual Alliance did not extend to the Far East, France was not compelled to join her ally; but in time of war benevolent neutrality may melt into belligerency at any moment. British opinion openly favoured Japan; but the Cabinet observed strict neutrality, and on February 12 Lord Lansdowne denied the foolish rumour that Japan had been permitted to use Wei-hai-Wei as a base. When the Anglo-French Treaty was signed King Edward was paying a visit to the Danish Court, and he remarked to Izvolsky, the Russian Minister, that the newly signed Treaty encouraged a hope of reaching a similar understanding with Russia.¹ Sir Charles Hardinge, he added, had just reached St. Petersburg as British Ambassador, with instructions to improve relations. It would be difficult to agree on the various questions at issue, but the attempt ought to be made. Izvolsky, for his part, lamented the Anglo-Japanese

¹ Sidney Lee, *The Times*, July 22, 1921.

alliance, which, he argued, encouraged the war party in Japan. The conversation was not without value, for Izvolsky was soon to be Foreign Minister; but no progress could be made during the conflict. Moreover, the Tsar was still bitterly hostile, resenting our alliance with Japan, our harbouring of Russian exiles, and the growing influence of Jews in England.¹

A struggle which required ships no less than soldiers was certain to raise the question of the Straits.² When in the autumn of 1902 Russia obtained permission for four destroyers to pass the Straits, the British Ambassador at Constantinople presented a formal protest to the Porte and announced that we should not hesitate to use the precedent for British ships in case of war. During the opening months of the Japanese conflict the Black Sea fleet remained passive; but trouble began in July when two cruisers of the Volunteer fleet, which had been created at the time of the Penjdeh crisis and was permitted to pass the Straits under a commercial flag, assumed the character of warships and stopped British and German vessels in the Red Sea. The *P. & O. Malacca* was searched, despite the assurance that she carried ammunition for the British fleet at Hong-Kong and a general cargo for Yokohama. The Russian captain demanded to see the latter, and, as it could not be reached without endangering the stability of the vessel, a prize crew was placed on board and the ship ordered back to Suez, whence she was to sail to Libau to a Russian prize court. Almost at the same time the *Ardova*, a British ship carrying explosives from the Government of the United States to Manila, and the *Formosa* were seized.

Russian ships of war were justified in searching neutrals for contraband; but converted cruisers had no such right. The Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar that such violation of international law would create surprise and

¹ Dillon, "The Eclipse of Russia," 329-30.

² See the admirable work of Coleman Phillipson and Noel Buxton, "The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles."

disgust in Germany, and the Tsar replied that it should not occur again. The British Ambassador lodged an emphatic protest, demanding the release of the *Malacca* on the ground that the status of the cruiser was irregular and that the ammunition was for the British navy and bore the British Government mark. The reply was conciliatory. The *Malacca* was not to go to a prize court, and no such incident should occur again; but "as a matter of form" its cargo would be examined at a neutral port. Since this

**The
Volunteer
Fleet** appeared to maintain the claim of volunteer cruisers to be ships of war, the Mediterranean squadron was sent to Alexandria, and a cruiser was ordered to Suez to anchor close to the *Ardova*. At the same moment the *Knight Commander*, bound from New York to Yokohama, with American-owned cargo, was sunk by the Vladivostock squadron on suspicion of contraband and because the ship could not spare a prize crew to take her to port. When announcing this outrage the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary added that Russia had given orders that seizures by the volunteer ships should not be recognized, and had withdrawn them from the Red Sea. The *Smolensk* and *Petersburg* resumed their activity off the Cape; but the shock was diminished by the Prime Minister's announcement that, at Russia's request, British cruisers had been sent to bid the vessels to stop their activity, as they had not received orders. They were found at Zanzibar, and no British vessel was interfered with during the remainder of the war.

Despite the tension with Great Britain, the Tsar longed to make use of his ships in the Black Sea, and he was encouraged to do so by the Kaiser on October 10. "Shebeko informed me of your intention to send out the Black Sea fleet in conjunction with the Baltic fleet, and asked me for my opinion. I confess that long since I have been expecting his plan to be executed. It is a sound military plan and will ensure victory. The Sultan—as

we both know for certain—will not offer a shadow of resistance. Once you are out we shall all quietly accept the *fait accompli*. I have not the slightest doubt that England will accept it too, though the Press may fume and rage and their squadrons steam about a little.”¹ In spite of this encouragement the project was wisely dropped, and the Baltic fleet alone was ordered to the Far East.

“I visited the fleet during its passage through the Belt,” records Izvolsky, then Russian Minister at Copenhagen,² “and found Admiral Rojdestvensky and his officers in a state of nervous excitement over the report that Japan had sent destroyers to Europe. This report emanated from Harting, of the Russian Secret Police, who came to Copenhagen several times and told me that Japanese destroyers were in the vicinity. I discovered that the report was baseless and that his sole object was to extort money. I informed my Government, but in vain. I scented danger, not from Japan, but from the defects rendering hazardous the passage of the Great Belt, and accordingly I induced Denmark to lend her best pilots and to station gunboats at the danger points.” Emerging from the Belt the Admiral mistook some Norwegian vessels for Japanese destroyers, and fired several shots without reaching them. On the afternoon of October 21 the *Kamchatka* fell behind on account of engine trouble. Towards evening she met and fired on a Swedish vessel and others unknown, and informed the Admiral by wireless that she was attacked on all sides by torpedo-boats. Just after midnight a green rocket was fired and the anxious watchers on the flagship, believing they saw a suspicious vessel, gave orders to fire. The Gamecock fleet of about thirty steam trawlers, from Hull, was on the Dogger Bank that night, with about fourteen trawlers of another fleet, and

¹ Troubetzkoi says that on a rumour that the fleet would come out, Great Britain made it clear that her fleet would oppose.—“Russland als Grossmacht,” 151.

² “Memoirs,” 42-3.

it was by them that the rocket had been fired as a fishing signal.

Lord Rosebery spoke for the nation in denouncing the "unspeakable outrage." Preliminary orders for mutual support were sent to the Home fleet at Cromarty, to the Channel fleet at Gibraltar, and to the Mediterranean fleet at Pola, while four battleships were ordered to Portland and submarines were dispatched to Dover. The two Governments, however, kept their heads, and the Tsar sent a message that in the absence of news he could only explain the incident as a regrettable misunderstanding, adding that he sincerely regretted the loss of life, and that he would afford complete satisfaction to the sufferers as soon as the mystery was solved. The Cabinet met on October 28, and the Prime Minister left the same evening to address a meeting at Southampton. The Russians were out of their course, and they knew that the Dogger Bank was frequented by fishermen. Happily the Russian Government had expressed its regret, the Tsar had promised liberal compensation, the officers and material witnesses would stop at Vigo, an inquiry would be held by an International Commission, the guilty would be tried and punished, and Russia would issue instructions to prevent a recurrence of the offence. With the signature of a Convention at Petrograd on November 25 the crisis was over. The settlement had been facilitated by the mediation of Delcassé. The Commission met on December 22, and by February 25, 1905, the work was done. The report implicitly, if not explicitly, dismissed the Russian case. The trawlers had committed no hostile act; the *Kamchatka* had been deceived, for no Japanese torpedo-boats were in the vicinity, and the firing was therefore unjustifiable. There were, however, extenuating circumstances.

It was perhaps fortunate that the British Cabinet was unaware of the anger which filled the heart of the Tsar during these critical weeks and of the design to establish a Russo-German alliance. The Kaiser had encouraged

the Tsar to believe that "Russia must and will win" and that "Korea must and will be Russian"; and the open sympathy of Berlin enabled the troops to be withdrawn from the Polish frontier.¹ Russia was indeed compelled to pay for these favours by the conclusion of a one-sided commercial treaty on July 28; but the struggle with Japan was severe, and without German aid there was little chance of victory. On August 15 Lord Lansdowne warned the German Ambassador that if Japan, owing to breaches of neutrality, became involved in war with Germany, Great Britain would accept the *casus fœderis*. "For some time," telegraphed the Kaiser on October 27, "the English Press has been threatening Germany that she must on no account allow coals to be sent to the Baltic fleet on its way out. It is not impossible that the Japanese and British Governments may launch joint protests against our coaling your ships, coupled with a summons to stop. The result of such a threat of war would be the inability of your fleet to proceed for want of fuel. This new danger would have to be faced by Russia and Germany together, who would both have to remind your ally France of her obligations. It is out of the question that France would try to shirk her duty. Though Delcassé is Anglophil and would be enraged, he would be wise enough to understand that the British fleet is utterly unable to save Paris. In this way a powerful combination of the three Continental Powers would be formed, and the Anglo-Saxon group would think twice before attacking it. Before acting you ought not to forget to order new ships. They will be excellent persuaders during the peace negotiations. Our private firms would be most glad to receive contracts. I am sorry for the mishap in the North Sea." "Of course, you know the first details of the North Sea incident from our Admiral's telegram," replied the Tsar, on October 20.

¹ Austria also assured Russia that she need not defend her southern front, and Russia in return promised neutrality in the event of an attack by Italy.—Szilassy, "Der Untergang der Donaumonarchie," 180.

"Naturally it completely alters the situation. I have no words to express my indignation with England's conduct.

I agree fully with your complaints about her behaviour concerning the coaling of our ships by German steamers, whereas she understands the rules of keeping neutrality in her own fashion. It is certainly high time to put a stop to this. The only way, as you say, would be that Germany, Russia and France should at once unite upon arrangements to abolish English and Japanese arrogance and insolence. Would you like to frame the outlines of such a treaty and let me know it? As soon as it is accepted by us, France is bound to join her ally. This combination has often come to my mind; it will mean peace and rest for the world." "Best thanks for telegram," wired the Kaiser. "Have sent off letter and draft of treaty you wished for this evening. Heard from private source that Hull fishermen have acknowledged that they have seen foreign steam craft among their boats, not belonging to their fishing fleets. So there has been foul play."¹

After dispatching his telegram the Kaiser sat down to write a letter. "I have at once communicated with the Chancellor and we have secretly drawn up the three articles of the Treaty you wished. Be it as you say. Let us stand together. Of course, the alliance would be purely defensive against European aggressor or aggressors in the form of a mutual fire insurance. It is very essential that America should not feel threatened by our agreement. As for France, we both know that the Radicals and the anti-Christian parties, which for the moment are the stronger ones, incline towards England, but are opposed to war, because a victorious general would mean certain destruction to this Republic of miserable civilians. The

¹ For the amazing story of the Björko Treaty see "The Kaiser's Letters to the Tsar," and the telegrams in Bernstein, "The Willy-Nicky Correspondence"; Izvolsky, "Memoirs"; Witte, "Memoirs"; Bompard, in *Revue de Paris*, May 15, 1918; Nekludoff, *Revue de deux Mondes*, March 1, 1918; Fay, *American Historical Review*, October, 1918; Dillon, "The Eclipse of Russia."

certainly that France means to remain neutral and even to lend her diplomatic support to England gives English policy its present unwonted brutal assurance. This unheard-of state of things will change for the better as soon as France is forced to declare herself for Petersburg or London. If you and I stand shoulder to shoulder, France must openly join us. This will put an end to made up grievances about so-called breaches of neutrality. This consummation once reached, I expect to be able to maintain peace, and you will be left The Draft Agreement a free hand to deal with Japan. Of course, before we can approach France that tiresome North Sea incident, which I am glad you have referred to the Hague Tribunal, must be closed. I enclose the draft of the Treaty. May it meet with your approval. Nobody knows anything about it, not even my Foreign Office. The work was done by me and Bülow personally."

"Their Majesties, in order to localize the war, have laid down the following articles of a defensive alliance :

"I. If one is attacked by a European Power, its ally will help. The two allies, in case of need, will also act in concert to remind France of her obligations under the Franco-Russian Treaty.

"II. No separate peace shall be concluded.

"III. The promise of help includes the case where acts, such as the delivery of coal to a belligerent, should give rise after the war to complaints by a third Power as to pretended violations of the rights of neutrals."

The Tsar returned the draft with an article binding the Kaiser to defend the conquests which Russia expected from the war. "This, if revealed, would lead the world to infer," replied the Kaiser, "that we had, instead of concluding a defensive alliance, formed a sort of Chartered Company for annexation purposes, possibly involving secret clauses for the benefit of Germany. It would be better merely to promise not to support any proposals for

robbing Russia of the fruits of victory." The Kaiser proceeded to offer further advice for keeping the British lion in his den. "An excellent expedient for cooling British insolence would be to make some military demonstration on the Perso-Afghan frontier, where they think you powerless to appear with your troops during the war. Even should your forces not suffice for a real attack on India, they would do for Persia, which has no army; and pressure on the Indian frontier from Persia will have remarkably quieting influence on the hot-headed Jingoism in London. I am told that this is the only thing they are afraid of, and the fear of your entry into India from Turkestan and into Afghanistan from Persia was the only cause that the guns of Gibraltar and the British fleet remained silent three weeks ago. Should the revised draft meet with your approval, it can be signed immediately. God grant that we may have found the right way to hem in the horrors of war and give His blessing to our plans."

In acknowledging the revised draft on November 23 the Tsar wired that before signing it was advisable that the French should see it. "It is my firm conviction," replied the Kaiser, "that it would be absolutely dangerous to inform France before we have both signed the Treaty. It is only the absolute knowledge that we are both bound by the Treaty to mutual help that will bring France to press upon England to keep the peace for fear of France's position being jeopardized. Should France know that a Russo-German Treaty is only projected, she will immediately give notice to her friend, if not secret ally. The outcome would doubtless be an instantaneous attack by England and Japan on Germany in Europe as well as in Asia. Their enormous maritime superiority would soon make short work of my small fleet. A previous information of France will lead to a catastrophe. It would be far safer to abstain from concluding any treaty at all."

On December 3 it was announced that a German ship had been stopped under the Foreign Enlistment Act from

coaling at Cardiff because its cargo was believed to be destined for the Russian fleet; and the Kaiser at once renewed his pressure at Petrograd. "The British Government," he wrote on December 7, "seems to think the moment opportune for an action against the provisioning of your fleet with coal. Under the pretext that it is its duty to maintain strictest neutrality, it has forbidden the German vessels belonging to or chartered by the Hamburg-America line to leave British ports. My fears that this would happen have now come true, and I must fix the attitude Germany has to take. It is far from my intention to hurry you in your answer about our treaty; but you will, I am sure, be fully alive to the fact that I must now have absolutely positive guarantees whether you intend leaving me unaided in case England and Japan should declare war against me on account of the coaling of the Russian fleet. Should you be unable to guarantee me that in such a war you will loyally fight shoulder to shoulder with me, then I regret I must immediately forbid German steamers to continue to coal your fleet." An agreement was accordingly signed on December 11 by which Russia promised to "stand by" Germany, and Germany to supply coal to the fleet. The fall of Port Arthur on January 1, 1905, however, increased the danger to the Russian fleet on its voyage from Madagascar, and the Kaiser proposed that Russia should buy his colliers. The Russians had no crews to man colliers, and Ballin, of the Hamburg-America line, was told that he must act on his own responsibility and at his own risk. Meanwhile the project of a political treaty slumbered for several months.

After the fall of Port Arthur, President Roosevelt unofficially but vainly advised Russia to make peace; but on May 31, after the crowning victory of Tsushima, Japan secretly asked the President to invite the belligerents to negotiate. The Tsar agreed in principle, and on June 8 Roosevelt telegraphed an identic invitation, offering to

arrange the time and place. As France and Germany were already urging Russia to make peace, the President suggested that Lord Lansdowne should exert pressure on Japan. The Foreign Secretary declined; and when the belligerents met at Portsmouth he was unable to second the President's heroic efforts to avoid a rupture. "The English Government has been foolishly reluctant to advise Japan to be reasonable," he wrote on August 23; and on September 11, when the Treaty was signed, he told Whitelaw Reid that the Kaiser had stood by him like a trump.¹

Though the British Government declined to press its victorious ally, it had taken a step which contributed to make Japan accept somewhat less than she had demanded. Though the Treaty of 1902 was concluded for five years, a new compact of wider scope was signed in London on August 12, 1905, for ten years. In addition to handing over Korea to Japan, the Treaty introduced two new principles of vital moment to Great Britain. In the first place, the scope of the agreement was extended to embrace India, thus correcting what was generally regarded as the inequality of advantage under the Treaty of 1902. In the second, each was to come to the assistance of the other if attacked by a single Power—a stipulation which not only increased our liabilities, but involved the obligation to intervene in a struggle between our ally and the United States. Lord Lansdowne instructed Sir Charles Hardinge to communicate the text of the new compact, "which has a purely pacific purpose and tends to protect rights and interests of incontestable validity." At their next interview Lamsdorff observed that everyone from the Tsar downwards regarded the Treaty as directed against Russia. The Ambassador rejoined that only the mention of India could justify such a notion, and that the Treaty was purely defensive. These assurances produced no effect on the Tsar, who had, indeed, recently concluded

¹ Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt," I, chs. 31-2.

the Treaty with Germany which had been discussed in the previous autumn.

On July 19 the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar from a port in Sweden, where he had visited the King, that he could not pass the entrance to the Gulf of Finland without sending his love and best wishes. "Should it give you any pleasure to see me, I am, of course, always at your disposal." The Tsar was "delighted," and suggested a meeting at Björko, near Viborg, where on July 23 the royal yachts arrived. The Kaiser proposed the visit "as a simple tourist, without any ceremony," and the Tsar accordingly brought no political adviser with him. But the monarchs agreed that in the event of a British attack on the Baltic they would safeguard their interests by occupying Denmark during the war. The Kaiser then produced the draft of a treaty, which he persuaded the Tsar to sign on board the *Hohenzollern* on July 24. The Kaiser insisted on the signature of witnesses, and the compact was accordingly countersigned by Tschirsky and by Admiral Birileff, who did not read the document.

**The Björk
Meeting**

I. If any European State shall attack either Power the other will aid with all its forces.

II. Neither will conclude a separate peace.

III. The Treaty shall come into force on the conclusion of peace with Japan, and may only be cancelled at a year's notice.

IV. Russia will make its terms known to France and invite her to sign it as an ally.

The Kaiser returned home delighted with his handiwork. "The Alliance will be of great use to Russia, as it will restore quiet in the minds of the people and confidence in the maintenance of peace in Europe, and encourage financial circles in foreign countries to place funds in enterprises to open up Russia. In times to come even Japan may feel inclined to join it. This would

cool down English self-assertion and impertinence. July 24 is a cornerstone in European politics and turns over a new leaf in the history of the world, which will be a chapter of peace and good will among the Great Powers of the Continent. The moment the news of the new grouping becomes known, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and Norway will all be attracted to this new centre of gravity. They will revolve in the orbit of the great block of Powers (Russia, Germany, France, Austria and Italy)." The Kaiser's old dream of a Continental combine under German leadership to keep England in her place seemed to be fulfilled.

A month later Witte, on his return from America, was invited to visit the Kaiser at Rominten, where his host, after securing leave from the Tsar, told him that a defensive alliance had been signed at Björko which France was to be asked to join. "Having imparted this extraordinary piece of news," relates the Russian statesman, "he asked me whether I was satisfied, and in my innocence I replied that my heart was filled with joy." He added that if France was to come in she should not be too hard pressed in Morocco. "He is a firm advocate of a Russo-German-French Alliance," wrote the Kaiser on September 26, "and was consequently very agreeably surprised when I told him of our work at Björko. The 'Continental combine' flanked by America is the sole manner effectively to block the way to the whole world becoming John Bull's private property, which he exploits to his heart's content after having, by lies and intrigues without end, set the rest of the civilized nations by the ears for his own personal benefit. Now the peace being signed, would you not think it practical if we were to instruct our Ambassadors at foreign Courts identically, without letting them into the existence of a treaty, that in all questions of general policy our Ambassadors are to work together? This common espousal of a common cause will not fail to impress the world that our relations

Witte's
Return

have become closer, and thus slowly prepare your allies the French for the new orientation which their policy must take for the entry into our ^{new} treaty."

While the Kaiser was dreaming of the Dual and Triple Alliance united under his command, the Tsar was oppressed by his guilty secret. On his return from Björko he appeared to Lamsdorff to be embarrassed, and when the conclusion of the Japanese war compelled him to divulge it the Foreign Minister "could not believe his eyes or ears." The Grand Duke Nicholas, the Minister of War and the Chief of the Staff were also informed, but no action was taken till the return of Witte. The Kaiser, as we have seen, had told the Tsar that his guest had approved the Treaty, and Witte congratulated the Tsar at their first meeting. Nicholas quoted Witte's approval to Lamsdorff, who excitedly asked if that was the fact. Witte replied that he had not seen the text, and when the Foreign Minister produced it he exclaimed with his usual bluntness, "Does not His Majesty know that we have a treaty with France?" Even the feeble and obedient Lamsdorff was clear that the new pact must be denounced, since France would otherwise have to revolve within the German orbit or sacrifice the Russian alliance. The vacillating Tsar had already hinted his difficulties, and on September 29 the Kaiser administered a telegraphic cordial. "The working of the Treaty does not collide with the Franco-Russian alliance, provided, of course, that it is not aimed directly at my country. On the other hand, the obligations of Russia towards France can only go so far as France merits them through her behaviour. Your ally notoriously left you in the lurch during the whole war, whereas Germany helped you in every way as far as she could without infringing the laws of neutrality. That put Russia also morally under obligations to us. I fully agree with you that it will cost time, labour and patience to induce France to join us. Our Moroccan business is regulated, so the air is

**The Tsar
Repents**

free for a better understanding. Our Treaty is a very good base to build upon. We joined hands and signed before God, who heard our vows. I therefore think that the Treaty can well come into existence. What is signed is signed; God is our testator."

The position of Lamsdorff and Witte was strengthened by the reply of the Russian Ambassador at Paris, who, on being instructed to sound the French

**The Pact
Lapses**

Government, rejoined that it was useless, since France would never join a German league nor recognize the settlement of 1871. Witte then wrote to Berlin that the pact was not binding, as it did not bear the signature of the Foreign Minister; to which Bülow replied, "What is signed is signed." The final step was taken at the advice of Witte, who was appointed Prime Minister on October 20, when the Tsar sent a letter to the Kaiser through the ordinary diplomatic channels, and the Russian Ambassador was instructed to add that it must remain inoperative till Russia, Germany and France could agree, since the adhesion of France was at present impossible and the Treaty was incompatible with the Dual Alliance. The Kaiser appeared unable to recognize that the game was up. "The Chancellor, to whom I read parts of your letter," he wrote on November 28, "told me that our purely defensive agreement cannot possibly clash with the French Treaty. For, if it did, the meaning would be that Russia is bound to support France even in a war of aggression against Germany. If your French agreement is, like ours, purely defensive, there is no incompatibility between the two." The Kaiser only realized that the alliance was dead when the publication of Lamsdorff's instructions to the Russian delegate to the Conference of Algeciras showed that Russia had emancipated herself from German leadership. Thus the Treaty of Björko, treacherously extorted and quickly denounced, was the prelude to a new orientation of Russian policy.

Soon after the repudiation of the pact the Tsar began

to discuss with the British Ambassador, Sir Charles Hardinge, the questions at issue between Great Britain and Russia. In his speech at the City Liberal Club on October 20, 1905, Sir Edward Grey declared that the roots of estrangement lay solely in the past, and urged both Governments to encourage mutual confidence. A few weeks later the speaker found himself Foreign Secretary, and Campbell-Bannerman declared in his programme speech at the Albert Hall that new Ministers had nothing but good feelings towards the great people of Russia. The Conference of Algeciras provided a welcome opportunity for co-operation and common counsel. The British delegate, Sir Arthur Nicolson, was already converted, and his conversations with Count Cassini, the Russian delegate, were shared by Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, the leading British authority on Russia and a *persona grata* at the Russian Court. When at this moment Turkey threw down a challenge to the British occupation of Egypt by the occupation of Tabah, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople informed the Porte that the Russian Government supported the British claims.

British opinion had sympathized with the reform movement of 1905, and the opening of the Duma in May, 1906, was anticipated with disinterested satisfaction. The governing classes in Russia, however, could hold the Duma at bay

**The
Russian
Loan**

so long as they could obtain money from abroad, and a large loan was needed to tide the country over the financial crisis of the Japanese war. When Witte became Prime Minister on October 20, 1905, he at once began negotiations for an international loan.¹ The French Government, which was naturally expected to contribute the largest share, was unable to move till the Morocco crisis was over; and Poincaré, the Minister of Finance, doubted the legal right of the Russian Government to conclude the loan without the sanction of the Duma. At last, when the Treaty of Algeciras was signed,

¹ Witte, "Memoirs," ch. 11.

and the jurist Martens had settled the legal question, the contract for the loan was signed in Paris on April 3. "It was the largest foreign loan in the history of modern nations," writes Witte with pride. "By its means Russia maintained intact its gold currency, and was enabled to recover after the ill-starred war and the senseless turmoil known as the Revolution. This loan enabled the Government to weather all the vicissitudes of the period." The German Government, in retaliation for the failure of the Björko policy, forbade German participation. British finance, on the other hand, participated for the first time since the Crimean war; and the warnings uttered, not only in London but in Paris and Petrograd, rendered this participation all the more significant.

**The First
Duma**

Clemenceau cautioned his countrymen in *L'Aurore* against new loans to assure the Tsar victory over his own subjects. "Opposition organs," wrote the Petrograd correspondent of the *Times* on April 9, "continue their campaign against a foreign loan before the Duma meets. They fear that the Government, having secured a large sum, will try to terrorize the Duma." Their apprehensions were only too well founded. The Duma opened on May 9, only to be dissolved on July 22. "The Government's arbitrary step," wrote the *Times*, at that time still a Russophobe organ, "justifies only too completely the reformers who besought the friends of constitutional liberty in the West not to lend more money to the autocracy. The Russian Government obtained their loan by what now looks uncommonly like false pretences, but they cannot live on it for ever. How can they hope to hold down for ever an exasperated people?" The news of the dissolution reached London on the eve of the meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union; and Campbell-Bannerman added to his inaugural address a resonant warning to the Russian Government and a message of hope to the Russian people. "*La Douma est morte. Vive la Douma.*"

The discussions between the two Governments pro-

ceeded, and the substitution of Izvolsky for Lamsdorff brought to office a statesman already convinced of the necessity of a Triple Entente. "Russia will now take a new turn," observed Aehrenthal on hearing of the appointment, "for he leans towards England." In May, 1907, the *Times* hinted that an agreement was on the point of being signed. "It does not exist," replied the Foreign Secretary, "but I must add that there is a growing tendency in both countries to occupy themselves in a friendly manner with questions of common interest as they arise. This tendency has recently led the two Governments to co-operate on more than one occasion. It is a tendency which we shall be happy to encourage, and which, if it continues, will naturally involve the progressive settlement of questions and the strengthening of friendly relations between them."

On February 1, 1907, a session of the Russian Ministers was held to discuss the Persian aspect of the problem.¹ England, explained Izvolsky, proposed to divide Persia into spheres of influence. Till recently this idea had found no support in Russian public opinion, and official circles were convinced that Persia must fall entirely under Russian influence and that Russia must advance with a trans-Persian railway to a fortified base on the Gulf. Recent events, however, had shown this to be impossible, and had proved that everything must be avoided which could lead to a conflict with England. The best method was to delimit spheres of influence. He then referred to the close connexion between a Persian settlement and the Bagdad Railway. An agreement with England could only lead to the desired result if it provoked no opposition from Germany, who was already disturbed by the possibility of a *rapprochement*. He had therefore assured Berlin that Russia would undertake no obligations without a previous understanding if they in any way affected German interests. A German understanding was needed.

Russia and
Bagdad

¹ Siebert, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke," 315-19.

Till now Russia had tried to hinder the Bagdad Railway, but the Ministers must now decide if it was wise to alter this policy. Kokovtseff, the Minister of Finance, approved an agreement with Germany, but argued that the old objections to the railway remained. It would create competition with Russia's cereal export by enriching Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, while the branch lines towards the Persian frontier would endanger her position in North Persia by allowing German and English articles to reach her economic sphere of interest. Since, however, the railway could not be prevented, it must be accepted, and compensation should be secured. The Minister of Trade, the War Minister and the General Staff agreed that the time for opposition was passed and that compensations should be sought.

The negotiations between Berlin and Petrograd regarding the Bagdad Railway were not completed till 1910, but the Anglo-Russian settlement proceeded apace. On August 31, 1907, Sir Arthur **Anglo-Russian Convention** Nicolson and Izvolsky signed a convention at Petrograd. Lord Salisbury's famous declaration that in the Near East we had put our money on the wrong horse terminated the tension in Europe, while the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the defeat of Russia by Japan removed all apprehensions regarding the Far East. Thus the pact of 1907, though more limited in scope than that of 1904, achieved a similar result by removing the causes of antagonism between the two historic rivals.

The first and most important of the three agreements concerned Persia. "The Governments of Great Britain and Russia, having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations, considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest

in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighbourhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand, and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the above-mentioned provinces, have agreed on the following terms :

The
Persian
Clauses

I. Great Britain engages not to seek any concessions of a political or commercial nature beyond a line from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Bagdad and including Ispahan and Yezd, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose demands for similar concessions in this region supported by the Russian Government.

II. Russia engages not to seek concessions beyond a line from the Afghan frontier through and including Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose demands for concessions in this region supported by the British Government.

III. Russia and Great Britain engage not to oppose, without previous arrangement, any concessions to British or Russian subjects in the regions between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II.

In other words, Persia was divided into a large Russian and a small British sphere of influence, with a neutral zone in which the two countries were to have equal opportunities.

A letter from Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson, dated August 29, explained why the Persian Gulf formed no part of the Convention. "The arrangement respecting Persia is limited to the regions of that country touching the respective frontiers of Great Britain and Russia in Asia, and the Persian Gulf is not part of those regions, and is only partly in Persian territory. It has not, there-

fore, been considered appropriate to introduce into the Convention a positive declaration respecting special interests possessed by Great Britain in the

The Persian Gulf

Gulf, the result of British action in those waters for more than a hundred years. His Majesty's Government have reason to believe that this question will not give rise to difficulties between the two Governments should developments arise which make further discussion affecting British interests in the Gulf necessary. For the Russian Government have, in the course of the negotiations leading up to the conclusion of this arrangement, explicitly stated that they do not deny the special interests of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf—a statement of which His Majesty's Government have formally taken note. In order to make it quite clear that the present arrangement is not intended to affect the position in the Gulf, and does not imply any change of policy respecting it on the part of Great Britain, His Majesty's Government think it desirable to draw attention to previous declarations of British policy, and to reaffirm generally previous statements as to British interests in the Persian Gulf and the importance of maintaining them. His Majesty's Government will continue to direct all their efforts to the preservation of the *status quo* in the Gulf and the maintenance of British trade; in doing so they have no desire to exclude the legitimate trade of any other Power."

In regard to Afghanistan, Great Britain declared that she had no intention of changing the political status of the country or of interfering in its internal concerns, and would neither take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures threatening Russia. Russia, for her part, recognized Afghanistan as outside her sphere of influence, and promised that all her political relations with the country should be conducted through the British Government. In a third agreement both Powers engaged to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet, and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.

The Treaty was received in Russia with mixed feelings.¹ To Witte it appeared a triumph of British diplomacy, making it impossible for Russia to annex Persia. The British Parliament had risen before the signature of the Treaty, and the expert analysis had to be deferred till the session of 1908. The attack was opened on February 6 by Lord Curzon, who found little to praise in what he described as the most important treaty concluded in the last half-century by a British Government. The conception was right, but its execution was faulty. The settlement was doubtful as regards Afghanistan, bad in Tibet and worse in Persia. Lord Lansdowne, on the other hand, though critical of details, expressed confidence in Russia's loyalty. While Lord Curzon spoke of her as an enemy to be watched, the leaders of the Opposition and most of their followers were prepared to regard her as a friend.

In 1907, as in 1904, the Government and their expert advisers secured as much and at as low a price as the situation permitted. We had given up nothing, argued Sir Edward Grey, that we ^{The Balance-sheet} had not lost before. But the later balance-sheet, if regarded purely as a business transaction, was the least successful. The character of the bargain was determined when Lord Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief in India, on being asked how much of Persia he could defend, replied that he could only be responsible for the south-east. For this reason we confined our zone to Seistan, the larger part of the province of Kerman, and Persian Mekran, and insisted on a neutral zone against the wishes of Izvolsky. It was of the utmost importance that henceforth Russia could no longer threaten the approaches to India; but in theory we surrendered our preferential position not only in the south, but in the Gulf, where our influence had been unchallenged for a century. No answer was given by the spokesman for the Government to the criticism that Russia's recognition

¹ See Troubetzkoi, "Russland als Grossmacht," ch. 5.

of our position in the Gulf was not explicitly stated in her own words and above her own signature; and the Afghan clauses, lacking the Ameer's assent, remained a dead letter.

If the Anglo-Russian Convention was open to criticism as a business transaction, its political success was beyond cavil. Russia could only regain her position as a Great Power by adding British friendship to the French alliance; and Great Britain, having definitely taken sides with France, required Russian support in face of the growing danger from Germany. Thus the removal of local friction was followed, as had been the case with France, by diplomatic co-operation in various fields. The Anglo-French Entente and the Dual Alliance broadened into the

**Bülow's
Comments**

Triple Entente, which confronted the Triple Alliance on the European chess-board. Prince Bülow endeavoured, without much success, to assuage the anxiety with which his countrymen regarded the termination of an historic feud. "Relying on assurances," he declared on April 30, 1907, "we watch the end of the negotiations without anxiety. I may be told that I take the Anglo-Russian *rapprochement* too calmly. I take it for what it is—the attempt to remove difficulties which I brought home from my residence abroad, that the antagonism of the whale and the elephant was not unalterable. That we are surrounded by difficulties and dangers no one is better aware than myself. They are the result of our exposed position. We need not be alarmed at ententes in regard to matters which do not directly concern us. We cannot live on the enmities of other nations. Let us grant to others the freedom of movement which we claim for ourselves." To Reventlow, on the other hand, it appeared a greater blow to Germany than the Anglo-French pact of 1904, and complaints of *Einkreisung* became more than ever the order of the day.¹

The reconciliation of Russia and Great Britain was con-

¹ "Politische Vorgeschichte," 130-5.

firmed by a *rapprochement* between their respective allies. On June 9, 1907, France and Japan agreed to respect the independence and integrity of China, with economic equality for all nations. In the following month Russia and Japan signed a similar treaty, and agreed to maintain the *status quo* and to secure respect for it by all pacific means at their disposal. A few months later they signed three agreements, which had been settled in principle at Portsmouth, concerning the fisheries, commerce and navigation, and the Manchurian railways. Thus the dangerous tension surviving from the Russo-Japanese war was removed. The two parties—Great Britain and Japan on the one side, Russia and France on the other—had now made friends. Russia had no longer to think of the perils of the Far East, and could turn her undivided attention to the even more dangerous game of European politics.

CHAPTER XII

THE NEAR EAST

I

THE chronic misrule of the Turk in Macedonia encouraged the neighbouring Christian States to peg out claims for the future by armed propaganda and organized massacre.¹ In June, 1902, Turkey invited the Powers to press Bulgaria to dissolve the Macedonian Committee; but Russia and Austria, who had covenanted in 1897 to co-operate in the Balkans, informed Abdul Hamid that the first move lay with him. The Sultan promised reforms and appointed an Inspector-General, Hilmi Pasha, to carry them out. The scheme was palpably insufficient, and in January, 1903, Lord Lansdowne outlined his own programme. "In our opinion the condition of the population in Macedonia has become almost intolerable. The appointment of one or more Christians on the Commission of Inquiry at Constantinople and on the Committee of Inspection in Macedonia would be valuable; but inquiry is not enough. We need the appointment of European inspectors in the departments of Justice and Finance, and European officers to reorganize the gendarmerie and police. Without arrangements for payment of salaries no reforms are possible." Shortly afterwards the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors handed to the Foreign Secretary an outline of the scheme drawn up by Lamsdorff and Goluchowski, and asked him to support it. The Inspector-General was to be irre-

¹ The Blue Books on Macedonia are very numerous. The best books on the subject are: Sir C. Eliot, "Turkey in Europe"; Brailsford, "Macedonia"; and "The Balkan Question," edited by L. Villari.

movable for a term of years except by agreement with the Powers. Foreign experts were to reorganize the police and gendarmerie, the latter to consist of Christians and Mussulmans. The Porte was to stop the crimes of Albanians against Christians. Amnesty was to be granted to all accused or condemned for political offences in the three vilayets in connexion with recent disturbances. A Budget was to be drawn up for each vilayet, and local revenues, checked by the Ottoman Bank, were to be assigned in the first place to the needs of the local administration. Finally, the collection of tithe was no longer to be farmed out. The Foreign Secretary accepted the scheme in principle and undertook to recommend it to the Sultan, but he reserved the right to recommend changes after closer examination. The Sultan accepted the "February programme" *en bloc*, and undertook to apply it not only to Macedonia but to the three other vilayets of Turkey in Europe. To ensure that Turkey should have no pretext for inaction, Lamsdorff had visited Sofia and Belgrad and exhorted the Cabinets to suppress revolutionary agitation. The Bulgarian Government thereupon dissolved the Macedonian Committees in Bulgaria, and ordered its commercial agents in Turkey to warn the Bulgar leaders that, if an insurrection occurred, Bulgaria would render no assistance.

Despite the Sultan's theoretical acceptance of the reform scheme and the readiness of Bulgaria to hold her hand, the Balkan sky remained dark with clouds; and in July, 1903, the anticipated explosion occurred in Macedonia. The insurgents stood no chance against the regulars, and on August 31 Bulgaria appealed to the Powers. Austria and Russia proposed to meet the situation by a warning from the Powers to Turkey and Bulgaria that neither could count on support if they resisted the Austro-Russian programme; but Lord Lansdowne replied that the time had come for the stronger measures which he had from the first held himself free to propose. The re-

bellion was over by the end of September, and the Foreign Secretary now forwarded suggestions to Vienna, where Lamsdorff and Goluchowski were engaged on a fresh scheme of reform. A Christian Governor, unconnected with the Balkans or the Great Powers, or a Mussulman, assisted by European assessors, selected by Austria and Russia, should be appointed. European officers in adequate numbers should reorganize the gendarmerie. Turkey should withdraw her troops from the Bulgarian frontier, and Austria and Russia would guarantee that Bulgaria would not send troops or allow bands across the frontier. Each of the Powers should send six officers to accompany the troops. The Austrian and Russian Governments thanked the British Minister for his suggestions, adding that they were in accord with decisions already reached at Mürzsteg, where the Emperor and the Tsar, accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, had met to discuss the situation.

On October 24 the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors brought the Mürzsteg programme to Downing Street.

**The
Mürzsteg
Programme**

1. Civil agents of Austria and Russia were to accompany the Inspector-General, call his attention to the needs of Christians and the misdoings of the local authorities, watch the introduction of reforms and the pacification of the country, and report to their respective Governments.

2. A foreign general, with foreign officers, should be appointed to the gendarmerie, dividing up the country for supervision, instruction and organization.

3. After the pacification of the country Turkey should modify the boundaries of the administrative units, with a view to the more regular grouping of the nationalities.

4. The administrative and judicial institutions should be reorganized, and Christians be admitted to the public service.

5. Mixed committees, with an equal number of

Christians and Mohammedans, should inquire into the crimes committed during the recent troubles.

6. Turkey should pay for the repatriation of Christian refugees, and the rebuilding of houses, churches and schools destroyed by Turks. The money should be distributed by committees on which Christian notables would sit, while Austrian and Russian Consuls should supervise.

7. A year's taxes should be remitted to Christians in the burnt villages.

8. Turkey should undertake to introduce the reforms of the February and the Mürzsteg programmes without delay.

9. The irregulars should be disbanded.

After a peremptory Austro-Russian warning, the Mürzsteg programme was accepted in principle. An Austrian and a Russian assessor were appointed. General di Georgis was selected to train the gendarmerie with twenty-five foreign officers to assist. Macedonia was divided into zones, Austria taking Uskub, Italy Monastir, Russia Salonika, France ^{The} Seres, and Great Britain Drama. Germany ^{Gendarmerie Reforms} undertook no zone, but supplied a director for the gendarmerie school at Salonika. An agreement between Turkey and Bulgaria in April removed the fear of another rising. Austria and Russia were hopeful, and the Civil Agents reported the presentation of hundreds of petitions. "It is felt on all sides," wrote the Austrian Civil Agent, "that a new epoch has begun." The experienced British Consul Graves reported from Salonika a temporary improvement, but added that it would not last unless finance and the judiciary were reformed, and that there was no change in the methods of the Turkish Government.

Lord Lansdowne had never believed in the adequacy of the Austro-Russian programmes, and on January 11, 1905, he outlined bolder measures in a dispatch. No part of the

reform scheme had been carried out except the organization of the gendarmerie, in which the European officers were still too few. Money was needed, and it could only be secured by the reduction of the army. As the Concert was slow and somewhat ineffective, Great Britain had stood aside while Russia and Austria grappled with the problem; but the persistent and successful obstruction of Turkey

called for joint pressure by the Great Powers. **Lord Lansdowne's Scheme** The first demand should be the reduction of the troops in and near Macedonia to the number required for internal order, while Bulgaria should make a corresponding reduction and prevent the organization of bands. If she declined, the Powers might collectively guarantee that Bulgaria should not be allowed to occupy Turkish territory. The second demand should be for the appointment of a Commission of Delegates, nominated by the Powers and under the presidency of the Inspector-General, possessing administrative and executive powers. Financial reforms should include the commutation of the tithes and provide for a fixed payment to the Porte by each vilayet, the balance remaining for local purposes. The Inspector-General, assisted by the Commission, might command the troops.

Meanwhile Russia and Austria presented a financial reform scheme in which all Macedonian revenues should pass through the local branches of the Ottoman Bank, which should control its expenditure under the supervision of the Inspector-General and the Civil Agents. If the money was ear-marked for Macedonian reforms and compensation to the Christian victims of 1903, the two Powers were willing to agree to the raising of the customs from eight to ten per cent. Turkey's reply was a rival scheme of financial reform without foreign control; but Lord Lansdowne refused to accept either the one or the other. Before he consented to the raising of the customs he must ask why the deficit could not be diminished by reducing the troops, and must obtain a guarantee that the proceeds

would go not to the Ottoman Bank, which was unequal to the task, but to some competent authority which would apply them to the Macedonian reforms. Russia and Austria consented that the other Powers should send a delegate to co-operate with their Civil Agents in the supervision of finance. The appointment of financial delegates now became the official policy of the Powers, and in August the six Ambassadors urged Turkey to allow them to exercise their functions in co-operation with the Civil Agents. When she refused, Lord Lansdowne suggested a naval demonstration. A collective Note presented in November accordingly demanded the extension of the mandates of the Inspector-General, the Civil Agents and the gendarmerie for two years longer, and the acceptance of the *règlement* of the Financial Commission, which was to consist of the Inspector-General, the Austrian and Russian Civil Agents, and a delegate from each of the four other Powers. After a demonstration at Mitylene by ships of all the Powers except Germany, and the occupation of the custom house and telegraph office, the Sultan yielded to necessity.

Sir Edward Grey, who at this moment replaced Lord Lansdowne at the Foreign Office, found the Concert "exhausted by the effort it had made," and was reluctantly compelled for a time to **The Greek Bands** play a watching game. The gendarmerie won the confidence of the inhabitants, and the British representative reported hopefully on the work of the Financial Commission. In April, 1907, Sir Edward agreed to the raising of the customs duties by three per cent., to take effect in July. At the same moment he informed Benckendorff that though the administration was improved, the Powers must in his opinion make a much more serious effort to stop the bands. "The Greek bands are at the root of the whole problem." In consequence of British pressure, the Austrian and Russian Governments addressed a joint Note on September 30 to Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. The bands, it was sug-

gested, were fighting each other partly owing to a misunderstanding of Article III of the Mürzsteg programme. Any delimitation would not take into account the re-grouping of nationalities brought about by the activities of the bands, but would be decided by the *status quo ante*. This misconception now being removed, the Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian Governments must try to stop the bands receiving support. The Austro-Russian Note was supported by the Ministers of the other Powers; but not one of the Balkan States admitted Article III to be a cause of the trouble. Nothing had been gained, and the Sultan was soon to show that he was as stubborn as ever. When the Powers asked for the prolongation of all foreign mandates for seven years—the period for which the higher customs duties were granted—he replied that the Civil Agents and the Financial Commission must enter the Turkish service, like the gendarmerie officers. It was only after weeks of pressure and menace that he gave way and renewed all the mandates till 1914.

Despite the efforts of the Powers the condition of Macedonia grew steadily worse, and at the end of 1907

Sir Edward Grey boldly resumed the initiative. The Powers, he urged, should represent to the Sublime Porte that the heavy charges on the Macedonian Budget for the maintenance of Turkish troops were out of all proportion to the services which they rendered in the maintenance of public security, and that the only effective means of suppressing the bands lay in the increase upon a large scale of the gendarmerie, the formation of mobile columns of gendarmes, and in granting executive power to the officers in command. The savings effected by the reduction of the troops would provide funds for their increase and adequate equipment. This vigorous call fell on deaf ears. Austria and Russia declined to co-operate on the ground that the demands would meet with a categorical refusal from the Sultan. Wolff-Metternich bluntly informed the Foreign Secretary that the German Government

deemed his proposals impracticable. Before asking for an increase in the gendarmerie, wrote Tittoni, the Powers should demand the fulfilment of the original engagements.

While these excuses for inaction were reaching Downing Street, a blow was struck at the waning prestige of the Concert. On January 27, 1908, Aehrenthal, the masterful diplomat who succeeded the pliant Goluchowski at the Ballplatz in 1906, and who, while Ambassador at Petrograd, had desired the revival of the Dreikaiserbund, announced that he had obtained from the Sultan permission to survey the route for a railway through the Sanjak of Novibazar, connecting the The Sanjak
Railway Bosnian system with the Turkish terminus at Mitrovitz.¹ Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin empowered Austria to construct military and commercial roads through the Sanjak; and though railways were not specifically mentioned, nobody argued that the Austrian Minister was exceeding his treaty rights.

In announcing the concession he proclaimed that, true to her Balkan policy, Austria pursued no territorial aims and merely desired an alternative route to Salonika, since Serbia could block her outlet to the Ægean in the event of a tariff war. On March 24 Bülow spoke with sympathy of the Austrian project, "though we neither gave nor were asked our advice." "I was informed of the intention," echoed Tittoni in the Italian Chamber, "but I could not dispute the right. There is no danger to the Concert or to peace if all the Powers regard railways as an item in the reform of Macedonia." Very different was the reception of the news in Russia, where Izvolsky bitterly complained of the violation of the spirit of the pact of 1897 and of the Münzsteg agreement. The co-operation in the Balkans inaugurated in 1897 came suddenly to an end, and the wound was too deep to be healed by Aehrenthal's subsequent acceptance of the project of a railway from the

¹ See Molden, "Graf Aehrenthal: Sechs Jahre äussere Politik Oesterreich-Ungarns," 32-8.

Danube at the junction of Serbia and Roumania to San Giovanni di Medua on the Albanian coast.

While the anger of Russia was due less to her sympathy with the Macedonian peasantry than to her jealousy of Austrian influence in the Balkans, Great Britain regretted that the chances of securing reform were diminished if not destroyed by the spectacle of a leading Power begging a favour at the moment that the Concert was formulating demands for judicial reform; and Sir Edward Grey's references to Austria's action were polite but unambiguous.

**Sir Edward's
Comments**

"Our attitude towards these railway projects," he declared on February 28, "is one of benevolent neutrality. But this latest project has undoubtedly been the occasion of very marked comment. That this special moment should be chosen for promoting a large railway scheme which requires the Sultan's consent was sure to excite apprehension lest individual Powers should be turning their attention to objects specially adapted to their interests. I should regret exceedingly that any such impression should gain ground, because I wish to see the Concert maintained for Macedonian reforms." But an even graver issue was involved. "In discussing the Macedonian question you are never far from the Turkish question, which has more than once led to a European war. As long as the Concert exists you have a certain guarantee that the question will not lead to war." He proceeded to reiterate the proposals which he had pressed during the winter, with a significant addition. "If a Turkish Governor were appointed for a fixed term of years—a man whose character and capacity were accepted and recognized by the Powers—and if he had a free hand and his position were secure, I believe that the whole Macedonian question might be solved. Tinkering at the Mürzsteg programme will not improve the situation."

Austria had only herself to thank for the speech: for when she betrayed the cause of Macedonian reform Sir Edward Grey, who was in earnest, naturally took it up.

The Austrian Press, led by the *Fremdenblatt*, roundly declared that an independent Governor was impossible without the coercion of Turkey; and comment in the other capitals was no more encouraging. Undeterred by the hostile reception of his speech, Sir Edward embodied its substance in a vigorous dispatch to the Great Powers. The prompt response of the Russian Government, which since the Sanjak *coup* was free to pursue its own line, manifested a welcome advance towards the British standpoint. While approving in principle the appointment of a Governor for Macedonia, it was compelled to recognize that it had no chance of being adopted unanimously by the Powers or accepted by the Sultan. The same object could be satisfactorily attained by making the Inspector-General irremovable for a term of years without the consent of the Powers. Sir Edward, delighted by the reply, virtually accepted the proposal that Hilmi Pasha should be raised to the rank of Vizier, confirmed for a term of years and superseded only with the consent of the Powers. There seemed at last to be some prospect of advance; but it could only come from the growing intimacy of Great Britain and Russia, and it was to foster the spirit of confidence and co-operation that King Edward accepted the invitation to visit the Tsar at Reval in June.

The first visit ever paid by a British sovereign to Russia aroused unusual interest both at home and abroad, and was as sharply challenged by the Labour party as it was warmly defended by Sir Edward Grey. The visit, he declared, was long overdue. The King had not seen the Tsar for seven years, and the Tsar had visited Queen Victoria at Balmoral. "The time has arrived when, if the relations of the countries are friendly, it cannot longer be postponed without marked discourtesy. You might as well tear up the Convention; and to continue the discussion of Macedonian reforms would be fruitless." On June 10 the King and Queen, accompanied by Sir John Fisher, Sir John French and Sir Charles Hardinge,

**The Reval
Visit**

reached Reval. "I am confident," declared the Tsar, "that this meeting will strengthen the numerous and powerful ties which unite our houses, and will have a happy result of bringing our countries closer together and of maintaining the peace of the world. During the past year several questions of great importance for Russia and Great Britain have been settled satisfactorily. I am certain that Your Majesty appreciates as much as myself the value of these agreements, for, despite their limited scope, they can only aid in spreading between our countries the sentiments of good will and mutual confidence." "I can cordially subscribe to the words of Your Majesty on the Convention recently concluded," replied the King. "I believe it will serve to strengthen the ties which unite our peoples, and I am certain it will lead to a satisfactory settlement of some important matters in the future. I am convinced that it will also greatly aid to maintain the peace of the world." Izvolsky and Sir Charles Hardinge also issued a *communiqué* that they were in complete agreement on all points.

These soothing assurances merely stimulated speculation, and far-reaching designs were confidently attributed to the actors in the drama. Prince Bülow displayed his anxiety by pointed inquiries, and Izvolsky assured him that "no open or secret Anglo-Russian Conventions existed which could be directed against German interests." Soothing assurances were also conveyed to Aehrenthal. That apprehension was felt in still higher quarters was revealed by a speech of the Kaiser to his officers during an inspection at Döberitz. "It seems they wish to encircle and provoke us. We shall be able to support it. The German has never fought better than when he has had to defend himself on all sides." A few days later he was greeted with unusual enthusiasm at the Hamburg regatta and by *Die Wacht am Rhein*. "When I asked myself what this outburst meant," he declared, "our old German song burst forth. Then I knew. Gentlemen, I

German
Apprehen-
sions

thank you and I have understood you. It was a handshake to a man who goes resolutely on his way and who knows that he has somebody behind him who understands him and is willing to help him." Germany was mistaken in attributing to the chief actors at Reval designs against her security or welfare, but she was right in her belief that the visit had tightened the bonds between the two Powers.

Nowhere was the Reval visit more anxiously canvassed than in certain secret conventicles both within and without the dominions of the Sultan. Young Turk exiles had long planned and plotted for a **The Young Turks** Republic and a Constitution; but in 1905 the reform movement within the Ottoman dominions became independent of Paris, and a network of committees was formed in European and Asiatic Turkey, with their headquarters at Salonika.¹ The anarchy of Macedonia constituted a standing invitation to the Powers to intervene; and the Young Turks, recognizing the necessity of reforms, resolved that they should be carried out by Turkish hands. Their programme contemplated a strike of the troops at some critical moment, and the Third Army Corps, which was stationed in Macedonia, was selected for the experiment. From time to time the Yildiz spies stumbled across the threads of the conspiracy, and in March, 1908, a Commissioner was dispatched from Constantinople to collect evidence. Fearing discovery, the Committee of Union and Progress planned a rising for September; but the meeting at Reval determined them to forestall by immediate action the intervention which it appeared to foreshadow. On July 3 Niazi Bey raised the flag of revolt at his native village of Resna, and took to the hills, where he was promptly joined by Enver Bey. On July 6 the officers of the Monastir garrison deserted, and volunteers poured in from Macedonia and Albania. On July 22 Niazi entered Monastir in triumph, and on July 23 the Constitution of 1876 was proclaimed. The

¹ See Moore, "The Orient Express," ch. 21, "The Young Turks."

following day, faced with the Young Turk ultimatum, "Surrender or we march on Stamboul," Abdul Hamid granted the Constitution, and at midday Hilmi Pasha himself proclaimed it from the steps of the Konak in Salonika. The revolution was hailed with delight throughout the Ottoman dominions. The murdering bands disappeared as if by magic, Greeks and Bulgarians, Mussulmans and Christians fraternized in the streets, the Press became free, women doffed their veils, and the sorely tried citizens of the Turkish Empire entered on a brief period of light-hearted happiness.¹ In the course of the summer the whole machinery of control—the gendarmerie, the Financial Commission and the Civil Agents—was scrapped.

II

While Europe was still ringing with praises of the Young Turk revolution, the harmony of the Chancelleries was rudely disturbed by a proclamation of Francis Joseph, announcing the formal incorporation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in his dominions (on the ground that annexation was the essential preliminary to the grant of a Constitution), and the evacuation of the Sanjak of Novibazar.² In the League of the Three Emperors, concluded in 1881, Austria received the right to annex the provinces whenever she deemed opportune. Kalnoky, however, the Foreign Secretary, made no use of the privilege, and,

¹ See "Turkey," No. 1, 1909 (Correspondence on the Constitutional Movement in Turkey). Excellent pictures of this brief period of hope are drawn by C. R. Buxton, "The Revolution in Turkey," and Sir E. Pears, "Forty Years in Constantinople." The second stage of the Young Turk movement is described by G. F. Abbott, "Turkey in Transition."

² See the Austrian Red Book, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke betreffend Bosnien und die Herzegovina, 1909"; Siebert, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Entente-politik," ch. 1; Friedjung, "Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus," II, chs. 23-5; Molden, "Graf Aehrenthal"; Conrad, "Aus meiner Dienstzeit," I; Sosnosky, "Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns," II; Steed, "The Realm of the Hapsburgs"; Larmeroux, "La Politique Extérieure de l'Autriche-Hongrie," II; Troubetzkoi, "Russland als Grossmacht"; Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," III; Bogitshevich, "Causes of the War."

soon after the renewal of the Treaty in 1884, Russia's wrath at the union of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria was a warning not to provoke her further. During the decade of strain, 1887-1897, the matter naturally slumbered. Even in 1897, when Francis Joseph returned the visit of the Tsar to Vienna in 1896, a proposal to reaffirm the right of annexation provoked the chilling rejoinder that it would "require special scrutiny at the proper time." Kallay's successor in Bosnia, Burian, openly favoured annexation, and the substitution of a Russophil for an Austrophil dynasty in Belgrade in 1903 had introduced a new danger for the southern provinces of the Empire.

Aehrenthal had secured the concession for the Sanjak railway without consulting Russia; but he never dreamed of annexing Bosnia without a previous understanding. The Sanjak controversy left Izvolsky angry and suspicious, and the criticisms of Miliukoff and other orators in the Duma spurred him on to recover his prestige. For some weeks the Foreign Minister's demeanour towards Berchtold, the Austrian Ambassador, was chilly; but the mood passed, and in April their discussions bore fruit in a memorandum recording his desire that the entente of the two Powers should be renewed. Austria should agree to the Danube-Adriatic railway, which would give Serbia access to the sea through Albania. Aehrenthal replied that the line ought to run through Bosnia. Without consulting either France or Great Britain, Izvolsky now played his trump card in an *aide-mémoire* of July 2, accepting the Sanjak railway and announcing his readiness, should the maintenance of the *status quo* prove impossible, to discuss changes, among them the annexation by Austria of Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sanjak, in return for the opening of the Straits to Russian warships. The intimation that Austria might annex Bosnia was a delightful surprise to Aehrenthal, and, once assured of Russia's conditional assent, he determined to carry out the project with the least possible delay. If Izvolsky pointed the path, the

Izvolsky
approaches
Aehrenthal

Young Turk revolution indicated the moment. On hearing the news he remarked to his wife, "Now I must take on myself the odium of doing what all my predecessors since Andrassy were afraid to do." He replied that, if Russia would advocate the opening of the Straits for Roumanian and Bulgarian warships as well as for her own, and would guarantee that Constantinople should not be attacked by a Russian fleet, he would evacuate the Sanjak and surrender Austrian rights over Montenegro. After a Crown Council on August 19 he secured the assent in principle of Germany and Italy to the deal, and Izvolsky gave a hint to the Serbian Foreign Minister, Milovanovich.

Final arrangements were made when Izvolsky, who was staying at Karlsbad, accepted an invitation from Berchtold to meet Aehrenthal at his castle in Bohemia on September 15. As the conversations took place without witnesses, and nothing was committed to paper, and as the two statesmen subsequently supplied conflicting versions to the public,¹ we cannot be sure what occurred. The main lines of agreement, however, had already been mapped out, and Aehrenthal accepted Izvolsky's plan for a European conference to ratify the proposed changes; but Izvolsky was later to maintain that he spoke of the unlawfulness of Aehrenthal's plans and merely promised not to oppose them, while a letter from Aehrenthal to Francis Joseph written on the evening after the interview reported that the Russian statesman had promised a benevolent attitude. The latter version was confirmed by the host, to whom both Ministers described their conversation. A second conflict of testimony was much more serious. According to Aehrenthal's report to the Emperor, he informed Izvolsky that the annexation would perhaps take place early in October before the meeting of the Delegations. The Russian statesman urged a later date, say the middle of October, after his return to Petrograd.

¹ *Fortnightly Review*, September and November, 1909.

Aehrenthal replied that such a postponement would hardly be practicable, but promised to let him know beforehand in good time. After the annexation Izvolsky loudly complained that he had been deceived; but when Berchtold, the Austrian Minister in Petrograd, reminded him of the Buchlau conversations, he did not deny that the beginning of October had been mentioned. He had, indeed, only himself to thank for his embarrassment; for he had promised to send to Vienna an exact record of what had been agreed at Buchlau, and had never done so.

After completing his cure at Karlsbad the Russian Minister crossed the Alps and entered on a leisurely round of diplomatic visits, in which he intended to discuss the opening of the Straits with Italy, France and Great Britain. The Austrian Minister, on the contrary, returned to Vienna resolved to act. The Russian bear, he observed to Schön, would growl but would not bite. It was clear that Turkey would protest, and Aehrenthal therefore determined to have Bulgaria on his side. On September 23 Ferdinand visited the Emperor at Budapest and was received with royal honours. "Aehrenthal **Bulgarian Complicity** did not tell the Prince of his arrangements with Izvolsky or of the approaching annexation," writes his biographer, "and they did not discuss common action. He may, however, have dropped a hint." In any case, Ferdinand was assured that Austria would raise no objection if he were to proclaim his independence; but, as at Buchlau, no precise date was fixed. An incognito visit to Vienna followed, and another interview with the Foreign Minister took place. A strike on the Oriental Railway, followed by Bulgaria's seizure of the line, and the simultaneous refusal of the Sultan to invite the Bulgarian envoy to a Court function, precipitated the decision, and the independence of Bulgaria was proclaimed at Tirnovo on October 5.

On October 1 the Austrian Ambassadors to France, Italy, Great Britain and Germany were dispatched with autograph letters from their sovereign which they

were ordered to deliver on October 5. On reaching Paris on October 3 Izvolsky found a letter of September 30 from Aehrenthal announcing that annexation would take place on October 7. Since, however, President Fallières was to be away on October 5, the audience of Count Khevenhüller was fixed for October 3; and at 3 P.M. on

**The Secret
Revealed**

that day the letter of Francis Joseph was presented. "This letter," commented the President, "announces the annexation of Bosnia. What of the independence of Bulgaria?" "It is all arranged," was the prompt if indiscreet reply. "Bulgaria will anticipate us by a day." The momentous news was thus prematurely announced to the world at Paris instead of simultaneously at the different capitals, and Khevenhüller informed Pichon that Russia, Germany and Italy approved the action of his Government. The annexation was proclaimed by Francis Joseph on October 6 instead of October 7.

Clemenceau, the French Premier, was more indignant with Izvolsky for not consulting Russia's ally than with Aehrenthal for infringing the Treaty of Berlin, and French opinion was but little perturbed. "It does not profoundly modify the European system," wrote Hanotaux; "it is serious but not mortal."¹ In Russia and Serbia, on the other hand, where nothing was known of the preliminary negotiations, stupefaction prevailed. In conversation with Vesnitch, the Serbian Minister at Paris, Izvolsky declared that he could not understand Serbia's excitement, since she lost nothing and gained Russian support; and the Russian Ambassador in Vienna in like manner explained to the Serbian Minister that the surrender of the Sanjak was sufficient compensation, since it blocked Austrian expansion towards Salonika and opened up the prospect of Serbia securing it. In public, however, Izvolsky assumed a different tone. He declared that Aehrenthal had acted without his knowledge; and

¹ "La Politique de l'Equilibre"; cf. Gauvain, "L'Europe au jour le jour," I, "La Crise Bosniaque."

in order to restore his shattered prestige he resolved to summon Austria before the European Areopagus in the hope that, while ratifying her action, it might at the same time admit Russia's claim to compensation. It was in the hope of securing British consent to his plan that he left Paris for London on October 9; but here, too, disappointment awaited him, and he was again forced to listen to well-deserved reproaches for concealing his plans from his friends.

When Count Mensdorff presented the Emperor's autograph letter, King Edward made no attempt to conceal his displeasure; and his autograph reply expressed regret at the action of Austria, **Izvolsky in England** and reminded his august correspondent of the solemn engagement of 1871. In a speech to his constituents on October 7 Sir Edward Grey declared that any modification of the Treaty of Berlin must be approved by another European Congress, just as Russia's repudiation of the Black Sea clauses of 1856 had to be ratified at the London Conference of 1871, which decreed that "no Power can free itself from the engagements undertaken by treaty nor modify its stipulations without consent of the contracting parties." The British, French and Russian Ambassadors at Constantinople were instructed to tell the Porte that all changes in the Treaty of Berlin required the assent of all its signatories, and a British squadron was sent to the *Ægean* as a symbol of sympathy and support. On October 13 an official *communiqué* announced that the British and Russian Ministers had agreed to demand a conference. Izvolsky had thus secured the first item of his programme; but the second and far more important of his demands—compensation for Russia—had been refused. Sir Edward Grey had known nothing of the conspiracy against the Treaty of Berlin, and after denouncing its breach by Austria he could hardly support his colleague's proposal for a further encroachment on Turkish sovereignty. He made it plain to his visitor that the question of the Straits must not be raised at the Con-

ference, but he accompanied the intimation with a written assurance that he sympathized with the object and that the veto was only temporary.¹ On October 13 Prince Bülow informed the British Government that Austria was opposed to a conference and that Germany must support her; but on October 22 Aehrenthal explained to the Delegations that he had no objection to a meeting if the programme was settled in accordance with his views and the annexation sanctioned but not discussed.

The third partner in the Triple Alliance was by no means satisfied with the course of events, and Victor

**Opinion in
Italy**

Emmanuel described the annexation as a stab at the Treaty of Berlin. Anti-Austrian manifestations took place before the Palazzo Venezia in Rome; and the seething discontent found vent in a passionate oration by Fortis, an ex-Premier, during the debate of December 3 and 4, to which the Austrian Ambassador was an interested listener. "There is only one Power with whom Italy sees a possibility of conflict, and that, I regret to say, is our ally. The Government must invite the nation to new sacrifices to adjust our military forces to the needs of the situation." Bosnia, he argued, was a material gain, and Italy came out of the crisis with empty hands.² Tittoni was in an awkward predicament, for he had willingly agreed to the annexation in advance. He now declared that he knew that it was coming, but that Aehrenthal's sudden move was a surprise. The Triple Alliance, he explained, only guaranteed compensation for Italy in the event of a change in the *status quo* in Albania or Macedonia, and the voluntary surrender of the Sanjak was of great importance, since it removed all fear of an Austrian advance to Salonika. A conference to ratify the changes

¹ Siebert, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke," 517.

² The scene is described by William Miller, who adds that Giolitti, "after a careful study of the House," rose and congratulated the orator.—"The Foreign Policy of Italy," *Quarterly Review*, April, 1916. Tittoni's speech is printed in his speeches on Foreign and Colonial Policy (English translation).

of the Treaty would be necessary, but there was nothing to be gained by abuse of Austria.

If the annexation came as a shock to Great Britain and to the people, though not to the Governments, of Russia and Italy, it was a staggering blow to Montenegro and Serbia, who at once ^{Repercussion in Serbia} began to make military preparations. "My country," lamented Milovanovich, the Foreign Minister, to a Vienna journalist, "feels it almost like physical pain, so that the very soul of the people cries out." Serbia had never reconciled herself to Austria's control of Bosnia, and King Milan once remarked that he was the only Serb who had forgiven the occupation. Since King Peter's accession the hope of ultimately detaching the Yugoslav provinces from Austria by Russian aid had taken firm root in the country. Relations had become strained in 1905, when Austria launched a tariff war in reply to a proposed Serbo-Bulgarian customs union; and the "Pig War" left the whole nation exasperated, and was followed by large orders to Creusot. Milovanovich, well aware that the annexation could not be reversed, set forth on a round of visits to the Chancelleries to ask for autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina under the guarantee of the Powers, and a port on the Adriatic as a consolation prize. Sir Edward Grey, he reported, promised to support the demand for territorial compensation so long as Russia did the same.¹ An even warmer welcome awaited Prince George and Pasitch at St. Petersburg. "The Tsar," reported the latter, "expressed great sympathy for Serbia, but advised a quiet line of conduct, as our cause was just but our preparations weak. The Bosnia-Herzegovina question would be decided by war alone. Austria would consent neither to autonomy nor territorial compensation. Russia would not recognize the annexation. He believes Austria will not attack Serbia, but we must give no provocation." Despite these counsels of moderation Serbian opinion remained

¹ Bogitshevich, "Causes of the War," 110-12.

bellicose; but her appeal to Turkey was equally fruitless. The evacuation of the Sanjak had gilded the pill, and Kiamil declared that, though he would not recognize the annexation and the boycott of Austrian goods expressed the just resentment of the people, he must decline active co-operation.

Autumn passed into winter with Europe in turmoil, though no State cared or dared to challenge Austria to ordeal by battle. The hysterics of Belgrad aroused the contemptuous anger of Vienna, and the fiery Chief of the Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorff, deeply convinced that Austria would one day have to meet a combination of foes if she did not deal with them singly, repeatedly urged summary chastisement. Germany was loyal, Italy negligible, Russia weak, France indifferent, Great Britain pacific. "Your Sir Edward Grey wants peace," remarked Aehrenthal to British visitors; and when he was warned not to underrate British influence, he replied, "What can England do to us?" His confidence was strengthened by the speeches of Bülow and Izvolsky in the closing days of the year. On December 7, the Chancellor combined judicious homage to the Young Turks with unflinching support of his ally.

"The whole civilized world watched them with sympathy and respect. It has been said that we were their opponents, because we stood well with the *ancien régime*. We do not interfere in the domestic politics of other countries. Our only desire is to see Turkey economically and politically strengthened. We have never taken or asked for Turkish soil. We have no need to play a leading part in the Bosnian game. We were told of the intention to annex about the same time as Italy and Russia, but not of the moment. Austria must settle for herself what are her vital interests and how to deal with them. We did not hesitate to support these interests to the utmost of our power, and I told Izvolsky that in regard to the Conference we should not separate ourselves from our ally." Izvolsky's long-

deferred speech to the Duma on December 24 was pitched in the minor key, and virtually admitted that the game was lost. Indeed, he lamented to Berchtold that he was a broken man. He explained that Russia's freedom of action in the Bosnian question was barred by the pacts of thirty years. To protest without the intention to fight would have been madness. The only course was to press for a conference, after a preliminary discussion between the Cabinets, and that implied no unfriendliness to Austria. The mildness of language, so different from the Minister's earlier utterances, was attributed at Vienna to Aehrenthal's threat to publish the documents unless Izvolsky ceased to attack his good faith.¹ When the new year dawned the idea of a conference was already fading away. Austria declined to attend without a preliminary agreement and unless a discussion of the annexation was ruled out; and if her actions were to be condoned in advance it seemed futile to bring the Powers together in solemn conclave. There were, however, three urgent problems to be liquidated—the relations of Austria to Turkey, the relations of Bulgaria to Turkey, and the relations of Serbia to Austria—and all three were solved without bloodshed before Easter.

Aehrenthal had argued that the unsolicited withdrawal of the garrisons from the Sanjak was adequate compensation to Turkey for the loss of her shadowy rights over Bosnia and Herzegovina; but the Turkish boycott of Austrian goods and the desire to diminish the number of his opponents finally persuaded him to add a *solatium*. The news that Austria would pay two and a half millions for the loss of Crown property in the annexed provinces was hailed by Sir Edward Grey as "the first blue sky." The relief was increased when Bulgaria's offence against Turkish sovereignty was purged by a covenant to pay

¹ In private Izvolsky freely vented his anger. "Aehrenthal is not a gentleman," he cried to the Austrian Chargé. Szilassy, "Der Untergang der Donaumonarchie," 194.

five millions for her share of the Oriental railways; and the transaction was arranged by Russia reducing Turkey's indemnity of 1878 by a similar amount.

In Aehrenthal's opinion the suzerain's acceptance of the annexation ought to carry the assent of less directly interested States; and though his view was not shared by Serbia, the Triple Entente endeavoured to build a bridge for her retreat. The Serbian official reply to the *démarche*

**Serbia
Holds Out**

of the Powers satisfied neither the Ballplatz nor Downing Street, and a more submissive formula was drafted by Aehrenthal and Sir E. Cartwright. The solution of the crisis seemed within sight, but it was not to end without a final alarm. On March 17 Pourtalès informed Izvolsky that the Chancellor was ready to suggest that Aehrenthal should acquaint the Powers with Turkey's sanction of the annexation; and, if Russia approved, Germany, perhaps in association with Russia, would propose to the Powers to recognize it in an exchange of notes, thus fulfilling the wish of Petrograd for an European sanction. Izvolsky thanked Pourtalès for his friendly communication—"the first sign since the beginning of the crisis of the German Government's desire to diminish the tension"—but remarked that it appeared to negative a conference, to deliver Serbia into Austrian hands, and to relieve Austria of the necessity of solving the other problems. He promptly telegraphed the news to London and Paris, adding that he might accept the offer in principle, with a guarantee for the meeting of the Conference.

On March 23, after six days had elapsed without a response to the German proposal, Prince Bülow applied what he asserted to be gentle pressure, but what was regarded throughout the world as something closely resembling an ultimatum.¹ "The German Government

¹ "It was not an ultimatum, but a proposal for mediation," writes Jagow. "which Izvolsky welcomed as an escape from a cul-de-sac. His assistant Tcharikoff observed that Germany had rendered Russia a great service." Kiderlen-Wächter, however, then Acting Foreign Minister, boasted to Take Jonescu that he alone framed the ultimatum. "I knew

is glad to note that the Russian Government recognizes the friendly spirit of Germany's step and that Russia seems inclined to accept the proposal. It is ready to suggest to the Vienna Cabinet to invite the Powers, while notifying them of the Austro-Turkish Agreement, formally to assent to the cancelling of Article XXV of the Berlin Treaty. Before doing so, however, it wishes to be sure that the Russian Cabinet is ready to accept the Austrian proposal. Say we expect a precise answer, Yes or No. Any ambiguous reply we must regard as a refusal. In that case we should let things take their course. The responsibility for all eventualities would rest exclusively on Izvolsky."¹

Germany
presses
Russia

After consulting the Tsar, Izvolsky replied that, if Austria invited the Powers to assent to the cancelling of Article XXV, the Russian Government would declare her formal and unconditional acceptance. In giving this new proof of a desire to solve the crisis, he hoped that Berlin would use its influence to persuade Vienna to accept the British initiative and to reach an understanding with Belgrad. In reporting the event to London and Paris Izvolsky explained that opposition was impossible, as it presented the alternative of an instantaneous recognition of the annexation or an invasion of Serbia. In view of the great danger to Russia and to the peace of the world from an Austro-Serb conflict, and also in order to protect Serbia, there was no option but to accept. The Russian Ministers were to explain to the British and French Governments the greatness of the sacrifice for the sake of peace, and to add that Russia had no intention of foregoing the Conference. Aehrenthal expressed his "grateful satisfaction" to the Chancellor; but the surrender came so suddenly that the *Neue Freie Presse* published a warlike

Russia was not ready for war. Schön would never have dared to do it."—Take Jonescu, "Personal Impressions," 58. The German Government had invited France to join in the *démarche*, but in vain.

¹ Bülow's telegram to Pourtalès is published in Hammann, "Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit."

article on March 25 in which the historian Friedjung, on the basis of documents (some of which were forged) supplied to him by the Austrian Government and emanating from the Austrian Legation at Belgrad, accused the Serbo-Croat leaders of treasonable intercourse with Belgrad.

Bülow promptly instructed his Ministers to invite Rome, Paris and London to follow the example of Petrograd. Italy accepted, though Tittoni was annoyed at the suddenness of the demand.¹ France replied that she would accept, but hoped that Austria would postpone her request till the Austro-Serb conflict was ended. Sir Edward Grey, who shared the resentment of Sir Arthur Nicholson, stubbornly replied that the recognition of annexation must follow, not precede, an Austro-Serb settlement. On March 26, however, Aehrenthal declared that he would wait till March 28, but would then issue an ultimatum to Belgrad. Cartwright reported that Aehrenthal was in earnest, and on March 28 Sir Edward approved the Aehrenthal-Cartwright formula in its final shape, and announced that when Serbia had dispatched it and Austria had accepted it, he would recognize the abrogation of Article XXV if invited to do so. On March 31 the

Surrender of Serbia

Serbian Minister brought to the Ballplatz his country's formal surrender. Serbia recognized that her rights were not infringed by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In accordance with the advice of the Great Powers she undertook to cease her attitude of protest and opposition, to alter the tendency of her policy towards Austria, and to live with her on neighbourly terms. Trusting to the peaceful intentions of Austria, she pledged herself to reduce her army to the standard of the spring of 1908. The Triple Entente now complied with a request to accept the abrogation of Article XXV, Austria for her part surrendering the right to police Montenegrin waters.

The bloodless conflict of the Chancelleries left deep

¹ Tittoni describes his interview with Count Monts in his little book, "Who Was Responsible for the War?"

scars on the body politic of Europe. Aehrenthal had played for high stakes and won. He had carried through his breach of the Treaty of Berlin with a skill and resolution which were universally **Profit and Loss** recognized, if not universally approved. The apparent success of his policy gave a new feeling of self-confidence to the Hapsburg Empire; and on his death in 1912 Pichon was to hail him as the greatest Austrian Minister since Metternich. The closeness of the ties which bound Vienna to Berlin was advertised by the Kaiser's appearance "in shining armour." Berlin had neither suggested nor desired the annexation; but as soon as opposition developed, the duty and interest of Germany became manifest, and Holstein emerged from his retirement to urge the Chancellor to range himself unhesitatingly on the side of his ally. When the crisis was over, Bülow pronounced judgment in the Reichstag. "Austria has right on her side. The annexation is no cynical theft, but the last step on the road of a political and cultural effort begun thirty years ago. She has won her right to the provinces by hard work; and her formal offence is purged by her settlement with Turkey. Serbia's aspirations are not worth a world-war. Russia's recent conduct has won the gratitude of all friends of peace." After his retirement he described the crisis with less reserve. "For the first time the Austro-German alliance proved its strength in a grievous conflict. The group of Powers whose influence had been so much over-estimated at Algéciras fell to pieces when faced with the tough problems of Continental policy." His statement is true enough, but it is not the whole truth. The Central Powers had won a Pyrrhic victory. Though the immediate result was the discomfiture of the Triple Entente, the ultimate consequence was the tightening of its bonds.¹ The anger of Izvolsky was in some degree the humiliation of a profes-

¹ To Bülow's claim that the capitulation of Russia was "the end of King Edward's Einkreisungspolitik," Haller replies that it was, on the contrary, its beginning.—"Die Aera Bülow," 11.

sional wrestler by the superior skill of his antagonist; but of greater importance was the brooding resentment of Russia and her ruler. She had seen her secular rival increase her power in the Balkans; she had missed the compensation for which she had consented to the annexation; she had failed to secure the summoning of a conference; and above all she had been compelled to confess to Serbia and to the Slavs throughout the Balkans that she was too weak to defend their interests. Henceforth Petrograd and Belgrad were closely linked by revengeful memories and hopes. The Tsar forgave William II but

**Russia's
Deep
Resentment**

not Francis Joseph. On visiting the King of Italy in October, 1909, he ostentatiously avoided passing through Austrian territory; and though normal diplomatic relations were restored in February, 1910, the spectacular humiliation continued to rankle. Moreover, in December, 1909, a secret treaty superseded and enlarged the Russo-Bulgar pact of 1902, and declared that the realization of the ideals of the Slav peoples in the Balkans would only be possible after a Russian victory over the Central Powers.¹

The Kaiser had long been alarmed at the trend of Russia's policy, and during the crisis he unbosomed himself to the Tsar. "You are right in saying the old year was eventful," he wrote on January 8, 1909; "the annexation of Bosnia was a genuine surprise for everybody; particularly for us, as we were informed about Austria's intentions even later than you. But Austria having taken this step without consulting us, hesitation as loyal allies was out of the question. You will be the first to approve this loyalty of ours. But this does not mean that we intend

¹ The Russo-Bulgar Treaty is printed in Laloy, "Documents Secrets," 52-8. For the bitter quarrel between the Hapsburg Empire and the Jugoslavs see Seton-Watson, "The Southern Slavs"; Südländ (a pseudonym for the Croatian Pilar), "Die südslavische Frage und der Weltkrieg"; Mandl, "Oesterreich-Ungarn und Serbien," and "Die Habsburger und die südslavische Lage"; Bogitshevich, "Causes of the War"; Übersberger, "Die Rolle Serbiens," in "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg"; Friedjung, "Zeitalter des Imperialismus," II, ch. 23; Miss Durham, "Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle"; and "Das Deutsche Weissbuch über die Schuld am Kriege."

to drop our old friendly relations. Valuing them as I do I consider it all the more important that whatever might injure them should be removed. Recently we have been represented as resenting your agreement with England about Central Asia. The same rumours are circulated about the visit Uncle Bertie paid you at Reval. All Nonsense! We understand perfectly that Russia must for the present avoid getting into a conflict with Great Britain. And you have repeatedly assured me that you would not enter upon any agreement with England of a more general nature. No, ^{Kaiser and Tsar} my dear Nicky, neither your agreement with England nor your meeting at Reval has produced any uneasiness or disappointment in Germany. The cause is quite a different one. It is the patent fact that for the last two years Russian policy has been gradually drawing away from us more and more, evolving always closer towards a combination of Powers unfriendly to us. The Triple Entente between France, Russia and England is being talked of by the whole world as an accomplished fact. English and French papers miss no opportunity of representing this alleged Triple Entente as being directed against Germany, and only too often the Russian Press chimes in joining the chorus. The tendency of Russian policy to prefer to lean on England and France was particularly evident in the present crisis."

After the capitulation of Russia the Kaiser thanked the Tsar for "the loyal and noble way in which you led the way to preserve peace. It is thanks to your high-minded and unselfish initiative that Europe has been spared the horrors of an universal war. I am credited by some papers with being the author of annexation and am accused among other nonsense of having humiliated Russia by my peace proposals! Of course you know better. Personally, I am totally indifferent to newspaper gossip; but I cannot refrain from a certain feeling of anxiety that, if not contradicted at once, the foul and filthy lies which are freely circulated about my policy and

my country will tend to create bitterness between our peoples. If you and I join in open and loyal co-operation

**The
Potsdam
Agreement** for the maintenance of peace—which is my most fervent wish—I am thoroughly convinced that peace will not only be maintained but not even be troubled.” The two monarchs remained on friendly terms, and the agreement in regard to Persia and the Bagdad Railway reached at Potsdam in 1910 was compared by Kiderlen-Wächter to Bismarck’s reinsurance Treaty of 1887. But no lasting *détente* occurred, and the Press of each country became ever more critical and suspicious of the policy and aims of the other. The stage was set for the world-war and the grand rehearsal had taken place.

CHAPTER XIII

ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY

THE Navy Law of 1900 brought Germany into what German publicists describe as the danger-zone, and in his political apologia Bülow claims credit for careful steering. When Bebel quoted in the Reichstag articles by naval officers arguing that the fleet must be strong enough to defeat England, he dismissed them as rubbish to which no sensible German paid attention. Even when the programme of 1900 was completed, he pointed out, the navy would only be fourth or fifth on the list, and it harboured no aggressive designs.¹ In an interview sought by a British journalist in November, 1904,² the Chancellor continued his efforts to dissipate the suspicion of his policy and character. He consented to see Mr. Bashford, he explained to the Reichstag on December 5, because in recent months certain British publicists had sown tares in the garden of Anglo-German relations. "I cannot imagine that the thought of a war can be seriously entertained by sensible people. I hope the destinies of both countries will always be guided by cool heads who know that England and Germany, not only now but for ever, are best served by the preservation of the present peaceful relations."³

Bülow and
England

Official assurances failed to dispel the anxiety of the

¹ "Reden," Jan. 22, 1903.

² Published in the *Kölnische Zeitung*, the *Nineteenth Century*, and reprinted in Bülow's "Reden," II, 393-400.

³ Hammann relates that Bülow, like Admiral Galster, desired for political reasons that Germany's navy should consist mainly of defensive units, but that Tirpitz insisted on capital ships.—"Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," 144-5.

British Government, which was fostered not only by the dimensions of the Navy Law of 1900 and by the inspection of its first-fruits on the King's visit to Kiel, but by provocative utterances of the Kaiser and certain of his subjects. It was owing to the anticipated danger from a new quarter that it was decided in 1903 to construct a first-class naval base at Rosyth; that the Cawdor programme of four battleships annually was sanctioned; and that Sir John Fisher, on his appointment as First Sea Lord in 1904, proceeded to concentrate the fleet in home waters. Obsolete ships were scrapped, and in October, 1905, the *Dreadnought*, the largest and most heavily armed vessel in the world, was laid down.

Long before Englishmen had begun to suspect the designs of the German navy, Germans had felt alarm at the strength of the British fleet. The foolish article in the *Saturday Review* in 1897, contending that if Germany could be swept away to-morrow every Englishman would be the richer, was exploited to whip up enthusiasm for a fleet. In 1904 an article in the *Army and Navy Gazette*, suggesting that Great Britain should veto any further increase of the German warships, was accepted as the authentic voice of the Admiralty. Early in 1905 a still more threatening note was struck by a member of the Ministry. In explaining to his constituents the object and result of the policy

Arthur Lee's
Speech

of concentrating the main force of our fleet in home waters, Mr. Arthur Lee, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, urged his hearers to turn their face from France and the Mediterranean to the North Sea. If war were declared, it would be possible to strike the first blow before the other party read the news in the papers. The speaker in vain complained that he was misreported and misunderstood. The Kaiser complained to the British Ambassador, and large sections of German opinion began to believe that their country was threatened by a sudden attack. The construction of the *Dreadnought* intensified the feeling of danger and impotence. "I was besieged by a demand for

a large increase to meet British threats," writes Tirpitz.¹ "My Bill of March, 1906, added the six large cruisers which had been refused in 1900, and obtained money to widen the Kiel Canal, through which Dreadnoughts could not pass." The naval rivalry entered on a new and more dangerous stage. Each Admiralty attributed aggressive designs to the other, and sections of the Press in both countries laboured at its congenial task of sowing tares in the cornfield. The situation was thoroughly understood by the German Ambassador, Wolff-Metternich. "The real cause of the political tension," he reported to Berlin in 1906, "is not commercial rivalry, but the growing importance of our navy."

On the other hand, a speech by the Prime Minister on May 4, 1905, explaining the views of the newly founded Committee of Imperial Defence, contributed in some degree to tranquillize opinion. The **Balfour on Invasion** army and navy, he argued, should be concentrated as far as possible; but experts had decided that even if the regular army was abroad and our organized fleets at a distance, an invasion would not be attempted with less than 70,000 men.

The *détente* following the Algeiras Conference was employed by the newly installed Liberal Cabinet to strive for an arrest of armaments. It was announced that one of the four battleships of the Cawdor programme would be omitted, with corresponding reduction in destroyers and submarines. If any expectation existed that this step might evoke a response from Berlin, it was quickly disappointed. The Kaiser observed to Sir Frank Lascelles that if disarmament were to be brought up at the next Hague Conference he should decline to be represented.² Each State must decide for itself what forces it required. In August King Edward visited Cronberg, where the Kaiser remarked to Sir Charles Hardinge that the approaching conference was great nonsense. That his

¹ "Memoirs," ch. 15.

² Cook, "How Britain Strove for Peace" (from official sources).

attitude was not dictated by hostility to Great Britain was shown by his cordiality to the British War Minister whom he invited to the September manœuvres and allowed to examine the organization of the German War Office.¹

The Morocco crisis had proved too much for the Chancellor's strength, and it was not till November 14 that he reappeared in the Reichstag and surveyed the European situation. "We have no idea of disturbing the Franco-English friendship. The Franco-Russian alliance has been no danger for peace; on the contrary, it has helped to make the world-clock keep time. We hope to be able to say the same of the Anglo-French Entente. Good relations between Germany and Russia have not damaged the Franco-Russian alliance, and good relations between Germany and England are not incompatible with the Entente, if it pursues peaceful aims. The Entente without good relations of its members to Germany would be a danger to peace. A policy aiming at encircling Germany, forming a ring of Powers in order to isolate her, would indeed be dangerous. Such an encirclement is impossible without pressure. Pressure brings counter-pressure, and from pressure and counter-pressure explosions can arise. Between England and Germany there are no evil memories or deep political differences. Economic rivalry does not necessitate political differences, much less war. I was gratified by the reception of the German Burgomasters, and I have good hopes of the coming visit of German journalists. There is not a sensible man in Germany who does not desire straightforward and tranquil relations. Sympathy with the Boers was not the result of hatred of England but of German idealism. To my deep regret I am always reading in the Socialist Press that our defensive naval measures are the cause of English ill-feeling. The notion that the fleet is building against England is utter folly. The English apprehension of a great fleet not yet in existence is simply unintelligible. We have

Bülow
surveys
Europe

¹ Haldane, "Before the War," 23-8.

no idea of building a fleet as strong as the English, and we shall never break the peace. Time and patience are needed. The barometer has moved from Rain and Wind to Changeable. To point to Fair, both sides must avoid irritations. Too much importance has been attached to presumed friction between the two rulers. The meeting at Cronberg has strengthened the good personal relations."

Undeterred by the hostility of the Kaiser to the limitation of armaments, Campbell-Bannerman pleaded in the *Nation* for its discussion at The Hague. The writer's sincerity was confirmed by a navy programme in 1907 of three capital ships and a promise to drop a second if others would do the same. The offer was communicated officially to seven Powers; but on April 30 Prince Bülow, to whom the invitation was virtually addressed, curtly announced in the Reichstag that the German Government could not participate in a discussion which they believed to be unpractical if not actually dangerous. Russia and Austria also expressed a wish to postpone the question.

Despite the frowns of the Powers, Sir Edward Fry, the British Plenipotentiary, initiated a discussion on August 17 at the fourth Plenary Meeting of the Conference.¹ He began by quoting **Arrest of Armaments** Muravieff's circular of 1898, and pronounced its true and eloquent words more applicable than ever. "I know you will agree with me that the realization of the wish expressed in 1899 would be a great blessing for the whole of humanity. Is this hope capable of realization? I can only say that my Government is a convinced adherent of these lofty aspirations, and that it charges me to invite you to co-operate in realizing this noble object. Recognizing that several Governments desire to restrict their military expenses, and that this can be realized by the independent action of each Power, it would be ready to communicate yearly to the Powers who would do the same the programme of new ships of war and the expenditure this would entail. In conclusion

¹ Protocols of the Eleven Plenary Meetings, Cd. 4081, 1908, pages 27-31.

I propose the following resolution : The Conference confirms the resolution adopted in 1899,¹ and, seeing that the charges have considerably increased in almost all countries since that year, declares that it is highly desirable to see all Governments resume the serious study of this question."

When the British Plenipotentiary had concluded his eloquent appeal, the President read a letter from the first American Plenipotentiary. "In regretting that more progress cannot be made at this moment," wrote Mr. Choate, "we are happy to think there is no intention on the part of the nations to abandon the efforts, and we express our sympathy for the views and our support for the proposition of the British delegates." "In the name of the French delegation," echoed M. Bourgeois, "I expressly support the proposition. As the promoter of the *vœu* of the first Conference, I express confidence that from now till the next Conference the study will be resolutely continued." A similar letter of support was read from Spain; and a joint communication from Argentine and Chile proudly claimed that they were the first and only States to conclude a convention (in 1902) limiting their naval forces. The

The discussion was closed by a brief address
 Question from the President. In 1899, declared
 Shelved Nelidoff, the discussions were so lively that they threatened to wreck the Conference. The Russian Government had therefore not put it on the programme, since it was no topic for fruitful discussion, and decided not to share in the debate. It would be best to reaffirm the *vœu* of 1899. The resolution was put to the meeting, and the President declared that the unanimity of the applause rendered a vote unnecessary. Thus the ideal of 1898 was again interred with regret or relief. The most important achievement of the Conference was to reform the laws of naval warfare and to approve the creation of an International Prize Court.

¹ "That the limitation of military charges which weigh on the world is highly desirable for increasing the material and moral well-being of humanity."

The signature of the Anglo-Russian Convention in August, 1907, was not immediately followed by a diplomatic partnership, and nobody interpreted it as precluding friendly relations with Germany. The invitation to the Kaiser to visit Windsor in the autumn of 1907, and his decision to spend a brief holiday in the mild air of the Solent, filled the friends of peace in both countries with satisfaction.

The
Windsor
Visit

On November 11 the *Hohenzollern* steamed into Portsmouth harbour, and in reply to an address by the Mayor of Windsor the Emperor remarked: "It seems like coming home again; I am always glad to be here." The climax of the visit was the ceremony at the Guildhall. The Emperor opened with a reference to his last visit in 1891, when he received the Freedom of the City. "When I addressed Sir Joseph Savory from this place sixteen years ago I said that my aim was above all the maintenance of peace. History, I venture to hope, will do me the justice that I have pursued this aim unswervingly ever since. The main prop and base for the peace of the world is the maintenance of good relations between our two countries, and I shall further strengthen them as far as lies in my power. The German nation's wishes coincide with mine." On November 15 Lord Curzon conferred the degree of Doctor of Civil Law on the Emperor. On November 18 he left Windsor for Highcliffe Castle, while the Empress returned to Germany.

The hopes expressed by the statesmen and journalists of both countries appeared to be fully realized. "The visit," declared Professor Schiemann in the *Kreuzzeitung*, "plainly demonstrated the wish for friendly relations between the two peoples. The English Press has shown real understanding for the Emperor's personality and the necessities of our policy, and we most gratefully accept the hospitality he has received. No real antagonism of interests exists." The *Vossische Zeitung*, which was in close touch with the Chancellor, declared that the visit set the seal on the reconciliation of the peoples, and there was no longer any

ground for attributing to Great Britain a policy of encirclement. Except the *National Review*, which sounded its usual note of strident discord, most of the Opposition leader writers were only a little less cordial than their Liberal comrades. The *Times*, though critical, was not blind to the possible significance of the occasion. "An essential condition for gaining our friendship is a conciliatory policy towards our friends. Germany, we have felt, is inclined to go any lengths, short of war, to secure an advantage. If Berlin sees that other nations have no desire to quarrel with her, and that she will gain nothing by attempting to interfere with existing alliances, there will be no further cause of trouble. The visit, while altering nothing in the nature of actual arrangements, may alter everything by throwing a new and more genial light on all the political problems of the day."

The unofficial verdict of the editorial chair was confirmed by the voice of the Chancelleries. "I wish to ex-

**The
Situation
Improves** press my satisfaction at the welcome of our Imperial couple by King and people," declared Prince Bülow in the Reichstag. "I

believe that, when the history of the last decade is written from the sources, it will appear that the tension between Germany and England, which has long oppressed the world, was due in the last resort to a great mutual misunderstanding. Each attributed to the other purposes which it did not entertain. To remove these misunderstandings and to clear away the resulting suspicion was beyond the power of the two Governments, if not filled with good will. Public opinion must help. That the friends of peace in England did not labour in vain is shown by the reception of our Imperial couple. I am certain that I speak for this House and the German people when I say that such peaceful and friendly feelings are shared by us and honestly reciprocated." "The whole country has felt pleasure," echoed Sir Edward Grey in addressing his constituents at Berwick. "It is bound to have a good effect. More than half the difficulties of

diplomacy disappear when the nations become convinced that neither of them intends ill to the other." The Foreign Secretary took occasion to reassure France by affirming the solidarity of the Entente, but repeated that it was not directed against any country. "I have no complaint to make that Germany is embarking on a very large naval programme; but we should of course have to increase our own. The position, however, is perfectly safe, at any rate for a year or two more." "By my visit to England," wrote the Kaiser to the Tsar on December 28, in one of the few passages in his correspondence not unfriendly to Great Britain, "I think I have removed many causes for misunderstanding and distrust, so that the atmosphere is cleared and the pressure on the safety-valve relieved."

On arriving at Windsor Baron von Schön, the Foreign Secretary, had declared to an interviewer that there was no intention to discuss concrete political questions. The Emperor, however, was **The Bagdad Railway** incapable of excluding high politics from his conversation. No project of Imperial policy was nearer his heart than the Bagdad Railway; and the British refusal to co-operate had been not only a sore disappointment but an effective obstacle to the success of the scheme. Though the French Government like the British had declined official participation in 1903, the French group of the Ottoman Bank continued to desire a share. But as the Bourse was closed to Bagdad shares this tie was of slender value. The German company, thrown back on its own resources, pushed on with the line. Though the concession of 1903 covered the whole distance from Konia to the Gulf, a Turkish guarantee was only available for two hundred kilometres to Bulgurlu, which were completed in 1904. In 1906 Helfferich was sent to Constantinople by the Deutsche Bank and the Anatolian Railway Company to arrange with Turkey for carrying the line through the Taurus Mountains and if possible to Aleppo. Though convinced that an understanding with England was imperative, he desired to show that Germany

could complete the enterprise alone, if necessary, and thus have something with which to bargain. Though the three per cent. increase of customs duties in 1907 was earmarked by Sir Edward Grey for Macedonian reform, other Turkish funds proved to be available, and the resumption of building in 1908 was reported to be practicable.

Such was the state of affairs when the Emperor, finding Mr. Haldane among the guests at Windsor, broached the subject of British co-operation.¹ "I said that I could not answer for the Foreign Office, but that, speaking as War Minister, one thing I knew we wanted was a 'gate' to protect India from troops coming down the new railway. He asked me what I meant by a 'gate,' and I said that meant the control of the section which would come near to the Persian Gulf. 'I will give you the gate,' replied the Emperor. I saw the Foreign Secretary, who, after taking time to think things over, gave me a memorandum he had drawn up. The substance of it was that the British Government would be very glad to discuss the Emperor's suggestion, but that it would be necessary, before making a settlement, to bring into the discussion France and Russia, whose interests also were involved. Some weeks afterwards difficulties were raised from Berlin. Germany said that she was ready to discuss with the British Government the question of the terminal portion of the railway, but she did not desire to bring the other two Powers into that discussion, because the Conference would probably fail and accentuate the differences between her and the other Powers. The matter thus came to an end." The veto of Prince Bülow on a four-Power conference in Berlin ended the brief period during which reconciliation was in the air.² Under the mellowing influence of a warm popular welcome the Emperor's instinctive dislike for English

¹ Haldane, "Before the War," ch. 2; *cf.* Schön, "Memoirs," 59-63.

² Schön, who discussed the question with Sir E. Grey, explains the veto by the argument that Germany would have found herself alone at the conference table against three Powers acting together and not favourably disposed.

ideas and institutions momentarily yielded to a revival of family associations and a desire to resume the political intimacy of the early years of his reign. If the British refusal of co-operation in 1903 was an error, the German refusal of British conditions in 1907 was a calamity.

The King's speech at the opening of the Session of 1908 began with a warmly phrased reference to the Kaiser's visit; but the sky quickly filled with driving clouds. "It was in the last weeks of February," writes Colonel Repington,¹ The
Tweedmouth
Letter "that I learnt that the Kaiser had addressed a letter to Lord Tweedmouth on naval policy. This letter appeared to me an insidious attempt to influence, in German interests, a British First Lord, and at a most critical juncture, namely, just before the estimates were coming on in Parliament." After taking a week to think it over, the *Times* published a brief letter from its Military Correspondent on March 6 with the title, "Under which King?" The Kaiser had addressed a letter to Lord Tweedmouth on British and German naval policy, and a reply had been dispatched. Both letter and reply should be laid before Parliament without delay. A shrill leader argued that the Emperor wished to cut down British shipbuilding in order to steal a march on our naval supremacy. "It was a purely private and personal communication," replied the Prime Minister to the critics, "conceived in an entirely friendly spirit. The answer was equally private and informal, and neither the letter nor the answer was communicated to the Cabinet. Before the letter arrived the Cabinet had come to a formal decision with regard to the Navy estimates."

Prince Bülow dealt with his own critics in a similar manner. "I cannot publish the letter because it is private. I wish I could. It could be signed by any of us, by any sincere friend of good relations."² Every sovereign has a

¹ "Vestigia," ch. 21.

² The Kaiser had shown the letter to Schön, who saw no reason to stop it.

right to address other statesmen. It is a gross libel to suggest that it is an attempt to influence the Minister in the interest of Germany, or a secret interference in the domestic affairs of Great Britain. Our Kaiser is the last man to imagine that the patriotism of an English Minister would accept foreign suggestions as to the naval budget. We wish to live in peace with England, and therefore feel it bitterly that a section of English publicists is always talking of the German danger, though the English fleet is largely superior and other nations have greater fleets and work out their development with no less zeal. Yet it is always Germany and only Germany against which public opinion on the other side of the Channel is excited by an unscrupulous polemic. It would be in the interest of tranquillization between the two lands and of the world if this polemic ceased. As we do not contest England's right to settle her standard without us seeing in it a threat against us, so little can others complain that we do not wish our shipbuilding to be considered as a challenge to England. In the Kaiser's letter one gentleman speaks to another, one seaman to another. The Kaiser highly values the honour to be an Admiral of the British fleet. That is the tendency and tone of the letter. It would have been very regrettable if his noble objects had been misconceived, and I note with satisfaction that such attempts have found almost universal reprobation."

The Navy estimates for 1908-9, providing for only two Dreadnoughts, testified to the conciliatory spirit of the Cabinet, which determined to utilize King Edward's visit to Cronberg, on his way to Marienbad, to open negotiations.¹ Sir Charles Hardinge explained the uneasiness of the Cabinet, pointed out the dangers of naval competition, and urged that friendly discussion should take place between the Governments. The Kaiser renewed

¹ In June Ballin and Sir Ernest Cassel had the first of a series of semi-official conversations on the naval rivalry, which were reported to the Kaiser and the King. See Huldermann, "Berlin," ch. 8.

the assurance of his friendliness, but impulsively declared that no dictation as to his naval armaments by a foreign Government could be tolerated, and that he would rather go to war than submit to it. Herr von Jenisch, who represented the German Foreign Office, was equally emphatic in declining the British overtures. The personal aspects of the visit were pleasant enough. "Uncle Bertie was all sunshine at Cronberg and in very good humour," reported the Kaiser to the Tsar on August 18.¹ King Edward proceeded from Cronberg to Ischl to congratulate Francis Joseph on his diamond jubilee. "He brought up the topic of the German fleet," writes the biographer of Aehrenthal, "explained the re-
The Ischl
Conversations
 sentiment it aroused in England, and asked his host to persuade Germany to limit her shipbuilding. Francis Joseph refused. The parting was friendly, but the conversation was a landmark. Aehrenthal would have preferred a smaller German fleet, but he could not interfere." The King had no other purpose than to diminish the tension which was beginning to threaten peace; but the Emperor remarked that his guest had gone away dissatisfied, and to suspicious eyes in Central Europe the King's action came to appear as another link in the chain of his machinations against the solidarity of the Triple Alliance. "He tried to detach me from the alliance with Germany," complained Francis Joseph to Conrad, "but I put him off."² The two monarchs never met again.

The publication of an undated and anonymous interview with the Kaiser in the *Daily Telegraph* on October 28, 1908, let loose a fresh hurricane. The conversation was published with his approval as a contribution to friendly relations, and it was a bitter disappointment to him that

¹ The Kaiser sent a long telegraphic report to the Chancellor in Norderney of his conversation with Sir Charles Hardinge. His tone in discussing the question of naval rivalry, declared the Kaiser, was sharp and almost dictatorial. The telegrams are printed in Hammann, "Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit," 141-4.

² Conrad, "Aus meiner Dienstzeit," I, 55.

it produced the opposite result.¹ Its dominant theme was his friendship for England, as evinced both openly and secretly during the Boer war and steadily maintained, although neither shared by his own people nor recognized by the object of his affections. While the *Daily Telegraph* informed its readers that the interview was the work of a retired diplomatist, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* issued a statement that the Emperor received from an English gentleman the manuscript of an article collating a series of conversations at various times and with various personages, with a request to sanction its publication in the interests of good relations. The Emperor forwarded it to the Chancellor at Norderney, who sent it to the Foreign Office for revision. As the Foreign Office raised no objection it was published. On seeing it in print, Bülow informed the Emperor that he had not previously read it and that, if he had known its contents, he would have deprecated publication.² At the same time the German Foreign Office informed Reuter that the Emperor had not expressed a wish for publication, but declared that he had no objection if the Foreign Office approved. The Kaiser explains in his "Memoirs" that he suggested certain omissions, which, by an oversight, were not made.

Surprise and indignation were universal in Germany, and in his speech in the Reichstag on November 10 the Chancellor made no attempt to conceal his emotion. Great damage, he confessed, had been done by the interview, important parts of which were incorrect. For instance, no plan of campaign for South Africa had been worked out—nothing but some purely academic "aphorisms" on

¹ The Kaiser read the interview before it appeared, and corrected one or two words so that his meaning should be made clearer. It is reprinted in the Appendix to D. J. Hill, "Impressions of the Kaiser."

² A representative of the Foreign Office read parts of it to the Chancellor, who ordered its careful examination by the Foreign Office. The most complete account of the incident is given in Spickernagel, "Fürst Bülow," ch. 5; cf. Schön, 102-9, and the Kaiser's "Memoirs," ch. 4.

war in general, of which the General Staff knew nothing. Germany had not been guilty of playing a double game. "We warned the Boers in October, 1897, that they would have to fight alone, and in May, 1899, we urged them directly and through the Dutch Government to arrange matters, as war meant certain defeat." Nor was the picture of the proposed intervention by Russia and France correct. It was also untrue that the majority of Germans were hostile to England, and Japan could rest assured that Germany had no adventurous aims in the Far East. "If these revelations had appeared singly and correctly, the sensation would have been slight. For two decades the Kaiser has laboured, often under very difficult circumstances, to bring about friendly relations. The passionate sympathy of our people for the Boers led to unjust and violent attacks, and from England have also come unjust attacks on ourselves. Our aims were misunderstood, and hostile plans attributed to us which never entered our heads. The Kaiser, convinced that this situation was a misfortune for both lands and a danger to the civilized world, has stuck to his guns. Any doubt as to the purity of his intentions and his patriotism is unjust. I quite understand that, just because he knew himself to have striven zealously and sincerely, he felt pained by the constant attacks and suspicions of his naval plans. The knowledge that the publication has not produced the desired result in England, and has aroused excitement and painful regret in Germany, will lead him henceforth to observe even in private conversation the reserve which is essential to the unity of our policy and the authority of the Crown. If it were otherwise, neither I nor my successors could carry our burden. For the mistake I accept full responsibility. The officials in the Foreign Office trusted that I had read the document, as I read most things. I at once offered to resign, and the hardest resolve in my life was to remain at the Kaiser's wish. We must not, however, make a misfortune into a catastrophe. The mischief is not so great that it cannot

The
Chancellor
Explains

be made good. But no one must forget the warning that we have all received."¹

The *Daily Telegraph* interview, like the letter to Lord Tweedmouth, however well intentioned, increased the *malaise* which it was intended to dispel. When the Kaiser confessed that his subjects as a whole were unfriendly to England, he was generally believed, and when he affirmed his own undeviating good will he failed to carry conviction. Moreover, the rashness of his language deepened the impression already prevalent throughout Europe that his personality was an explosive element in world politics. A second shock of a similar character was narrowly averted by the suppression of an interview with an American journalist, Dr. Hale, on the Kaiser's yacht, which had been passed by the Foreign Office and was about to appear in the December issue of the *Century Magazine*.²

British Apprehensions While Cabinet Ministers expressed their confidence in the good will of Germany, a growing number of observers came to regard a collision as probable if not inevitable. From the opening of the century Mr. Leo Maxse had proclaimed in the *National Review* that Germany was the enemy, and that the safety of the country depended on close association with France and Russia. Lord Cromer warned the Government in the House of Lords that "their main duty was to make provision betimes for the European conflict which might not improbably be forced upon us before many years." During his cure at Marienbad in 1908 King Edward received a visit from Clemenceau, the French Premier, who argued that the Territorial Army was a plaything, and urged the creation of a national army. On November 23 Lord Roberts delivered a speech

¹ Cf. Bassermann's speech in his "Reden," I, and Hammann, "Um den Kaiser," ch. 6. The Crown Prince describes his father's physical and moral collapse at this crisis and his anger with Bülow.—"Memoirs," 87-8. The Kaiser bitterly complained that the Chancellor had "betrayed" him.

² According to D. J. Hill, "Impressions of the Kaiser," 96, the printed copies were bought up, taken out to sea by a German warship, and used to stoke the furnaces

in the House of Lords which succeeded in making compulsory service a living issue. "There lies in front of us one of the strangest spectacles ever witnessed. Within a few hours' steaming of our coasts there is a people numbering over sixty millions, our most active rivals in commerce and the greatest military Power in the world, adding to an overwhelming military strength a naval force which she is resolutely and rapidly increasing, while we are taking no military precautions in response. Words cannot express the responsibility which lies on the members of the Legislature. We are trustees for the future of the Empire. It is my absolute belief that, without a military organization more adequate to the certain perils of the future, our Empire will fall from us and our power will pass away."

While Lord Roberts was proclaiming his fears and propounding his remedies, Sir John Fisher secretly proposed to avert the menace by very different means. As far back as 1905, on his appointment to office, the First Sea Lord, in a written memorandum, predicted an Anglo-German war in August, 1914;¹ and on March 14, 1908, he wrote to King Edward, "That we have eventually to fight Germany is just as sure as anything can be." "Early in 1908," he writes, "I had a long secret conversation with the King, in which I urged that we should 'Copenhagen' the German fleet at Kiel, à la Nelson, and I lamented that we possessed neither a Pitt nor a Bismarck to give the order." The criminal design of seizing the fleet of a foreign Power in time of peace, without even Canning's excuse in 1807, was never communicated to Ministers. "I don't want to disclose my plan of campaign to anyone," wrote Sir John to Lord Esher on January 17, 1908, "not even Campbell-Bannerman himself. The only man who knows is Sir Arthur Wilson, and he is as close as wax. The whole success will depend on suddenness and unexpectedness."² The reception of

Sir John
Fisher

¹ "Memories," 64.

² *Ibid.*, 18-19, 183.

the plan by those to whom it was confided did not encourage its author to admit the public into the circle of his initiates.

The tension was recognized and deplored by no one more than the German Ambassador in London, who complained that the provocative methods by which the fleet was boomed got on English nerves. "Count Wolff-Metternich," writes Tirpitz, "watched this increasing fear of Germany with growing anxiety. Till then he had taken up the right standpoint that the English must and would accustom themselves to our Navy Bill. It is intelligible, if not quite excusable, that under the strong pressure of English circles around him in 1908 he should begin to lose his sure judgment of the deeper reasons of Anglo-German jealousy.¹ His reports caused Bülow to enter into detailed discussions with me during the winter. Since January, 1909, I declared my readiness to allow a proportion which would secure a definite British superiority for all time." There was only one path back to confidence and cordiality, but the Kaiser and his third Chancellor stubbornly refused to take it. "I am asked why we oppose limitations," declared Bülow in the Reichstag on December 10, 1908. "The technical difficulties are very great. It is not only the number and size of the battleships. How is one to reckon the interests of each Power at sea? And what of the problem of inventions? Besides, we are in the middle of Europe, in the most strategically unfavourable position on the world map. The present situation in Europe is not very comfortable. Our position would be bad indeed, and the peace imperilled if we reduced our armaments below the level demanded by our position in Europe. Finally, our fleet is determined by a law, solely to assure the defence of our coasts and our commerce." Meanwhile the construction of a mighty fleet was pressed steadily forward to the strident accom-

¹ Schön describes the conflicts between Tirpitz and the Ambassador, and adds that the Admiral often enforced his views by threats of resignation.

paniment of the Pan-German orchestra, and talk of war became common in both countries.¹

The relations of Great Britain with Germany in the earlier stages of the Bosnian crisis were less strained than with Austria, for everyone was aware that she had to stand by her ally. The inevitable friction was eased by the official visit of the King and Queen to Berlin in February, 1909, the novel King
Edward's
Visit feature of which was the King's visit to the Rathaus, where he spoke gratefully of his "splendid reception" by the municipality. Controversial topics were studiously avoided. The King's Speech on the opening of Parliament declared that he was much impressed and gratified by the warmth of his reception by all classes of the community. "In its extremely harmonious course," declared the Chancellor, "it was a happy event. The warm welcome they received here, its echo in England, above all, the King's words of sincere love of peace and friendship, have shown once again to both peoples how much cause they have to respect each other and to co-operate in peaceful work. Germany is England's best customer, and England is ours."

A few days before the German ultimatum to Russia ended the Bosnian crisis, British nerves received an unexpected shock. The Navy Law of 1908, reducing the life of capital ships from twenty-five to twenty years, conformed to the general practice and excited no alarm in Whitehall; but in the autumn the Admiralty heard that the programme of 1909-10 was being anticipated, and in January, 1909, Sir Edward Grey informed the German Government that in consequence the British estimates would be considerably increased. The Admiralty's proposal for meeting the new German Navy Bill was to lay down six Dreadnoughts in 1909-10, and a similar number

¹ Pan-Germanism may be studied in "Zwanzig Jahre Aldeutscher Arbeit und Kämpfe," 1910; W. T. Arnold, "German Ambitions"; Charles Andler, "Le Pangermanisme"; Chéradame, "l'Europe et la Question d'Autriche," and "The Pan-German Plot Unmasked"; Seton-Watson, "German, Slav and Magyar"; Nippold, "Deutscher Chauvinismus."

in the two succeeding years. A battle raged within and without the Cabinet; but the First Lord emerged victorious, since his defeat would have involved the resignation of the Foreign Secretary. Estimates were indeed for four; but

The Naval Estimates it was added that the Government "might find it necessary to make preparations for the rapid construction of four more large armoured ships." Mysterious whispers of coming trouble had filled the lobbies during the opening weeks of the session; but few were prepared for the dramatic scene when Mr. McKenna rose on March 16. "The safety of the Empire," he began, "stands above all considerations." For the first time the estimates were justified by selecting Germany as the standard by which to measure our requirements, and British and German Dreadnoughts were balanced against each other down the vista of the coming years. Mr. Balfour made his hearers' flesh creep by suggesting that our rival might possess twenty-five ships in April, 1912. The Prime Minister, while rejecting such fantastic exaggerations, confessed that seventeen ships in April, 1912, were a possibility and thirteen a certainty. A wave of panic swept over the country. Men began to speak openly of war as possible and even probable, and the legend of stealthy acceleration seemed proof positive of a fell design to wrest the trident from Britannia's hands.

Sir Edward accepted the explanations and assurances, "some vouchsafed before March 16 but more precisely after it," that there had been no acceleration in the date for the completion of the vessels; but the public continued to believe that Germany had tried to steal a march on her rival. The political result of the crisis was deplorable; but the British navy profited by the panic, for six of the eight vessels of the 1909-1910 programme were super-Dreadnoughts, with 13.5-inch guns instead of 12-inch. This stroke delayed the construction of the German vessels that had already been laid down; and when the danger-point of the spring of 1912 was reached, Germany possessed

not the thirteen monsters which Mr. Asquith had foretold as a certainty, but nine. Mr. McKenna, on the other hand, followed up his eight Dreadnoughts by five in each of the two succeeding years, thus completing in his three years of office the programme of eighteen which he had originally proposed to his colleagues.

On the same day that Prince Bülow was disclaiming acceleration, Mr. Arthur Lee moved a Vote of Censure on the Government for not at once laying down eight Dreadnoughts. In a weighty speech the Foreign Secretary replied that he was not sure that the four extra ships would be required, and that in any case they need not be ordered before July, as they would not be completed any sooner. But he made no attempt to disguise the serious nature of the problem. "The situation is grave. A new situation in this country is created by the German programme, whether it is carried out quickly or slowly. When it is completed Germany will have a fleet of thirty-three Dreadnoughts—the most powerful the world has ever seen. That imposes on us the necessity, of which we now are at the beginning—except so far as we have Dreadnoughts already—of rebuilding the whole of our fleet." The speech concluded with the sensible suggestion that future panics should be obviated by the Admiralties exchanging information and providing facilities for inspection by Naval Attachés; but the proposal was declined by the German Government. It was announced in July that the four contingent Dreadnoughts would be laid down, and the decision was received almost without protest. "Armaments are increasing," declared Lord Rosebery in an impressive speech at a banquet to Colonial journalists on July 9; "this calm before the storm is terrifying." The rejection by the House of Lords of the Declaration of London, which had been drawn up during the winter by naval experts to assist the projected Appeal Prize Court at The Hague, was due to the growing apprehension in Conservative circles that Britain might before long find herself

**Vote of
Censure**

at war, and that it would be unwise to tie her hands by the surrender of any belligerent rights.

In his "Imperial Germany," published in 1913, Prince Bülow explained the ideas which had governed him in the creation of a large navy. It was a delicate task, he declares, to awaken public opinion to its necessity without arousing patriotic feeling to such an extent as to damage irreparably Germany's relations with England, against whom her sea power would for years still be insufficient, and at whose mercy she lay in 1897 like butter before the knife. "It was both necessary and desirable for us to be so strong that no sea power could attack us without grave risk, so that we might be free to protect our oversea interests, independently of the influence and choice of other sea powers. Our vigorous national development, mainly in the industrial sphere, forced us to cross the ocean. For the sake of our interests, as well as of our honour and dignity, we were obliged to see that we won for our international policy the same independence that we had secured for our European policy. I have always been convinced that a conflict would never come to pass—

"i. If we built a fleet which could not be attacked without very grave risk.

"ii. If we did not indulge in undue and unlimited shipbuilding.

"iii. If we allowed no Power to injure our reputation or our dignity.

"iv. If we allowed nothing to make an irremediable breach between us and England.

"v. If we kept calm and cool, and neither injured England nor ran after her."

The Prince's pacific maxims were negative in character, and the mere fact that he and his master set their faces against the limitation of naval armaments was fatal to the confidence which is the only sure foundation of peace.

The most brilliant of Bismarck's successors lacked the master's capacity to measure the ultimate consequences of his policy. *Weltpolitik* was the fashion among the Great Powers, and it was natural that he should desire Germany to play her part; but to the Chancellor *Weltpolitik* meant the rapid construction of a mighty fleet in addition to the strongest army in the world. Though there is no reason to attribute to him aggressive designs, his policy was a challenge to our secular practice of maintaining our safety against invasion and the provisioning of our people by the possession of an unconquerable fleet. The Iron Chancellor gained a colonial empire without a fleet and without firing a shot. If the growth of new ambitions demanded a departure from the policy of his later years, his successors should have followed his practice of securing one object and incurring one risk at a time. William II was surrounded by men who agreed in desiring a forward movement, some looking to the Turkish Empire, others to the Atlantic. Each had its prizes and its risks. It was the task of statesmanship to choose between the Eastern and Western policy.¹ It is the supreme condemnation of the Kaiser and Bülow that, in addition to thwarting Russia in the Near East, they simultaneously antagonized Great Britain by threatening her naval supremacy.

Bethmann-Hollweg inherited no bed of roses when he succeeded Bülow as Chancellor in July, 1909. "Whether Germany might have secured a different world-constellation at the opening of the century," he writes in his pathetic "Reflections," "by accepting the English approaches and reaching a naval understanding, need not be discussed. In 1909 the main lines were laid down. England had taken up her position beside France and

¹ The Kaiser ("Memoirs," ch. 14) argues that his policy involved no risks at all; but the necessity of a choice is clearly recognized in the memoirs of Tirpitz, representing one school, and Bernstorff, representing the other. Johannes Haller's brilliant little book, "Die Ära Bülow," contains an annihilating criticism of Bülow's policy. Bülow defended himself in an interesting letter of June 21, 1919, reprinted in Spickernagel's "Fürst Bülow," 92-102.

Russia, while Germany had settled her naval programme and developed a Near Eastern policy. Sharp words had been exchanged, and the atmosphere was frosty and charged with suspicion. Prince Bülow informed me that the attitude of England was an object of grave anxiety, though he hoped it might yield to treatment. The fleet was Germany's darling. In it the forward-striving forces of the nation seemed to be most vividly incarnated. Apprehensions as to the grave international complications which arose from our navy policy were smothered by a robust agitation. Its direction was in the hands of a man who claimed political authority. Where differences between the navy and the political direction occurred, public opinion was almost invariably on the side of the former. The weighing of international factors appeared as kowtowing to the foreigner. The Pan-German movement had already begun to secure a footing among the Conservatives and National Liberals—not a wish for war but an arrogance which complicated my task.”¹ The Chancellor's dislike of Tirpitz was heartily reciprocated. “Prince Bülow,” writes the Admiral, “inspired in me a different feeling of security than his suspicious and inexperienced successor. The former gave the navy his full sympathy; but after his resignation I had to fight for the most necessary credits till I was exhausted—less with the Reichstag, which showed growing insight, than with the Treasury and the Chancellor, who suppressed a great deal that was desirable for Germany's armament.” The Pan-Germans made no secret of their hostility. “In Bethmann's eyes,” writes Reventlow, “the first aim of German diplomacy was to secure British neutrality in the event of a Continental war. He did not share the conviction of the necessity of a powerful German fleet, believing that its influence made rather for war than for peace.”

Though the new Chancellor was powerless to alter the course of the ship, a more accommodating spirit entered

¹ “Reflections,” I, ch. 1.

the Wilhelmstrasse; and Kiderlen-Wächter, whom he called to office despite the Kaiser's disapproval, and who exercised more power than was usually allowed to the Foreign Secretary, shared the view that Germany should be satisfied with a fleet which did not arouse British hostility. "The army preserves peace," he observed to Reventlow; "the fleet endangers it." The Chancellor was convinced of the good will of the British Government, and determined on a frank interchange of views. He declares that he found no obstacle in the highest quarter. "As we could not dissolve the Franco-Russian partnership, we could only obviate its danger by an understanding with England. Not only did the Kaiser agree with this view, but he repeatedly indicated it to me as the only possible policy. In the opening days of August I began discussions on the fleet with Sir E. Goschen. The negotiations led to no result, as the London Cabinet hardly showed interest in their success, and no formula was found to satisfy the Admiralties." The Kaiser declares in his "Memoirs" that he supported these endeavours, though without much hope of success.

"The Chancellor," relates Sir Edward Cook,¹ "sent for the British Ambassador, to whom he said that he realized that the naval question was regarded by England as the chief obstacle to really cor-
Naval Negotiations
dial relations between the two countries; that the German Government were now ready to make proposals for a naval arrangement, but that discussion on that subject could profitably be undertaken only as part of a general understanding based on a conviction that neither country had hostile or aggressive designs against the other. The British Government were naturally much gratified by the Chancellor's messages and met his overtures cordially. The naval question was the dominant one for them, but they were ready to consider with the utmost sympathy any proposals for a general understanding so long as these were not inconsistent with Britain's

¹ "How Britain strove for Peace."

existing obligations to other foreign Powers. The naval proposals made by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg were somewhat vague. There could be no question, it was explained, of any departure from the German Navy Law as a whole, as that would meet with insuperable opposition in the Reichstag; but the German Government were willing to discuss the question of 'retarding the rate' of building new ships. Precise explanation of this formula was not forthcoming. What was understood to be meant was that the total number of ships to be completed by 1918 would not be reduced, but that the number of capital ships might be reduced in the earlier years and equivalently raised in the later. There would, it will be seen, be no ultimate reduction of expenditure, and no definite reduction of the total German programme.

"The basis of naval negotiation suggested by the Chancellor was thus undefined, slender, shadowy. The *quid pro quo* which he required for it was positive and substantial. Great Britain was to be party to an agreement declaring that (1) neither country had any idea of aggression, and that neither in fact would attack the other; and (2) that in the event of an attack made on either Power by a third Power or group of Powers, the Power not attacked should stand aside.

"To the first condition there was and could be no objection; to the second, the objection from the British point of view was serious. If Great Britain accepted the German condition, it became practically certain, owing to the general position of the European Powers, that she would be bound to stand aside from any Continental struggle. In any such struggle Germany could arrange without difficulty that the formal inception of hostilities should rest with Austria. If Austria and Russia were at war, Germany was pledged to support Austria; while as soon as Russia was attacked by two Powers, France was bound to come to her assistance. The giving of the pledge proposed by the German Government would, therefore,

**The
Neutrality
Problem**

prevent Great Britain from supporting France, no matter what the reasons of the conflict or its results might be. Thus French trust and good will would be forfeited, since Great Britain could be of no assistance to France, should Germany determine to press to the ultimate issue of war any demands she might choose to make. It could not be overlooked by Ministers acting as trustees for their country's future that the period of forced British neutrality, involved in the Chancellor's proposals, might be used by Germany strenuously to consolidate her supremacy in Continental Europe. Great Britain would be a paralysed spectator, until Germany were free to devote undivided strength to reducing her, the only remaining independent factor in Europe. Moreover, the German proposal involved, in the second place, a repudiation in certain events of England's treaty obligations to Belgium. Suppose Germany in a war with France were to invade Belgium, England would have been prevented by this proposed agreement with Germany from vindicating Belgium's neutrality. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the autumn of 1909 the British Government declined the German Government's proposal. Politically, it was open to the gravest objections; on the naval side, it offered no substantial reduction of naval expenditure."

If Tirpitz is to be believed, the Chancellor found in the Minister of Marine a partner in his endeavours. "From the first days of his taking office I supported him in his endeavour to meet the English in various matters brought forward by them. In particular I influenced the Emperor in this direction, and I left nothing undone for the negotiations concerning a naval agreement. Since January, 1909, I had been ready for any agreed proportion. As a starting point I mentioned 3:4, but later declared myself ready for 2:3, and finally settled on 10:16. Even though Churchill left certain back doors open which secured a greater superiority, I passed them over, convinced that the completion of our Navy Bill would fulfil the defensive

**Attitude of
Tirpitz**

purpose which was all we had ever aimed at." But though he supported Bethmann's efforts, he had no belief in their success. "In the course of these conversations I received the impression that the English Government was not serious about a real naval understanding, but that it was only concerned to confirm our Foreign Office in the legend that the fleet was to blame for everything. One of the chief supporters of the idea that only the fleet prevented Germany going arm-in-arm with England in world-politics was the Secretary to the Embassy in London, Kühlmann. Bethmann's fundamental error was the belief that certain concessions in naval affairs, little courtesies, so to speak, might alter our relations. A few ships more or less were all the same to the English. It was clear that they preferred us to have not even a fleet fifty or a hundred per cent. weaker than theirs. We could only obtain recognition by abandoning the building of the fleet altogether."

In May, 1910, the Kaiser came to London for King Edward's funeral, and his manifest sympathy was warmly appreciated. Negotiations were resumed in the summer, the course of which was subsequently described by Sir Edward Cook. "Speaking in Parliament in July, 1910, Mr. Asquith said: 'We have approached the German Government. They have found themselves unable to do anything. They cannot, without an Act of Parliament, repeal their Naval Law. They tell us, and no doubt with great truth, they would not have the support of public opinion in Germany to a modified programme.' The Chancellor replied to this speech that the German Government had not opposed a *non possumus* to the British approaches; they could not agree to reduce naval construction, but they were ready to discuss temporary retardation. The precise meaning of this proposal was again not defined, but the British Government at once responded to the overtures, and in August, abandoning their previous contention that any naval agreement must be based upon a reduction of the existing German naval pro-

Negotiations
of 1910

gramme, they intimated their readiness (1) to discuss the suggestion of temporary retardation; (2) to negotiate a naval agreement on the basis that the existing German programme should not be increased, and that information should be exchanged with regard to the actual progress of shipbuilding in each country; (3) with regard to a political understanding, to give assurances that in any agreement between themselves and any other Power there was nothing directed against Germany, and that they themselves had no hostile intentions respecting her.

"The reply of the German Government was received in October, and negotiations continued till the spring of 1911.

"(1) With regard to 'temporary retardation,' this proposal, upon which the Chancellor had relied to justify his denial of a *non possumus* attitude, was withdrawn in May, 1911, a withdrawal which was strange, since the reason given (namely, the importance of feeding the shipbuilding industry with a definite quantity of Government orders) would have been equally cogent against the offer when first made.

"(2) With regard to the negotiation of a naval agreement on the basis of no increase in the German programme and of exchange of information, the German Government agreed to discuss the latter subject; negotiations continued for many months: the final British memorandum, accepting the German conditions on all essential points, was communicated at the end of January, 1912, and was left unanswered. As for the basis of no increase in the German programme, the German Government in October, 1910, asked what equivalent engagement would be made by Great Britain. The British Government were considering their reply, when the German Emperor informed the British Ambassador that he would on no account ever consent to any agreement binding Germany not to enlarge her naval programme. The discrepancy thus apparent between the attitude of the Emperor and the Chancellor respectively was not cleared up, but in May, 1911,

The
Kaiser
Obstructs

the German Government intimated their readiness to examine any proposals for a mutual reduction of expenditure on armaments not involving a departure from the requirements of the Navy Law. The withdrawal at the same time of the offer of temporary retardation did not inspire confidence, and the professed readiness of the German Government to negotiate a naval agreement on a fresh basis had been preceded by a very uncompromising official declaration in the Reichstag.

"On March 13, 1911, Sir Edward Grey made a speech in Parliament indicating between the lines the course of negotiations with Germany, defining the limits within which alone those negotiations could hopefully proceed, and declaring it to be a paradox that while sentiments of friendship were sincere armaments should increase. This speech met with a favourable reception in the German Press; but, on the subject coming up in the Reichstag, the Chancellor took occasion to apply cold water. 'I consider,' he said, 'any control as absolutely

**Bethmann's
Scepticism**

impracticable, and every attempt in that direction would lead to nothing but continual mutual distrust and perpetual friction. Who would be content to weaken his means of defence without the absolute certainty that his neighbour was not secretly exceeding the proportion allowed to him in the disarmament agreement? No, gentlemen, anyone who seriously considers the question of universal disarmament must inevitably come to the conclusion that it is insoluble so long as men are men and States are States.'

"(3) While Germany was thus alternately coming forward and drawing back on the naval side of the negotiations with England, the German Government continued to attach great importance to a political understanding. They laid emphasis on this point in their reply of October, 1910, and when negotiations were resumed after the General Election in this country, the British Government assented to the German view that some wider agreement of

a political nature should be a condition precedent to a naval arrangement, and submitted suggestions as a basis for discussing such a political agreement. An arrangement, as foreshadowed by the Chancellor, embodying a general political formula, might be considered more comprehensive, far-reaching, and intimate than any arrangement, short of actual alliance, that England had with any other Power; and such an arrangement, therefore, might cause misunderstanding in France and Russia. The British agreements with France and with Russia were not based on a general political formula; they were settlements of specific questions, and the settlements had transformed relations of friction and pinpricks into friendship. There was nothing exclusive in those friendships, and the British Government had seen with satisfaction the settlement of some questions between France and Germany and between Russia and Germany. Why should not something of the same kind be attempted between England and Germany? The reply of the German Government (May, 1911) to these suggestions seemed not unfavourable, though the withdrawal of the previous naval offer was discouraging. The German Government declared that the British suggestions might form a suitable basis for an agreement, though they repeated their preference for a general political formula."

The tension seemed to be growing less acute. In May the Kaiser accepted King George's invitation to attend the unveiling of the Memorial to Queen Victoria, and was received with the usual cordiality. "I observed with my own eyes," reported Count Lalaing, the Belgian Minister, "that the welcome of the public became warmer from day to day. The death of King Edward seems to have brought about a slight *détente* in Anglo-German relations."¹ But at this moment a rash resolve at Berlin sundered the two nations once again, and plunged Europe into a crisis even more alarming than that of 1908.

The
Kaiser's
Visit

¹ Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," III, 245-6.

CHAPTER XIV

AGADIR

THE Conference of Algeciras was followed by improvement neither in the relations between France and Germany nor in the internal conditions of Morocco.¹

France in Morocco

The kernel of the Treaty was the power given to France and Spain to provide police for eight ports under a Swiss inspector; but recruiting and instruction proceeded very slowly and were never fully carried out. A French official was shot at Tangier, and a French doctor was murdered in Marakesh. In April, 1907, General Lyautey occupied the town of Ujda on the Algerian frontier "until reparation was secured." In June Sir H. Maclean, instructor to the Moorish army, was kidnapped by Raisuli. In July some navvies employed on the port works at Casablanca were murdered for endangering the cemetery, and the attack was followed by the bombardment of the town and the occupation of the surrounding territory. France was now entrenched both in the east and west of the Promised Land. Drawing strength from the hostility to foreign encroachments, Mulai Hafid raised the banner of revolt against his brother Abdul Aziz in the south, and was proclaimed Sultan at Fez in January, 1908. Abdul Aziz was crushed, and by the end of the year Mulai Hafid was recognized by the Powers after promising to respect the

¹ See the *Livres Jaunes*, "Affaires du Maroc," 4 vols., 1906-12; Tardieu, "La Conférence d'Algéciras" (edition of 1909) and "Le Mystère d'Agadir"; Louis Maurice Bompard, "La Politique Marocaine de l'Allemagne"; Caillaux, "Agadir"; Mermeix, "Chronique de l'an 1911"; Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir"; Morel, "Morocco in Diplomacy"; Bethmann-Hollweg, "Reflections," I, ch. 2; W. B. Harris, "Morocco That Was"; Hammann, "Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit"; Siebert, ch. 10.

Act of Algeciras. He, however, failed to restore order. The Riff tribesmen defied him in the north and a new pretender, El Roghi, in the south.

In 1907 Pichon, Clemenceau's Foreign Minister, encouraged conversations between Raynaud, the editor of *La Dépêche Marocaine*, and the German Legation at Tangier, which showed the possibility of an entente on the basis of the political *désintéressement* of Germany in return for a share in important economic enterprises; and in January, 1908, Jules Cambon reported that the German Foreign Secretary desired to discuss an economic entente. In March Baron Schön informed the Reichstag that Franco-German relations were normal and even friendly, and that Germany fully recognized the loyalty of France to the Act of 1906. But these approaches were rudely interrupted in September by an incident which for some weeks threatened the peace of the world. Some German residents in Casablanca, aided by their Consul, had established in 1906 an agency for organizing desertions from the Foreign Legion, and in September, 1908, it persuaded two Germans, a German naturalized as a French citizen, a Russian, a Swiss and an Austrian to desert. The Consul provided them with civilian clothing, hid them in the city for some days, and intended to embark them on a German steamer lying off the port. Early in the morning of September 25 they were accompanied to the harbour by a member of the Consulate; but the boat in which they embarked capsized and they were forced to return to the shore. The Commandant of the harbour noticed them and gave orders to arrest them. A brief struggle ensued, and the German Consul loudly demanded the restoration of the three Germans.

The
Casablanca
Deserters

When the Governments were informed, Austria declined to take action; but Baron Lancken appeared at the Quai d'Orsay to demand "prompt and complete satisfaction." The Minister replied by demanding that the German Consul should be disavowed and censured. A

fortnight later the German Government proposed arbitration; but when Pichon accepted, Berlin demanded the punishment of the port authorities at Casablanca and the release of the three deserters, after which the German Consul would also be punished. Pichon replied that the matter was now referred to arbitration. The German Ambassador again demanded the prompt liberation of the three Germans and compensation for the two *employés* of the German Consulate who had been injured. Next day Bülow informed the French Ambassador that unless the second demand was conceded the Kaiser would recall his Ambassador. Pichon stood firm, and replied that he must await the arbitral award. On November 6 Bülow made a final and equally fruitless attempt to procure an apology for the arrest of the deserters before the arbitration began. "King Edward," writes Tardieu from inside knowledge of the French Foreign Office, "let the French Government know that he would place at its disposal on the Continent, if peace were broken, five divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry to hold the left wing in the second line." On November 7 the British and Russian Ambassadors informed the Quai d'Orsay that their Governments fully approved the action and shared the policy of France. Two days later the Austrian Ambassador told Pichon that his master had urged the Kaiser, who was at that moment his guest, to settle the question amicably, and the Kaiser had agreed. The crisis was over, and Kiderlen-Wächter and Jules Cambon proceeded to sign a declaration regretting the events of September 25 and referring the questions of fact as well as of law to arbitration. The verdict of The Hague Tribunal censured "the grave and manifest fault" of the Chancellor of the German Consulate in aiding the escape of the non-German legionaries. The French authorities had acted correctly, except that needless violence had been displayed in the arrest of the deserters.¹

**The Crisis
Ends**

¹ Schön, "Memoirs," 90-3.

The decision of the German Government not to push the Casablanca quarrel to extremes was in part due to the ferment provoked by the *Daily Telegraph* interview and to the preoccupation of the Central Powers with the Bosnian crisis. "Kiderlen visited me to-day on behalf of Baron Schön," reported Jules Cambon on January 26. "He renewed the assurance that Germany had only economic aims in Morocco. I said that France would emphasize her interest in the integrity of Morocco, and Germany her will not to thwart the political interests of France. Both would express their desire, while keeping in view the special and recognized position of France, to see their nationals associated in economic enterprises." On February 3 the formula was settled, and Jules Cambon, its author, travelled to Paris to secure the approval of the Government. On February 8 the declaration was signed. "The Governments, animated by an equal desire to facilitate the execution of the Act of Algeciras, have agreed to define the meaning they attach to its clauses in order to avoid all cause of future misunderstanding. Consequently France, entirely attached to the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Morocco, resolved to safeguard economic equality and therefore not to thwart German commercial and industrial interests; and Germany, pursuing merely economic interests, and recognizing that the special political interests of France are closely bound up with the consolidation of order and internal peace and resolved not to thwart those interests, declare that they will not pursue or encourage any measure of a kind to create in their favour or the favour of any Power an economic privilege, and that they will seek to associate their nationals in the affairs which they may be able to secure." On the same day letters were exchanged between Cambon and Schön declaring that "the political *désintéressement* of Germany" did not affect the positions already held by her nationals, but implied that they would not compete for posts in the public services of a political

The
Morocco
Pact

character, and that when their interests were associated it would be recognized that French interests were the most important.

The agreement appeared to embody a profound modification of Franco-German relations. Pichon declared that it removed all causes of conflict in Morocco, and Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador, cheerfully added that a lasting entente had been secured. The Kaiser congratulated Schön, and Bülow informed the Reichstag that it assured France her legitimate political influence in Morocco without allowing her to appropriate the country. "I rejoice," declared Aehrenthal to the French Ambassador, "and so do all my countrymen, whose cordial sympathy with you grows daily stronger." Similar felicitations came from Tittoni at Rome. In informing Sir Edward Grey of the Declaration, Paul Cambon declared that it in no way infringed the rights and interests of other nations, and the Foreign Secretary replied that the Government were glad to see the end of the disagreement. Russia, on the other hand, neither felt nor feigned satisfaction, for she saw in the Morocco entente fresh evidence of French reluctance to back up her ally in the Bosnian crisis.¹

"We dream of no new departure," declared Pichon. "Our rights and interests are to-day what they were yesterday. We have no intention of going beyond the limits fixed at Algeciras." But this was to understate the case. The Convention, while paying lip homage to the Treaty of 1906, increased French freedom of action. "We can now cash the Act of Algeciras," declared the *Journal des Débats*. Even in France, however, the agreement did not escape criticism. "One is struck by the vagueness of the formulas and the engagements," comments Caillaux. "Germany did not recognize our

¹ In July, 1911, Izvolsky denounced the pact of 1909 to Caillaux; and Troubetzkoï condemns it as the fraternization of the seconds while the duel was in progress.

full liberty of action, and France conceded a heavy economic mortgage."

Germany promptly invited a technical discussion, and a French expert was dispatched to Berlin, where it appeared that she desired to cancel the Algeciras principle of public adjudication.¹ France was, of course, at liberty to associate England and Spain in her enterprises, but their share must come out of the French quota. Despite Germany's virtuous championship of equal opportunity in Morocco, the country was henceforth to be a preserve for herself and France. The Berlin *aide-mémoire*, summarizing the results, reached Paris on June 9; but Pichon, pressed to sacrifice old friends to the new partner, postponed his reply till October, when, despite a few reserves, he accepted the German invitation. The spoils to be divided consisted of mines, public works and railways, and in all three difficulties quickly arose. The Union des Mines had The
Morocco
Mines been founded in 1907 by Schneider, Creusot and Krupp; but nothing had been done owing to opposition from the Mannesmann Brothers, who advanced money to Mulai Hafid while Pretender and obtained mining concessions in return. In 1909 negotiations between the two groups began in Paris, but the Mannesmann claims were so excessive that no settlement had been reached before the Agadir crisis.² In the domain of public works the progress was no less disappointing. French and German capitalists created a Société Marocaine des Travaux Publics, and projects of water supply and tramways, lighthouses and harbour works, were elaborated. In the first plan, that for lighthouses, the British Government protested against the allocation of the contract to the Société, and claimed open tender under the Act of Algeciras; and the project accordingly lapsed.

The construction of railways was delayed by the

¹ The attempts at co-operation in Morocco and in the French Congo are fully described by Tardieu, "Le Mystère d'Agadir."

² They were a thorn in the flesh to Schön.—"Memoirs," 115-18.

French claim that certain lines were strategic. The military authorities had long demanded lines from Casablanca into the Shawia, and from the Algerian frontier to Ujda, and credits were voted for their construction by military engineers. In January, 1911, Schön informed M. Pichon that he did not object to railways in the military zones of occupation if they were open to trade on equal terms for all; but he claimed that a special agreement was necessary if the line was built beyond Ujda towards Fez, and suggested the employment of the Société and the prior construction of a line from Tangier to Fez. Pichon was willing that the French lines should be constructed by the Société under the direction of French military engineers, and had no objection to a prior Tangier-Fez line. An agreement was within sight, and on March 2 Jules Cambon advised his Government to sign the German draft. At this moment the Ministry fell and French policy changed. "I see the advantage in signing it," telegraphed Cruppi, the new Foreign Minister, to Cambon on March 4; "but would not Spain and England object to the clause binding France and Germany to secure the concession of Tangier-Fez for the Société?" "It would be very inconvenient if we do not sign," replied the Ambassador. "The project does not prevent Spain and England competing in the adjudication. If we change tactics at the moment when an instrument for exploiting the country is under discussion, we shall ruin the results already obtained as well as our work of economic penetration. If we make Germany think that we want to dodge the Convention of 1909, it would create many difficulties." Cruppi proposed a small change in the accord, which Kiderlen accepted; but Cruppi then telegraphed that its terms must be weighed, and summoned Cambon to Paris.

The Convention of 1909 encouraged the French and German Governments to extend their co-operation to the Congo. The French Ngoko-Sangha Company had neglected its concession, and German traders supplied

the natives' wants in exchange for rubber and ivory. These products were in theory the monopoly of the company; but a claim for compensation was refused by the French Government. The company appealed to the Chamber, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs recommended and secured an indemnity of two and a half million francs. The company now favoured co-operation with the German Company of South Cameroon. The approach was welcomed in Berlin, and an agreement was negotiated at the end of 1910. When the affair became known the French Government undertook not to sanction the consortium till the Chamber had approved; and when the Monis Cabinet took office it announced that it could not carry out the consortium.

Meanwhile the collaboration of France and Morocco was no more successful than that of France and Germany. A loan of 1910 paid off the Sultan's debts, but he was soon in debt again. A second Anarchy in
Morocco loan in 1911 was equally sterile. The handling of the military problem was no less unsatisfactory. When the Sultan invited General Mangin to reorganize his army, the General's request for French officers was not granted, and when the tribes round Fez rose in 1910 there were no troops to defend the capital. In a word, France had obtained no political benefit, and Germany no economic advantage, from the pact of 1909 which had been so loudly acclaimed.

The procrastination of the new French Cabinet with regard to the railway accord caused all the more annoyance in Berlin since rumours of a forward policy in Morocco were beginning to circulate. On March 13, 1911, Kiderlen spoke to Jules Cambon of rumours of military action in Morocco. "German opinion might be excited, and it would be wise if Germany were informed in good time. By small successive military operations France could be led on to an even more extended operation, which would end by annulling the Act of Algeciras." The Ambassador replied that French plans were not fixed, but she would

respect the Act of Algeciras as hitherto. On returning to Berlin after a short stay in Paris in connexion with the railway accord, he visited Kiderlen on April 4. "I spoke of the bad news from Morocco and of the security of the Europeans if they were invested. We should probably be forced to occupy Rabat, but in any case we should respect the spirit of Algeciras and the sovereignty of the Sultan." Kiderlen dryly replied that he had no news from Morocco, and was apprehensive of the effect of such action on German opinion. On April 19 Cruppi announced that, in view of the danger to Europeans, France had listened to the Sultan's appeal for aid in organizing a Moroccan force for the relief of Fez. A French column would also be available if required to succour the capital.¹

On receiving the news the Chancellor remarked to the Ambassador that the news from Tangier was not good, but that things would calm down. If France intervened they would grow worse. "You know German opinion on Morocco, and I must take account of it. If you go to Fez you will stay there, and then the Morocco question will be raised in its entirety, which I wish at all costs to avoid." "Who tells you that we shall not leave the capital?" asked Cambon. "The revolt is against the Sultan, not against the Europeans," replied the Chancellor. "I can only insist on the importance of observing the Act of Algeciras, for difficulties will begin directly French troops enter Fez. I cannot encourage you; I can only counsel prudence. I do not say No, because I cannot assume responsibility for your compatriots; but I repeat I do not encourage you." "The Chancellor," reported Cambon, "does not seek adventures in Morocco, and only wishes to maintain Germany's economic interests; not so the Pan-Germans. We must try to solve the question without putting ourselves too much forward. I deplore

¹ Izvolsky describes Cruppi as profoundly ignorant of foreign affairs and blind to the importance of the expedition to Fez, which he believed to be covered by the Act of 1906.—"Un Livre Noir," I, 56, 103-4.

the articles in our Press on the Tunisification of Morocco, which are brought up against our official declarations." The Chancellor returned to the charge on April 25. "The Sultan is in danger," he remarked to the Ambassador, "but not the Europeans. When you are at Fez, will you be able to abandon him? If not, do you think Moroccan independence will remain intact? Difficulties may begin which will destroy the work of three years."

While the Chancellor watched French action with dismay, the German Foreign Secretary secretly welcomed the opportunity of striking out a new line of policy. "If the Sultan requires the **Pan-German Excitement** support of French bayonets," he remarked, "we shall consider that the Act of Algeciras is infringed and we shall resume our liberty." "We shall stay there some weeks," replied the Ambassador, "and when order is restored we shall retire." "I do not suspect your intentions," rejoined Kiderlen; "but when will the French agents on the spot think their task is accomplished?" Meanwhile the German Press began to peg out counter-claims. The *Post* demanded "a German Algeria," and even the *Berliner Tageblatt* clamoured for a port at Agadir. On May 1 the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* officially observed that a violation of the Act of Algeciras, voluntary or involuntary, would restore to all the signatories their liberty of action.

The French Press was divided on the wisdom of a forward policy. The *Temps* contended that the Act of Algeciras would not be infringed by a temporary occupation of Fez. Hanotaux argued that there was no choice, since if Fez were taken and the Sultan killed the whole country would lapse into anarchy. The *Journal des Débats*, on the other hand, warned the Government that "a policy of disguised conquest" would involve the hostility of Spain and Germany; and Jaurès roundly declared the expedition a fraud, as neither the Sultan nor the Europeans were in danger. The view that a new situation had been created was shared by Spain, who claimed that

French military intervention gave her the liberty of action defined in the secret Treaty of 1904; and despite French protests she landed troops at Larache and occupied El-Kasr. "France is securing the military and financial administration of the whole country," complained the Premier Canalejas, "and Spain will have nothing left."

While the Spanish and German Governments regarded the march to Fez as the death-knell of the Algeciras settlement, Sir Edward Grey accepted the assurances of Paris. On May 2 Mr. Dillon

**The
British
Attitude**

asked the Foreign Secretary whether he had been consulted concerning the military measures in Morocco, and whether he approved the attack on the independence of Morocco. Sir Edward replied that France had informed the British Government, like the others, of the measures to succour the Europeans. Her action, he added, did not aim at changing the political status of Morocco, and he saw no objection to it. He made the same reply to an inquiry by the German Ambassador during a visit of the Kaiser to London in May. It was not only the right but the duty of France to succour the Europeans, and French intervention would be of benefit to the world.¹ Not content with thus publicly approving the action of France, he instructed the British Ambassador at Madrid to call the attention of the Government to the danger of Spanish action in Morocco, and invited it to announce that if order continued in El-Kasr the troops would be withdrawn to Larache, since France had declared that her troops would withdraw from Fez as soon as possible.

While troops were on the march to Fez, Cruppi attempted to reopen the railway negotiations; but the Ambassador at Paris had no instructions, and Kiderlen was on a holiday. Jules Cambon therefore visited the Chancellor on June 11. "I am still very anxious about Morocco," began the latter. "German opinion is on the alert. French influence is growing, whether she wishes it

¹ Siebert, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke," 417.

or not. If you leave Fez you will be compelled to return within a year. In Germany people will say German interests are being neglected, and I see the possibility of extremely grave difficulties." "Possibly," replied the Ambassador, "but nobody can prevent Morocco falling one day under our influence. Why not discuss all outstanding matters, except Alsace-Lorraine? We could try to give German opinion satisfactions which would allow it to watch our influence in Morocco develop without disquiet." "I will think it over," replied the Chancellor; "but go and see Kiderlen at Kissingen."

The advice was followed, and on June 22 the Ambassador reported the result. The situation, began the Foreign Secretary, had been completely transformed, with forces under French officers through-
out the country and a Sultan at the orders
of France. "You are wrong as to the Sultan's power and character," replied Cambon; "we have to put in his hands a military force and to discipline it, if we do not want to abandon the country to anarchy and to ruin trade. Have you forgotten the compact of 1909, which recognizes French political influence? Why do you contest our exercise of it?" "Influence is not Protectorate," rejoined Kiderlen, "and you are on the road to organize a veritable Protectorate; and that is not in the pact of 1906 or 1909, any more than is your occupation of the Shawia and the East." Cambon remarked that it was not easy in dealing with a barbarous authority to fix how far influence could go, and proposed a general discussion like that of England and France in 1903. "I agree," replied Kiderlen. "If we keep to Morocco we shall not succeed. It is useless to plaster over a tottering structure." At this point the Ambassador entered a caveat. "If you want part of Morocco, French opinion would not stand it. One could look elsewhere." "Yes," rejoined Kiderlen, "but you must tell us what you want." Cambon promised to submit these ideas to his Government; and at parting the Foreign Minister exclaimed,

"Bring us back something from Paris." Cambon travelled straight to Paris, where he reported to Cruppi; but the same evening the Monis Cabinet fell and was succeeded by Caillaux. Before, however, the new Ministry had time to consider Cambon's communication the German Government took a step which shook Europe to its foundations.¹

Kiderlen's wish, according to Reventlow, had long been to wipe Morocco off the slate. He considered that Bülow's policy had been a failure and must be liquidated by the surrender of political claims in return for colonial compensation. The expedition to Fez provided the opportunity for which he had waited, and he seized it with both hands.² On July 1 the German Ambassador at Paris informed the new French Foreign Minister, M. de Selves, that the *Panther* had been sent to Agadir. In presenting the Note he added that the Act of Algeciras was dead, and that Germany desired to eliminate the Morocco question by friendly discussion. A dispatch was communicated to all the signatories of the Act of Algeciras. "Some German firms established in the south of Morocco, notably at Agadir and in the vicinity, have been alarmed by a certain ferment among the local tribes, due, it seems, to

¹ The Kaiser declares in his "Memoirs" that he vigorously, though vainly, protested against the Agadir decision.

² Kiderlen's attitude remains uncertain, but he was clearly a dangerous man. In his public utterances he disclaimed all desire for Moroccan territory. The Pan-Germans, on the other hand, claimed him for their own, and Class, the President of the Pan-German League, declared that both Kiderlen and Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary, expressed their intention to take part of Morocco. The Foreign Secretary confessed to the Reichstag on Feb. 17, 1912, that he had discussed with Class methods of arousing patriotic sentiment, but denied that he had gone further. His friend Reventlow, who condemned the Agadir coup as crazy, testifies that he never dreamed of a foothold in Morocco, and knew that England would forbid it, but that he purposely allowed ambiguity to rest on his aims, desiring to create a vigorous sentiment to which he could point in his negotiations with France. "He told me that he had said to an influential Pan-German, in order to lead him astray, that we would never go out of Morocco. The fool believed it; but we were never there, so we could not go out. The idea was right, but its execution faulty." The Crown Prince was a champion of partition. "Le Maroc est un beau morceau," he remarked to Jules Cambon; "vous nous ferez notre part et tout sera fini."—Bourgeois et Pagés, "Origines et Responsabilités," 337.

recent occurrences in other parts of the country. These firms have applied to the Imperial Government for protection for their lives and property. At their request the Government have decided to send a warship to Agadir to lend help in case of need to their subjects and *protégés* as well as to the considerable German interests in that territory. As soon as the state of affairs has resumed its normal tranquillity the ship will leave." In presenting the Note the German Ambassador added a few verbal comments. He would not discuss if the sending of the *Panther* conformed to the Act of 1906, as it had been so infringed that its authority could no longer be invoked. German opinion was very nervous, and this action was intended to calm it. This measure of precaution for the life and property of German subjects should not affect the relations of the two countries. M. de Selves replied that he greatly regretted the event. Conversations were desirable, but this would change their character. It would be difficult to persuade France of the reality of the motive alleged. On the same day the French Chargé in Berlin reported the explanation given by Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary. The *Panther* had been dispatched because considerable German interests were menaced by agitation, and because public opinion could no longer suffer the Government to look idly on at a moment when France and Spain seemed no longer to intend to observe the limitations of Algeciras.

The Foreign Minister frankly explained his attitude to Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister at Berlin. "If France had continued to advance with calculated slowness we should have had to submit to her usurpations. One day she would have invoked the hostility of a village which constituted a strategic point to occupy it militarily; another time she would have made a pretext of the uncertainty of the boundaries on the map to cross them. It would have been the invasion of the drop of oil. I thanked heaven," he added with his little malicious laugh, "when I learned of the march on Fez. for it restored our liberty of

Kiderlen-
Wächter
Explains

action. Yet we did not wish to act without making a last attempt at an understanding. At Kissingen I spoke of a compensation due to Germany. We consented to abandon Morocco in return for territory in Africa. This friendly discussion remaining without result, we sent the *Panther*. "It has been urged," echoed the Chancellor on November 9, "that the Sultan himself summoned the French to his assistance; but a ruler who relies solely on the support of foreign bayonets is no longer the independent ruler on whose existence the Act of Algeciras was based. We let this be known and suggested to France an understanding, leaving, of course, the initiative to her. At first we received no positive proposals from Paris, while the French military power continued to spread in Morocco, and the fiction began to be established that France was acting with a European mandate. When therefore German interests appeared to be threatened we sent a warship to Agadir. Never for a moment did we attempt to acquire territory in Morocco. It was not a provocation, but we protect our rights. Morocco was like a festering wound in our relations not only with France but also with England. The expedition to Fez led to an acute stage and rendered an operation necessary. We performed the operation in order to heal the wound."

The news of the *Panther's* spring was received with even greater indignation and surprise in Downing Street than at the Quai d'Orsay; for the British Government was resolved at all costs to prevent Germany from securing a naval base in Morocco, and appears to have known little of the repeated warnings from Berlin when the troops set forth for Fez. "You are violating the Act of Algeciras," observed Sir Arthur Nicolson, who in the absence of the Foreign Secretary received the Ambassador. "That has already lost its validity," was the prompt reply.

In communicating the *aide-mémoire* to the British Government Count Metternich was furnished with an explanatory Memorandum. "Though our information as to

the position of the Europeans at Fez did not tally with that of the French, no objection was raised to the advance. A situation had meanwhile gradually arisen which rendered the Algeciras Act illusory. Whilst, for instance, a limited co-operation in the establishment of police under international control was granted to France and Spain in the open ports, similar institutions were now growing up under the direction of French officers at the most important points of the interior. It might appear questionable whether it would be possible to return to the *status quo* of 1906. We were therefore prepared, if it became necessary, to seek, in conjunction with France, some means, which would be compatible with the interests of the other signatory Powers, of arriving at a definite understanding on the Morocco question. Direct negotiations could hardly meet with insuperable difficulties in view of the good relations between us and France."

Sir Edward, to whom the expedition to Fez appeared wholly legitimate, regarded the voyage of the *Panther* as an unprovoked attack on the *status quo*.

"The official communication," he declared Sir Edward Grey on November 27, "was accompanied by an explanation given to us at the same time which seemed to me much more important than the actual communication of the sending of the ship. It made it clear that the German Government regarded a return to the *status quo* in Morocco as doubtful, if not impossible, and that what they contemplated was a definite solution of the Moroccan question between Germany, France and Spain. The communication was made to the Foreign Office on the Saturday. On the Monday I asked the German Ambassador to come and see me. I informed him I had seen the Prime Minister, and that we considered the situation created by the dispatch of the *Panther* to Agadir as so important that it must be discussed in a meeting of the Cabinet. The next day I asked the German Ambassador to come and see me again, and said that I must tell him that our attitude could not be a disinterested

one with regard to Morocco. We must take into consideration our Treaty obligations to France and our own interests in Morocco. We were of opinion that a new situation had been created by the dispatch of a German ship to Agadir. Future developments might affect British interests more directly than they had hitherto been affected, and, therefore, we could not recognize any new arrangements that might be come to without us. I made it quite clear to the Ambassador that this communication and the exact words which I used were those of His Majesty's Government sitting in Cabinet."

On July 9 Kiderlen-Wächter and Jules Cambon began the conversations which were to continue for four months.

The German Foreign Minister declared himself ready to renounce territorial claims in Morocco, and asked for compensation in the Congo. It would be impossible, he added, to admit a third party to the discussions without inviting all the signatories to the Treaty of Algéciras. The Ambassador did not demur, but remarked that France must keep her friends and allies informed. Kiderlen proceeded to remark that he desired to resume the conversations of Kissingen. Agadir, replied the Ambassador, had changed the situation. Agadir, retorted the Foreign Secretary, was a necessity. "The railway hitch opened my eyes. Let us leave the past. I am ready to give up Morocco, but, to get that accepted by German opinion, we must have compensation, for instance in the Congo." While these conversations were proceeding in Berlin the British Government were waiting for news. Sir Edward regarded his communication of July 4 as a request for information, but it was not couched in an interrogatory form. "The declaration that Agadir created a new situation," declared the German Chancellor on December 5, "did not appear to us an inquiry necessitating an answer." Both parties were to blame—Sir Edward in not definitely asking for explanations, the German Government for failing to volunteer a reassuring statement. In the absence

of direct communication suspicion was inevitable. A partition of Morocco haunted his mind, and there were rumours of impossible demands in the Congo.

On July 16 Kiderlen suggested the cession of the French Congo from the Sangha to the sea. "That would break off the negotiations," replied Cambon; "we cannot give up our whole colony." "I ^{The French Congo} will give you North Cameroon and Togoland," rejoined the Foreign Secretary. "But we cannot have our colony cut off from the sea." "You bought your liberty in Morocco from Spain, England and even from Italy," rejoined Kiderlen, "and you have left us out. You should have negotiated with us before you went to Fez." The dialogue filled the Ambassador with anxiety, and on July 19 he advised his Government to consider what measures should be taken and what diplomatic situation would result if the negotiations broke down. Sir Edward Grey was also considering the possibilities of danger. "I have been asked by the British Ambassador," reported de Selves to Paul Cambon on July 20, "as to our views on a conference in the event of a rupture of negotiations, and what the French programme would be." On the same day his reply was dispatched to London. "The negotiations of France and Germany about French equatorial Africa will probably last for some time. If they fail, France would not object to England inviting a conference of the signatories of 1906, and England, in taking the initiative, should outline the programme. The cession of Moroccan territory to Germany, however, would be contrary to the pacts of 1904 and 1909." On the same day de Selves telegraphed to Jules Cambon that the cession up to the Sangha was impossible, but that France was ready to modify the frontiers. This telegram crossed one from Jules Cambon reporting a heated interview in which Kiderlen loudly complained of indiscretions in the French Press, and censured de Selves for saying to Schön that he could not take these excessive demands seriously. "In such a grave affair I only utter serious

words," added the Foreign Minister. "We must both observe discretion. If conversation is rendered impossible, we shall resume our liberty of action, and demand the integral application of the Act of Algeciras, and if necessary we will go *jusqu'au bout*." "I understand your menace," rejoined the Ambassador with dignity, "and your wish to go far, and we are equally willing."

On July 21 Sir Edward Grey asked the German Ambassador to see him: "I said I wished it to be understood

Conversa-
tion of
July 21

that our silence, in the absence of any communication from the German Government, must not be interpreted as meaning that we were not taking in the Moroccan question the interest which had been indicated by our statement of the 4th of that month. I had been made anxious by the news which appeared the day before as to the demands which the German Government had made on the French Government, demands which were in effect not a rectification of the frontier, but a cession of the French Congo, which it was obviously impossible for the French Government to concede. I heard that negotiations were still proceeding, and I still hoped that they might lead to a satisfactory result; but it must be understood that if they were unsuccessful a very embarrassing situation would arise. I pointed out that the Germans were in the closed port of Agadir; that according to native rumours they were landing and negotiating with the tribes, so that, for all we knew, they might be acquiring concessions there, and that it might even be that the German flag had been hoisted at Agadir, which was the most suitable port on that coast for a naval base. The longer the Germans remained at Agadir the greater the risk of their developing a state of affairs which would make it more difficult for them to withdraw and more necessary for us to take some steps to protect British interests. The German Ambassador was still not in a position to make any communication to me from the German Government."

The Ambassador's telegraphic report reached Berlin

the next day, and a reassuring message was at once dispatched. It would have been well had Downing Street waited for that reply, and it would also have been well if the German Government had explained its views before instead of after the conversation. A few hours after the interview a public declaration of British policy introduced new elements of danger into a delicate situation. "I believe it is essential in the higher interests not merely of this country but of the world," declared Mr. Lloyd George at the Mansion House, "that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and her prestige amongst the Great Powers of the world. If a situation were to be forced on us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievements, by allowing Britain to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure." The significance of the declaration was emphasized by a strident leader in the *Times*.

Lloyd
George's
Warning

The date of the speech had long been fixed, and it was justly resented by more than one of his colleagues that a step of such importance should have been taken without reference to the Cabinet. The Foreign Secretary, who must bear the chief responsibility for the decision, seems to have been unaware that he was launching a high explosive. It was precisely the same claim to be considered that the Kaiser had championed at Tangier, and it provoked the same explosion in Germany as the Tangier declaration had provoked in England. The German people saw France and Germany engaged in discussing the Moroccan question, and no French statesman had raised the alarm. Suddenly a contingent declaration of war seemed to be flung across the North Sea. It was regarded as convincing evidence that Great Britain was as eager to thwart the colonial and commercial ambitions of Germany

as she was to encourage those of France. The Pan-Germans were furious, and Maximilian Harden in shrill tones called for a declaration of war in reply to the intolerable insult.

The reply of the German Government to Sir Edward's queries in the interview of July 21 had been dispatched before the text of the Chancellor's speech reached Berlin; but orders were at once sent to Wolff-Metternich, in presenting the reply, to complain of the Mansion House declaration. "On July 24, three days after the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer," relates Sir Edward Grey, "the German Ambassador came to see me. He informed me that the German intention in sending a ship to Agadir had not changed. Not a man had been landed there. Germany had never thought of creating a naval port on the coast of Morocco, and never would think of it. I said that I was likely to be asked in Parliament what was happening at Agadir, and I should like to know whether I might say that the German Government had informed me that not a man had been landed. The Ambassador asked me to make no public statement with regard to this communication until he had had time to communicate with his Government. The next day, July 25, he came to see me again, and told me that the information that he had given me on the previous day was confidential, and that the German Government could not consent to its being used in Parliament in view of the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He then made to me in regard to that speech a communication which was exceedingly stiff in tone. I felt it necessary to say at once that as the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed to me to give no cause for complaint, the fact that it had created surprise in Germany was in itself a justification of the speech, for it could not have created surprise unless there had been some tendency to think that we might be disregarded. The German Government had said that it was not consistent with their dignity, after the speech of the Chan-

**Germany
Replies**

cellor of the Exchequer, to give explanations as to what was taking place at Agadir. I said to the Ambassador that the tone of their communication made it inconsistent with our dignity to give explanations as to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Ambassador observed that if the British Government had intended to complicate and embroil the political situation and to bring about a violent explosion, they could certainly have chosen no better means than the Chancellor's speech." After this stormy interview the clouds quickly dispersed, and on July 26 Sir Edward was authorized to communicate to the House the reassuring message of July 24. On the 27th the German Ambassador made a very conciliatory communication, and an hour or two later the Prime Minister in Parliament expressed an earnest desire for the success of the Franco-German negotiations.

The Mansion House speech, while inflaming German opinion, modified German demands. "Kiderlen demanded the Congo from the coast to the Sangha,"

writes his friend Reventlow, "and he told Cambon, No haggling; take it or leave it!

**German
Demands
Modified**

Then came the speech and he drew back." "Yesterday's conversation was very different from the last," reported the French Ambassador on July 24; and the Foreign Minister now displayed a desire for agreement. "Reserving the free export of iron, Germany will let you found this North African Empire which is your great objective." He renewed the demand from the Congo to the sea, but offered Togoland and North Cameroon, and the absolute abandonment of Morocco. Once again the Ambassador replied that it was impossible to cede the French Congo. A further advance was registered on July 25, when Fondère, the African expert, informed the Premier that Baron Lancken had asked him to visit the German Embassy. "Go and find out what he wants," replied the Premier. Next day Fondère reported that Germany would be content with part of the colony between the Sangha and the sea, would leave Gabon and

a fraction of the Middle Congo, and transfer North Cameroon and most of Togoland. The Premier replied that the demands were still too high; but he informed the Ambassador in Berlin, who welcomed the indication that Germany was weakening. On August 1 a further advance towards settlement was made, when Kiderlen, after a visit to the Kaiser, declared that the essential demand was for access to the Congo, while he would not complain of a French Protectorate in Morocco. De Selves accepted the principle, and on August 4 Kiderlen renounced his claim to the Congo Coast. But though a certain approach had been made, the two parties were still far from agreement, and on August 14 Kiderlen withdrew the offer of Togoland, as German opinion would not allow it. The danger was not yet over, and the Ambassador reported a rumour that the German authorities were studying the landing of troops at Agadir. By the middle of August seven German proposals for territorial

**Deadlock
and
Danger**

cessions in the Congo had been rejected by France, and six French offers by Germany. On August 18 Kiderlen left Berlin to consult the Kaiser, leaving the French Ambassador in a state of grave anxiety. "Opinion is excited," he reported on August 20. "If the negotiations fail, Germany will probably refuse a conference and occupy the seas. The internal situation affects the external. The elections approach, and the parties compete in patriotism. I hope our apprehensions may be groundless, but it would be levity not to see the possibility of conflict."

While Caillaux was still on holiday, he heard that Kiderlen had told certain Ambassadors "that the attitude of France made war almost inevitable, and the situation could not remain as it was." Rumours reached him of German agents in the hinterland of Agadir and Mogador telling Chiefs that Germany would soon control this region; and pamphlets continued to appear in Germany, among them *West Marokko' Deutsch*, which sold 80,000 copies in a few days, and argued that all compensation

outside Morocco was unacceptable. He believed that Germany still coveted part of Morocco, and he was ready to fight to prevent it. Returning from his holiday on August 17 he took the rudder from the hands of his inexperienced Foreign Minister, summoning the brothers Cambon from Berlin and London and Barrère from Rome to assist the Cabinet with their counsel.

On August 30 Jules Cambon returned to Berlin with two sets of instructions, one for Morocco, the other for the Congo. The concessions in the latter were only to be discussed when France had definitely obtained the Protectorate of the former. On September 4, when the conversations between Kiderlen and Jules Cambon were renewed, the Foreign Minister virtually accepted the Morocco proposals, but demanded larger compensation than France offered. On September 8 Kiderlen proposed a rival scheme for Morocco, which its author defended as merely designed to prevent the expulsion of German industry, but which was scouted by the Ambassador as an attempt by Germany, under cover of economic guarantees, to retain her position in Morocco. The critical stage reached in the negotiations became known, and a financial panic ensued. German stocks fell, there was a run on the banks, and the bankers declared that Germany was not financially prepared for war. The wiser heads were against a conflict, and both the Kaiser and the Chancellor were throughout opposed to war. **Morocco Agreement Reached**
 "To obtain any part of Morocco," wrote Schiemann, who was in close touch with the Government, "is only possible by war with England and France. The cost would outweigh the possible gain, and the moral justification would be more than doubtful." After this revelation of Germany's economic weakness, Kiderlen showed himself more accommodating. The Morocco accord was signed on October 11, and the covering letters on October 14.

On the following day the Congo discussions were resumed; and Kiderlen remarked, "If you wish them to

succeed you must give us access to the Congo." The difficulties were increased by the neurotic condition of German opinion. "A campaign against the exchange is in full swing among the members of the Reichstag, who wish to reopen the Morocco question," reported the Ambassador. "German opinion seems increasingly to regret the pact and returns to the idea of partition. It feels Morocco is worth more to France than any part of the tropics, and therefore would not regret a rupture. I should not be surprised if it occurred, though I do not fear an immediate conflict; but a landing at Agadir is not impossible." The thorny question was on the verge of settlement when on October 27 Kiderlen suddenly raised the question of the French pre-emption of the Congo. "If the matter arises, France must confer with Germany, whose interests must not be neglected." His tone suggested a rupture, and the Ambassador accompanied his report with the words, "We must not yield." The news was promptly forwarded to London and Petrograd, with a request for their views. Russia, who had no wish to be dragged into war for the sake of Morocco, suggested that "any change of sovereignty in the Conventional basin of the Congo must be discussed by all the signatories of the Berlin Act."¹ The formula was approved by Great Britain, and accepted by France and Germany. The Congo Treaty was signed on November 3, and the joint Treaty on November 4. The exhausting debate of four months, in which Kiderlen and Jules Cambon had had over one hundred interviews, was at an end.

The settlement satisfied both the French Premier and the French Ambassador. France, declares Caillaux, obtained all she asked in the political, administrative and judicial sphere in Morocco; and in the economic field she only conceded the maintenance of tariff equality, though this time without limit. Jules Cambon was equally convinced that the Moroccan jewel was worth a high price.

¹ Sazonoff, unlike Izvolsky, was lukewarm throughout the months of crisis.

Unless France had been prepared to pay it, Morocco would have been internationalized and lost to her for ever. Clemenceau and Pichon criticized the departure from the pact of 1909, of which they were the authors, and Hano-taux complained that the cession of 100,000 square miles broke the back of the French Congo. The settlement was, however, a triumph for France, who rounded off her African Empire. In March, 1912, by the Convention of Fez the Sultan accepted a French Protectorate; and after a massacre of French officers and civilians in Fez and the abdication of Mulai Hafid in favour of his brother Mulai Yusuf, the country settled down under the firm but tactful rule of General Lyautey.¹

The reception of the treaties in Germany was far more hostile, and Lindequist, the Colonial Minister, resigned in protest. Schiemann, however, correctly described them as the maximum obtainable without war, and the Chancellor discussed the settlement with his habitual moderation. "After the dust of the conflict has settled," he observed to the French Ambassador, "we shall both see the importance of the results obtained, and Europe will find peace therein. The situation has been cleared up. Doubtless Morocco was destined to pass more and more into your sphere of influence; but we distinguished between political influence (as recognized by us in 1909) and direct authority. Perhaps at Paris they confused these things, and thence arose friction, which will now disappear. You are the masters in Morocco." When Jules Cambon complained of the sending of the *Panther*, the Chancellor reminded him of his grave warnings. "If you could go to Fez, we could go to Agadir." Nowhere was the feeling of relief stronger than in London. "Tell M. Caillaux," said Mr. Asquith, "that he returns from Berlin, like Lord Beaconsfield, bringing peace with honour."

The
Balance-
sheet

¹ German agents continued to give trouble. "Hostility continues the principle of German policy in Morocco," complained Lyautey, July 28, 1913.

The official defence of the Treaty did little to assuage the bitterness of the German people. The Chancellor sorrowfully complained that they were living in an atmosphere of passion such as they had never experienced. When he declared that the *Panther* was not sent to acquire territory, and that South Morocco was not a desirable possession for Germany, there were jeers and laughter. But if there was contempt for the Government which had brandished the sword and then sheathed it, there was burning indignation against Great Britain. "We know now," declared Heydebrand, the Conservative leader and "the uncrowned King of Prussia," "when we wish to expand, when we wish to have our place in the sun, who it is that lays claim to world-wide domination. It has been like a flash in the night. We shall secure peace not by concessions but with the German sword."¹ His attacks on the Chancellor were ostentatiously applauded by the Crown Prince, who, despite the lecture he received on the same day from the Chancellor in his father's presence, continued to play the part of Hotspur which he had chosen for himself. Anglophobia was stimulated by an interview—correctly or incorrectly reported—with Sir Fairfax Cartwright in the *Neue Freie Presse*, and by a speech of Captain Faber which suggested that the British fleet had been on the point of opening hostilities.

On November 27 Sir Edward Grey reviewed the crisis and replied to his British and German critics. The Treaty was signed, but the sea was still rough. "So much suspicion and gossip have collected that it is exciting men's minds and corroding their tempers to a greater extent than ever before. Some people take delight in suggesting how near we were to war. It is as if the world were indulging in a fit of political alcoholism." The German Foreign Minister now declared that there was never any intention of taking any part of Morocco. "If after my communication of July 4 that intention had been con-

¹ Cf. Bassermann's angry speech, "Reden," I.

fided to us as definitely as that, a good deal of misunderstanding would have been avoided." The Chancellor replied in the Reichstag on December 5. He would follow Sir Edward's good example and avoid recriminations; but the tension could have been prevented if greater confidence had been placed in the German declarations and if the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not intervened. The root of all the trouble was the disposal of Morocco in 1904 by France and England without consideration for German interests. "From this arose the necessity for us to go to Algeciras and then to Agadir—to safeguard our economic interests and to show the world that we were firmly resolved not to allow ourselves to be elbowed aside." This was now at an end. "The English Ministers have unanimously expressed a desire for better relations with us, and I associate myself entirely with this desire. But it can only come if the British Government is prepared to give in her policy positive expression to her need for such relations."

Cleaning
the Slate

Among the repercussions of the Agadir crisis was the seizure of Tripoli by Italy, who had long cast greedy eyes on the African coast.¹ "All interested Powers have recognized our prior rights in Tripoli," declared Tittoni in 1905. "I have often been asked lately, Is Italy preparing to occupy it? I answer decidedly, No. Italy should not occupy it except when circumstances make it indispensable. We could never allow the balance of power in the Mediterranean to be disturbed to our disadvantage. It is not to be thought of while we are in cordial relations with Turkey, and it would encourage those who wish to hasten her end. The integrity of the Ottoman Empire is one of the foundations of our foreign policy. But if we do not wish to occupy Tripoli at present, that does not mean our action there should be nil. The rights we have for the

¹ See Barclay, "The Turco-Italian War," and Giolitti, "Memoirs." The Italian atmosphere on the eve of war is reflected in the volume, "L'Ora di Tripoli," by Corradini, the leader of Italian nationalism.

future must give us a preference in the economic field.”¹ The cordiality of which Tittoni spoke was not of long duration. Early in 1908 Italy quarrelled with the Sultan about the acquisition of land and the unfriendliness of the Turkish authorities to Italian consuls, and after a naval demonstration obtained satisfaction. In October, 1909, at Racconigi she secured Russia’s assent to ultimate annexation by agreeing to Russian views in regard to the Straits. In February, 1910, attention was called in the Italian Chamber to French encroachments on the frontier, as if it were already Italian. The Banco di Roma opened a branch in Tripoli to aid Italian undertakings, subsidized steamers visited the ports, and subsidized schools were opened. The ground was prepared, and Italy only awaited the moment to strike.

In June, 1911, San Giuliano informed Aehrenthal that he might have to annex Tripoli; and when Jagow announced the voyage of the *Panther*, he
Italy seizes
Tripoli said to the Under-Secretary, “Tripoli’s hour is nigh.” On August 26 the Italian Minister at Petrograd announced the intention of his Government to “end the continual unpleasantness and compel Turkey to respect Italian interests.” He added that the other Powers knew of the plan and had no objection. But the Italian Ambassador at Vienna only informed Aehrenthal on September 26 that his Government would act at once.² An ultimatum was issued on September 26, and war was declared on September 29. The complaints of ill-treatment of her nationals and opposition to her trade were mere pretexts. “It is an unprovoked war of conquest,” wrote Schiemann on September 27, “and a danger to European peace. The Eastern Question will be reopened in its full scope. Injury to Turkey is injury to our interests. Germany did not expect it, and cannot approve. It reminds us of the Boer war. Both were in a fashion historical necessities; but both were acts of violence.” On the outbreak of war Jagow was empowered

¹ “Italian Foreign Policy,” Speeches, 19-27. ² Molden, “Aehrenthal.”

to offer a solution which gave Italy the same position in Tripoli as Great Britain occupied in Egypt; but though San Giuliano was favourable, it was rejected by Giolitti. British opinion was equally hostile; yet no word of protest or rebuke was heard from the Minister who had so sharply condemned the far less serious offence of the annexation of Bosnia.

The effects of the Tripoli war on the European situation were indirect but none the less significant. Italy's action, undertaken at least with the passive good will of the Triple Entente and without consulting the interests of her allies, marked **The
Triple
Alliance** a further stage on her journey from one camp to the other. If her independent attitude at Algeciras and the outburst of anger in the Bosnian crisis were storm signals, the attack on Tripoli was her declaration of independence. The Kaiser was indignant at the disturbance of his plans to win the Mussulman world. "Italy was not bound to obtain our consent and did not do so," writes Bethmann-Hollweg; "but when she wished to attack Turkey in Europe the *status quo* in the Balkans became a critical question. We were again and again compelled to mediate to prevent the differences of our allies growing into danger." The hot-headed Conrad thirsted for war, but was overruled by the dying Aehrenthal. Austria's veto on Italian attacks in European Turkey was considered in Italy to prolong the war; but sharp friction with France, arising from the search for contraband on French ships bound for Tunis, counterbalanced the enmity to Austria. "Italy now realized the value of the Triple Alliance," writes Bethmann-Hollweg. "When Kiderlen visited Rome in January, 1912, he was warmly welcomed by the King and the Ministers. At a meeting of the Kaiser and the King in March Victor Emmanuel did not hide his deep resentment against France, and when San Giuliano came to Berlin in November a renewal of the Alliance was arranged. A new blossoming seemed at hand; but the pristine strength of the Triplice was gone, for Italy had

undertaken too many obligations to France, England and Russia." Despite the conclusion of a naval convention relating to the Mediterranean in 1913, the upshot of the Tripoli war was that Turkey came to occupy the position in the confidence of Germany and Austria which Italy had forfeited.¹

Now that one item of the Racconigi programme had been carried out, Sazonoff considered that the other might have its turn, all the more since the closing of the Straits injured Russian trade. He therefore flew a kite at Constantinople and proceeded to sound France and Great Britain. "I told Sir Edward," reported Benckendorff on October 23, "that Russia thinks the time has come for closer relations with Turkey, and that the Russian Ambassador has informally presented a scheme under which Russia would influence the Balkan States to maintain friendly relations with Turkey, and might even guarantee the capital, in return for which the Sultan would open the Straits to Russian warships. Russia hoped that France and England would help at Constantinople. Sir Edward replied that he stood by his memorandum of 1908, that he would examine the formula, and that Sir Gerard Lowther would be instructed to keep in touch with Tcharykoff and support him." Tcharykoff made it clear to the British and French Ambassadors that his conversations with the Vizier were private, and that the Russian Government retained a free hand for the eventual official negotiations.²

Turkey was in no yielding mood. When on December 4 a Russian note openly claimed free passage for her warships the Porte replied that such a serious change

¹ For Austrian distrust of Italy see Chlumecky, "Oesterreich-Ungarn und Italien" (1907), and "Die Agonie des Dreibundes" (a reprint in 1915 of articles written during the years 1906-15). For Russo-Italian relations see Siebert, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke," ch. 11-12.

² Siebert, ch. 18. The Belgian Minister at Bucharest reported the rumour that Turkish authority over Crete would be confirmed and the capitulations abolished. See Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," IV, 41-2, 54-5; and "Un Livre Noir," 143-79.

could not be made without the assent of the other signatories of the Treaty of Berlin; and the *Jeni Gazette* announced officially that no Turk could for a moment entertain the idea that the Ottoman Empire could sink to the level of a Russian vassal. In reply to Turkey's inquiries Great Britain and France replied that if she permitted the opening of the Straits they would consent, and that if she declined they would take no part in exercising pressure on her. Germany and Austria, on the other hand, refused consent and encouraged Turkey to hold her ground. The Turkish Cabinet therefore dispatched a firm reply to Russia.

**Turkey
stands
Firm**

"The Government cannot authorize the exclusive passage of the Russian fleet through the Straits in time of peace or war, and declares that all rights over the Straits belong exclusively to the Ottoman people and its sovereign." On the same day an interview with Sazonoff appeared in the *Temps*. The overtures to Turkey, he declared, were not official, but were "academic" conversations of the Russian Ambassador, who had acted without special instructions. Though Tcharykoff was promptly recalled, the attempt to suggest that Russia had not been rebuffed deceived no one, and the incident further estranged Turkey from the Triple Entente.

CHAPTER XV

THE BALKAN WARS

I

THE spectacle of Great Britain standing in shining armour beside France encouraged the chauvinists on both sides of the Rhine. "I went to Berlin in the autumn," writes Tirpitz, "and represented to the Chancellor that we had suffered a diplomatic check, and must salve it by a Supplementary Naval Bill. The Chancellor denied the check and feared that a Bill would lead to war with England. My plan did not aim at an actual increase of our fleet but at increasing our readiness for war. One weak point in our naval armament lay in the autumn change of recruits, which with our short period of service temporarily crippled the preparedness of the fleet. We planned to put a reserve squadron into commission, so that in future we should have three squadrons instead of two. This reform only necessitated an increase of three big ships. Nobody could believe that England could be incited to war by an increase of three ships, unless she was already resolved to fight, and Count Metternich did not anticipate danger. On November 14 the Kaiser instructed the Chancellor to work the Supplementary Bill into the budget of 1912."

While Tirpitz was striving for an increase of the fleet, wiser heads resolved on a fresh attempt to relieve the tension which had threatened the peace of the world. The settlement of the Morocco question produced a certain *détente* with Germany, and Anglo-Russian co-operation

in Persia was at this moment proceeding less smoothly than usual. Sir Edward Grey sympathized with the efforts of Persian nationalists to reform the Government of their country and to frustrate the intrigues of the Shah, both before and after his deposition, and he sincerely desired to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of the country, as he had promised in 1907.¹ Russia, on the other hand, had no belief in the constitutional movement and no desire for its success; and, although the Foreign Secretary occasionally put the brake on the Russian steam-roller, he never dared to push his protests too far. If the Persian question were mismanaged, he explained to his Liberal critics, the Persian question might disappear and bigger issues would arise. The situation was thoroughly understood and skilfully exploited at Petrograd. "The English," wrote Sazonoff in a revealing letter to the Russian Minister in Teheran on October 8, 1910, "pursuing as they do vital aims in Europe, will if necessary sacrifice certain interests in Asia in order to maintain the Convention with us. These circumstances we can naturally turn to our own advantage, for instance in our Persian policy." Thus when in 1911 the Persian Government secured the services of Mr. Shuster, an American expert, to reorganize the national finances, and he proceeded to appoint British subjects to aid him in the Russian sphere, Sir Edward joined in compelling him to resign. In following up her victory, however, Russia put forward demands on Teheran which for once he was unable to approve. When Benckendorff visited the Foreign Office on December 2 he found the Foreign Secretary in very serious mood. If co-operation in Persia ceased, argued the latter, it would mean the end of the Entente, and he would resign, as he could not strike out the new line of policy which would become inevitable. The Ambassador reported that he had

The
Shuster
Crisis

¹ The Blue Books on Persia are very numerous. Cf. Browne, "The Persian Revolution"; Shuster, "The Strangling of Persia"; Fraser, "Turkey and Persia in Revolt"; Sykes, "History of Persia," II (edition of 1921); and Siebert, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke," chs. 4-5.

never seen him so disturbed, and Cambon confirmed the verdict. "To maintain the Entente," added the former, "we must assure him that we will observe the Convention, otherwise it is certain that he will resign." The difficulty was overcome, but the divergence of opinion left a scar.

"Public opinion is beginning to turn in our direction again,"¹ remarked Wolff-Metternich to Benckendorff; and Benckendorff agreed. A direct exchange of views between London and Berlin seemed desirable, and an early visit from Sir Edward Grey was proposed. After preliminary discussions carried on through the agency of Sir Ernest Cassel and Ballin it was agreed that Lord Haldane should be sent on a private mission. On February 4 the German Government announced that the *Novelle* might be revised if Germany received satisfactory assurances for a friendly orientation of British policy, and on February 8 Lord Haldane arrived in Berlin.

"My first interview," relates the envoy, "was with the Imperial Chancellor, and the conversation, which was quite informal, was a full and agreeable one."² I said that the increasing action of Germany in piling up magnificent armaments was, of course, within the unfettered rights of the German people. But the policy had an inevitable consequence in the drawing together of other nations in the interests of their own security. I told him frankly that we had made naval and military preparations, but only such as defence required, and as would be considered in Germany matter of routine. I went on to observe that our faces were set against aggression by any nation, and I told him, what seemed to relieve his mind, that we had no secret military treaties. But, I added, if France were attacked and an attempt made to occupy her territory, our neutrality must not be reckoned on by Germany. Next day I was summoned to luncheon at the Schloss, and

¹ Siebert, 253.

² Haldane, "Before the War"; cf. Bethmann-Hollweg, "Reflections," I, ch. 3; the Kaiser's "Memoirs," ch. 5; and Tirpitz, "Memoirs," I.

afterwards had a long interview with the Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz in the Emperor's cabinet room. He handed me a confidential copy of the draft of the proposed new Fleet Law, with an intimation that he had no objection to my communicating it privately to my colleagues. I was careful to abstain even from looking at it then, for I saw that, from its complexity and bulk, it would require careful study. So I simply put it in my pocket, and I repeated what I had said to the Chancellor. We then discussed the proposal of the German Admiralty for the new programme. Admiral von Tirpitz struggled for it. I insisted that fundamental modification was essential if better relations were to ensue. The tone was friendly, but I felt that I was up against the crucial part of my task. The Admiral wanted us to enter into some understanding about our own shipbuilding. He thought the two-Power standard a hard one for Germany, and, indeed, Germany could not make any admission about it. The idea then occurred to me that, as we should never agree about it, we should avoid trying to define a standard proportion in any general agreement that we might come to, and, indeed, say nothing in it about shipbuilding, but that the Emperor should announce to the German public that the agreement on general questions, if we should have concluded one, had entirely modified his wish for the new Fleet Law, as originally conceived, and that it should be delayed, and future shipbuilding should at least be spread over a longer period. The Emperor thought such an agreement would certainly make a great difference, and he informed me that his Chancellor would propose to me a formula.

**Tirpitz
versus
Bethmann**

"At my final meeting with the Chancellor he suggested that we might agree on the following formula:

"1. The High Contracting Powers assure each other mutually of their desire for peace and friendship.

"2. They will not, either of them, make any com-

bination, or join in any combination, which is directed against the other. They expressly declare that they are not bound by any such combination.

"3. If either of the High Contracting Parties become entangled in a war with one or more other Powers, the other of the High Contracting Parties will at least observe toward the Power so entangled a benevolent neutrality, and use its utmost endeavour for the localization of the conflict.

"4. The duty of neutrality which arises from the preceding article has no application in so far as it may not be reconcilable with existing agreements which the High Contracting Parties have already made. The making of new agreements which make it impossible for either of the Contracting Parties to observe neutrality toward the other beyond what is provided by the preceding limitations is excluded in conformity with the provisions contained in Article 2.

"Anxious as I was to agree with the Chancellor, I was unable to hold out to him the least prospect that we could accept the draft formula which he had just proposed. Under Article 3, for example, we should find ourselves, were it accepted, precluded from coming to the assistance of France should Germany attack her and aim at getting possession of such ports as Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. Difficulties might also arise which would hamper us in the discharge of our existing treaty obligations to Belgium, Portugal and Japan. The most hopeful way out was to revise the draft fundamentally by confining its terms to an undertaking by each Power not to make any unprovoked attack upon the other, or join in any combination or design against the other for purposes of aggression, or become party to any plan or naval or military combination, alone or in conjunction with any other Power, directed to such an end. He and I then sat down and redrafted what he had prepared, but without his com-

**Discussion
of
Neutrality**

mitting himself to the view that it would be sufficient. We also had a satisfactory conversation about the Bagdad Railway and other things in Turkey connected with the Persian Gulf, and we discussed possibilities of the re-arrangement of certain interests of both Powers in Africa. I entertain no doubt that he was sincerely in earnest in what he said to me on these occasions, and in his desire to improve relations with us and keep the peace. So I think was the Emperor, but he was pulled at by his naval and military advisers, and by the powerful, if then small, chauvinist party in Germany. But still there was the possibility of an explosion, and when I returned to London, although I was full of hope that relations between the two countries were going to be improved and told my colleagues so, I also reported that there were three matters about which I was uneasy. The first was my strong impression that the new Fleet Law would be insisted on. The second was the possibility that Tirpitz might be made Chancellor in place of Bethmann-Hollweg. The third was the want of continuity in the supreme direction of German policy." The Kaiser was equally pleased with the visit. "He was very nice and reasonable," he wrote to Ballin on February 9. "I have gone very far to meet him, but there is a limit. I have done all I can."¹ The Chancellor was hopeful, and it was a good sign that Tirpitz was depressed.

In his first conversation with the German Ambassador after Lord Haldane's return Sir Edward Grey declared himself "immensely impressed" with his colleague's report of his conversations with the Chancellor, and expressed with the greatest emphasis his determination to carry on the work thus begun. He hoped it would be possible gradually to disperse the war cloud. Everything depended on a detailed examination of the German suggestions. The path to reconciliation, however, was beset with difficulties; for when the *Novelle* was studied it was

¹ Huldermann, "Albert Ballin," ch. 7; cf. Siebert, ch. 20.

found to involve a sensational increase in the size and striking power of the fleet. "I hear it is the *Novelle* which has caused the hitch," wrote the Chancellor to Ballin on March 2. "It is feared that it will affect public opinion so that a political agreement would be unacceptable. But the idea of an understanding is still fully accepted, even if it is only reached in six months or a year, and England reckons that the confidence will continue, even if there is no agreement. Success

**The
Negotiations
Fail**

is possible despite the fleet." Germany, however, was equally disappointed with the political offer which was all that England felt at liberty to make. "Grey only offered us neutrality in an unprovoked attack," complains the Chancellor, "and refused our addition 'if war is forced on Germany.' Why should such a strictly limited neutrality formula hurt the feelings of England's friends? It would merely have shown them that they could not rely on her help in an anti-German policy. Ever since 1909 Grey had told me on every occasion of his primary obligation to the Dual Alliance, but in return for his neutrality formula I could not surrender the *Novelle*. England's effort of reconciliation was sincere, but perhaps we were wrong in under-estimating her intimacy with France and Russia."¹ The disappointed Chancellor offered his resignation, which the Kaiser, though convinced that the Haldane mission was merely a political manœuvre, declined to accept.

On the failure of the attempt to limit the naval rivalry, the British Government proceeded to consider its reply to the *Novelle*. In May the Prime Minister and Mr. Churchill met Lord Kitchener, now the ruler of Egypt, at Malta to discuss the problem of the Mediterranean,² and the decisions of the Cabinet were announced by the First Lord of the Admiralty in the House of Commons on July 22 on introducing a Supplementary Estimate.

¹ "Reflections," I, 54-5; cf. his "Kriegsreden," 46-50.

² See Arthur, "Life of Kitchener," II, 336-7.

The main feature of the *Novelle*, he declared, was the increase in the striking force of all classes always available. Four-fifths of the entire navy would be in full permanent commission—a proportion unknown elsewhere. The personnel would increase by 15,000, which would make a total in 1920 of 100,000. Two battleships and two small cruisers were added to the programme. When completed in 1920 there would be forty-one battleships, twenty battle-cruisers, forty small cruisers. To meet the new situation a further concentration of battleships in home waters would be necessary.

The situation was objectively described in dispatches from the Belgian Ministers in Berlin and London.¹ "A few weeks ago, at the moment of Marschall's arrival," wrote the former on July 25, "one could hope for improvements. The German Press was pleased at Haldane's speech to the German Society in London, in which he called the Kaiser a great man. Now Churchill's speech has altered the situation. The Germans will not confess that the continual increase of their naval forces is the primary cause of England's measures of defence. If France has on her conscience Moroccan ambitions which have menaced and still menace peace, Germany, in wishing to rival England at sea, has equally laboured to render a conflict inevitable. That is the explanation of Churchill's speech, and that is precisely what they will not recognize at Berlin." "Germany is fortunate that the Liberals are in power," wrote the Belgian Minister in London on August 3. "When the Conservatives return, they will not be content with a superiority of sixty per cent. For England it is a vital question on which no English party can yield, for the day it loses naval supremacy it will be all up with British power and prestige. That is the pivot of English policy which they do not seem to understand in Berlin."

The
British
Fleet

The concentration of our naval forces was facilitated

¹ Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," IV, 72-4.

by the fact that France had to face the prospect of dealing with the combined fleets of Austria and Italy, and therefore desired to focus her whole battle fleet in the Mediterranean.¹ This involved exposing the Atlantic and Channel coasts to attack; but it was anticipated that the British fleet would fill the vacuum. In September, accordingly, it was announced that the Third French Battle Squadron, based on Brest, was to join the First and Second in the Mediterranean; and in the spring of 1913 the whole of the Atlantic defence flotillas were demobilized and the defence of the ports was handed over to the army. There only remained at the northern bases six old armoured cruisers and the flotillas which were to co-operate in the defence of the Channel. These momentous changes appeared to necessitate a closer political understanding, and on October 22, on the pro-

Grey-
Cambon
Letters

posal of Poincaré, the nature of the Entente was defined in an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and the Ambassador.²

"From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. I agree that, if either Govern-

¹ See J. Corbett, "Naval Operations," I, 7-9.

² "Les Origines de la Guerre," 79-81.

ment had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common." In theory the Grey-Cambon letters left Great Britain with her hands free, and her freedom continued to be solemnly reiterated at intervals by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary; but from 1911 onwards most Frenchmen regarded Great Britain as pledged in honour to come to the assistance of France if attacked by Germany. The problem was further complicated by the fact that France was allied to Russia. It was not deemed necessary to embody our relations to the great Slavonic Power in a written formula; yet the action of Russia might concern the fortunes of Great Britain very closely, since an attack on Russia would involve an attack on France. We were thus conditionally involved in the quarrels and ambitions of a distant Power over whose policy we exercised no control.

As a European war appeared to become more probable, the part which Belgium and the Scheldt might be forced to play became an object of increasing interest to her neighbours. In the opening days of 1911 the *Times* had published a series of articles on the project of fortifying Flushing, in which it detected a German design to use Holland against Great Britain and France. The French Government was equally convinced that the project was of German parentage. Though Holland's right to fortify the mouth of the Scheldt was uncontested, the Dutch Government yielded to pressure. The coast defence programme, therefore, in consequence of protests and apprehensions, was first postponed, then whittled down into insignificance. In April, 1912, Colonel Bridges, the British Military Attaché, in conversation with General Jungbluth, head of the Belgian General Staff, renewed

Holland
and
Belgium

the discussions of 1906 on the technicalities of military co-operation. On receiving the General's report, however, the Belgian Government took no steps to continue the conversations. No convention was concluded or even discussed. Indeed, when General Jungbluth was invited to attend the British manœuvres in 1912, the invitation was declined in order to afford no foundation for the rumour of an entente. But though no common action was taken, both countries proceeded to prepare for the expected storm. Belgium introduced compulsory service in 1913, and elaborate surveys of Belgian roads and railways were undertaken by direction of the British War Office. For it was generally believed by military specialists in the west that in the next war Germany would force her way through Belgium.

II

The year 1912 opened with dark clouds on the Eastern horizon. The death of Aehrenthal, once the stormy petrel

Count
Berchtold

of European politics, was generally regretted; for he had championed the cause of peace against the bellicose Conrad von Hötzendorff, and his successor, Count Berchtold, was headstrong and incapable. Alarming reports from Austria and the Balkan capitals reached London and Paris, and on April 25 Francis Joseph remarked to the French Ambassador that peace had become much more precarious in the last eight months. His reading of the situation was correct; for, unknown to the world, a Balkan League was in process of formation with the express object of attacking and partitioning Turkey.¹

¹ See the Austrian Red Book, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke betreffend die Ereignisse am Balkan, 1912-13"; the French Yellow Book, "Les Affaires Balkaniques," 3 vols.; Conrad, "Aus meiner Dienstzeit," II; Siebert, chs. 13-15; "Un Livre Noir," I (Izvol'sky's correspondence); Seton-Watson, "The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans"; G. Young, "Nationalism and War in the Near East"; Crawford Price, "The Balkan Cockpit"; Report of the Carnegie Commission on the causes and conduct of the Balkan wars; Gueshoff, "The Balkan League" (the Bulgarian

**Bulgaria
and
Serbia**

After the Bosnian crisis Serbia, filled with fierce anger against Austria and Austria's treatment of her Yugoslav subjects, sought in vain for the friendship of Bulgaria; but two years later the shifty Ferdinand convinced himself that he could not realize his ambitions without Serbian aid. The Russophil Bulgarian Premier, Gueshoff, has revealed himself as the author of the Balkan alliance, which was aimed in the first place against Turkey and in the second against Austria. His desire for good relations with Turkey, he declared, was shattered by the Young Turk policy of extermination in Macedonia, and he was therefore driven to seek co-operation with Serbia. Having secured the approval of the King, he visited Belgrad in October, 1911, where he found a warm welcome. After months of stubborn negotiations, in which Hartwig, the influential Russian Minister at Belgrad, took an active, and Nekludoff, the Russian Minister at Sofia, a minor, part, a treaty was signed in March, 1912, guaranteeing the independence and integrity of the two countries, and promising mutual support if one of the Great Powers tried to annex or occupy any Balkan territory under Turkish rule. The defensive convention was accompanied by a secret annex arranging for common action, subject to Russia's approval, against Turkey in the event of disturbances or menaces of war in the Ottoman Empire. The distribution of territorial gains was specified, the destiny of a contested zone in Central Macedonia being left to the arbitrament of the Tsar, who was to decide all disputes arising out of the alliance. A military convention, signed a month later, determined the conditions of mutual aid in the event of attack by Turkey, Roumania and Austria, or of an attack on Turkey. A copy of the

side); Balkanicus (Stojan Protich), "The Aspirations of Bulgaria" (the Serbian side); Poincaré, "Les Origines de la Guerre"; Bethmann-Hollweg, "Reflections," I, ch. 4; Gauvain, "L'Europe au Jour le Jour," IV-V; Hanotaux, "La Guerre des Balkans et l'Europe"; Nekludoff, "Diplomatic Reminiscences"; Dumaine, "La dernière Ambassade de France en Autriche"; Hoyos, "Der Deutsch-Englische Gegensatz und sein Einfluss auf die Balkan-Politik Oesterreich-Ungarns."

Treaty was taken to the Tsar at Livadia and to Sazonoff at Petrograd by Daneff, President of the Sobranje, who hinted that Bulgaria was only awaiting the moment to strike. Sazonoff advised a cautious policy, and declared that active intervention in Macedonia would not be approved in Russia. As early as April, 1911, Greece had suggested to Bulgaria a defensive alliance, and on

Greece and Montenegro May 29, 1912, a treaty was signed, in the making of which an active part had been played by Bouchier, the trusted correspondent of the *Times* in the Near East. Tricoupes' dream of 1891 had at last been realized by Venezelos, who had been summoned from Crete in 1910 to reform the Motherland. A military convention followed in September, 1912, but no agreement as to future frontiers in Macedonia was reached. A verbal understanding with Montenegro was reached in August. These preparations for war, however, did not prevent Ferdinand from making pacific declarations at Vienna and Constantinople.

The French Premier, Poincaré, was informed on April 1 of a Serbo-Bulgar pact against aggression and for the maintenance of the *status quo*, the two Powers binding themselves to do nothing without Russian advice. Poincaré complained that the pact had been made without consulting France, and refused a Bulgarian loan before he knew Russia's real designs. It was therefore decided that he should visit Petrograd and discover the truth about the Balkans. A naval convention between France and Russia was signed in Paris, and a few days later, at the beginning of August, Poincaré reached the Russian capital. He again expressed surprise at not having been informed of the Serbo-Bulgar pact while it was being discussed, and he was shocked when Sazonoff showed him the text. "It contains the germ of a war not only against Turkey but against Austria," he wrote in a report of the interview. "It also establishes the hegemony of Russia over the Slav Kingdoms, since she is to arbitrate in all matters. I told Sazonoff that the Convention in no way

corresponds to the description which was given me, and that it was in fact *une convention de guerre*, which not only revealed the ambitions of the Serbs and Bulgars but encouraged them." The Premier returned home with anxious foreboding. Sazonoff, on the other hand, was delighted with the visit. "I was extremely pleased to meet Poincaré, in whom Russia possesses a sure friend with exceptional political intelligence and an unbending will. If the critical moment in international relations arrives, it would be desirable to have at the head of our French ally if not Poincaré, then a man with a no less energetic character, and equally little fear of responsibility." After the failure of the Tcharykoff negotiations Russia had returned to the plan of a Balkan League against Turkey, and she was ready for the dangers which such a policy involved.

While the French Premier was in Petrograd, the Austrian Chargé informed the Quai d'Orsay that his Government was anxious about the Balkans and desired to know if the Great Powers would join in "recommending to Turkey the adoption of a policy of progressive decentralization, which would secure for the Christian nationalities their legitimate guarantees, and in urging the Balkan States peacefully to await the results of their policy."¹ Poincaré was delighted at Berchtold's suggestion, which appeared to denote the return of Austria to the Concert of Europe, and he persuaded Sazonoff to accept it. All the Powers followed suit; but Berchtold seemed in no hurry to follow up his plan, and was left behind by the race of events. Turkish promises of reform for Albania evoked complaints of neglect from Serbs and Bulgars, and Montenegro began to mobilize. Sazonoff, who shrank from the conflict which his policy had done much to encourage, invited his ally to co-operate in keeping the peace by warnings at Sofia, where the chief danger seemed to lie. Poincaré went further, and informed Bulgaria that

¹ Siebert, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke," ch. 13.

the question of a French loan must wait, at the same time urging both Constantinople and Cetinje to withdraw their troops from the frontier. Berchtold sent a message of gratitude, and proposed to urge the Sultan to extend to the other Balkan nationalities the advantages he had promised to the Albanians.

In the middle of September Sazonoff started on a round of visits, beginning with Berlin, where he urged action by the Powers to localize the conflict if it could not be prevented. When the larger Balkan States followed the example of Montenegro and began to mobilize, Kiderlen-Wächter and the Chancellor suggested that the Powers should veto all territorial changes, and promised that if Russia would propose a declaration in favour of the territorial *status quo* they would obtain the assent of Austria. On reaching Paris Sazonoff expressed himself ready to inform the Balkan States, either jointly with Austria or in the name of the Powers, that they could not allow a rupture and that they were resolved to maintain the *status quo*. He added, however, that this would be useless unless the Powers favoured reforms for the Balkan peoples. On October 7, after weeks of discussion, the Powers agreed that Russia and Austria should inform the Balkan States that the Powers condemned any steps leading to a rupture, that they would themselves take in hand the reforms, and that no change in the *status quo* arising from a war would be allowed. It was, however, too late, for on October 8 Montenegro gave the signal for hostilities by attacking her ancient foe.

Though Turkey at once concluded peace with Italy, and though her population was nearly double that of her four little enemies, her armies were rolled back by the impetuous onslaught. The Bulgarians triumphed at Kirk-Kilisse in Thrace on October 22, the Serbs at Kumanovo in Macedonia on October 26, and the Greeks entered Salonika on November 8. The sympathies of Russia were manifest from the first; and though Sazonoff began by

suggesting the intervention of the Powers after the first decisive battles, on November 2 he telegraphed to his representatives abroad that the conquered territories belonged to the Allies by right of occupation and should be partitioned by friendly agreement. British opinion was almost unanimously on the side of the Christian States; and the Prime Minister spoke for the country when he declared at the Guildhall on November 9 that the Powers would recognize accomplished facts and would not oppose the territorial changes resulting from the victory of the Allies. The Central Powers, on the other hand, were disagreeably surprised by the triumphs which enabled Serbia to reach the Adriatic and Bulgaria to threaten Constantinople. The Belgian Minister, dining with Kiderlen-Wächter, found him stupefied by the news of Kirk-Kilisse; and Austria concentrated 100,000 troops on the Serbian frontier.

The League
Triumphs

Fortunately the German Government was bent on peace. "The Kaiser was very cautious throughout the Balkan wars," records Bethmann-Hollweg, "and he remarked to me in November that he would not march on Paris or Warsaw for the sake of Albania.¹ Energetic pressure on Vienna was needed to prevent war; but we left nobody in doubt that we should help our ally if she were attacked." France, though equally pacific, was no less loyal; and Poincaré assured Izvolsky that if Austria declared war on Russia and was supported by Germany, France would fulfil her obligations. Meanwhile the French Premier discussed with the Powers the summoning of a conference to deal with the situation.

The rapid triumph of the Balkan States, which caused Turkey on November 3 to ask for the intervention of the Powers, raised difficulties for their champions. Sazonoff warned Bulgaria that if her troops attempted to enter

¹ When Franz Ferdinand visited Berlin in November he declared that Austria could make no more concessions; to which the Kaiser, on parting from his guest at the station, warningly replied, "No pranks!" (Keine Dummheiten!—Beyens.)

Constantinople, he would order the Black Sea fleet to the Bosphorus. Sir Edward Grey expressed the hope that the Tchataldja lines would be held, adding that if the Turks were ejected from their capital it should be internationalized. These apprehensions, however, were quickly relieved; for the Bulgarian wave had spent its force against the Tchataldja breakwater. A far graver problem was

**Serbia and
Durazzo**

presented by the victories of Serbia and her march across the Albanian mountains to the coast. On November 8 Sazonoff asked Italy to influence Austria to allow Serbia a port, on the ground that a lasting peace would be impossible without it; but Rome was bound by a pact with Vienna to respect the integrity of Albania, and she had as little desire as Austria to share the Adriatic with a new rival. Thus the dividing line between the two diplomatic groups appeared within a month of the opening of hostilities. "We, France and England, are ready to support Serbia's claim," telegraphed Sazonoff to Hartwig on November 9; "the Triple Alliance opposes. But in sending troops to Durazzo Serbia is too rash, and complicates the task of her champion. She desires economic independence, which she can only gain on the Adriatic; but railway connexion would secure it not less than territorial access. If she gives way on the harbour, she can more easily expand southward or in Albania. We will not wage war for Durazzo." Sir Edward Grey, convinced that a railway under Serbian control to a harbour would be best both for Serbia and Albania, also urged moderation in Belgrad. It was as well that Russia was cautious, for there were men in high places at Vienna spoiling for a fight. On November 23 Franz Ferdinand tried to convince his uncle that action was necessary; and the hot-blooded Conrad urged the reoccupation of the Sanjak and the eviction of Serbian troops from Albania.¹ The Em-

¹ A terrifying picture of the confusion and levity reigning at the Ballplatz is given by Szilassy, "Der Untergang der Donaumonarchie," ch. 8; cf. Kanner, "Die Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik."

peror vetoed all such plans; and the party of moderation was strengthened when Bethmann-Hollweg, in announcing the renewal of the Triple Alliance, declared that Germany would only join in a conflict if her partner were the victim of aggression.

No one had worked so hard to prevent the outbreak of war as Poincaré; and when his efforts proved fruitless, he determined to localize the conflict. "He says he proposed a conference of ambas- ^AConference Needed sadors as early as October 15," reported Izvolsky on November 26, "and suggested it several times to London, Berlin and Vienna. Germany and Austria have said they would take part only after an agreement as to its programme; but he finds a difficulty in taking the initiative, as these preliminary discussions would probably take place in Paris. He therefore asks if you think Grey would take it." Two days later Benckendorff reported that Sir Edward was ready, but wished to find out whether Austria was willing. The Foreign Secretary had observed to Lichnowsky that England and Germany, being least concerned in the Balkans, were most concerned in peace, since in case of war both would probably be dragged in. So anxious, indeed, was Sir Edward to clear the path that he suggested, though in vain, that Russia should persuade Serbia and Montenegro to content themselves with the Sanjak and to claim nothing on the Adriatic. Russian policy was set forth in a dispatch of December 9 from Sazonoff. "Our aim is the political and economic emancipation of Serbia, who should have direct communication with the coast through Albania, with guarantees of free traffic for goods, including munitions. The frontiers of Albania must be determined according to Austria's readiness to yield to her just claims." Sir Edward pronounced this excellent; but the Austrian Ambassador in Petrograd explained to Sazonoff that the Adriatic was for Austria what the Black Sea was for Russia. Yielding, however, to the advice of her allies, Austria consented to take part in the Conference on con-

dition that the permanent establishment of Serbia on the Adriatic should not be discussed. Serbia now agreed to yield to the decision of the Powers.

These explosive possibilities threw a special responsibility on Great Britain, of which she showed herself fully conscious throughout the Conference of Tasks of the Ambassadors which sat in London from the Conference December onwards. The task of its chairman was to prevent Russia and Austria, both of whom carried out partial mobilization, flying at each other's throats. From December to March the danger of war was acute.¹ The first crisis arose in January, when Russia massed troops on the Caucasian frontier and informed Turkey that if the Balkan struggle broke out again she could not promise neutrality. Germany at once informed Russia that an attack on Turkey would endanger the peace in Europe. Russia drew back, and Francis Joseph sent Prince Hohenlohe with an autograph letter to the Tsar, couched in conciliatory terms and appealing for the maintenance of peace.² A second crisis occurred when King Nicholas, disregarding the decision of the Powers to assign Scutari to Albania, continued to besiege the town and, after its surrender, was compelled by a naval demonstration to withdraw.³ So imminent did a conflict appear that Germany prepared for mobilization. The humiliation of Montenegro, added to the Austro-Italian veto on a Serbian port on the Adriatic, was bitterly resented in Petrograd; but the balance was in some degree redressed by the assignment of certain Albanian villages to Serbia. London and Berlin worked in perfect accord throughout, and Sir Edward Grey's share in keeping the peace was warmly and publicly acknowledged by Jagow and Bethmann-Hollweg.

It was fortunate for the peace of the world that the Conference had been established, for the conflict dragged

¹ See Valentin, "Deutschlands Aussenpolitik," 117-19.

² See the letter in Laloy, "Documents Secrets," 65-7.

³ See Miss Durham, "The Struggle for Scutari."

on beyond all expectation. The representatives of the belligerents met in London in December, and signed a treaty which was promptly repudiated in Constantinople, where the Government was violently overthrown by Enver Bey on January 24. During the second stage of the war, which began on February 3, Adrianople fell to the combined attack of Bulgarians and Serbs, and Jannina to the Greeks. But there was now almost open enmity between the victorious allies, Serbia demanding a revision of the partition treaty of 1912, and receiving the support of Greece. To prepare for the expected struggle Bulgaria signed an armistice with Turkey on April 16, and the diplomats returned to London. The Treaty was drafted in May, but the progress of the negotiations was so slow that on May 28 Sir Edward intervened. "Those who are willing to sign the preliminary treaty without any alterations should do so immediately. Those who are not disposed to sign had better leave London." Two days later the Treaty was signed by all the delegates. Greece obtained Salonika, Southern Macedonia and Crete, Serbia Central and Northern Macedonia. Bulgaria secured Thrace and the Ægean coast, but surrendered Silistria to Roumania. European Turkey emerged with nothing but a foothold in Eastern Thrace; but her victors, despite the efforts of the Tsar to keep the peace, proceeded to quarrel over the spoil. Serbia and Greece, whose interests were the same, concluded an alliance, and on June 29, by the written order of King Ferdinand to General Savoff, and without the knowledge of Daneff, the Premier, the Bulgarians treacherously attacked the Serbian forces in Macedonia, while the Southern Bulgarian army made a dash for Salonika.¹ The Bulgarian Cabinet promptly called off the troops, but it was too late. Serbia and Greece were reinforced by the advance of the Roumanian army across the Danube, since King Carol was resolved to prevent Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans; and the dash-

**The
Struggle
Renewed**

¹ Gueshoff maintains that it only anticipated a Serbo-Greek attack.

ing Enver reoccupied Adrianople without a blow. The struggle was over so quickly that there was no time for the Powers to take collective action, and peace was dictated by the victors—Roumania, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro—at Bucharest on August 10. Austria, having in vain urged her allies to join in suppressing Serbia at the beginning of July, now vainly suggested the submission of the Treaty to the Powers; but King Carol declined, supported by the Kaiser, to whom he telegraphed, "Thanks to you the peace will stand." On August 11 the Ambassadors' Conference in London at a final sitting determined the southern frontier of Albania; but it was not till October that Serbia, yielding to Austrian threats, evacuated the Albanian territories which she had occupied. Attempts to secure the withdrawal of the Turks from Adrianople were a failure; but the conclusion of peace between Bulgaria and Turkey in September was followed by leisurely negotiations for an alliance.

The ten months of war had left a profound *malaise* not only in the Balkans, where the future of Albania and the Ægean islands was still unsettled, but also on the broad arena of European politics.¹ The overthrow of Turkey by the League formed under the auspices of the Tsar, and the aggrandizement of Serbia, Russia's outpost in the Balkans, filled the Central Powers with foreboding. The Triple Alliance was renewed by anticipation in December. The German army, already slightly augmented in 1912 in consequence of the Morocco crisis, received in 1913 the largest increase it had ever known. A Memorandum was drawn up in December, 1912, in the office of the General Staff by Ludendorff to justify a capital levy of fifty millions.² Great Britain, he asserted, would take her place with France and Russia, while Italy would do nothing more than immobilize the French army of the

¹ See the *Livre Jaune*, "Les Affaires Balkaniques," III, and the Belgian dispatches of 1912-14 in Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," IV.

² Published in Ludendorff, "The General Staff," I.

Alps. Russia was in arrears with her military reorganization, so that for a time the Triple Alliance need not fear an armed conflict with her; but in view of her enormous expenditure she would grow stronger every year. "We must hold one front defensively in order to take the offensive on the other, and that front can only be the French. It would be necessary to violate the neutrality of Belgium. It is only by an advance across Belgium that we can hope to defeat the French army in the open field. On this route we shall meet the English Expeditionary Force and—unless we come to some arrangement—the Belgian army too. But this operation is more promising than a frontal attack on the French fortified eastern frontier." It was the Schlieffen plan, and it required an overwhelming striking force for its success.

In his speech on the first reading of the Army Bill on April 7, 1913, the Chancellor explained the increase by the displacement of power resulting from the Balkan wars, declared that the violence of Russian Pan-Slavism and French chauvinism was a growing menace, and spoke gravely of a conflict between the Teuton and the Slav. Though compulsory service was the law of the land little more than half the recruits had been taken, and the peace strength of the army was now increased by 170,000 men. The capital levy was to be devoted to strengthening the frontier fortresses, increasing the artillery and augmenting the gold reserve in the Juliusthurm at Spandau. The Bill passed without opposition, and the levy was paid without grumbling; for Germany was convinced that her safety could only be guaranteed by the strength of her own right arm. Austria was weakened by racial dissension, Italy an uncertain ally, Turkey diminished and humiliated, Roumania drifting towards Petrograd, while the enmity of France was unchanged, the hostility of Russia increasing, and the loyalty of Great Britain to her friends beyond reproach.

Germany
Prepares

If Germany was conscious of her peril, she was also

arrogantly conscious of her strength. Despite the correct attitude of the Government, public opinion was growing ever more restless and excitable. The centenary of 1813 recalled memories of sacrifice and victory, and swelled the flood of patriotic oratory. "The Kaiser is profoundly pacific," wrote the Belgian Minister, Baron Beyens, from Berlin on March 8, "but the spirit of the governing classes is very different. Hatred of France has been taught them in school at the same time as the sentiment of the greatness of Germany. This hostility and pride

**Militarism
in Germany**

make them consider a war with France as a necessary evil, inevitable to assure their supremacy and to break the obstacles by which France seeks to hinder Germany's development. When the Empire will rest on the most colossal army ever known, one wonders whether the pacific ideas of the Kaiser may not be too weak a barrier to arrest the warlike ardour of the upper classes." Meanwhile "incidents" fanned the flame of suspicion and resentment. When a Zeppelin, with three officers aboard, descended at Lunéville Frenchmen believed that it had come to spy; and when some German commercial travellers were molested at Nancy there was an outbreak of wrath in the Reichstag, only partially soothed by the dismissal of the Prefect. Well might the Belgian Minister at Berlin note the "excessive nervousity" of German opinion as the greatest menace to peace. The dangerous ferment struck all observers. Otfried Nippold, returning after several years in the Far East, was shocked at the change, and in his "German Chauvinism"¹ held the mirror up to his fellow-countrymen. Bernhardi's "Germany and the Next War" was only one of the books which proclaimed not only the nearness but the rightness of war. The Pan-German League had been reinforced by the Deutscher Wehrverein, founded in 1912 by General Keim, who declared that a

¹ "Deutscher Chauvinismus," 1913; *cf.* Vergnet, "La France en Danger," and Rohrbach, "Chauvinismus und Weltkrieg," II. An interesting political tour in Germany at this time is described in Bourdon, "L'Enigme Allemande."

war was inevitable. "There is a smell of blood in the air," echoed General Liebert. The political Generals had become a national danger, but many of the civilians were as bad. Maximilian Harden's biting attacks on the timidity of the Government, Bassermann's rousing appeals to the National Liberals, and the teaching of bellicose professors added to the danger of the situation.

Old friends and close observers began to detect a change in the Kaiser himself. "He was quite cordial," writes Bishop Boyd Carpenter after a visit to Berlin in June, 1913, "but he spoke with The
Kaiser a note which was new to me. He seemed apprehensive. He spoke of the dangerous position in which Germany was placed between two Powers which might prove hostile. When I left him I felt that he was under the influence of a great fear."¹ "From the beginning of 1913," adds Bethmann-Hollweg, "he spoke to me of the coalition which, like that of Kaunitz, was joining against us and would fall on us." His anxiety was revealed on the visit of King Albert to Potsdam on November 5-6. War with France, declared the host, was inevitable and near, for France wished for it and was rapidly arming for it; but he was assured of victory. Count Moltke, Chief of the Staff, added that in the event of war the enthusiasm of the whole people in repelling the traditional enemy rendered success a certainty.² The French Ambassador was informed of these conversations, which he reported to Paris with his own grave observations. "Enmity against us is increasing, and the Emperor has ceased to be a friend of peace. His personal influence has been exerted on many critical occasions in its favour, but he has come to think that war with France is inevitable. As he advances in years,

¹ Boyd Carpenter, "Further Pages of My Life," 263-94.

² Beyens, "L'Allemagne avant la Guerre," 24-5. Moltke denied that he spoke of a war as desirable or imminent. He expressed the view that the Germany army would show itself superior if it came to a conflict, and the people would rise as one man if attacked. See his letter of Dec. 18, 1914, "Deutsches Weissbuch über die Schuld am Kriege," 75-6.

family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the Court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater hold over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans. The Emperor and his Chief of the Staff may have wished to induce the King of the Belgians not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. Whatever the object of the conversation, the revelation is one of extreme gravity. It would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that he is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and we must keep our powder dry." In the following months Baron Beyens noticed that he was less friendly to French visitors. "I have

The
German
Atmosphere

often held out my hand to France," he remarked at a Court ball in February, 1914, "and she has replied with kicks. They had better take care at Paris, for I shall not always be here." "The atmosphere of hate and defiance," testified the Minister, "has become heavier owing to the discussions on the Three Years' Law. Peace remains at the mercy of an accident." Colonel House, visiting Berlin in May with a view to an Anglo-German-American Entente, was appalled by the militarism of Berlin. "The whole of Germany is charged with electricity," he reported. "Everybody's nerves are tense. It only needs a spark to set the whole thing off."¹

The German military effort inevitably provoked a French response; and a law restoring three years' service was proposed by the Briand Ministry, and carried by the Barthou Ministry which succeeded it.² "The heads of our army," writes Poincaré, "considered it imperative. The increase of German effectives, the apprehensions aroused by the Balkan crisis, the difficulties arising from

¹ Hendrick, "Life and Letters of Walter H. Page," I, ch. 9.

² In its issue of May 25, 1913, *Gil Blas* stated that the return to three years' service had been demanded by Russia on the occasion of M. Poincaré's visit in 1912, and the story was generally believed in Germany. The reduction to two years had been made in 1905.

the application of the Moroccan Treaty, the memory of Tangier, Casablanca and Agadir—all this naturally lent a new vivacity to patriotic sentiment." The law was fought by the Socialists and the Caillaux Radicals; but France, like Germany, was ready for sacrifices, and the election of Poincaré as President in January proclaimed the new spirit of confidence. The atmospheric change was recorded and analysed in a series of dispatches from the Belgian Minister in Paris. "The British attitude in 1911," he wrote on October 9, 1912, "caused a revulsion in opinion. To say that the French nation has become bellicose would be going too far. The agriculturist, the bourgeois, the merchant, the industrialist know what a conflagration would cost them, yet the country is confident of success. We must count with the turbulent youth and the military. The men at the head of affairs are sincerely pacific, but their action is excessive. It is good to restore to a nation its dignity, but dangerous to foster its chauvinism. They began by military parades and marching through Paris. The visit of the Grand Duke Nicholas excited nationalism. **Militarism in France**

Millerand accompanied him to the frontier, whence the Grand Duchess saluted the lost provinces, and the visit concluded with a review at Nancy, which became a demonstration against the Treaty of Frankfurt. Opinion forced the hand of Napoleon in 1870, and could again confront the Governments with a situation leaving no issue but war." "Delcassé's appointment to Petrograd," writes the same diplomat on February 24, 1913, "exploded yesterday like a bomb. It must have pleased Poincaré, the Lorrainer, on the first day of his office to affirm his resolve to hold the flag erect. In these troubled moments that is the danger of his presence at the Élysée. One hopes his cool and practical mind will save him from all exaggeration. The great increase of German armaments at the same moment increases the danger of a too nationalist orientation of French policy." In reporting the new tone in the theatres and *café*

chantants, he writes on May 5 that the most chauvinist tirades arouse frenzied applause.¹

Austrian opinion throughout the Balkan wars had been in a ferment, and when Bulgaria attacked Serbia on June 29 she could scarcely control herself. "Austria," telegraphed San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, to Giolitti, the Prime Minister, who was absent from Rome, "has informed us and Germany of her intention to take action against Serbia, and describes it as defensive, hoping to establish the *casus fœderis*, which I consider inapplicable. I am trying to concert with Germany to prevent this action, but it might be necessary to say clearly that we do not consider it defensive, and therefore that the *casus fœderis* does not arise." "If Austria acts against Serbia," replied Giolitti, "it is clear that it does not arise. There is no question of defence, since no one seeks to attack her. That must be stated to Austria in the most formal manner, and it is to be hoped that Germany will dissuade her from this perilous adventure." Receiving no encouragement from her allies, Austria postponed the reckoning with her neighbour; but the tension was rendered even more acute by the growth of Pan-Serb propaganda and by the brutal coercion in the southern provinces of the Dual Monarchy, and above all in Croatia, which fed it.² "Austria," reported the French Ambassador at Vienna on December 13, "finds herself in an *impasse*, without knowing how she is to escape. Thus the feeling that the nations are moving towards a conflict, urged by an irresistible force, grows from day to day. People here are becoming accustomed to the idea of a general war as the only possible remedy for the

¹ Cf. Millerand, "Pour la défense nationale, une année au Ministère de la Guerre"; Marcel Sembat, "Faites un roi, sinon faites la paix"; Dimnet, "France Herself Again"; and Rohrbach, "Chauvinismus und Weltkrieg," I.

² Croatia was ruled from Budapest, where Tisza and the Magyar nobles pursued a policy of iron centralization and racial ascendancy unknown in Cis-Leithan Austria for half a century; but since 1908 the anti-Slav feeling was as violent in Vienna as in Budapest.

financial stringency which is cruelly felt after the military efforts the country has had to make for the last year."¹ In 1913 Franz Ferdinand was appointed Inspector-General of the Army and Navy, and aided Conrad von Hötzen-dorff, who had been recalled to office after Aehrenthal's death, to train the forces of the Dual Monarchy for war. Conrad, indeed, complained bitterly that he had twice prepared the army for battle, and that it could not for ever be disappointed.²

Opinion in Russia was no less inflamed than in Germany, Austria and France. Kiderlen, declares Reventlow, did not believe that the Entente wanted war, and was sure that Russia was unable to wage it; but his successor, Jagow, like the Chancellor, took a more alarmist view. The Kaiser and the Tsar met for the last time in May, 1913, when the wedding of the Princess brought the British and Russian sovereigns to Berlin. While the rulers remained on friendly terms, they were surrounded by men filled with suspicion and hostility. The acuteness of the tension was revealed when Turkey asked the German Government for an officer of high rank to reorganize its army, as Liman von Sanders Von der Goltz had reorganized it in 1883.

No objection was raised when the Kaiser discussed the matter with the Tsar in Berlin, and in November a contract was signed appointing Liman von Sanders to command the First Army Corps. In this arrangement Russia saw with dismay a fresh obstacle to her desire for the opening of the Straits; and the conciliatory Kokovtseff was sent to Berlin to remonstrate.³ The Kaiser and the Chancellor explained that they could not refuse Turkey's request, partly because Germany had long supplied her needs since the time of Von der Goltz and partly because she would go elsewhere if they declined.

¹ Poincaré, "Les Origines de la Guerre," 177.

² Ashmead-Bartlett's letter to the *Times*, July 30, 1917.

³ Siebert, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke," chs. 17-19; "Les Affaires Balkaniques," III, 81-107; and Liman von Sanders, "Fünf Jahre Türkei," ch. I.

To the suggestion that they need only send instructors they replied that experience had proved them useless, and that they must have a power of command. They added, however, that they had no wish to make difficulties for Russia, and would consider the matter afresh.

Sazonoff was in no way mollified, and he asked Sir Edward Grey to approve the following peremptory note.

**Excitement
of
Sazonoff**

"The German command would put the whole Diplomatic Corps in the power of Germany, and the General could take military measures in violation of the Sultan's sovereignty. If Germany obtains such a privileged position, the other Powers would have to consider their own interests." When Sir Edward objected to the threat, the Chargé observed that Russia attached the very greatest importance to the Note and reckoned on England's firm support. Sir Edward rejoined that Kühlmann had just told him that the German command was only necessary because Von der Goltz could never get his instructions carried out, and that it would be like the British Naval Mission. He had replied that Constantinople interested all the Powers, and that this plan violated the Sultan's sovereignty. Moreover, the British Admiral would not be a combatant. "Nor would the General," replied Kühlmann. After these two interviews, the Foreign Secretary telegraphed to Constantinople suggesting that the three Ambassadors should separately and verbally make a communication to the Porte. "We have heard a German General has received a very far-reaching command. We assume Turkey will do nothing to jeopardize the independence or security of the Straits and the capital. Other Powers are also interested, and we should be glad of information regarding the contract." Sazonoff resented Sir Edward's attempt to pour water into his wine, and complained of his coolness "in a matter of such importance for us"; but he was compelled to adopt the milder course. The three Ambassadors accordingly asked the Grand Vizier for information, and on December 15 the official

reply was received. "The General is Chief of the Mission, Member of the War Council, Inspector of Military Schools, and Commander of the First Corps. His command is purely technical. The Straits, the forts, and the maintenance of order in Constantinople are not in his jurisdiction."

The Turkish reply tells us nothing new, commented Sazonoff, who thereupon informed Sir Edward that he would now await a British initiative. But the Foreign Secretary, who observed to Lichnowsky that no event had made such a profound impression in Russia since he had been in office, refused to be stampeded into violent courses; for a conciliatory breeze was blowing from Berlin. The General arrived in Constantinople on December 14 and took over the command of the First Corps; but before leaving home Jagow had informed him of Russia's objection and had supported the Russian suggestion that he should take command of the Second Corps, stationed at Adrianople. The General replied that the Chief of the Mission could only reside in the capital. A compromise was finally adopted by which Liman resigned command of the First Corps and was appointed General-Inspector of the Turkish army. At the New Year's reception the Tsar warmly thanked the German Ambassador for complying with his wishes; but Sazonoff's embitterment remained after its immediate cause had been removed. Well might Professor Schiemann close his weekly article on December 31, 1913, with the confession that at hardly any time in the last century had the clouds spread so far over the horizon.

While the Liman crisis was at its height a New Year's article in a Russian military paper expressed the views prevailing among a section of officers. "We all know we are preparing for a war in the West. Not only the troops but the whole nation must accustom itself to the idea that we arm ourselves for a war of annihilation against the Germans, and the German Empires must be annihilated." The Liman compromise brought no real *détente*. Russia

withdrew Government orders from Germans, and at the end of January a new French loan of 2½ milliards was negotiated, part of which was earmarked for strategic railways. Meanwhile the threads between Petrograd and Belgrad were drawn tighter. On February 2 Pasitch in an audience of the Tsar broached the possibility of the marriage of the Crown Prince to one of the Princesses, and held out the prospect of her becoming the Tsarina of the Yugoslav people. The Tsar favoured the proposal, and begged his visitor to say to King Peter, "For Serbia we will do everything."¹

The Liman incident inspired Sazonoff to submit a memorandum to the Tsar "on the necessity of a comprehensive programme of action, in order to assure for us a satisfactory solution of the question of the Straits in the event of being compelled at no distant period to defend our interests in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles." The Tsar ordered the question to be dismissed by a Crown Council, which met on February 21, 1914,² under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister and was attended by military, naval and diplomatic experts, including the Ambassador at Constantinople. Sazonoff opened by observing that, though he did not anticipate serious complications at the present moment, there was no guarantee for the maintenance of the *status quo* in the East. If Turkey lost control of the Straits, Russia could not allow another Power to settle on their shores, and might thus be forced to occupy them herself. As the success of this operation would depend on its rapidity, landing operations must supplement naval action. The Foreign Minister therefore asked the Council to report what had already been done to prepare for action against the Straits, and what could and should be done. The Chief of the Staff pointed out that a considerable force would be needed, and

¹ See Bogitshevich, "Causes of the War," 126-34.

² Laloy, "Documents Secrets," 74-100, and "Das deutsche Weissbuch über die Schuld am Kriege," 169-81, print the official report.

that its size would depend on the political situation. Sazonoff interjected that neither Greece nor Bulgaria would oppose; for, if one of them intervened, the other would probably join the Russian side. To the question whether Serbia's support might not be counted on, he replied that action against the Straits would hardly be undertaken except in a European war, in which she would be compelled to throw her whole weight against Austria. Roumania was bound by treaty to Austria, but in view of the Russophil trend of opinion it was not certain that she would fight on her side. The Chief of the Staff then observed that the struggle for Constantinople was impossible without a European war. Troops could only be spared for the purpose if and when the struggle on the Western front had been satisfactorily concluded. In conclusion the Council made detailed recommendations relating to transport by land and sea, the construction of new lines in the Caucasus and the strengthening of the Black Sea fleet.

The deliberations of the Council were unknown to the public; but the tension was revealed in a sensational article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* of March 2 from its Petrograd correspondent. "The Russian danger is not imminent; but in 1917 the army reforms will be completed and troops are already being massed on her Western frontier. Germany will perhaps be unable to prevent invasion. Russian armaments are enormous and she will turn her arms against Germany. Such a war would be acclaimed by the whole people. In three years, when we negotiate a new commercial treaty, she will perhaps try to provoke foreign complications." The article, which was believed to have been inspired from Berlin,¹ aroused alarm throughout Europe; and an article in the *Bourse Gazette* of March 13, universally attributed to Sukhomli-

**Militarism
in Russia**

¹ According to Baron Schelking's "The Game of Diplomacy," it was inspired by the Councillor of the German Embassy. Jagow denied official prompting.

noff, the War Minister, increased the excitement. "Russia wishes for peace but is ready for war. The army is not only large but excellently equipped. Russia has always fought on foreign soil and has always been victorious. Russia is no longer on the defensive, Russia is ready." On May 14 Jagow uttered a warning in the Reichstag to the Russian Press, while expressing his conviction that the Government remained friendly; and on May 23 Sazonoff exhorted the Press of both countries to remain calm. The appeals were in vain. The Russian

**Russo-
German
Polemics**

Press continued to proclaim the historic mission to possess Constantinople. It was hinted that Russia would show her strength when the commercial treaties came to be renewed in 1916, and Witte gloomily prophesied that the discussion would lead to war. In Germany the Press was equally neurotic. "The relative calm is only apparent," reported the Russian Ambassador at Berlin. "Public opinion is strongly excited against Russia, and the military and the Junkers do not conceal their bellicose sentiments. This excitement and the warlike atmosphere is due to the fear of the growth of our military and economic strength, and it is believed that the present moment, when our preparations are far from completion, is the best for Germany. That such a collision will come sooner or later is not doubted here. The Government, however, does not share these warlike sentiments."

Russia, like Germany and France, had made feverish efforts since the Balkan wars to increase and improve her armaments; for it was in vain that Witte and Rosen besought the Tsar and their colleagues in the Council of the Empire to drop the forward policy in the Balkans which was leading straight to war.¹ In June, 1913, an increase of recruits was demanded of the Duma, approved by the Tsar in August, and begun in November, the scheme to be completed in 1917. In the spring of 1914 the Duma, in secret session, voted large sums for military prepara-

¹ See Rosen, "Forty Years of Diplomacy," II, ch. 30-3.

tions. Recruits were increased by 135,000 a year, and in the spring of 1913 a "period of preparation for war" was instituted, which enabled the preliminaries of mobilization to take place before mobilization itself was proclaimed. Early in 1914 fifty millions, described by Kokovtseff as earmarked for a war, were spent on the army. In April, 1914, a Japanese military mission, on visiting Russia, was struck by the evident hostility of the officers, who talked openly of the coming war.¹ In addition to the military preparations, an attempt was made to improve the diplomatic situation. In June the Tsar visited Roumania, when there was talk of a marriage between the Crown Prince and a daughter of the Tsar; and negotiations were subsequently begun with Bratiano for a military convention.²

At the invitation of Professor Delbrück, his old pupil Professor Mitrofanoff contributed to the June number of the *Preussische Jahrbücher* an article which increased the prevailing apprehension. "The ^{The} Mitrofanoff ^{Article} tension is felt by every one of any intelligence. The signs are not only in the Press. The feeling against the Germans is in everybody's heart and on everybody's lips. It has only recently become vocal, but it has long been ripening. The cause is the thwarting of age-long Russian ambitions in the Near East. It is now clear to Russians that, if everything remains as at present, the road to Constantinople lies through Berlin. We have no desire to attack Germany. We have too much admiration for German civilization to wish for ourselves Attila's victory. We are also fully convinced that Germany is far from having directly aggressive tendencies; but we feel ourselves on all sides hampered and hemmed in by German pressure, on our flanks, in Turkey, in Sweden, in Austria. We meet with no recognition of our present situation, no reckoning with our present strength,

¹ Beyens, April 4, in Schwertfeger, "Zur Europäischen Politik," IV, 189.

² Telegram of July 30, 1914, from the Russian Minister in Bucharest, published by the Bolsheviks.

and we are resolved to win for ourselves the position due to us. War with Germany would be a misfortune, but one cannot escape from a bitter necessity when it is really necessary. Only the possession of the Straits can end this intolerable situation, in which Russia's export trade can be stopped at any moment. The southward urge is an historical, political and economic necessity, and any State which resists it is *ipso facto* an enemy."¹ It was Skobelev's old cry that the road to Constantinople passed through the Brandenburg Thor.

The tension was increased by a provocative article on June 13 in the *Petrograd Bourse Gazette*, entitled, "Russia is ready. France must be ready too,"
 "Russia is Ready" attributed to the War Minister. "Russia fulfils all her obligations under the alliance, and she expects her ally to do the same. The contingent of recruits this year has been raised from 450,000 to 580,000, and the period of service increased by six months. Thus every winter Russia has an army of 2,300,000. Germany possesses 880,000, Austria 500,000 and Italy 400,000. Russia therefore naturally expects 770,000 men from France, which is only possible with the Three Years' Service. This increase is to facilitate rapid mobilization, in which connexion Russia is advancing to new reforms—to the construction of a whole network of strategic railways and the most rapid concentration of the army in the event of war. Russia wishes the same from France. Russia and France desire no war; but Russia is ready, and France must be ready too." The article aroused anger in Berlin. "So the Russians have shown their cards," wrote the Kaiser. "Any German who still disbelieves that Russia and France are working full steam for an early war against us and that we must take corresponding measures is fit for a madhouse." On June 16 the pacific Chancellor wrote to Lichnowsky that no inspired article had ever so nakedly revealed the bellicose

¹ This memorable article is reprinted in Delbrück, "Krieg und Politik," I.

tendencies of the Russian military party. "Till now only the extremist circles among the Pan-Germans and militarists attributed to Russia the definite plan of an early offensive against us; but cooler minds are beginning to share this view. The first result is the cry for a new and immediate increase of the army; and when the army gets something, the navy will also raise its voice. As the Kaiser is already won over I apprehend for the summer and autumn the outbreak of a new attack of armament fever. I do not believe Russia is planning a speedy attack; but she wishes, in the event of another Balkan crisis, to take a stronger line. Whether it comes to a European conflagration will depend solely on the attitude of Germany and England. If we combine, which our respective obligations do not forbid, war will be avoided. If not, a subsidiary difference between Russia and Austria would light the torch."

III

While the relations between the Dual Alliance and the Central Powers grew steadily worse, a welcome *détente* had occurred between Great Britain and Germany. After the settlement of the Morocco crisis Sir Edward Grey declared that we had no desire to oppose German expansion in Central Africa; and the possibilities of colonial co-operation were briefly discussed between Lord Haldane and Bethmann-Hollweg at Berlin. Negotiations were begun in London after his return,¹ and the first task was to overhaul the agreement of 1898 which divided the African colonies of Portugal into economic spheres of influence. "Thanks to the accommodating spirit," writes Lichnowsky, "the new agreement fully accorded with our wishes and interests." Angora, with San Thomé and

The
Portuguese
Colonies

¹ See Lichnowsky, "My London Mission"; Jagow's reply to Lichnowsky, in "International Conciliation," No. 127; Helfferich, "Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," 116-20.

Principe on the West coast, and Mozambique from German East Africa to the Zambesi were earmarked for Germany. The agreement was far more favourable to Germany than that of 1898. The negotiations were practically completed when King George visited Berlin in May, 1913, and the agreement was initialled in August. Sir Edward, however, would only sign if the agreement of 1898 and the Windsor Treaty were published with it; and the Wilhelmstrasse declined the condition. "We intended publication," explains Jagow, "but only at a suitable moment, when the danger of hostile criticism should be less acute, and if possible with the simultaneous announcement of the Bagdad agreement, then near completion." Sanction was finally obtained at the end of July, 1914; but by that time the war was in sight, and the Treaty was never signed.

The discussions relating to Asiatic Turkey were more difficult and more far-reaching.¹ The withdrawal of Russian opposition at the Potsdam meeting in 1910 rendered British acceptance of the Bagdad Railway a mere matter of time; and the final negotiations took place when the Grand Vizier, Hakki Pasha, visited London for the peace negotiations after the first Balkan war. Turkey accepted our definition of the *status quo* in the Gulf, and we recognized the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan over Koweit. An International Riverain Commission, with a Turkish *façade* and British control, was to regulate the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab, and the Lynch Company was confirmed in its privileges on the Tigris.

The German Government was informed of the Anglo-Turkish settlement; and Anglo-German discussions, which began immediately, resulted in a convention initialled on June 15, 1914. Great Britain undertook not to oppose the Bagdad railway system, and Germany not to oppose British

¹ The British story is given in the *Quarterly Review*, October, 1917; the German in Helfferich, "Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," and Schäfer, "Die Entwicklung der Bagdadbahn Politik." For the Russo-German negotiations see Siebert, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke," chs. 8-9.

control of river navigation. The terminus was to be at Basra, two British directors were to sit on the board, and the construction and exploitation of the ports at Bagdad and Basra were to be undertaken by a separate company, in which British capital was to hold 40 per cent.; and the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab was to be entrusted to a company in which Great Britain should hold half the capital, while Turkey could hand over 20 per cent. to German capital. Agreements were also concluded in regard to irrigation and oil. Both parties engaged to prevent discrimination on the railways and rivers of Asiatic Turkey. **Anglo-German Agreement** Germany undertook not to support the establishment of any port or railway terminus on the Gulf without our consent, and recognized our special position on the Shatt-el-Arab. Sir Edward's most important concession, observes Lichnowsky, was the continuation of the railway to Basra, thus recognizing the whole of Mesopotamia north of that point as within the German sphere of influence. Friends of peace on both sides were thankful that the greatest cause of Anglo-German friction except the fleet had at last been removed. Meanwhile France and Germany had also come to terms, and an agreement was initialled on February 15, 1914. The French group withdrew from the Bagdad Company, and France undertook to ask for no railway concessions in the Bagdad railway zone. Germany, in return, promised to claim no concessions in North Syria and the hinterland of the Black Sea. Questions relating to railway connexions, tariffs, and future loans to Turkey were also amicably arranged. A Franco-Turk Treaty was signed on April 22, 1914.¹ There now only remained an agreement between Germany and Turkey before the whole complex of settlements came into operation; and this too was nearing its conclusion.

British negotiations with Germany were watched by our friends with unfounded suspicion. At the end of 1912

¹ See Bompard, "L'Entrée en Guerre de la Turquie," *Revue de Paris*, July 1, 1921.

the French Ambassador was instructed to mention that the Press rumours of a *rapprochement* with Germany were damaging the Entente, and that Poincaré was to answer an interpellation. Sir Edward replied that there was no foundation for the rumours, and that he was only discussing colonial and other subordinate questions in a friendly way. The feeling of insecurity, however, could not be wholly eradicated. "Goschen asked Cambon his view on a naval holiday," reported the Russian Minister at Berlin in February, 1914. "Cambon replied that he could not approve, as all savings on the navy would go to the army and be used against France in a future collision. He looks very sadly at the continual rumours of an improvement in Anglo-German relations, as it suggests the possibility of a *rapprochement*. I can see from here how the German Government is trying to meet the English."¹

The Liman crisis, in which he deemed Sir Edward to have left him in the lurch, intensified Sazonoff's desire to tighten the bonds of the Triple Entente.

The Triple Entente

The transformation of the Triple Alliance, he wrote to Izvolsky on April 2, seemed to him desirable.² "Certain steps towards co-operation and closer definition of their mutual obligations have been taken between France and England. We must work in the same direction. I share your view that it would be well if Poincaré and Doumergue, taking advantage of the meeting with the King and his Minister at Paris, could point out confidentially that a closer relationship between Russia and England would be joyfully welcomed in France and would be equally desirable for all the members of the Entente. Perhaps the French Government would propose to Grey to inform us of the Anglo-French political compact, which would serve as the foundation for a similar arrangement."

¹ Siebert, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke," 775.

² See the dispatches in Siebert, ch. 21. A selection was published by the German Foreign Office in 1919 as "Diplomatische Kriegsrüstungen: Dokumente zu den Englisch-Russischen Verhandlungen über ein Marine-Abkommen"; cf. Jagow, "Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges," ch. 8.

The King and Queen arrived in Paris on April 1; and the importance of the occasion was emphasized by the presence of the Foreign Secretary, who had never left our shores during his long tenure of office. According to arrangement Doumergue pleaded for closer relations between Great Britain and Russia, and Izvolsky reported the result to Petrograd. An alliance was impossible, but Sir Edward was ready for an arrangement with Russia like that existing with France. A naval convention was possible, and the Anglo-French agreements might be communicated.

Conversations in Paris

"Doumergue and Cambon told me they were astonished at Grey's clear and definite willingness for a close *rapprochement*." On May 12 Benckendorff reported a memorable interview with the Foreign Minister. "Sir Edward sent for me to express how profound were the impressions of his journey—impressions which were shared by the King and all who had taken part in the visit. These impressions had far surpassed his expectations, and he could not sufficiently congratulate himself on his reception by Poincaré and Doumergue, with whom entire agreement on current issues and the general situation was reached. The British Government had drawn the conclusion that the Entente had struck as deep root in France as in England. Grey spoke with a warmth that is not usual with him." Four days later the Ambassador reported the favourable result of the Cabinet discussion. Russia would be informed of the Grey-Cambon letters, and discussions would then take place between the Russian and the British Admiralties.

On May 23 the Foreign Secretary gave the Russian Ambassadors the Grey-Cambon letters, adding that there was no objection to a similar agreement with Russia, which would naturally deal with the navies. After full discussion the Russian Admiralty recommended that Great Britain should hold as large a part of the German fleet as possible in the North Sea, and thereby render possible a Russian landing in Pomerania; that for this purpose

she might send merchant ships to Russia and the Baltic ports before the beginning of hostilities; that Russian ships should be allowed to use British harbours in the Eastern Mediterranean, as they were already allowed to use French harbours in the western half; and that information as to signals, ciphers, etc., should be exchanged. After conversation with Prince Louis of Battenberg the Russian Naval Attaché reported that the British Government was in no hurry, and that the Prince would visit Russia in August for discussions with the Admiralty.

**Naval
Discussions**

By this time the secret had leaked out. Ever since 1909 an official in the Russian Embassy in London had communicated to Berlin the correspondence which passed through the hands of Benckendorff; and the *Berliner Tageblatt*, at the wish of the German Government, now revealed the Anglo-Russian discussions.¹ Sir Edward lamented to Benckendorff the indiscretions that had appeared, as he would be forced to answer a question in the House. Meanwhile he sought to relieve the apprehensions of Bethmann-Hollweg, who had instructed Lichnowsky to ask for explanations. "It is most satisfactory that Sir Edward has denied the rumours of an Anglo-Russian Naval Convention," he wrote to Lichnowsky on June 16. "If they had been true it would not only have stimulated Russian and French chauvinism, but would have produced a navy scare and a renewed poisoning of our slowly improving relations with England. Coming on top of the neurotic tension in which Europe has lived in recent years, its further results would have been beyond prediction." The Under-Secretary, Zimmermann, on the other hand, wrote to the Chancellor that the Ambassador was once more hoodwinked by Sir Edward Grey, and suggested that he should be shown the proofs of the negotiations in progress between England and Russia. On July 11 the Foreign Secretary replied to questions in Parliament whether a naval con-

¹ See Valentin, "Deutschlands Aussenpolitik," 145-47.

vention with Russia had been or was being made. A year ago, he declared, the Prime Minister had said that if war broke out between the European Powers no unpublished agreements existed which could limit the freedom of the Government or Parliament. No negotiations with any Power had been or were being or were likely to be undertaken which would make this less true. If any such convention were contemplated which would modify the Prime Minister's declaration, it would have to be laid before Parliament. This ambiguous phraseology was interpreted in different ways; but the inability to meet a plain question with a direct negative confirmed the suspicious in their fears. "It is now only a question of form when an alliance is concluded," wrote Schiemann. "I have always held that as soon as France and Russia were certain of England's support a European war would become probable."

The slow progress of the discussions annoyed Sazonoff, who reminded Benckendorff of the necessity to conclude the Convention as soon as possible. "I will do all I can to hasten the negotiations between Captain Wolkoff and the Admiralty," replied the Ambassador on July 2; "but I see no reason to believe that the Government has the least objection to carry out the Paris project. If it is not yet finished, it is because Prince Louis is to complete the negotiations in Petrograd. Another cause of delay is the indiscretions. Perhaps Sir Edward wishes that the disquietude in Berlin should diminish before he goes further. As a matter of fact, he would find it difficult at the same moment to issue *démentis* and to negotiate." Before, however, Sir Edward had time to solve his problem in casuistry or Prince Louis to sign the Naval Convention at Petrograd, the whole energies of the British Government were engaged in a desperate effort to maintain the peace of the world.

Impatience
of Russia

CHAPTER XVI

THE BREAKING OF THE STORM

THE European atmosphere was charged with electricity when Francis Ferdinand and his wife were murdered by the Austrian Serbs at Sarajevo on June 28.¹ The headstrong Berchtold instantly resolved to seize the opportunity for the final reckoning with Serbia for which he had been waiting; but on July 1 Tisza warned the Emperor in an impressive Memorandum that there was not sufficient proof to charge Belgrad with the crime, that Austria would be universally regarded as the disturber of the peace, and

The Sarajevo Murders

¹ See "Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War," ed. by J. B. Scott; supplemented by Kautzky, "Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegausbruch"; Dirr, "Bayerische Dokumente zum Kriegausbruch"; the evidence given before the Untersuchungsausschuss of the Reichstag; and the final Austrian Red Book, published after the defeat of the Central Powers. The best defences of British policy are by Headlam, "The History of Twelve Days" and "The German Chancellor and the Outbreak of War"; Oman, "The Outbreak of the War"; and Gilbert Murray, "The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey." Earl Loreburn, "How the War Came," is more critical. The best defences of French policy are by Poincaré, "Les Origines de la Guerre," and Bourgeois et Pagès, "Les Origines et les Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre." Pevet, "Les Responsables de la Guerre," is highly critical. The best defences of German policy are in "Das deutsche Weissbuch über die Schuld am Kriege"; Bethmann-Hollweg, "Reflections on the World War," I, supplemented by his "Kriegsreden," excellently edited by Thimme; Jagow, "Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges"; Helfferich, "Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges"; and Oncken's chapters in "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg." Kautzky, "Wie der Weltkrieg entstand," is hostile. The most dispassionate discussion by a German is in Valentin, "Deutschlands Aussenpolitik," ch. 10. The fullest account of Austrian policy is given by Gooss, "Das Wiener Kabinet und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges." Kanner, "Die kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik," and Szilassy, "Der Untergang der Donaumonarchie," sharply attack Berchtold. Julius Andrassy, "Diplomacy and the War," explains the Hungarian standpoint. The most impartial discussion is by Fay, "New Light on the Origins of the War," *American Historical Review*, July and Oct., 1920, and Jan., 1921.

that to begin a great war before Bulgaria replaced Roumania as a satellite of the Triple Alliance would be folly. The sentiments of Francis Joseph were expressed in an autograph letter, drawn up by Berchtold, to the Kaiser. "The crime against my nephew is the direct consequence of the agitation carried on by Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavists, whose sole aim is to weaken the Triple Alliance and shatter my Empire. Though it may be impossible to prove the complicity of the Serbian Government, there can be no doubt that its policy, intent on uniting all Jugoslavs under the Serbian flag, must encourage such crimes and endanger my house and countries if it is not stopped. My efforts must be directed to isolating Serbia and reducing her size. After the recent terrible event I am certain that you also are convinced that agreement between Serbia and us is out of the question, and that the peace policy of all European monarchs is threatened so long as this centre of criminal agitation remains unpunished in Belgrad." The Imperial letter was accompanied by a memorandum on Roumania and Bulgaria drawn up a few days before the crime; and an ominous postscript added that it was now necessary for the Dual Monarchy to grasp the threads which its enemies were weaving into a net over its head and tear them asunder.

Francis
Joseph's
Letter

When the Kaiser received the letter on July 5 he assured the envoy, Count Hoyos, that Austria might in this case, as in all others, rely on Germany's full support. Action against Serbia should not be delayed. Russia's attitude would no doubt be hostile, but for this he had long been prepared; and should a war between Austria and Russia be unavoidable, Germany would stand beside her ally. Russia was in no way prepared for war, and would think twice before appealing to arms. If Austria had really recognized the necessity of war against Serbia, he would regret if she did not make use of the present moment, which was all in her favour. On the following

day the Chancellor informed the Austrian Ambassador that it was not the Kaiser's business to express an opinion on the questions at issue between Austria and Serbia, but that Francis Joseph could rely on his support in accordance with his obligations and his old friendship. Meanwhile he would endeavour to bring back Roumania to the fold.

The Kaiser's autograph reply repeated his verbal promises of support. No Crown Council was held; but before starting on his annual cruise in northern waters on July 6 he saw the representatives of the War Office and the Admiralty and warned them of the danger of European complications.¹ "We were quite aware that a warlike attitude on the part of Austria against Serbia might bring Russia into the field," explained the German White Book, "and that it might therefore involve us in a war in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, in view of the vital interests of Austria which were at stake, advise our ally to assume a yielding attitude incompatible with his dignity nor deny him our assistance, all the less since our own interests were menaced by the Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued, with the aid of Russia and France, to menace the existence of Austria, her gradual collapse and the subjection of all the Slavs under the Russian sceptre would result, thus rendering untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian Pan-slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our eastern and western neighbours." Vienna was no more the tool of Berlin in 1914 than in 1908; but by encouraging Austria to take action which was almost certain to plunge Europe into war, the German Government incurred a share in the guilt of the catastrophe scarcely less than that of Austria herself. That the Kaiser

¹ See the Beilage, "Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges, Schriftliche Auskünfte Deutscher Staatsmänner."


regarded the Serbs as regicides and savages, and believed that the Tsar would view them in the same light, affords no excuse for the criminal levity with which he urged their prompt and exemplary punishment.

While Berchtold was preparing his thunderbolt and assuring himself of German support, Lichnowsky was instructed to warn Sir Edward Grey that relations between Vienna and Belgrad were likely to become strained, and to suggest that he should persuade Russia to advise Serbia to submit to the Austrian demands. The Foreign Secretary was ready to urge Russia to moderation if Austria were compelled to adopt sharper measures against Serbia; but much would depend on whether they would inflame Slav feeling to a degree rendering it impossible for Russia to remain passive. Austria, however, was in no mood for compromise. After receiving the reply of the German Government the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy met on July 7 to discuss the situation, and Count Berchtold expressed his views that the moment had come to put an end to Serbia's intrigues once for all. Germany had promised support, and an attack on Serbia did not necessarily involve war with Russia. All present except Tisza, who argued that an attack on Serbia involved a world war, and reiterated his protest in a second memorandum to the Emperor, agreed that a purely diplomatic success would be worthless, and that such stringent demands must be presented as to ensure a refusal.¹ Berchtold's resolve was in no way modified by the report of Wiesner, an official who had been sent by Berchtold to Sarajevo to investigate, that there was "nothing to prove or even to cause suspicion of the Serbian Government's cognizance of the steps leading to the crime."² In a second Crown Council on July 19 the text of the note to Serbia was

Austrian
Crown
Council

¹ For Tisza's moderating influence see, in addition to the Red Books, Fraknoi, "Die Ungarische Regierung und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges."

² Berchtold concealed this report from Tisza, from Francis Joseph, and from Berlin.



settled, and it was agreed to present it on July 23. Conrad declared that military prospects were no longer so good as they had been, but that they would grow worse: Tisza's assent was secured by a resolution that Austria should disclaim annexations. Berchtold, however, insisted that the strategic frontiers must be corrected and portions of the country assigned to other States. On

**Ultimatum
to Serbia**

July 23 the ultimatum was presented at Belgrad with a time limit of forty-eight hours. Austria's demands, set forth in ten articles, included not only the suppression of Pan-Serb societies and propaganda, but the co-operation of Austrian officials in the measures required for that purpose. Francis Joseph was well aware of the gravity of the step. "Russia cannot accept it," he observed to a Minister. "It will be a big war."¹

When the Austrian Ambassador presented a copy of the ultimatum at Downing Street on July 24, the Foreign Secretary complained that a time limit had been adopted at this stage. He had never seen one State address to another a document of so formidable a character. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were no concern of the British Government. He would exchange views with other Powers and must await their views as to what could be done. His first task was to send for the French Ambassador, whom he informed of his conviction that the only chance of mediation was that Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain, who had no direct interests in Serbia, should act jointly and simultaneously in Vienna and Petrograd. Cambon replied gloomily that nothing could be said in Petrograd till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action; that in two days Austria would march into Serbia, since the Serbians could not possibly accept the ultimatum; that Russia would be compelled by public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and, therefore,

¹ Kanner, "Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik," 251. This utterance outweighs the testimony of Margutti, "The Emperor Francis Joseph."

that when the Austrian attack began it would be too late for mediation. The same afternoon the Foreign Secretary saw the German Ambassador, who brought a circular note denouncing Serb intrigues against the integrity of the Dual Monarchy, approving the Austrian procedure, and expressing the opinion that the matter concerned Austria and Serbia alone. Sir Edward declared that if the ultimatum did not lead to trouble with Russia, he had no concern with it. But he was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take, and in view of the extraordinary character of the Austrian Note and the short time allowed, he felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned. The only chance was that the four other Great Powers should mediate and gain time, and this was only possible if Germany would propose and participate in such advice at Vienna. Having thus proposed mediation to Paris and Berlin, Sir Edward on the same day urged Serbia to promise the fullest satisfaction if any of her officials should prove to have been accomplices in the murders.

On July 26 Sir Edward telegraphed the proposal for mediation which he had discussed with the Ambassadors to the Governments of Paris, Berlin and Rome. "Would the Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct the Ambassador here to join with the representatives of France, Italy, Germany and myself to meet in confidence immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? If so, representatives at Belgrad, Vienna and Petrograd should request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference." France and Italy promptly accepted the proposal; but the Kaiser declared that he would only take part in mediation at Austria's express wish, "since in vital matters people consult nobody." The Foreign Secretary rejoined that the Serbian reply, which he had just seen and which went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands, was obviously

England
Offers
Mediation

due to Russian prompting, and it was therefore at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. Serbia's reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause, and Germany should urge this course at Vienna. Lichnowsky reported that he found the Minister for the first time in bad spirits. "He spoke very gravely and seemed very definitely to expect us to use our influence to settle the question. Everybody here is convinced that the key is in Berlin, and that, if Berlin wishes peace, it will hold back Austria." The Chancellor, who earnestly desired peace but had completely lost control of the situation, telegraphed Lichnowsky's dispatch to Vienna, adding that, having already declined the proposal for a conference, it was impossible to reject the new suggestion. "By rejecting every sort of mediation we should be made responsible before the whole world for the conflagration. Our situation is all the more difficult as Serbia has apparently given way very far. We cannot, therefore, reject the rôle of mediator and must lay before the Vienna Cabinet the English proposal. Ascertain Berchtold's view of the English plan and of Sazonoff's wish to negotiate direct with Vienna."

Unfortunately for the peace of the world Vienna was resolved on a final reckoning with her troublesome neighbour.¹ "The integral acceptance of the ultimatum," reported Sir Maurice de Bunsen, "was neither expected nor desired. When it was rumoured that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known that it had been rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations with Belgrad, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning. Now the flood gates were opened, and

¹ In his interesting book, "*La dernière Ambassade de France en Autriche*," Dumaine presents Berchtold as an amiable mediocrity spurred on by Tschirschky. This picture is not confirmed by the protocols of the Crown Councils.

the entire people and Press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Serbian race. The country believed it had before it only the alternative of subduing Serbia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. So just was the cause of Austria held to be that it seemed inconceivable that any country should place herself in her path." Count Mensdorff was instructed to inform Sir Edward that Serbia had not accepted the demands, that Austria must proceed to force, and that she counted on British sympathy in the struggle forced on her. The Ambassador explained that the reply might on paper seem satisfactory, but that the co-operation of Austrian officers and police which alone would guarantee the cessation of the subversive campaign against Austria had been refused. Sir Edward retorted that the response of Belgrad involved the greatest humiliation he had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing that Austria had treated it as a blank negative.

If Austria was determined at any cost to have the reckoning with Serbia of which she had been baulked in 1913, and which she regarded as essentially defensive, Russia was no less resolved to **Determina- tion** honour her reiterated promises of support to her Balkan *protégé*.¹ Moreover, the military party looked forward with confidence to a conflict of which Constantinople might be the prize. In the Central Empires it was hoped and in some quarters sincerely believed that she would stand aside while Serbia was receiving her chastisement; but there was no ground for such a supposition. After reading the Austrian ultimatum, which by a refinement of duplicity was issued directly the French President had concluded his visit to the Russian Court and was on the high seas, Sazonoff described it to Sir George Buchanan as provocative and

¹ Vivid pictures of the Russian actors in the drama are drawn in the diaries of the German and French Ambassadors—Pourtalès, "Am Scheidewege zwischen Krieg und Frieden," and Paléologue, "La Russie pendant la grande guerre." I, chs. 1-2.

immoral, and expressed the hope that the British Government would proclaim its solidarity with Russia and France. The Ambassador replied that he did not expect any unconditional engagement of armed support, since direct British interests were nil, and a war for Serbia would never be sanctioned by British opinion. Sazonoff retorted that the general European question was involved, that Great Britain would sooner or later be dragged in if war broke out, and that she would render it more probable if she did not from the outset make common cause with France and Russia. The French Ambassador joined in the appeal; and Sir George concluded his dispatch by expressing his opinion that, even if we declined to join them, France and Russia were determined to make a strong stand.

Such was the situation when on July 27 the Foreign Secretary in a few pregnant sentences informed the House of Commons, whose attention had been focused on Ireland, of the gravity of the situation, and of his proposal for co-operation with France, Germany and Italy. He had uttered no word since the beginning of the crisis to bind himself or his colleagues; but an important decision had been taken on the previous day when the Admiralty on its own responsibility gave orders that the fleet which had assembled at Portland for manœuvres should not disperse. When Benckendorff complained that in German and Austrian circles an impression prevailed that we should stand aside, Sir Edward rejoined that such an impression should be dispelled by the orders to the fleet. That fact, however, must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.

Exhortations and warnings fell on deaf ears in Vienna. When Sir Maurice de Bunsen on July 28 explained the desire of the British Government that the four Powers should work for peace, Berchtold replied, "quietly but firmly," that no discussion could be accepted on the basis of the Serbian Note, that war would be declared that day,

that no temporary arrangement with Serbia was worth having since she had deceived Austria before, and that she was not a civilized nation. The peace of Europe, he added, would not be saved if the Great Powers backed her up, for, if Austria were now to accept mediation, she would feel encouraged to pursue her old path and the question of war would quickly crop up again.¹ When the declaration of war was known at Petrograd, mobilization was ordered in the south, and Sazonoff telegraphed to Benckendorff that it put an end to the idea of direct communications between Petrograd and Vienna. Action by the London Cabinet with a view to suspension of military operations was now most urgent, for, unless they were stopped, mediation would only give Austria time to crush Serbia.

The Austrian declaration of war, though not less deeply resented in Whitehall than the ultimatum, wrought no change in British policy. The Foreign Secretary continued to make no promise of support which might inflame the martial ardour of Petrograd, and no promise of neutrality which might encourage hot-heads at Vienna and Berlin. On July 29 he appealed to the German Government through Lichnowsky to suggest any method by which the four Powers could prevent war. Mediation might be possible if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory till she had received satisfaction, stated that she would not advance further pending the effort to mediate between her and Russia. If Germany would recommend this at Vienna, he would secure Russian assent. He added what the Ambassador afterwards described as "the famous warning." "This afternoon," telegraphed Sir Edward to Sir E. Goschen, "I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. If Germany became

Warning to
Lichnowsky

¹ Berchtold's belief that a compromise would merely postpone the struggle was generally shared in Austria. See the thoughtful discussion in Hoyos, "Der Deutsch-Englische Gegensatz und sein Einfluss auf die Balkanpolitik Oesterreichs."

involved and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests, and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation into thinking that we should stand aside. The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given to Berlin as his view of the situation."

Lichnowsky's report of this conversation did not reach Berlin in time to influence the Crown Council held on

**The
Potsdam
Council**

the same evening at Potsdam, whither the Kaiser had returned from his northern cruise. "I found the Chancellor and the Foreign Office," he writes in his Memoirs, "in conflict with the Chief of the Staff, since Moltke argued that war was inevitable, while the others believed it would be avoided if I did not mobilize."¹ After the meeting Bethmann-Hollweg made what Sir Edward Goschen described as a strong bid for British neutrality. It was clear, he observed, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed; but that was not Germany's object. If British neutrality were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that Germany aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France. When questioned about the French colonies, he said he could not give a similar undertaking. It depended on the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium; but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. His object had always been to bring about an understanding with England. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce would enable him to look forward to its realization. Sir Edward Grey, on receiving a report of the conversation, hotly replied that the Government could not for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal of neutrality on such terms.

¹ "Memoirs," ch. 10.

The German Government had rashly encouraged Berchtold to set the stone rolling, and with culpable negligence had not even asked to see the ultimatum, which struck both the Chancellor and Jagow as needlessly sharp;¹ but after the Serbian reply they attempted to apply the brake to the Austrian chariot. "The wishes of the Monarchy are in the main fulfilled," wrote the Kaiser to Jagow. "The few reservations can be cleared up by negotiations. A capitulation of the most humiliating character is enshrined therein, and every ground for war disappears. But the piece of paper is only of value when it is translated into fact. The Serbs are Orientals, false and procrastinating. In order that these fair promises materialize, a *douce violence* must be applied. Austria could only hold Belgrad as a guarantee. The Austrian army must have a visible *satisfaction d'honneur*. That is the condition of my mediation." This proposal was dispatched to Vienna on the evening of June 28, anticipating a similar proposal of Sir Edward Grey. Information received a day later from the German Ambassador at Petrograd caused Berlin to address sharp warnings to Vienna which would have been of greater utility at an earlier date. When Pourtalés' dispatch reached Jagow late on July 29, he sketched a telegram to Vienna, took it to the Chancellor, who was already in bed, and sent it off in a sharpened form. "We cannot expect Austria to negotiate with Serbia, as she is at war. The refusal, however, to exchange views with Petrograd would be a grave mistake. We are indeed ready to fulfil our duty. As an ally we must, however, refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration through Austria not respecting our advice. Tell Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness." It was the information from Petrograd, not the threat from

Bethmann
Warns
Vienna

¹ The controversy as to Germany's knowledge of the text is irrelevant, since her blank cheque to Austria rendered her morally responsible for whatever Austria chose to do. "Tschirschky," declares Berchtold, "was told of the material points before it was drawn up, and the text was given him two days before it was sent." See Goricar, "The Inside Story of Anglo-German Intrigue," 300-1.

Downing Street, which had not yet reached him, which led the Chancellor to issue his peremptory warning.

Berchtold at once permitted the renewal of conversations at Petrograd, and added that neither the infraction of

Austria
Uncom-
promising

Serbia's rights nor the acquisition of territory was contemplated; but his apparent conversion was purely tactical. A Crown Council was summoned to discuss the British proposal, and the Foreign Minister reported that he had explained to the German Ambassador, who presented the proposal, that the cessation of hostilities was impossible. The Emperor had approved the suggestion to avoid accepting the offer on its merits, but to show a desire to meet the wishes of England and the Chancellor. The reply would state that operations against Serbia must continue, that Austria could not discuss the British offer till the Russian mobilization had stopped, and that Austria's demands must be accepted integrally. A mere occupation of Belgrad would be of no use. Russia would pose as the saviour of Serbia, which would remain intact, and in two or three years Austria would be exposed to an attack under far more unfavourable conditions. In the debate which followed the other Ministers showed themselves no less uncompromising. Tisza suggested that the Monarchy should declare its readiness to accept the British proposal in principle and on condition that operations in Serbia continued and the Russian mobilization stopped. Count Stürgkh, the Austrian Prime Minister, observed that the idea of a conference was so odious to him that he would not like even to appear to accept it. The Finance Minister welcomed Tisza's proposal as extremely clever, since by making the two conditions time would be gained. The London Conference was so terrible a memory that public opinion would revolt against its repetition. At the close of the meeting the Foreign Minister reported to the Emperor the decision to send a courteous reply to the British offer of mediation, which Austria was willing to consider on condition that the operations in Serbia were not inter-

rupted thereby and that Russia instantly ceased mobilization and dismissed its reserves.

The minutes of this Crown Council prove that the readiness for a *bona fide* compromise with which Austria was credited at the time was imaginary; for it was of the essence of the Anglo-German proposal that the campaign against Serbia should halt, and no one could expect Russia to cease mobilization and dismiss her reserves while Austria continued to trample her enemy underfoot. When Sir Edward was informed by Lichnowsky that, as a result of German representations, con-
**England's
Last Efforts**
versations between Russia and Austria had been resumed, he expressed his great satisfaction. He did not, however, see how Russia could suspend military preparations unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops. "It has occurred to me that Germany might sound Vienna and I would sound Petrograd whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Serbia, provided that they did not impair Serbian sovereignty and the integrity of Serbian territory, which she had already declared her willingness to respect. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands impairing Serbian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would, of course, suspend further military operations or preparations." The Ambassador was ordered to repeat the promise and the warning which the Foreign Secretary had given to Lichnowsky. "I said that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at Petrograd and Paris and would go the length of saying that, if Russia and France would not accept it, the Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but otherwise I told the

Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in."

Sir Edward's conversation with Lichnowsky on the morning of July 31 took place, and his instructions to Berlin were dispatched in ignorance of the **Russia's General Mobilization** fact that Russia, who had mobilized 55 divisions on July 29 in answer to Austria's 22, had now mobilized her entire forces. According to Sukhomlinoff, the Russian War Minister, the Tsar signed the order for general mobilization on the afternoon of July 29; but, after a friendly telegram from the Kaiser, he ordered that mobilization should only take place against Austria. The War Minister, however, and the Chief of the Staff allowed the general mobilization to continue, while concealing it from the Tsar and denying it to the German Military Attaché. Their disobedience was not discovered at the time; for in the afternoon of July 30, Sazonoff, the War Minister and Minister of Marine, on learning of the bombardment of Belgrad, agreed that general mobilization was necessary. The Tsar's consent was obtained the same night, and early next morning the capital was placarded with notices.¹ A few hours later Austria ordered general mobilization, and Germany proclaimed *Drohende Kriegsgefahr*.

The Tsar appeared to the German Ambassador hardly to realize the significance of what he had done,² and in a telegram to King George he described the German ultimatum which followed as quite unexpected; but his Foreign Secretary and War Minister could be under no such delusion. On July 25, Sir George Buchanan had warned the former that if Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. Similar advice had been proffered from

¹ See Höniger, "Russlands Vorbereitung zum Weltkrieg"; "Untersuchungen zum Sukhomlinoff-prozess," in *Deutsche Rundschau*, April, 1918; Eggeling, "Die Russische Mobilmachung"; and the report of the Reichstag Committee, "Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," Heft 2.

² See Pourtalès, "Am Scheidewege."

Paris, which was not consulted before the irrevocable step was taken. Moreover, it was understood between the French and Russian experts that mobilization was equivalent to a declaration of war. The provocation involved in the attack on Serbia was grievous, and Sazonoff described it as a matter of life and death to Russia; and the guilt of the Austrian ultimatum was beyond comparison greater than the guilt of the Russian mobilization, because it was first in time and invited the response which it received. The world-war was nevertheless precipitated by the action of Russia at a moment when conversations between Vienna and Petrograd were being resumed, when Bethmann-Hollweg was at length endeavouring to restrain his ally, and when the Tsar and the Kaiser were in telegraphic communication. The ultimatum which was dispatched to Petrograd on the afternoon of July 31, demanding the cessation of general mobilization within twelve hours, was hailed throughout Germany as the inevitable reply to the dread menace of invasion. Had the German Government, on the other hand, been as anxious for peace as the British Cabinet, it might, like Austria, have answered the Russian mobilization by counter-mobilization. In the opinion of Falkenhayn, Minister of War, the ultimatum, though justifiable, was overhasty and unnecessary; but the Chancellor, convinced that Russia meant business, supported the demand of Moltke, Chief of Staff, for the declaration of war in order that she should not have a longer start in gathering her gigantic forces for the onslaught. Moltke added that to negotiate under the pressure of Russian mobilization would be a national humiliation.

The
German
Ultimatum

While Sir Edward had been gallantly struggling to build a bridge between Vienna and Petrograd, the French Government played a strangely passive part throughout the crisis, fearing to exert pressure on its excited ally and convinced that nothing but a public assurance of British support for the Dual Alliance would arrest the avalanche. "The President is convinced," reported Sir Francis Bertie

on July 30, "that peace is in the hands of Great Britain. If the Government announced that England would come to the aid of France, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude." On the same day the French Ambassador reminded the Foreign Secretary of the letters of 1912. **England and France** "He did not ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose, for instance, if Germany demanded that France should cease her preparations or demand her neutrality." Sir Edward promised a reply after the Cabinet meeting on the following day; and meanwhile the Prime Minister significantly announced in the House of Commons the postponement of the contentious Irish Amending Bill. On July 31 the Foreign Secretary saw the French Ambassador according to promise. "I said we had come to the conclusion in the Cabinet to-day that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Up to the present we did not feel that any treaties or obligations were involved." A direct appeal from the President to King George repeated the familiar French argument. If Germany were convinced that England would not intervene, war would seem to be inevitable; but if she were convinced that England would take the field, there was the greatest chance of peace. The King cautiously replied on August 1 that he was still not without hope; that he was using his best endeavours with the Emperors of Russia and Germany; and that the Government would continue to discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of interest to the two nations.

When the news of the Russian mobilization and the proclamation by Germany of *Drohende Kriegsgefahr* reached London on July 31, Sir Edward telegraphed to the French and German Governments¹ to ask whether they

¹ The guarantee of 1839, as Palmerston pointed out, gave a right but did not impose an obligation to defend Belgian neutrality. Gladstone's treaties in 1870 were necessary because that of 1839 did not automatically involve action. See Sanger and Norton, "England's Guarantee to Belgium and Luxemburg."

would engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and informed Belgium that he assumed she would uphold her neutrality to the utmost of her power. France at once gave the desired assurance, while the German Foreign Secretary replied that a response would reveal the plan of campaign. Sir Edward accordingly read to the German Ambassador a warning unanimously adopted by the Cabinet. "The reply of the German Government is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country." At this point the Ambassador naturally asked whether we would remain neutral if Germany gave the required promise. "I replied that I could not say that. Our hands were still free. Our attitude would be largely determined by public opinion, and the neutrality of Belgium would appeal to it very strongly." The Ambassador then asked whether Sir Edward could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral, and even suggested that the integrity of France and her Colonies might be guaranteed. "I said that I felt obliged to refuse any promise to remain neutral on similar terms and that we must keep our hands free."

Neutrality
of Belgium

While Great Britain was still declining to commit herself, the great conflict had begun. Austria and Serbia had been enemies since July 28; and on the afternoon of August 1 Russia and Germany were at war. No reply was sent to the German ultimatum, and Russian troops crossed the frontier into East Prussia before the expiration of the time-limit. An inquiry by the German Ambassador at Paris on July 31 as to what course France would pursue in the event of war between Germany and Russia received the unexpected reply on August 1 that she would consult her interests.¹ On the same day France, in hourly expecta-

¹ For the last days in Paris, in addition to the dispatches, we possess the narratives of Poincaré, "Les Origines de la Guerre," and Schön, "Memoirs," ch. 4. The object of the Chancellor's instructions on July 31 to demand the handing over of Toul and Verdun in the event of France promising neutrality was to prevent France from following up a brief neutrality by a declaration of war when Germany was deeply engaged in the East.

tion of an ultimatum, began to mobilize. The anticipated outbreak of hostilities between Germany and France compelled Great Britain to define her attitude; and on the morning of August 2 the Foreign Secretary was empowered by the Cabinet to promise conditional naval support to France. "I am authorized to give the assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of the Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding the Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place." In handing the Memorandum to the Ambassador, the Foreign Secretary pointed out that the Government could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but that it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. In taking the momentous decision to oppose a German naval attack on the French coasts, the Cabinet had before it a letter from Mr. Bonar Law, which was brought to Downing Street during the sitting, conveying the opinion of the leaders of the Opposition that it would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture.

Lord Morley and Mr. John Burns resigned, and after the Cabinet of August 3 orders were issued for the mobilization of the Expeditionary Force. At midday it was rumoured that Belgium had received an ultimatum demanding leave for Germany to march through her territory. An ultimatum had, in fact, been presented at Brussels on the evening of August 2. It had been drawn up by Moltke on July 28 and forwarded on July 29 in a sealed

envelope to the German Minister to be ready in case of need.

Sir Edward Grey opened his anxiously awaited speech on August 3 by recognizing that the peace of Europe could not be maintained. He, like the Prime Minister, had always promised that if such a crisis arose, Parliament would be free to decide. We had therefore merely to consider what the situation required of us. For many years we had had a friendship with France. "But how far that friendship entails obligation let every man look into his own heart and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western coasts of France are absolutely undefended because of the feeling of confidence and friendship between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet engaged in a war which France had not sought came down the Channel and bombarded the undefended coast of France, we could not stand aside. France was entitled to know at once whether in the event of attack on her unprotected northern and western coasts she could count on British support, and I therefore gave the promise yesterday to the French Ambassador. It was not a declaration of war." A still more serious consideration was the neutrality of Belgium. News had just arrived of a German ultimatum. "If true, and if she accepted, her independence would be gone, whatever might be offered in return. If France is beaten, if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, consider what would be at stake from the point of view of British interests. If in a crisis like this we turn away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect we should have lost. Though the fleet is mobilized and the army is mobilizing, we have taken no engagement yet to send an Expeditionary Force out of the country;

**British
Attitude
Defined**

but if, as seems not improbable, we are forced to take our stand on those issues, then, I believe, when the country realizes what is at stake, we shall be supported not only by the House of Commons but by the determination, the courage and the endurance of the whole country." The House adjourned till the evening, when Sir Edward announced that an ultimatum had been presented to Belgium on the previous day. At 6.45 Schön brought to Viviani a declaration of war, and left Paris the same night. On the following morning, August 4, news arrived in London that the Belgian frontier had been crossed by German troops. When the Cabinet met all doubts and hesitations had been swept away, and an ultimatum was drawn up, approved and dispatched.

While the fateful message was on its way to Berlin, the Reichstag met in the Weisser Saal of the Palace at Berlin. "With heavy heart," ran the speech from the Throne, "I have been compelled to mobilize my army against a neighbour at whose side it has fought on many a battlefield. With genuine sorrow do I witness the end of a friendship which Germany loyally cherished. The Russian Government, yielding to an insatiable nationalism, has gone to the support of a State which by its patronage of criminal attempts has provoked this war. That France has joined our opponents cannot surprise us. Too often have our efforts to establish friendly relations been shipwrecked on old hopes and resentments. The present situation is a result not of passing conflicts of interest, but of years of active malevolence towards the power and prosperity of the German Empire. The White Book shows how my Government, and above all my Chancellor, strove to the last to avert the catastrophe. We are animated not by lust of conquest, but by a stern resolve to maintain the position which God has given us. We draw the sword with a clear conscience and clean hands."

The speech from the Throne was elaborated by the Chancellor, who supplied his enemies with some phrases

of which they were to make damaging use. Russia had set fire to the house. Germany argued that the Austro-Serbian conflict must be localized; but Russia had intervened, mobilizing first against Austria and then against Germany, who till that moment had not summoned a single reservist. "Were we to wait till the Powers between whom we are sandwiched chose their time to strike? To expose Germany to such a danger would have been a crime. We therefore demanded that Russia should demobilize, as the last chance of preserving peace. France had refused to promise neutrality and had crossed the frontier before war was declared. Gentlemen, we are in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. That is contrary to International Law. We knew France was ready to do the same, but she could wait, while we could not. A French thrust at our flank on the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. We were therefore compelled to dismiss the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong we do thus commit we will endeavour to repair directly our military aim is achieved. Whoever is threatened as we are and is fighting for his all can only consider how to hack his way through. I repeat the Kaiser's words, 'Germany enters the struggle with a clear conscience.' We fight for the fruits of our peaceful efforts, for the heritage of the great past and for our future. Our army is in the field, our fleet is ready for action, and behind them stands the whole German people, united to the last man."¹ The Kaiser had declared that he no longer knew parties, but only Germans; and all parties rallied to his support. The Reichstag sincerely believed that Germany had been attacked. In the name of the Socialists Haase

Bethmann-
Hollweg's
Speech

¹ "Kriegsreden," 3-11. In his next speech to the Reichstag, on Dec. 2, 1914, the Chancellor argued, on the strength of documents discovered in Brussels, that Belgium had compromised her own neutrality before the war. For an admirable German tribute to Belgium's loyal neutrality see Valentin, "Deutschlands Aussenpolitik," ch. 11.

declared that the triumph of Russian despotism would be the end of the German people, and Bebel's prophecy that they would not leave the Fatherland in the lurch was fulfilled.

Later in the afternoon Sir Edward Goschen delivered the British ultimatum to Jagow, who expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then through Great Britain to get closer to France. The Ambassador then paid a farewell visit to the Chancellor, on whom Lichnowsky's reiterated warnings had produced little effect, and who lacked the capacity to forecast the effect of his actions on the policy of other Powers. "I found him very agitated. Just for a word—'neutrality'—just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. The policy to which he had devoted himself had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable. It was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. The blow was all the greater that he had been working with us to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years." No reply was expected or received, and when the listening Ministers in Downing Street heard Big Ben toll the hour of midnight they knew that the British Empire was launched on the greatest struggle in its history. Two days later Austria declared war on Russia, to which Great Britain and France responded by declaring war on Austria. In accordance with the expectation entertained in both camps, Italy and Roumania proclaimed neutrality.

Though the conduct of each of the belligerents appeared devilish to its enemies, yet in every case it was precisely

what might have been expected. It was natural that Serbia should aspire to unite under her sceptre the Jugoslav subjects of her neighbour, should use their undoubted grievances to foster the Pan-Serb idea, and should look to Russia for assistance, as Cavour in similar circumstances had looked to France. It was equally natural that Austria should defend herself against the openly proclaimed ambition to rob her of provinces which she had held for centuries. After the Bosnian crisis Serbia had promised to be a good neighbour; but she had not kept her word, and her intrigues with Russia were notorious. To stand with folded arms and wait till her enemies felt strong enough to carry out their programme of dismemberment was to invite disaster; and the murder of Francis Ferdinand by Jugoslav assassins appeared to demand some striking vindication of the authority of the State. The ultimatum to Serbia was a gambler's throw; but to the statesmen of Vienna and Budapest it appeared to offer the best chance of escape from a terrible danger which was certain to increase and which challenged the existence of Austria as a Great Power.

The conduct of Germany was no less short-sighted, yet no less intelligible. Austria had set her heart on abating the Serbian nuisance, and Austria was the only Power, large or small, on whom Germany could rely, since Italy and Roumania were allies in nothing but name. If Austria ceased to be a Great Power through the loss of her southern provinces, Germany would stand alone in Europe, wedged in between a hostile Russia and a France bent on revenge. In the Bulgarian crisis Bismarck had bluntly told his ally that he would not fight for her Balkan ambitions; but at that time the wire to Petrograd was still working, and Bismarck possessed the friendship of England, which his successors had lost. The Kaiser's appearance in shining armour at the side of Francis Joseph in 1908-9 had compelled Russia and Serbia to keep the peace, and it was hoped that a fresh demonstration

The
German
Case

of Austro-German solidarity might produce a similar result. If it did not, the Central Powers felt themselves strong enough to defeat the Dual Alliance; for they knew that the Russian colossus had feet of clay, and recent revelations in Paris suggested that France was ill prepared for a struggle of life and death. There was, indeed, a risk that Great Britain might throw her sword into the scales; but Anglo-German relations had so greatly improved since the settlement of the Morocco problem that it seemed probable that her neutrality might be secured. Thus when Francis Joseph asked whether he could rely on the support of his ally, the Kaiser and his Chancellor replied that he could. Neither of them desired a world-war; but they were ready for it if Russia declined to permit the localization of the Austro-Serb conflict. A struggle between the Teuton and the Slav was considered almost inevitable; and the General Staff preferred 1914 to a later date, when Russia's strategic railways on the Polish frontier would be complete and the Three Years system in France would be in operation. Moreover, though the navy had not reached its full stature, the widening of the Kiel Canal was completed.

Russia's defeat by Japan had thrown her back on Europe, and it was obvious that as soon as she recovered her breath she would once more pursue her historic ambition to dominate the Near East. Her inability to take up the challenge in 1909 was a bitter memory, and no one had a right to expect that she would submit to such a humiliation again. By 1914 she had regained her self-confidence, and was prepared to meet a challenge from any quarter. As Berchtold saw the hand of Russia in the tragedy of Sarajevo, so Sazonoff felt the ultimatum of July 23 as a blow struck at Nicholas II not less than at Peter Karageorgevitch. Had she left her *protégé* to the tender mercies of Austria, she would have forfeited all claim to be the champion of the Slavonic races and have handed over the Balkan peninsula and Turkey without a

**The
Russian
Case**

struggle to the irrevocable domination of the Central Powers. Russia could no more be expected to remain neutral in face of an Austrian attack on Serbia than England in face of a German attack on Belgium. The same instinctive pride of a Great Power which compelled Vienna to throw down the glove compelled Petrograd to take it up. Moreover, the support of Britain in a world-war was taken for granted.

The main cause of the conflict lay in the Near East, and its authors were Germany and Austria on the one side, Russia and Serbia on the other. "I shall not see the world-war," observed Bismarck to Ballin in 1891, "but you will, and it will start in the East"; and his prophecy had come true. But for a quarter of a century the destinies of France had been linked with those of Russia, and, when the long-expected crisis arrived, she took her place at the side of her partner with as little hesitation as Germany at the side of Austria. She had no desire for war, and took no step to precipitate it. But she had never abandoned the hope of recovering the Rhine provinces, and for that reason could not be included among the "satiated Powers" who are the most effective champions of peace. The catastrophe long feared by Jaurès, who was assassinated by a Nationalist on the eve of war, had come to pass, and France was dragged into a desperate conflict by the ambitions of her ally. To have declined the summons would have constituted disloyalty to her treaty obligations, increased the contempt for a "decadent Power" which was entertained beyond the Rhine, and have left her defenceless against the victorious Teuton.

It was as natural for Italy to stand out of the conflict as for the five other Great Powers of Europe to take part. As far back as 1896 she had informed her allies that she could not fight on their side, if Great Britain as well as France were among their enemies. In 1902 she had pledged herself by treaty to take no share in an attack on France. In 1909 she had promised support for Russian

The
French
Case

12

ambitions in return for Russian support of her own. Thus in 1914 she was connected by treaties or understandings with every member of the Triple Entente. On the other hand, though her relations with Germany were excellent, the undiminished longing for *Italia Irredenta* could only be gratified, and the mastery of the Adriatic could only be secured, at Austria's expense. There had never been any real identity of interest between the two Powers, and since her *rapprochement* with France, Italy had only been a sleeping partner in the Triple Alliance. Austria was well aware of the sentiment of her southern ally, and she counted so little on her support that she neither communicated her designs nor asked for assistance till the Rubicon was crossed. No Italian statesman could have persuaded his countrymen to take up arms on behalf of Austrian ambitions in the Balkans.

The course taken by Great Britain was marked out for her with equal clearness. "My God, Mr. Page, what else could we do?" exclaimed the King. The violation of Belgian neutrality roused the country to righteous anger; but it was the occasion rather than the cause of our entry into the war. For better or worse we had departed from our traditional policy of isolation, and become entangled in the quarrels and ambitions of our friends. Had we stood aside at Armageddon, the Central Powers would have won an easy victory, and at the conclusion of the contest we should have found ourselves alone in Europe. France and Russia would have scorned us as false friends who, after years of diplomatic co-operation, expert discussions and resonant protestations of solidarity, deserted them in the crisis of their fate; and the German menace, intensified by the collapse of the Triple Entente, would have compelled us to arm to the teeth on sea and land. Sir Edward's assurance on August 3 that our hands were free was correct in form but inaccurate in substance, and his whole speech breathed the conviction that we should be disgraced if we left France in the lurch. Mr. Lloyd

**The
British
Case**

George was later to describe the relationship as an obligation of honour, and such is likely to be the verdict of history.

To explain the conduct of the statesmen of Europe in July and August, 1914, is not necessarily to justify it on the grounds either of morality or expediency, or to approve the policy pursued by them and their predecessors, out of which the crisis arose. The root of the evil lay in the division of Europe into two **The Two Camps** armed camps, which dated from 1871, and the conflict was the offspring of fear no less than of ambition. The Old World had degenerated into a powder magazine, in which the dropping of a lighted match, whether by accident or design, was almost certain to produce a conflagration. No war, strictly speaking, is inevitable; but it requires rulers of exceptional foresight and self-control in every country to avoid catastrophes. It is a mistake to imagine that the conflict of 1914 took Europe unawares, for the statesmen and soldiers had been expecting it and preparing for it for many years. It is also a mistake to attribute exceptional wickedness to the Governments who, in the words of Lloyd George, stumbled and staggered into war.¹ Blind to danger and deaf to advice as were the civilian leaders of the three despotic empires, not one of them, when it came to the point, desired to set the world alight. But though they may be acquitted of the supreme offence of deliberately starting the avalanche, they must bear the reproach of having chosen paths which led straight to the abyss. [The outbreak of the Great War is the condemnation not only of the clumsy performers who strutted for a brief hour across the stage, but of the international anarchy which they inherited and which they did nothing to abate.]

¹ "The more one reads memoirs and books written in the various countries of what happened before the first of August, 1914, the more one realizes that no one at the head of affairs quite meant war at that stage. It was something into which they glided, or rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly, and a discussion, I have no doubt, would have averted it."—Dec. 23, 1920.

CHAPTER XVII

THE WORLD WAR : FIRST PHASE

THE violation of Belgian neutrality formed part of a plan of campaign drawn up by Schlieffen, the Chief of the German Staff till 1906, and accepted by his successor. A war on two fronts, he believed, could only be won by striking down France before Russia could bring her innumerable forces into action; and since the Franco-German frontier was lined with impregnable fortresses, the best chance of victory in the west appeared to lie in rolling up the French left by a wide encircling movement.¹ Though the minutes of the Franco-Russian Military Conference in 1911 (published by the Bolsheviks) show that an attack through Belgium was expected, France had left her north-eastern frontier virtually unfortified; and, even when the ultimatum to Brussels revealed the direction of the coming blow, she failed to concentrate her forces on the threatened arc. It was natural, on the other hand, that Belgium, trusting to her neutrality, which she had never abused, should be unprepared for resistance to the greatest military Power in the world, and her small army could do no more than hold up the avalanche for a few days. But though her military contribution to ultimate victory was small, her refusal to purchase immunity from the horrors of invasion by the surrender of her Treaty rights and her self-respect steeled the will of her champions

¹ For the general history of the years of war see "Encyclopædia Britannica," XXX-XXXII; "The Annual Register"; Pollard, "A Short History of the Great War"; Schulthess, "Europäischer Geschichtskalender"; Lavisé, "Histoire de France Contemporaine," IX; "Chronology of the War," 3 vols.; Buchan, "History of the Great War."

and rallied the moral support of the world to the cause of the Allies.

While the armies of Europe were mobilizing in ominous silence, the German troops nearest the Belgian frontier, without waiting for siege artillery, attacked Liège on August 5 and entered the town two days later.¹ The last of the outlying forts fell on August 15, and the German armies poured through south-eastern Belgium in overwhelming numbers, the Belgian troops falling back on their principal fortress at Antwerp and leaving Brussels, which was unfortified, to be entered without resistance. The fall of Namur on August 23 after three days' bombardment revealed the inability of Brialmont's fortresses to withstand the enormous projectiles which the Central Powers now employed for the first time. Meanwhile the first two of the three army corps forming the British Expeditionary Force, created by Lord Haldane and commanded by Sir John French, had crossed the Channel without a casualty, and on August 22 had taken up the stations determined in advance on the left of the French forces. Though

**The British
Retreat**

the best-trained soldiers in the field, the British Regulars were too few and too weakly supported to withstand the onrush. The defeat of the French at Charleroi compelled the British to retreat after their baptism of fire at Mons, and the battle of Le Cateau was only an incident in the long retreat from the Belgian frontier to the gates of Paris. There was nothing to prevent the seizure of the Channel ports by the invaders, and indeed the British base was temporarily transferred to the mouth of the Loire; but Kluck pushed on at lightning speed for Paris, whence the Government fled in haste to Bordeaux, leaving the capital in the strong hands of Galliéni, the veteran conqueror of Madagascar.

On September 5 the great retreat ended, and the six days' battle of the Marne saved Paris and destroyed the

¹ See the official "History of the Great War," I, by General J. E. Edmonds. For Schlieffen's plan see Kuhl, "Der deutsche Generalstab."

German plans of a rapid victory in the west. The grim struggle showed that the French soldier, when properly led, had lost none of his traditional qualities, and was willing to obey Joffre's order that there must be no retreat. But the battle could not have been won unless Castelnau had checked a simultaneous invasion from Lorraine, unless the neutrality of Italy had enabled France to withdraw her garrisons from the south-eastern frontier, unless the British army had stood by her side, unless the Belgians had engaged a German force before Antwerp, and unless a formidable Russian offensive had compelled the transfer of troops from the western to the eastern front. The Germans were out-generalled, and Moltke, whose health and military capacity were unequal to such a searching test, was promptly superseded as Chief of the Staff by Falkenhayn, the Minister of War. The knock-out blow had been parried, and for a moment it seemed as if the invader might be summarily expelled. The main German army, however, fell back to a strong position on the Aisne, where for three weeks an indecisive battle raged across the river. Antwerp fell on October 10, after a bombardment to which the short-range guns of the fortress were unable to reply; and the remains of the Belgian army marched along the coast towards the French frontier to join the British forces transferred from the Aisne, thus completing a line of defence from the sea at Nieuport to the Swiss frontier. No sooner was the approach to the Channel ports barred—though very thinly held—than a terrible German attack was launched on October 15. The line was strained almost to breaking-point, and the flower of the British Regulars laid down their lives in the desperate encounters of the First Battle of Ypres. Welcome aid was rendered by the opening of the sluices, which allowed the Yser to overflow its banks, and by the co-operation of heavily armed monitors off the low-lying coast.

Another critical struggle was maintained by Foch round

Arras; but by the middle of November the attack had spent its force. Troops were urgently needed in the east, and the Germans, like other people, had run short of munitions. The war of movement and manœuvre in the west terminated, only to be resumed in 1918, and people now realized that Kitchener's dread forecast of a three years' war might prove correct. The winter was a period of terrible suffering, for no preparations had been made for trench warfare or for the mud of Flanders. Germany had failed to strike down her rival in the time allotted by the Schlieffen plan; but she had won not only a large expanse of territory with a teeming population which could be compelled to labour, but also the coalfields of Belgium and Northern France and the iron mines of French Lorraine, without which she could not long have carried on the exhausting struggle.

While German plans in the west had broken down, the opening moves in the game on the eastern front proved more successful than the strategists of Berlin had anticipated.¹ Large Russian forces poured into East Prussia with unexpected promptitude at the beginning of the conflict, and carried fire and sword almost within sight of Königsberg, inflicting similar barbarities on the civilian population as the German invaders were committing at the same moment in Belgium. The hard-pressed Allies in the west comforted themselves with calculations as to how many days would be needed till "the Russian steam-roller" reached Berlin and the victorious Cossacks would be marching through the Brandenburger Thor. The Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas, uncle of the Tsar, was a man of iron will and a soldier of some capacity; but the troops in East Prussia were badly led, and on August 27 a crushing

**Battle of
Tannenberg**

¹ See Falkenhayn, "General Headquarters"; Ludendorff, "My War Memories," I; Hindenburg, "Out of My Life"; Gourko, "Russia, 1914-1917"; Sir A. Knox, "With the Russian Army." Paléologue, "La Russie pendant la Grande Guerre," and Sir J. Hanbury Williams, "The Emperor Nicholas as I Knew Him," supply the background.

defeat was inflicted on them at Tannenberg by the veteran Hindenburg, who had been summoned from retirement on account of his unique knowledge of the treacherous *terrain* of the Masurian Lakes. Aided by Ludendorff, who had distinguished himself in the capture of Liège, the General manoeuvred the Russians into a position in which almost the whole army was captured or destroyed, and its Commander, Samsonoff, perished. The full significance of the Russian Sedan was hidden from the Allies by the censorship; but it was the one decisive battle of the war. Portions of East Prussia were again to be invaded, but the stricken field of Tannenberg decided that the Teuton should not be conquered by the Slav. Throughout the German-speaking world the names of Hindenburg and Ludendorff became the symbols of victory. When, however, the victors pressed forward into Russia they were expelled with heavy losses.

The invasion of Austria proved for Russia an easier task.¹ Geographically Galicia forms part of the vast plain which stretches north and east from the

Invasion of Galicia

Carpathians, and it was inevitable that Austria's forces in her northernmost province should be driven back by superior numbers. The Austro-Hungarian army had been strengthened and trained by Conrad von Hötzendorff, who had been Chief of the Staff since 1906, and had clamoured for war ever since his appointment; but even his skill and determination could not render the struggle popular either in Bohemia or in the Yugoslav provinces of the Empire. Lemberg was captured by Russky and Brusiloff on September 3, the Austrian invaders of Southern Poland were expelled, the fortress of Jaroslav was taken on September 23, the great fortress of Przemyśl was invested, while Russian patrols advanced across the Carpathians

¹ For a general sketch of Austria's share in the war see Nowak, "Der Weg zur Katastrophe" (revised by Conrad von Hötzendorff); and Cramon, "Unser Oesterreichisch-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse." Cramon represented the German Staff. Cf. Auffenberg, "Aus Oesterreichs Höhe und Niedergang."

almost within sight of the towers of Cracow. The plight of the Austrians in Galicia led Hindenburg to attempt to relieve the pressure by striking at the enemy's centre in Poland; but desperate fighting on the middle Vistula throughout October resulted in the repulse of the invaders. In Galicia the Austrian cause temporarily improved, Jaroslav being recaptured and Przemyśl relieved; yet the failure of the German attack on Warsaw compelled a second Austrian retreat in the south. Przemyśl was once more besieged, and Russian troops pressed forward to the outposts of Cracow. By the end of the year Russia appeared to have recovered from the stunning blow at Tannenberg. Almost the whole of Galicia was in her hands, the rich province of Silesia was threatened, and Warsaw stoutly resisted a series of thrusts launched throughout the winter.

Meanwhile Austria had suffered unexpected defeat at the hands of little Serbia no less than of her mighty patron.¹ The troops which had occupied Belgrad before the outbreak of the Euro-
pean war were recalled to defend Galicia, Austria and
Serbia and by the end of August the invaders were expelled, the Serbs in turn invading Bosnia. The Austrians renewed the attack in November with larger forces, but were chased out of the country before Christmas, leaving an enormous number of prisoners in the enemy's hands. Thus the opening months of the war had brought nothing but disaster to the Power which had madly provoked the conflict. At the beginning of hostilities Francis Joseph had remarked that he would be satisfied if he emerged from the struggle with a black eye and with no bones broken; and Mr. Lloyd George exultantly summoned his countrymen to applaud Russia tearing "the ramshackle empire" of the Hapsburgs to pieces.

The conflict began with Great Britain, France, Russia,

¹ See Crawford Price, "Serbia's Part in the War," and Laffan, "The Guardians of the Gate."

Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro on the one side, and Germany and Austria on the other. The Entente was speedily reinforced by Japan, who on August 15 demanded the withdrawal of German warships from the Far East and the surrender of Kiao-chau within a week. No reply to her ultimatum being received, she proceeded, with the aid of a handful of British troops, to reduce the fortress of Tsingtau. Timely aid was also rendered to the Allied cause by sweeping the German flag from the Pacific, by conveying British troops from different parts of the Empire to the scene of action, and by supplying Russia with the munitions of which she stood in desperate need. Japan, however, was far away, and she never threw or was asked to throw her whole strength into the conflict.

No statesman or soldier of the Entente dreamed of obtaining the support of the Young Turks; but there seemed to be a chance of preventing or at any rate postponing their entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers.¹ On August 3 the British Cabinet had taken over the two battleships which were being built for Turkey in British yards; and though the promise of compensation failed to allay the inevitable resentment—all the greater since they had been paid for by a patriotic levy—the wisdom of the decision was confirmed by the adventurous flight of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* from Malta to the Bosphorus. For several weeks the Porte was tempted by a *crescendo* of promises. If Turkey remained neutral, we declared, and Egypt tranquil, we should not alter the status of the latter. The next offer was a little more generous. The Entente would uphold Turkish independence and integrity against all attacks if she would observe scrupulous neutrality. When the Minister of Marine demanded the immediate abolition of the Capitulations, Sir Edward promised, subject to the assent of

¹ The White Paper and the (second) Russian Orange Book on the breach with Turkey are printed by J. B. Scott, "Diplomatic Documents," II, but not in the volume of official documents issued by the British Government in 1915.

France and Russia, to surrender our rights "as soon as a scheme satisfying modern conditions is set up." Finally King George sent a personal message to the Sultan expressing his deep regret at the necessity to seize the ships, and promising to restore them after the war.

The Sultan and the Grand Vizier invariably replied with soothing assurances; but an elaborate comedy was being staged at the expense of the Entente. Enver Pasha, Minister of War, the strong man of Turkey, had long resolved to side with the Central Powers in the event of a world war, and the majority of his countrymen shared his ambitions. British sympathies with the malcontent Christian races were as unconcealed as Russia's age-long desire to occupy Constantinople, and promises to guarantee the integrity of the empire were regarded as worthless. The Entente, it was believed, stood for partition, the Central Powers at most for economic exploitation, and the lesser evil

Turkey
joins
Germany

was naturally preferred. On August 1 Germany and Turkey signed a treaty, in which the *casus fœderis* would arise when Russia entered the war.¹ The condition was fulfilled on the same afternoon, and Austria adhered to the pact. Turkey was promised military support, and her territorial integrity was guaranteed against Russia. The decision remained a secret to most of the Turkish Ministers, and neutrality was maintained till Turkey was ready to strike. Verbal assurances were conveyed from Berlin and Vienna that in the event of complete victory they would facilitate the abolition of the Capitulations and a final settlement with Bulgaria. All territory occupied in the course of the war should be evacuated, while Turkey should receive a rectification of frontiers and a share of any indemnity.

These arrangements remained unknown to the peoples of the Entente,² though they would not have been greatly

¹ See Djemal Pasha, "Memories of a Turkish Statesman," ch. 3.

² The Quai d'Orsay learned of the Treaty on Aug. 8. See Bompard (the French Ambassador), "l'Entrée en guerre de la Turquie," *Revue de Paris*, July 1 and 15, 1921.

surprised had they discovered them; for mobilization proceeded without attempt at concealment, and on August 26 German sailors arrived overland. The British Ambassador warned the Porte that an attack on the Entente would mean the end of the Turkish Empire; but after the battle of the Marne he reported hopefully that the only firebrand was the Minister of War, and that the Peace party was daily increasing. "The situation may be saved," he added on October 5; "time is on our side." But the masterful Wangenheim, his Austrian colleague, and Admiral Souchon were pressing for action, and German officers and money were pouring in. On October 28 Enver's

preparations were complete. The Admiral of the *Goeben* entered the Black Sea with German and Turkish vessels, strewed mines off Sebastopol, sank a transport, and bombarded Odessa, Theodosia and Novorossisk. **Turkey attacks Russia** Russia promptly declared war on Turkey on October 31, and her allies followed her example. On November 3 the forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles were bombarded, and troops were hurried to the defence of Egypt, to which Turkish troops were already on the march, heralded by a Bedouin raid on the Sinai peninsula.

The entry of Turkey into the war was the first resounding diplomatic success scored by either side, and its results were far-reaching. The scope of the struggle was immensely enlarged, and both the dangers and the prizes were increased. As rulers of tens of millions of Mohammedans who looked to the Sultan of Turkey as their Caliph, the British Empire and France were confronted with the problem of Pan-Islamic solidarity and discontent. Great Britain had now to defend the Eastern Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, Egypt and the Persian Gulf, and was forced to rely in far greater measure on the aid of India, who had already sent troops to the western front. The formula "Berlin-Bagdad" seemed to assume concrete shape. Great Britain promptly retaliated by the annexation of Cyprus, the proclamation of a Protectorate over

Egypt, the deposition of the Khedive Abbas, whose sympathies with his suzerain were notorious, the selection of a son of Ismail as Sultan of Egypt, and the invasion of Mesopotamia. An attack on the Canal in February, 1915, was easily repulsed.¹

Russia, unlike Great Britain, hailed the belligerence of Turkey with delight, since it provided the opportunity of realizing her secular ambition. Victory over the Central Powers could give her little beyond an unwelcome increase of Polish malcontents, while victory over Turkey would turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake, substitute the Cross for the Crescent on the dome of St. Sophia, and secure the coveted control of the Straits. On November 14 Sir George Buchanan informed Sazonoff that Russia might have Constantinople and the Straits, and the Foreign Minister's face lit up with joy.² On March 4, 1915, Sazonoff handed to the French and British Ambassadors a Memorandum claiming the following territories as the result of a victorious war—Constantinople, the western coast of the Bosphorus, the Marmora and the Dardanelles; Thrace to the Enos-Midia line; the coast of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus and the river Sakaria; the islands in the Sea of Marmora, with Imbros and Tenedos.³ This arrangement assigned to Russia the whole of Turkey in Europe except a patch around Adrianople and Kirk-Kilisse, reserved as a bait for Bulgaria; the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus; and about eighty miles of the Black Sea coast of Asia Minor.

The French and British Governments expressed their readiness to agree to Russian wishes, provided that their own claims, both in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere, should be satisfied. Constantinople was to be recognized as a free port for the transit of goods to Russia, with a free passage through the Straits for merchant ships; British

¹ For a brief account of Egypt during the war see Chirol, "The Egyptian Problem," ch. 7.

² Paléologue, "La Russie," I, 194.

³ See Cocks, "The Secret Treaties," ch. 1.

and French rights in Asiatic Turkey, to be defined later, were to be recognized; the Sacred Places were to be protected and Arabia to be placed under an independent Mohammedan ruler; and the neutral zone in Persia was to be added to the British sphere. While accepting these demands in principle, Russia made a few reservations. It should be made clear, she suggested, whether the Sacred Places were to remain under Turkish sovereignty or whether independent States were to be created. The Caliphate should be separated from the Ottoman dynasty; freedom of pilgrimage should be guaranteed; and the inclusion of the larger part of the neutral zone of Persia in the English sphere was conceded. On March 12 accordingly Great Britain and France announced their assent to the annexation of Constantinople and the Straits. "A sincere recognition of mutual interests," telegraphed Sazonoff in delight to Benckendorff, "will secure for ever firm friendship between Russia and Great Britain." The wheel had indeed come full circle when the old antagonists of the Crimean war were leagued together to drive the Turks, bag and baggage, across the Bosphorus.

To carry out this tremendous programme proved more difficult than was anticipated. On January 2, 1915, an urgent telegram from Petrograd had implored Great Britain to relieve the pressure on the Caucasus front, where Enver had concentrated his main strength. The obvious method of responding to the appeal was to attack the Dardanelles, and the project was discussed by the British Cabinet with the military and naval authorities.¹ The arguments in its favour were marshalled by Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, who had urged an attack directly Turkey entered the war. The Caucasian front would be automatically relieved by compelling the Turks to defend their capital; and if successful it would

¹ See the reports of the Dardanelles Commission; Sir Ian Hamilton, "Gallipoli Diary"; Nevinston, "The Dardanelles Campaign"; Liman von Sanders, "Fünf Jahre Türkei"; Djemal Pasha, "Memoirs"; Morgenthau, "Secrets of the Bosphorus."

restore communications with Russia from the Mediterranean, block the German road to the East, turn the flank of the Central Powers, and perhaps bring Greece, Roumania and Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Entente. A deadlock had been reached on the western front, and troops from Australia and New Zealand were available in large numbers. Moreover, **The Dardanelles Project** to attack the Dardanelles was to diminish the danger to Egypt, and to facilitate the conquest of Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria. The prize was great, and in war nothing could be achieved without taking risks. In reply to these arguments it was pointed out that the supreme duty of Great Britain was to hold the western front and to prevent the Channel ports from falling into the hands of the enemy; that the Kitchener armies could not be ready for active service for several months; that the supply of guns and shells was insufficient even for the needs of the troops in France and Belgium; that the German fleet was undefeated, and that it would be dangerous to divert naval units to the eastern Mediterranean; that the Dardanelles were easy to defend; that if a few battleships forced the Straits and bombarded Constantinople, they could not bring Turkey to her knees and they might be unable to return to their base. In a word, there were not enough troops, ships or munitions for a distant and doubtful enterprise. It was the first round in the struggle between Easterners and Westerners which was to rage throughout the war.

It would probably have been wise to reject the whole plan as beyond our resources at that moment; but a compromise was reached by which a modified scheme was sanctioned without providing the essentials of success. On January 13, after Kitchener's declaration that he had no troops to spare at the moment, a naval attack was approved in principle, though Lord Fisher had no belief in the plan. On February 16 it was decided to send the 29th Division and to reinforce it with troops from Egypt; but its departure was delayed by anxiety as to the western front, and,

without waiting for the arrival of troops, the forts at the entrance of the Straits were subjected to a futile bombardment on February 19. When an attack in force was made in March, three battleships and two thousand men were lost, and it became clear that the Straits must be won by troops, not by ships. The interval before the next act, however, was prolonged by the necessity of transport ships returning to Egypt for repacking, and was profitably employed by the Turks in strengthening the fortifications and preparing the hilly peninsula of Gallipoli for defence. Sir Ian Hamilton's attack on April 25 succeeded at terrible cost in gaining a precarious foothold, and a second offensive in May and a third in June made no further advance. It had been hoped that Russia would co-operate by landing 100,000 men on the northern coast of Thrace and seizing the northern outlet of the Bosphorus; but no help came from the Power in whose interest the enterprise had been launched.

The adhesion of Turkey to the Central Powers was balanced by the adhesion of Italy six months later to the cause of the Allies.¹ In the early days of the war the Italian Government asked its partners for compensation under Article 7 of the Triple Alliance, and hinted a wish through Berlin for the Trentino. The suggestion was dismissed by Vienna; but the death of San Giuliano on October 16 brought a stronger hand to the helm. For thirty years Sonnino had been one of the stoutest champions of the Triple Alliance; yet on entering the Salandra Ministry he fully accepted the principle cynically enunciated by his chief. "What is needed is a freedom from all preconceptions and prejudices, from every sentiment except that of sacred egoism." There was no hurry to decide, for the army and navy had not recovered from the exhausting struggle in Tripoli. Sonnino at once renewed

¹ Italy's negotiations are fully recorded in the Second Austrian Red Book and the Italian Green Book, both printed in J. B. Scott, "Diplomatic Documents."

his predecessor's hint about the Trentino, and on this occasion Berlin supported the suggestion; but it was again rejected by Berchtold. The Italian Foreign Minister was well aware of the price that the only neutral Great Power in Europe was in a position to command; and in December he informed Austria that the excited opinion of his countrymen compelled him to press for compensation. Berlin again urged Vienna to concessions, but the stubborn Berchtold once more refused. At this moment the most incompetent and shortsighted of Austrian Foreign Ministers was dismissed from his post on January 13, 1915, and was succeeded by Burian.

The situation now developed apace. Prince Bülow was summoned from retirement, though without the approval of the Kaiser, and dispatched to the capital where in happier years he had won a host of friends; and Erzberger, the brain of the Centrum, gallantly seconded his efforts to keep Italy out of the war.¹ On March 9 Burian, scared by the Russian advance in Galicia and fearing that Italian intervention would also bring in Roumania, announced that he was willing to discuss the cession of territory. By this time, however, Sonnino's terms had risen, and embraced the immediate transfer of the coveted territories. Burian rejoined that he could offer nothing beyond the Trentino, and declined its immediate surrender. Such an offer was useless while the Entente was whispering honeyed promises into the other ear; and on April 10 Sonnino boldly demanded the whole of South Tyrol, Gorizia, Gradisca and Trieste; several islands off the Dalmatian coast; Italian sovereignty over Valona, and Austrian *désintéressement* in Albania. Even the fiery Conrad von Hötzendorff, the sworn foe of Italy, now urged concessions; but Burian played for time, increasing his offers but rejecting the full Italian demand.

Prince
Bülow's
Mission

¹ See Erzberger, "Erlebnisse im Weltkriege"; Spickernagel, "Fürst Bülow," ch. 7; Giolitti, "Memoirs," and A. L. Kennedy, "Old Diplomacy and New," 218-39.

It was natural that Italy's price for intervention should be higher than for neutrality; and it was equally natural that the Entente should be more generous with other people's property than Austria with her own. Though Sazonoff, as the watchful champion of Serbian interests, feared that the purchase of Italian support might complicate the relations of the Allies, **Italy's Demands** France and Great Britain were willing to pay a high price, and negotiations began in London at the end of February.¹ Italy's demands were deemed exorbitant by France and Russia, Sazonoff persistently opposing her designs on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, to which Serbia with better reason laid claim. The military situation, however, played into the hands of the greedy neutral. The first British offensive of the war had been repulsed on March 10 at Neuve Chapelle, and on April 22 the invaders momentarily broke the Allied line at the Second Battle of Ypres by the hideous expedient of waves of poison gas, which inflicted a lingering and agonizing death. A French offensive at Souchez met with no success, and British co-operation at Festubert was handicapped by a lack of high explosives, the revelation of which led to the formation of a Coalition Ministry and to the creation of a Ministry of Munitions under Mr. Lloyd George.

The Treaty of London, signed on April 28 by Sir Edward Grey and the Ambassadors of Russia, France and Italy, was enough to satisfy the hungriest of appetites. Italy was to receive the Trentino; the Southern Tyrol up to the Brenner Pass; the city and district of Trieste; the county of Gorizia and Gradisca; Istria; North Dalmatia and the islands facing it. The coasts and islands of South Dalmatia were to be neutralized. The littoral from Istria to Dalmatia, including Fiume, was earmarked for Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro, while Valona, with the island of Saseno and the zone needed to secure their military security, fell to Italy. In the event of a small autonomous

¹ See Cocks, "The Secret Treaties," ch. 2.

and neutralized State being formed in Albania, Italy undertook not to oppose the possible desire of France, Great Britain and Russia to partition the northern and southern districts between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece, though she would herself control its foreign relations. Italy obtained the twelve islands (Dodekanese) in full possession; and France, Great Britain and Russia admitted in principle her interest in The Price Paid the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean and her rights, in the event of a partition of Turkey, to the province of Adalia. Her interests should also be considered if the Powers were only to establish spheres of influence. In Libya she was to enjoy all rights and privileges which belonged to the Sultan by the Treaty of Lausanne. Should Great Britain and France increase their colonial possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany, she should extend her possessions in Eritrea, Somaliland, and Libya. Great Britain would facilitate a loan on advantageous terms of fifty millions, and Italy was to share in the war indemnity. France, Great Britain and Russia would support her in preventing the Holy See from taking any diplomatic steps for the conclusion of peace or the settlement of questions connected with the war. The Treaty was to be kept secret, and the new ally was to begin hostilities within a month.

It is no wonder that its authors desired to hide from the world—and above all from Serbia—a document which handed over North Dalmatia to Italy; and there is no other palliation than the familiar plea of necessity offered for Canning's seizure of the Danish fleet in 1807 and for Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality. "The French and ourselves were fighting for our lives on the western front," testified Mr. Asquith at Paisley long after, "and the Treaty represented the terms on which Italy was prepared to join forces."¹ Though it increased the material strength of the Entente, it diminished its moral prestige; for it was known within a week to the Serbs, who were

¹ Feb. 5, 1920.

furious at the transfer of Yugoslav territories behind their backs and the prospective transformation of the Adriatic into an Italian lake.

When the Entente had accepted his terms, Sonnino continued negotiations with Vienna in order to obtain a pretext for attacking his ally. On April 21 he announced that the differences were too wide to bridge, and on May 3 he denounced the Triple Alliance. The Austrian Government at last realized that a desperate effort must be made. On May 10 Erzberger informed Giolitti, the leader of the neutralists, of the final concessions, which gave the larger part of what had been asked. Italy was to gain the Trentino, the west bank of the Isonzo and the town of Gorizia. Trieste was to become a Free City, with an administration ensuring it an Italian character and an Italian university. Italian sovereignty over Valona was to be recognized, and Austria expressed her *désintéressement* in Albania. The territories were to be handed over within a month of the conclusion of an agreement, and

<p>Giolitti versus d'Annunzio</p>	<p>Germany guaranteed the fulfilment of the offer. Giolitti demanded and obtained copies signed by the Austrian Ambassador and Prince Bülow for himself, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and on May 12 a confirmatory telegram arrived from the Ballplatz. On the same evening, however, the stormy petrel d'Annunzio, the most eloquent of writers and orators, arrived in the capital, and warlike demonstrations began. A majority of the Deputies left cards on Giolitti, and on May 13 Salandra resigned. The President of the Chamber advised the King to send for Giolitti; but after taking time for consideration, Victor Emmanuel recalled Salandra. Giolitti fled from Rome in terror of his life, and on May 17 the Cabinet decided on war, which was declared against Austria on May 23. By a curious anomaly, war against Germany was not declared till August 27, 1916. From the first Italy concentrated her gaze on Trieste; but repeated attacks on the Isonzo front were beaten off, for the</p>
--	--

mountain frontier, strengthened by every device known to military science, was impregnable.¹ Despite the appearance of a new and formidable enemy on her southern flank, Austria was able to contribute large forces to the combined offensive which was to sweep the Russians out of Galicia.

The year 1915 had opened with bright prospects for Russia; but she lacked the resources to carry on a prolonged and exhausting struggle. Like all the other belligerents, her supply of munitions was utterly inadequate to the demands of modern war; and she also was wanting in facilities, which both her allies and her enemies possessed, for increasing them. Witte's ten years of office had laid the foundations of Russian industry; but his successors, fearing the creation of a revolutionary proletariat, had discontinued his work, and Stolypin had aimed at the creation of peasant proprietors. Nor could the Allies effectively supply the deficiency; for Archangel was blocked from November till May, the Siberian railway could only bring a scanty stream from the distant factories of Japan, and the attack on the Dardanelles gave no promise of speedy relief.

Falkenhayn's strategy in 1915 was to stand on the defensive in the west and to deliver a knock-out blow in the east. The point chosen for the attack was in Galicia, for it was there that Austrian help could be most effectively rendered, and it was there that the Russians had penetrated farthest beyond their borders. More-
The
Gorlice
Offensive
over, if the invaders could be swept out of Galicia the Russian armies in Poland would find themselves in a dangerous salient. Mackensen's offensive began on May 2 at Gorlice, and the overwhelming supply of heavy artillery, to which the ill-equipped Russians could make no response, drove the enemy headlong across the San. Przemyśl was evacuated on June 1, and on June 22 Lemberg was

¹ The Italian campaigns may be studied in Cadorna, "La Guerra alla fronte Italiana," and G. M. Trevelyan, "Scenes from Italy's War."

restored to Austrian rule. The reconquest of Galicia was achieved in less than two months, and the victorious Mackensen now turned north and invaded Poland. The larger part of Courland in the far north was overrun in May, and the converging attack on Poland from the north, the south and the west proved irresistible. On July 15

Evacuation of Warsaw the Grand Duke Nicholas decided on the evacuation of Warsaw, and on August 4 the Russians marched out of the city, blowing up the bridges across the Vistula as they retired. Next day, after a year of war, the troops of the Central Powers marched in. The Russian armies retreated without molestation, devastating the country as they withdrew; but the Teutonic steam-roller pushed steadily forward. On the northern flank the fortress of Kovno fell on August 17, Grodno on September 2, and Vilna, the historic capital of Lithuania, on September 12, while the conquerors of Warsaw marched forward to Brest-Litovsk, and drove the Russians behind the Pripet marshes. The attempt on Riga failed, and some brilliant counter-offensives in September brought the advance in the north to a halt; but the loss of Poland, Courland and Lithuania, following on the expulsion from Galicia, destroyed the military prestige of Russia and inflicted on the dynasty a blow from which it was never to recover. The Grand Duke Nicholas was dismissed and sent to command the army of the Caucasus, while the Tsar assumed nominal control, with Alexeieff as Chief of the Staff.

The conquest of Poland, which, like Alsace-Lorraine, had from the outbreak of the war been regarded as the prize of the victor, proved easier than the determination of its future status.¹ Now that the three Powers who had dismembered her had quarrelled, there seemed at last a chance of reuniting the broken fragments and of restoring

¹ See Alison Phillips, "Poland"; Ralph Butler, "The New Eastern Europe"; Bethmann-Hollweg, "Betrachtungen," II, ch. 2; Czernin, "In the World War," ch. 9.

the country to her rightful place among sovereign States. But her wishes were of no importance in the eyes of the despotic Empires by which she was surrounded, each of whom thought of her merely as a pawn in their game. Prussian Poland had reached a relatively high level of material prosperity, but enjoyed no cultural autonomy. Galicia, on the other hand, ^{Polish} ~~Nationalism~~ though the most backward province of the Hapsburg realm, was allowed the fullest political and cultural liberty. Russian Poland could boast of little economic prosperity, and was denied political and spiritual liberty. On the outbreak of hostilities the three Empires competed for the favours of the race which they had wronged. On August 15, 1914, the Grand Duke Nicholas issued a grandiloquent proclamation. "Poles! The time has come when the dream of your fathers and forefathers will at length be realized. A century and a half ago the living body of Poland was torn in pieces, but her soul has not perished. She lives in the hope that the time will come for the resurrection of the Polish nation and its fraternal union with all Russia. The Russian armies bring you the glad tidings of this union. May the frontiers which have divided the Polish people be united under the sceptre of the Russian Emperor. Under this sceptre Poland will come together, free in faith, in language, and in self-government. One thing Russia expects of you: an equal consideration for the rights of those nations with which history has linked you. With open heart, with hand fraternally outstretched, great Russia comes to you. She believes that the sword has not rusted which overthrew the foe at Tannenberg. From the shores of the Pacific Ocean to the Polar Sea the Russian war-hosts are in motion. The morning star of a new life is rising for Poland. May there shine resplendent in the dawn the sign of the Cross, the symbol of the Passion and Resurrection of nations." The only fruit of this manifesto was the permission, after long delay, to use the Polish language in the local administration, all

other benefits being deferred till after the war. Germany for her part promised reunion of the Poles, while Austria merely reminded them of the favours they had enjoyed under her benevolent rule. None of them offered independence, for which the soul of Poland thirsted not less than for reunion.

The Poles were in one respect the most unfortunate of all the belligerents, for their soldiers in the Russian, German and Austrian armies were compelled to fight one another. They were, moreover, though at one in their ideals, divided as to the tactics of the moment. The National Democrats, led by Dmowski, considering

**Austro-German Con-
dominium** complete independence impossible of attainment, worked for reunion and autonomy under the Russian flag, while Pilsudski crossed the Galician frontier on the outbreak of war and organized a Polish legion to fight against the hated rule of the Tsar. From the defeat of Russia in 1915 till the end of the war the country was subject to a *condominium*, the German Government residing at Warsaw, the Austrian at Lublin. A clumsy attempt to Germanize the country broke down, and its new masters found it more profitable to cultivate sympathy by establishing Polish universities at Warsaw and Vilna, and by creating town councils which Russian Poland had never known. A new partition was rejected as it proved impossible to agree on the frontier, and it was realized that it would inflame the animosity of the population. The German proposal of a buffer state, in economic, political and military alliance with the Central Powers, was rejected at Vienna, where it was desired to unite Russian Poland with Austria in territorial or personal union. To this the German Chancellor could only consent if Germany obtained a corresponding increase of territory elsewhere. In August, 1916, it was agreed to establish a nominally independent State under a monarchy, with military and economic restrictions; but agreement as to the ruler proved impossible. On November 5, however,

in the hope of securing the aid of Polish soldiers for the final struggle, a proclamation was issued promising to restore an independent Poland as an hereditary constitutional monarchy attached to the Central Powers. Though the German and Austrian Governments at Warsaw and Lublin continued to function, and though the delimitation of boundaries and the selection of a ruler were postponed, the appointment of a Regency Council and a Council of State prepared the country for the self-government which, by unexpected good fortune, the defeat of its three oppressors was before long to render possible.

The collapse of Russia in the summer of 1915 was promptly followed by the entry of Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Central Powers. The search for allies in the Near East had been busily pursued by both sides from the outset, and Greece, Bulgaria and Roumania were plied with exhortations, promises and threats. In September, 1914, Venezelos informed the Entente that if Turkey joined the Central Powers Greece would assist them in the war against the Turks on condition that she was guaranteed against a Bulgarian attack. Great Britain responded by promising that the Turkish fleet should not be allowed to leave the Dardanelles; and the Entente permitted a Greek occupation of North Epirus without prejudice to its future. Constantine, however, telegraphed to the Kaiser that he would not attack Germany's allies unless they attacked him. Early in December the Entente offered South Albania, with the exception of Valona, if Greece would at once join their ranks.¹ Venezelos demanded a guarantee from Roumania that Bulgaria would not attack, but Roumania refused, and Venezelos was forced to remain neutral. A British offer of Smyrna in January, 1915, in return for intervention, spurred him to

Courting
of Greece

¹ See the Greek *Livre Blanc*; "The Vindication of Greek National Policy, 1912-1917" (speeches of Venezelos and others); Laloy, "Documents Secrets," 134-42; Deville (French Minister at Athens), "L'Entente, la Grèce et la Bulgarie"; G. F. Abbott, "Greece and the Allies."

a daring resolve. "For the co-operation or benevolent neutrality of Bulgaria," he wrote to King Constantine, "I should not hesitate to sacrifice Kavalla. The concessions in Asia Minor would double our territory." At this moment, however, Germany paid to Bulgaria the first instalment of a loan arranged before the war, and this indication of the trend of Bulgarian policy led him to withhold his offer. The futile bombardment of the Straits on February 19 revealed the need of a landing force, and Venezelos urged the dispatch of an army corps, or at least a division, to Gallipoli. Constantine

**Indecision
at Athens**

was won over, but the General Staff disapproved, and the King changed his mind. The expedition was vetoed and Venezelos resigned. Gounaris continued the negotiations, and the Allies offered the Vilayet of Aidin if Greece would intervene. Gounaris replied that the Allies must guarantee her territorial integrity during and for a period after the war, while the question of territorial gains in Asia Minor could be discussed later; but no agreement was reached, and Baron Schenk continued his propaganda in Athens to keep Greece out of the war. Meanwhile Gounaris ruled without a majority, and at the elections held in June Venezelos was returned to power. But at this moment the King was dangerously ill, and on this pretext Gounaris retained office two months longer.

The Allies were equally unsuccessful in attempting to secure the support of Bulgaria.¹ Early in August, 1914, Mr. Noel Buxton, chairman of the Balkan Committee, submitted a memorandum to Sir Edward Grey. Armed Bulgarian neutrality, he argued, might be secured by a revision of the hated Bucharest treaty in the event of victory, and by a loan. The Foreign Office had little hope of success; but Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill, who believed that Bulgaria could be won, suggested that Mr. Buxton should visit Sofia, and the First Lord of the

¹ See Noel Buxton and L. Leese, "Balkan Problems," part II; A. L. Kennedy, "Old Diplomacy and New," 240-64.

Admiralty sent him to Salonika in a British warship. As early as August 5 Sazonoff urged Pasitch to purchase the co-operation or at any rate the benevolent neutrality of Bulgaria by territorial concessions in Macedonia; but Pasitch, though himself ready for sacrifices, replied that his colleagues were not.¹ The entry of Turkey into the war, however, spurred the Entente Ministers to action, and they telegraphed to their Govern-
 ments advocating the promise of Macedonia

The
 Buxton
 Mission

up to the 1912 line with immediate occupation of the district east of the Vardar. The reply stated that immediate occupation was impossible, and that no precise promise could be made. Returning home in January, 1915, Mr. Buxton reported to Sir Edward Grey that Bulgaria was still uncommitted, though Macedonia constituted a continual temptation, and urged that she should have Macedonia if Serbia secured Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia. Kavalla would also be necessary, and Greece might cede it in return for a promise of Smyrna. In February Delcassé sent one of the Orleans princes to Sofia; but Ferdinand flatly refused to tie his hands.² No serious attempt, however, to win Bulgaria was made by the Allies till the Russians were chased out of Galicia and the first attacks on the Dardanelles failed. If she would attack Turkey, she was told in May, she might occupy and retain Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line. The Allies would guarantee her Southern Macedonia on condition that she should not occupy it till the peace, and that Serbia received compensation in Bosnia, Herzegovina and on the Adriatic coast. They also pledged themselves to urge Greece to cede Kavalla, to favour the reopening of the Dobrudja settlement, and to provide the financial aid which she might require. On June 14 the Bulgarian Government replied by asking whether the compensation to Serbia and Greece would have to be secured before her aspirations in Macedonia and Kavalla could be realized,

¹ See Laloy, "Documents Secrets," 101-5.

² Paléologue, "La Russie," I, 306-7.

and what the Entente proposed in the Dobrudja. It was now obvious that Bulgaria would be lost if she received merely a conditional promise of Macedonia. British and French missions were dispatched to Sofia in July, and early in August the Allies, led by Great Britain, pressed Serbia to cede the uncontested zone of 1912. The Skuptschina sat in secret session on August 16 and approved concessions; but it was too late.

The Central Powers had held the winning Bulgarian cards in their hands throughout, and they played them well. In taking stock of the situation in the Near East created by the Balkan wars, Austria had determined to seek compensation in closer relations with Sofia for the growing estrangement of Bucharest. Ferdinand responded to the advances from Vienna, for Serbia was their common enemy and Russia was Serbia's patron. Indeed, negotiations had proceeded so far that at the outbreak of the war the signing of treaties of alliance seemed imminent, and when the struggle began Berlin and Vienna pressed for a decision. Ferdinand replied that to attack Serbia would be too dangerous, since Greece, Roumania and Turkey might join in retaliation. He added that he had received large offers from Russia, and could promise neutrality, but nothing more at present. The Turkish alliance could only be turned to full account by the Central Powers if Bulgaria joined their ranks; whereas, if Ferdinand sided with the Entente, communications with Russia could be opened up from the Mediterranean, Turkey would be isolated, Serbia's flank secured, and Roumania and Greece tempted to intervene. The sympathies of the King and Radoslavoff were with the Central Powers, but they desired to see how the struggle would develop and which side would offer the highest price for their support. At the end of 1914, after the failure of her invasion of Serbia, Austria announced her readiness, in return for intervention, to allot to Bulgaria the Serbian territory which she claimed if she could conquer it. But the thronging

calamities which made Vienna desire his aid were so many reasons for Ferdinand to refuse it, and he spun out the negotiations, declining to make binding engagements till the military situation was more defined. He repeated that he could promise nothing more than neutrality, and even for neutrality he demanded the promise of territory in Macedonia. He increased his claims during the spring of 1915, when the Russian advance in Galicia, the attack on the Dardanelles, and the intervention of Italy enhanced his market value. Burian, however, stoutly refused to consider territorial concessions except in return for active help.

The long period of hesitation in Sofia was ended by the disasters of Russia and the deadlock in the Dardanelles, and in June negotiations for an alliance began in earnest. The Central Powers insisted on a military convention as well as an alliance, and also on a treaty with the Turks. Accordingly on July 22 Turkey ceded a strip on the Thracian frontier through which ran the line to Dedeagatch, and a Bulgarian officer was dispatched to the German Headquarters at Pless at the end of August. The repulse of the grand British attack at Suvla Bay removed any lingering scruples in the mind of Ferdinand, and on September 6 Bulgaria undertook to attack Serbia in return for Serbian Macedonia. If Bulgaria or her allies (including Turkey) were attacked by Roumania, Germany and Austria would consent to her recovering the territory ceded to Roumania and Greece at the Treaty of Bucharest, and to a rectification of the Bulgar-Roumanian frontier of 1878. On the same day a military convention was signed, arranging for a concerted invasion of Serbia. Germany and Austria were each to place six divisions on the Serbian frontier within thirty days, while Bulgaria was to provide four divisions within thirty-five days and to enter Serbian Macedonia on October 11. Bulgaria was to remain neutral in regard to Greece and Roumania till the Serbian operations were finished,

Bulgaria
joins
Germany

subject to an assurance that they would also observe neutrality.¹

On September 19 Mackensen, with his Galician laurels on his brow, inaugurated the Austro-German attack on Serbia by the bombardment of Belgrad; and Bulgaria mobilized her forces, proclaiming her armed neutrality. Her purpose was clear, and Serbia, with the instincts of a warlike race, proposed to strike the first blow; but she was dissuaded by Great Britain, who pointed out that such an attack would absolve Greece from a treaty obligation which a large section of her people was in any case none too anxious to fulfil. In August the Allies informed Athens of their offer to Bulgaria of Kavalla and part of Serbian Macedonia, Greece being promised large compensation in Asia Minor without herself entering the fray. Venezelos, who had been waiting for the recovery of the King, now assumed the reins and at once announced that Greece would not tolerate Bulgarian aggression against Serbia, in ignorance of the fact that Constantine had told Bulgaria that he would not intervene. When Bulgaria mobilized, Greece mobilized also, and Venezelos

asked Great Britain and France for the dispatch of 150,000 men to co-operate with Greece in the support of Serbia. Constantine authorized the mobilization and the appeal, though he added that he did not want to fight, since Germany was bound to win. Great Britain and France responded to the appeal and dispatched troops to Salonika without waiting for Bulgaria's declaration of war against Serbia, a proceeding which caused Venezelos, at the King's command, to issue a protest against their disembarkation as a breach of Greek neutrality. At this moment Constantine, firmly resolved to take no step which might bring him into conflict with German troops, and convinced that in great decisions he was responsible to God alone, dismissed his Premier and summoned Zaimis to office. On the same day the French and British

¹ Falkenhayn, "General Headquarters," 159-62.

troops began to disembark at Salonika without hindrance by the new Government, which, however, proclaimed the neutrality of Greece in the Serbo-Bulgar war. On October 7 Austro-German forces crossed the Danube and entered Belgrad on October 9, while the Bulgarians crossed the frontier on October 11. The Tsar angrily described Ferdinand as "a Bulgarian atrocity." The British Government offered to cede Cyprus if Greece would intervene; but though the King declared that Greece still considered herself the ally of Serbia, he refused, and the offer was withdrawn. Zaimis was quickly succeeded by Skoloudis, who more fully shared the sympathies of his master.

The intervention of Bulgaria and the neutrality of Greece aroused anger as well as disappointment in Great Britain; and on October 14 Sir Edward Grey reviewed the situation. We had tried to keep Turkey neutral, and had worked for a Balkan agreement; but only military success would have enabled us to secure our aims. Greece had ordered mobilization after the Bulgarian mobilization; and though she made a formal protest when the first Allied troops arrived at Salonika, their welcome was proved by the circumstances of the landing, the reception of the troops and the facilities for continuing disembarkation. Indeed, in view of the Treaty between Greece and Serbia, how could there be any other attitude towards the assistance offered through her to Serbia? These arguments produced no effect on Sir Edward Carson, who resigned his post in the Cabinet on the ground of our failure to assist Serbia; but, whatever criticism might be brought against the Balkan diplomacy of the Allies, it was too late to rescue our Serbian allies when hostilities had commenced. The few thousand men hurried north from Salonika failed to establish contact with the Serbian army and had quickly to retire to their base, while the remains of the Serbian forces struggled across the Albanian mountains to the Adriatic, and recovered from their sufferings

**Serbia is
Overrun**

at Corfu. With the defeat of Serbia Montenegro was isolated, Cetinje was occupied by Austrian troops, and King Nicholas fled across the Adriatic.

The collapse of Serbia opened a direct railway route for heavy artillery from the Central Powers to Constantinople and Asiatic Turkey, and rendered the continuance of the Dardanelles adventure inadvisable.¹ The failure of the attack at Suvla Bay in August, 1915, suggested the

The abandonment of a costly enterprise; and
Dardanelles Sir Charles Monro, who succeeded Sir Ian
Evacuated Hamilton in command, advised withdrawal.

The Cabinet, with British prestige to consider, felt unable to accept the advice without further consideration; and Kitchener was dispatched to study the situation on the spot. His advice was for evacuation, which was carried out without loss of life at Suvla Bay on December 18 and at Cape Helles on January 7. Some of the troops were transferred to Salonika, where a large Allied army was gradually built up under the incompetent and distrusted command of General Sarrail. Though at first too weak to take the offensive, it performed a useful task by immobilizing part of the Bulgarian army and by keeping watch on Greece, where the friends of the Central Powers were now in command.²

At the close of 1915 the Central Powers could survey the panorama of the titanic struggle with considerable satisfaction. The western front had been held by inferior numbers, and the formidable autumn offensives of the British at Loos and the French in Champagne had proved utter failures. France was begging Petrograd to dispatch troops to the west. Italy had battered in vain against the Austrian defences. Galicia had been cleared, and Russia had been driven out of Poland, Courland and Lithuania. In the Near East Bulgaria had entered the fray, Serbia and Montenegro had been overrun, railway

¹ See Evans Lewin, "The German Road to the East."

² See Villari, "The Macedonian Campaign"; Sarrail, "Mon Commandement en Orient"; Mermeix, "Sarrail et les Armées d'Occident."

communication with Turkey had been established, and the attack on the Dardanelles had been abandoned. The populations of Germany and Austria continued to be well fed, and the confident expectation of victory and territorial aggrandizement braced them to support the horrors of the struggle.¹ On the other hand, there was a factor in the great gamble of war which was scarcely taken into account by the mass of combatants and civilians, but was none the less of increasing if not indeed of decisive importance: Great Britain was in command of the sea.

To the surprise and relief of the Western Powers the German navy made no attempt to impede the transport of the Expeditionary Force at the outset of the struggle; and indeed it seemed as if she had no intention of challenging her rival to a decisive battle, preferring the less risky tactics of wearing down our strength by floating mines and submarines.² Except for skirmishes off Heligoland on August 28, 1914, and The Naval War January 24, 1915, no serious fighting took place in home waters during the opening months. On the other hand, enemy cruisers in distant parts of the world gave a good deal of trouble before they were caught or interned; and the German Pacific squadron under von Spee, which had left Tsingtau on Japan's entry into the war and was deprived of other naval bases by the loss of all the German colonies in the Pacific, annihilated Cradock's squadron at the battle of Coronel off the Chile coast on November 1, 1914. The victor threaded the Straits of Magellan; but his squadron was in turn annihilated on December 8 off the Falkland Isles by Sturdee's vastly superior fleet, which Sir John Fisher, who had succeeded Prince Louis of Battenberg as First Sea Lord, had sent to catch him. By the end of 1914

¹ See Grumbach, "Das Annexionistische Deutschland."

² See Jellicoe, "The Grand Fleet"; Sir J. Corbett, "Naval Operations"; Scheer, "Germany's High Sea Fleet." For the anger of Tirpitz at this inaction see his letters in the second volume of his "Memoirs."

the German flag had disappeared from the ocean, and the German colonies in Africa, cut off from reinforcements, were conquered at leisure.

The Grand Fleet had taken up its station at Scapa Flow, in the Orkneys; but the position had not been fortified against submarine attack. Admiral Jellicoe was tortured by apprehensions which he only revealed to his astonished fellow-countrymen after the war had been won; but the enemy was unaware of our deficiencies, and contented himself with occasional bombardments of towns on the east coast, which the cruisers resting on Rosyth and the patrols of Harwich and Dover were unable to prevent or to punish. The main functions of the fleet, however, were to safeguard the British Isles against invasion and starvation, to blockade the German coasts, and to cover the transport of troops; and these tasks were fulfilled with complete success. When 1915 passed and 1916 opened without the long-expected battle in the North Sea, it seemed that Germany had determined to save her fleet

**Battle of
Jutland**

intact as an element of bargaining in peace negotiations; but on May 30, 1916, the German High Sea Fleet, commanded by Admiral Scheer, and the British battle squadron under Admiral Beatty, met off the coast of Jutland. The British ships were outnumbered, and suffered more heavily both in units and in lives than their opponents; for before the Grand Fleet under Jellicoe could take effective part in the conflict the German ships were saved from destruction by fog and escaped. The greatest naval battle in history was claimed as a victory by both sides, the Germans arguing that they had inflicted the heavier losses, the British replying that the enemy had not dared to face the main British force.¹ The first-rate fighting qualities of the German vessels, the skill of their commanders and the accuracy of their gunners were proved to demonstration; but the German fleet took good

¹ The battle must be studied in the British Blue Book and in Admiral Scheer, "Germany's High Sea Fleet."

care never again to challenge a masculine decision, and the lead of Great Britain was steadily increased by new construction of every type.

In the war of 1914, as in the struggle with Napoleon, the exercise of sea-power involved Great Britain in continual friction with neutrals. Despite the indignation aroused by the attack on Belgium and the preponderant sympathy with the Allied cause, both the Government and the people of the United States desired at the outset to remain "above the battle"; for Europe was far away, Germany had many friends, and the claims of the Russian autocracy to be fighting for civilization and liberty were justly derided.¹ The President invited the belligerents to observe the Belligerents
and
Neutrals Declaration of London; and when Great Britain made reservations, he announced his resolve to see the rights and duties of the United States settled "in accord with the accepted principles of International Law and treaty obligations." Great Britain's proclamation of the blockade of the North Sea on November 3 evoked a protest from Washington against searching ships for contraband. Sir Edward Grey's interim reply on January 7, 1915, undertook that neutral commerce should be interfered with no more than was necessary for the safety of the belligerents, and repudiated a desire to interfere with genuine commerce, while affirming the right to check trade in contraband. He challenged the complaints of a large decrease in trade owing to British policy, and emphasized the suspicious increase of the export of copper to Scandinavia and Switzerland. It was necessary to bring a ship into port before it could be searched, since copper might be hidden in bales of cotton. In regard to food he refused an unconditional undertaking owing to the belligerent methods of Germany. It was a courteous but firm rejection of American representations; but the situation was eased

¹ See "Diplomatic Correspondence between the U.S. and Germany, 1914-1917," ed. by J. B. Scott; Hendrick, "Life and Letters of Walter H. Page," I, ch. 12, and II, ch. 15.

by the relations of confidence and affection between Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Page.

A new complication was added on February 4, 1915, when the German Government, despite the extreme paucity of submarines, which Tirpitz had always undervalued, announced that enemy merchantmen in the waters round Great Britain would be sunk and that neutral merchantmen might share their fate. The first result was that the *Lusitania* hoisted the American flag and entered Liverpool under it on February 6. On February 12 an American Note to Downing Street pointed out the risk to American citizens involved in this *ruse de guerre*, while a simultaneous Note to Berlin announced that if American lives were lost the German Government would be "held to strict accountability." Great Britain rejoined that there was no intention of using neutral flags as a general practice. Germany explained that her submarines were instructed not knowingly to attack American vessels, but disclaimed responsibility for accidents, and complained of the sale of war material to her enemies. If the Entente would observe the Declaration of London and allow the import of food and raw material, German reprisals would cease.

On February 22 the United States presented identic Notes to Germany and Great Britain proposing the abandonment of the use of floating mines and attacks on merchantmen except for detention and search, and suggesting that Great Britain should allow free passage of food consigned to agents named by the United States who would distribute it to civilians. The proposal was accepted in principle in Berlin, but not in London. On March 1 the British Government replied to the German proclamation by announcing their intention to intercept all oversea trade with Germany, to detain all goods, and to bring neutrals into British ports, since search at sea was dangerous. The German proclamation, argued Mr. Asquith, substituted indiscriminate destruction for regulated capture. "Her opponents are, therefore, driven to frame retaliatory

measures to prevent commodities of any kind reaching or leaving Germany; but they will be enforced by Great Britain and France without risk to neutral ships or to neutral or non-combatant lives. The Governments will hold themselves free to take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they would be otherwise liable to confiscation." The British refusal to mitigate the blockade annoyed the United States, where the Chicago packers, the farmers and the cotton-growers urged the President to champion their claims, and where the British extension of contraband to food was considered harsh and illegal; but an overwhelming tragedy was soon to transform the situation.

When President Wilson's attempt to mitigate the horrors of the conflict had failed, Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, issued a warning to American citizens not to travel in British vessels in the war-zone. The warning, which by a coincidence appeared on the eve of the departure of the *Lusitania* from New York, was unheeded; and the great liner was torpedoed off the south coast of Ireland on May 7, with a loss of 1,200 lives, of which 124 were American. Dernburg, the ex-Colonial Minister, who had been sent to the United States at the beginning of the war to present the German case, defended the destruction on the ground that the vessel carried munitions. The statement was true; but the torpedoing of a crowded passenger vessel without warning sent a thrill of horror through the world, and aroused American feeling far more than the violation of Belgium. Public opinion demanded a severance of diplomatic relations; and though the President philosophically observed that there was such a thing as a man being too proud to fight, and Mr. Bryan, the Secretary of State, desired to warn American citizens against travelling in Entente vessels, Bernstorff telegraphed to Berlin that a repetition of the offence would mean war. Dernburg was compelled to leave the country,

The
Lusitania
Sunk

and on May 13 the President called on the German Government to disavow the act, make reparation, and prevent its recurrence.

Germany was in no penitent mood, for the *Lusitania* was universally believed to be an auxiliary cruiser, armed with guns and laden with ammunition for the armies of the Entente. The destruction of a gigantic liner by a submarine aroused a hope that England's command of the sea might be challenged with success, and that the "hunger blockade," which appeared to the German as cruel as the submarine war appeared to the Englishman, might be countered by the blockade of her principal enemy. The

Bernstorff
and
Wilson

German Government accordingly replied by defending the attack on "an auxiliary cruiser with guns." There were no guns on board, and Bernstorff sought to discount the effect of an uncompromising rejoinder by an interview with the President. "We both wished to keep the peace by gaining time," he reported; "I learned that Wilson wants peace, but the country war." The President implored the Ambassador to discontinue unlimited submarine warfare, promising in return to press for the raising of the "hunger blockade"—a bargain which he believed Great Britain might accept. On July 21 a final American Note on the *Lusitania* issue announced that a repetition of the offence would be regarded as an unfriendly act; and Mr. Lansing, who had succeeded Mr. Bryan, privately warned Bernstorff that if any more American lives were lost, war would follow. Despite the defiant attitude of the German Government in public, there was no desire for a new enemy, and the commanders of submarines received orders not to attack liners. But German pride forbade communication of the decision to Washington.

The President still hoped to obtain a concession from Germany which would allow him to carry out his darling project of the freedom of the seas by finding a middle course between the views of London and Berlin. Indeed, he observed to a friend that, if he obtained a favourable

answer from Germany, he would "see the thing through with England to the end." Before Germany replied to his last Note, however, the *Arabic*, a British passenger steamer, was sunk on August 19, and two American lives were lost. The German Government promptly expressed regret, and added that it was contrary to the captain's instructions; and the Ambassador, to avoid a declaration of war, announced, without authorization, that German submarines had already been ordered not to attack passenger vessels. The *Arabic*, however, was not the last of the victims, for the *Ancona* perished on November 7, the *Persia* on December 30, and on March 24, 1916, the Channel steamer, the *Sussex*, was torpedoed, with the loss of several American lives. In response to a virtual American ultimatum the German Government now publicly undertook that no merchant vessels would be sunk without warning and the rescue of the crew, coupling its concession with the condition that the President should secure a corresponding pledge from Great Britain "to recognize the laws of humanity." Though the President rejected the condition, Germany's submarine campaign was kept within the specified limits for the remainder of 1916, and the situation was eased by the dismissal of Tirpitz.

Submarine
Campaign
Limited

It was owing to the patience of President Wilson, not to the statesmanship of Berlin, that the United States remained neutral; and it was owing to Germany's ruthless methods of waging war at sea that Great Britain was able to flout the sentiments of neutrals, both large and small. The United States were at no time inclined to renew the struggle of 1812, and after the *Lusitania* incident a declaration of war against the leading Power of the Entente was unthinkable. "America must remember that we are fighting her fight as well as our own," remarked Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Page, the American Ambassador; "you dare not press us too far." "He was right," commented the President on hearing of the conversation. "War with England would mean a German victory. I will not em-

barrass England.”¹ Thus the legal protests from Washington produced no effect in Whitehall, for the supreme sanction was lacking. On August 21, 1915, cotton was declared contraband by Great Britain and France. “The freedom of the sea,” explained Sir Edward in a letter to the *Times* on August 25, “might be a very reasonable subject for discussion, definition and agreement between nations after the war—but not by itself alone, not while

**Declaration
of London**

there was no freedom and no security against war and against German methods of war on land.” The final step was taken on July 7, 1916, when the Declaration of London was denounced. “As the struggle developed,” explained the official Memorandum, “it became clear that the attempt made in time of peace to determine not only the principles of law but even the forms under which they were to be applied, had not produced a wholly satisfactory result. These rules, while not in all respects improving the safeguards afforded to neutrals, do not provide belligerents with the most effective means of exercising their admitted rights. They could not stand the strain of rapidly changing conditions and tendencies which could not have been foreseen. The successive modifications may perhaps have exposed the purpose of the Allies to misconstruction. They have therefore come to the conclusion that they must confine themselves simply to applying the historic and admitted rules of the Law of Nations.” The needs of European neutrals were to some extent met by an elaborate system of rationing, based on their pre-war requirements.

After standing on the defensive in the west throughout 1915, the Germans withdrew troops from the East in 1916 and, for the first time since the autumn of 1914, strove for a decision. The Verdun salient was selected for the grand attack, which opened on February 21; and on the fourth day Fort Douaumont, one of the keys of the defences of the fortress, was stormed. It was a triumph of massed

¹ Tumulty, “Woodrow Wilson as I Knew Him,” ch. 27.

artillery, and the fate of the city appeared to tremble in the balance. Pétain was promptly dispatched by Joffre to the danger-point, reinforcements were hurried to the scene, and Sir Douglas Haig, who had succeeded Sir John French as British Commander-in-Chief after the failure at Loos, was requested to prepare for an offensive north of the Somme as soon as possible. The struggle of Verdun was the second of the three crises The Verdun Battles during the four years' struggle when the existence of France was at stake. Falkenhayn had marshalled such an array of troops and guns that he was prepared to continue the attack for months, and he believed that France might break under the strain; but the French fought with sublime determination enshrined in the historic formula, "On ne passera pas." The tense struggle continued through March, April and May, and at the end of the latter month the Mort Homme hill on the left bank of the Meuse was stormed. Pétain pressed for the opening of the British counter-offensive on the Somme, and when Fort Vaux fell on June 7 the anxious commander renewed his appeal. Haig undertook to strike on July 1; but the intervening weeks were a time of acute anxiety. Joffre, indeed, doubted whether Verdun could be held; for on June 23 the Germans captured Fort Thiaumont, and on June 24 stormed the village of Fleury. On this very first day of July, however, Haig opened the preliminary bombardment which was to usher in the battle of the Somme.

The costly failures of 1915 had taught the British Command not to strike before ample reserves of troops and munitions had been accumulated for a prolonged offensive.¹ The British forces in France were at length well equipped with aeroplanes, heavy artillery, shells, machine-guns, trench-mortars, hand-grenades and gas-projectors; and "Kitchener's army" in its hundreds of thousands was at last ready for a mighty effort. In the autumn of 1915

¹ See Dewar and Boraston, "Sir Douglas Haig's Command, 1915-1918."

the final yield of the voluntary principle had been secured by Lord Derby's official recruiting campaign, and in the spring conscription for single men under 42 was introduced.

**The Somme
Offensive**

It was only a half-way house, for in May, 1916, the exemption of married men was withdrawn. On July 1 the army marched to the attack, confident of its ability not only to relieve Verdun but to strike a shattering blow at the German right. These bright hopes, however, were quickly disappointed. The attack of the left wing broke down, for the preliminary bombardment had failed to dislodge the host of machine-guns which impeded the advance. The attack on the right wing, and a supporting offensive by the French on the south of the Somme, were more successful. The immediate object of the battle was attained, for the suffocating pressure on Verdun was instantaneously relieved. German troops were hurried to the Somme, and the ground before the beleaguered fortress which had been captured in the four months' struggle was regained by a series of short, sharp blows during the summer and autumn. At the end of August the failure of the onslaught on the French fortress was confessed by the dismissal of Falkenhayn, and the appointment of Hindenburg to the supreme command of the German armies, with Ludendorff as his chief assistant. Verdun was safe, and the invaders were now once more on the defensive, as they had been in 1915. But the costly Allied attacks on the Somme made little progress, despite the appearance of tanks in September; and the battle which had opened with high hopes on July 1 ended inconclusively in the middle of November, owing to exhaustion and the approach of winter. In the two colossal struggles of Verdun and the Somme both sides had suffered fabulous losses without corresponding gains. It was a year of attrition, not of decision.

While the attention of the world was focused on the struggle in France, indecisive combats were taking place during 1916 at other points in the vast arena of battle.

After repulsing repeated Italian offensives on the Isonzo, Austria felt herself strong enough to launch a formidable attack from the Trentino in May, designed to sever the communications of the main Italian army. The dangerous thrust was parried before the invaders reached the plain, and Italy struck her counter-blow when Gorizia fell on August 9. Her successes had been facilitated by a Russian offensive of unexpected virility.

On June 3, at the very moment when Austrian troops were deeply engaged on the Trentino, Brusiloff launched his grand attack on a broad front from the Pripet marshes southward to the Roumanian frontier. At the southern end of the line the Austrian front was broken, Lutsk and Dubno were taken, the Bukovina was overrun, and Eastern Galicia re-entered. An advance of fifty miles was registered within a fortnight. It was a victory of Russians over Austrians, facilitated by the surrender of large numbers of Austrian Slavs whose sympathies were with the foes of their masters. The German nut proved harder to crack. A Russian offensive north of the Pripet was repulsed, and the Central Powers strained every nerve to counter the thrust in the south. Troops were recalled from the French, the Italian and the Balkan fronts, and two Turkish corps were pressed into the service. Kovel was saved, and when the fighting died down in October the Central Powers had re-established their line. The Brusiloff offensive, like those of Verdun, the Trentino and the Somme, had spilled oceans of human blood but had failed to break the enemy's line.

Russian
Attack
Renewed

While military reputations were being won or lost in Europe by the gain or surrender of a few square miles, a war of movement was in progress in the ampler spaces of Asiatic Turkey. In February, 1916, Russian troops fought their way to Erzerum, the military and administrative centre of eastern Asia Minor, and the invading wave rolled west to Trebizond and south to Bitlis and Van. The victory was an asset to the Allied cause; but it would have been better for the Turkish Armenians had Russian troops

never crossed the frontier. The authors of the Adana massacres of 1909 were well aware of the sentiments which that suffering race must entertain in a struggle between the Crescent and the Cross; and Talaat and Enver set themselves with cool deliberation to exterminate hundreds of thousands who had supported or might wish to support the hereditary enemy.¹

In sharp contrast to the success of the Russian invasion of Asia Minor was the check to the British offensive in Mesopotamia. The invaders had pushed north along the Tigris from Basra, and in November, 1915, a small force had advanced to Ctesiphon, within twenty-four miles from Bagdad. General Townshend had in vain warned his superiors against the risk, and his apprehensions were confirmed when he was forced back to Kut-el-Amara in December and surrounded. All attempts at rescue proved fruitless, and after a siege of five months 2,000 British and 6,000 Indian troops were reduced by hunger to surrender in May, 1916.²

For this resounding disaster some slight compensation was found in the repudiation of the Sultan's authority on June 7, 1916, by the Sherif of Mecca, who had been won to the Allied cause mainly by the skilful advocacy of Colonel Lawrence, a young Oxford Orientalist with a sympathetic understanding of the mental processes of the East. Great Britain had recognized the independence of the Arabs south of the 37th degree of latitude, with the exception of Bagdad and Basra, which were to be subject to British control. The partition of Turkey was now further defined in an agreement between Great Britain, France and Russia.³ The latter claimed the provinces of Erzerum,

¹ See Toynbee, "The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire," with preface by Lord Bryce; Lepsius, "Deutschland und Armenien"; Morgenthau, "Secrets of the Bosphorus"; M. P. Price, "War and Revolution in Asiatic Turkey"; Djemal, "Memories," ch. 9.

² See General Townshend, "My Campaign in Mesopotamia," and the report of the Mesopotamia Commission.

³ Cocks, "Secret Treaties," ch. 3. For the Turkish view of the Arab revolt see Djemal, "Memories," ch. 8.

Trebizond, Van, Bitlis and Southern Kurdistan; France the coastal strip of Syria, the Vilayet of Adana, and south-east Asia Minor; Great Britain South Mesopotamia, Bagdad, and the ports of Haifa and Acre. The zone between the French and British territories was to form an Arab State or Confederation. Alexandretta was to be a free port. Palestine was to have a regime to be determined by Great Britain, France and Russia; and on November 9, 1917, Mr. Balfour's letter to Lord Rothschild announced that Great Britain would allow the establishment in that country of a national home for the Jews. Having thus secured a share in the prospective division of the spoils of Asiatic Turkey, the Sherif proclaimed his independence, occupied Jeddah, laid siege to Medina and cut the Hedjaz railway. His services were rewarded by recognition in December, 1916, as King of the Hedjaz, and his son Feisul aided Allenby in his formidable task of conquering Palestine and Syria. While Arabia was thus throwing off the yoke of the Turk, General Smuts was conquering the larger part of German East Africa and driving its defenders under the gallant Lettow-Vorbeck towards the south, where Portugal, who entered the war in March, was expected to join in the chase.¹

Our Arab
Allies

The fortunes of war were thus swaying in the balance when Roumania joined the Allies on August 28, 1916, after two years of assiduous courtship by both groups of belligerents.² The Tsar had warmly congratulated King Carol on his success in the third Balkan war, and on a visit to Constanza in June, 1914, the cordiality of the toasts revealed that the Bessarabian wound was finally healed. Indeed, Count Czernin, the Austrian Minister at Bucharest, reported after the visit that in the event of

¹ See General Crowe, "General Smuts' Campaign"; Lettow-Vorbeck, "My Reminiscences in East Africa."

² The fullest account of Roumanian policy and opinion before entering the war is in the Austrian Red Book issued after the breach. Cf. Czernin, "In the World War," ch. 4; Seton-Watson, "Roumania and the Great War."

war the King would be unable to fulfil his treaty pledge. The situation was realized at Vienna sooner than at Berlin, where the Kaiser counted on the loyalty of his relative, and where Ferdinand of Bulgaria was regarded with distrust and dislike. On August 2, 1914, when Germany had declared war on Russia, the Kaiser and Francis Joseph promised their aid in obtaining Bessarabia after victory if Carol would join their ranks. A Crown Council was held on August 4, in which the King urged intervention in accordance with his obligations; but he found support in Carp alone. The Treaty of 1883 was unknown to the Roumanian people and Parliament, and a profound change of opinion had recently occurred. Take Jonescu, who had just returned from a visit to Paris and London, has described the bitter disappointment of the veteran ruler at his inability to fulfil his pledges.¹ The opponents of intervention pointed to Italy's abstention, and the Council decided to maintain neutrality. Henceforth the ruler of Roumania was no longer Carol, but the Premier Bratiano, son of the greatest of Roumanian statesmen; and Czernin describes how the King, in tears and with trembling hand, tried to remove from his neck the *Ordre Pour le Mérite*, the symbol of his personal and political allegiance to the Hohenzollerns. He nevertheless informed the Kaiser and Francis Joseph that he would tell Bulgaria that she had nothing to fear from him if she joined the Central Powers. The German Government was now thoroughly alarmed, and urged Austria to keep her neighbour from joining their enemies by large territorial concessions. But in this case the decision lay with Budapest, not with Vienna; for it was at Hungary's expense that the sacrifice would have to be made. The unbending Tisza refused even to consider any cession of territory. When Germany proceeded to advise Austria not to resist an invasion of Transylvania by Roumania, and to announce that it was permitted in order to defend it from Russia, Berchtold refused, and

¹ "Souvenirs."

Tisza angrily replied that he would rather see Russians than Roumanians on Hungarian soil.

Meanwhile the Entente Powers had not been idle. In the opening days of the struggle Sazonoff offered Transylvania and a guarantee of recent acquisitions in the Dobrudja in return for intervention; but Bratiano replied that the Crown Council had decided on neutrality. On September 1 the Russian Minister at Bucharest reported that prominent men were asking for Bessarabia as the price not of intervention but of Claims of
Roumania neutrality. An important step was taken on September 23 when Roumania and Italy signed a treaty for common action. A few days later a treaty was signed at Petrograd, in which Russia agreed to oppose diplomatically all attempts against the integrity of Roumania, and recognized her claim to territory with a Roumanian population. The question of the partition of the Bukovina was to be referred to a joint commission. Roumania was to be at liberty to occupy the territories agreed upon whenever convenient, and Russia undertook to secure the support of Great Britain and France. Roumania promised in return benevolent neutrality till she should proceed to occupy the coveted territories.¹

On October 10, 1914, King Carol, the maker of Roumania, died of a broken heart. "The last weeks of his life," records Czernin, "were a torture to him. Each message that I had to deliver he felt as the lash of a whip." The new ruler, Ferdinand, possessed neither the ability nor the prestige of his uncle, and his wife, a daughter of the Duke of Edinburgh and of a Russian mother, followed the call of the blood. A British loan of five millions was arranged in January, 1915, but no change took place in the policy of the State. Roumania feared that an attack on Transylvania would bring in Turkey and Bulgaria on her flank; but a request by Czernin for a promise of neutrality was declined by the new ruler. The agreement with Italy was renewed on February 6, 1915,

¹ Laloy, "Documents Secrets," 106-7.

for four months, and in March the King confided to Czernin that if Italy entered the war Roumania must follow suit. When Austria at length consented to cede territory to Italy, Roumania raised her demands and spoke not only of the Bukovina but of Transylvania as the price of her neutrality; yet Burian and Tisza, hard pressed though they were, refused to surrender an inch of soil.

The Entente had always looked forward to the simultaneous intervention of Italy and Roumania; and when

**Bratiano's
Caution**

Italy tore up the Triple Alliance on May 3, 1915, Bratiano announced his price, which included Transylvania and the Banat up to the Theiss in the west, thence to the Carpathians in the north, thence to the Pruth, including the Bukovina. When the Russian Minister objected that this would infringe the rights of the other nationalities, the Premier consented to waive the southern Carpathians. The terms were, however, still too high for Sazonoff, mindful of Serbia's claims in the Banat. Thus Italy entered the war without her partner; and the decisive defeat of the Russians, followed by the overthrow of Serbia, rendered it too perilous to intervene, even were she to secure Russia's assent to her extravagant demands. Roumania now proceeded to conclude profitable commercial agreements with the Central Powers, and nothing more was heard of intervention till the following year.

Brusiloff's advance in 1916 swayed the statesmen of Bucharest back to the side of the Entente. At the end of June Czernin reported that negotiations with the Entente had been resumed in earnest, and foretold that Roumania would strike when the harvest was gathered in. Despite the customary counsel from Berlin and grave warnings from Conrad, Burian still refused concessions in return for neutrality. As Germany pressed Austria, so France pressed Russia; but on July 19 Stürmer, an unknown and reactionary official who had succeeded Sazonoff as Foreign Minister, telegraphed to the Russian Ambassadors that Roumania's terms were unacceptable, especially the con-

dition that the Allies should fight till all her demands were achieved. He proposed, therefore, to tell Bratiano that the Serbs of the Banat must be guaranteed against Roumanization. On August 2, however, Izvolsky reported from Paris that France was disappointed with the result of the Somme offensive, and that in view of her terrible losses Roumanian intervention was urgently desirable. On August 8 Russia abandoned her demand for guarantees in the Banat; and on the same day an agreement was drawn up between Roumania and the Allies, giving to Roumania the Banat, Transylvania and the plain as far as the Theiss and the Bukovina up to the Pruth. Even now in a memorandum to the Tsar Stürmer sulkily attempted to argue that Roumania must not be recognized as an equal, and that the Allies were not bound to continue the war till all her claims were realized. Bratiano threatened to resign, and on August 12 the Tsar yielded. The Treaty was signed on August 18 by Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy, and on the same day Russia and Roumania signed a military convention. Roumania's declaration of war against Austria on August 28 produced counter-declarations from Germany, Turkey and Bulgaria.

It had been arranged that the Allies should advance from Salonika on August 20; but Sarrail's plans were betrayed, and he was unable to move till September 7. Nor was the expected help from Russia in the north forthcoming. Rou-

**Collapse of
Roumania**

mania promptly threw her troops across the Carpathians into the promised land; but their sojourn in Transylvania was brief.¹ Despite the demands of Verdun, the Somme and Galicia, Falkenhayn, who had been supplanted in the supreme German command, gathered a powerful Austro-German army, later reinforced by Turks, hurled back the invaders and fought his way towards Bucharest. Meanwhile Sarrail's offensive secured Monastir by the Serbian branch of his polyglot army, but failed to advance further north. The northern Bulgarian army,

¹ See Djuvara, "La Guerre Roumaine."

avenging Roumania's stab in the back in 1913, occupied the Dobrudja and completed her discomfiture by crossing the Danube. Caught between two fires, Roumania, like Serbia in 1915, was quickly overthrown. The seat of government was transferred to Jassy, the capital of Moldavia, and on December 5 Bucharest was occupied by the triumphant enemy.

The Balkan peninsula was now in the grip of the Central Powers, for official Greece made no secret of her sympathies. In May Fort Rupel, the key to the Struma valley, had been handed over without a blow to Bulgarian troops, who proceeded to occupy Seres and Kavalla, the Greek garrisons being interned in Germany. The Entente retaliated with a pacific blockade, and Venezelos could no longer control his impatience. On August 30, two days after Roumania's intervention, the authority of the King was repudiated by Salonika, whose example was followed by Crete, Mitylene, Chios and other islands. Venezelos arrived from Athens and established a provisional Government at Salonika under the guns of the Allies, which after some delay was recognized by the Allies, and proceeded to declare war against Bulgaria. Though thousands of volunteers joined the rebel standard, continental Greece stood for Constantine and neutrality, and the King refused to yield to the pressure of the Allies.

Deposition of Constantine Troops marching to the capital from the Piræus at the end of 1916 were driven back with blood-shed; but the Tsar, for dynastic reasons, opposed the deposition of the King, and Italy, fearing the future rivalry of a State made great by Venezelos, was equally opposed to coercion at Athens. Not till the summer of 1917 did Great Britain and France grasp the Greek nettle by deposing the King and bringing back to the capital the most brilliant and consistent champion of the Allied cause in the Near East.¹

¹ See Recouly, "M. Jonnart en Grèce."

CHAPTER XVIII

THE WORLD WAR : SECOND PHASE

THE sensational collapse of Roumania, though a bitter disappointment to her allies, produced no outward change in their political declarations. In an interview which aroused universal attention Mr. Lloyd George committed himself to "a knock-out blow"; and when challenged in the House of Commons he replied that the phrase expressed not only his own opinion but that of the Cabinet, of their military advisers and of every member of the Alliance. Mr. Asquith announced in Parliament on October 11, 1916, that the struggle could not be allowed to end in some patched-up, precarious compromise. "The ends of the Allies are not selfish or vindictive, but they require adequate reparation for the past and adequate security for the future." An address by Sir Edward Grey to the Foreign Press Association on October 23 struck the same note of determination. "For years before this war we were living under the deepening shadow of Prussian militarism extending itself over the whole of Germany and then extending itself over the whole Continent. There must be no end to this war except a peace which is going to ensure that the nations of Europe live in the future free from the shadow of the great anarchist. A neutral has asked me what neutrals can do. The best thing is to work up an opinion for such an agreement between nations as will prevent a war like this happening again. If they had been united in such an agreement, and prompt and resolute to insist in July, 1914, that the dispute must be referred to a conference or to The Hague and that

the Belgian Treaty must be observed, there would have been no war."

The reference of the Foreign Secretary to an association of nations made a deep impression on the German Chancellor, who had never been dazzled by military victories and who disapproved the unmeasured ambitions of the Pan-Germans and the industrial magnates. Since the beginning of 1915 he had taken soundings as to the possibility of peace discussions,¹ and had definitely contemplated action since the summer of 1916. His first

**The Kaiser's
Decision**

step was to secure the Kaiser's assent to an invitation to the belligerents. The Entente, declared the monarch in a published letter of October 31, did not possess statesmen with the moral courage to propose peace, and therefore he, as a ruler with a conscience, would do so. The assent of Austria was assured in advance, for Francis Joseph had always approved the suggestions of peace from more or less authoritative quarters, though he always added that they must be discussed in full agreement with Germany. Burian, indeed, desired not only the discussion but the publication of peace terms, and had already pressed his suggestion on Bethmann-Hollweg. The terms which he proposed to announce on behalf of Austria were the integrity of the Empire, with trifling rectifications of the Russian and Italian frontiers. Serbia was to surrender a small fragment of territory to Austria and larger pieces to Bulgaria and Albania, and to enter into economic union with Austria, who was also to establish a Protectorate over an autonomous Albania. The German Government rejected the proposal to publish terms, and it was finally agreed that the four allies should invite the Entente to take part in a discussion of the possibilities of peace as soon as the Austro-German troops entered Bucharest.

¹ Helfferich, "Der Weltkrieg," II, 355; Bethmann-Hollweg, "Betrachtungen," II, 53-4, and ch. 4; Valentin, "Deutschlands Aussenpolitik," ch. 14. Approaches from Vienna, Berlin and Darmstadt are recorded in Paléologue's diary, and there is evidence of Russian feelers in the Vienna archives.

On December 12, six days after the fall of the Roumanian capital, Bethmann-Hollweg transmitted a brief Note to the Governments of France, Great Britain, Russia, Japan, Roumania and Serbia.¹ The latest events, he declared, proved that the resistance of the Central Powers was unbreakable; but they did not seek to crush or annihilate their adversaries, and they proposed negotiations. "They feel sure that the propositions which they would bring forward would serve as a basis for the restoration of a lasting peace. If, notwithstanding this offer of peace and conciliation, the struggle should continue, the four Allied Powers are resolved to carry it on to the end, while solemnly disclaiming any responsibility before mankind and history." An Imperial Army Order, drawn up by Ludendorff in phraseology little calculated to conciliate possible negotiators, informed the troops of the *démarche*. "Soldiers! In the consciousness of victory which you have won the rulers of the Allied States have made an offer of peace. We shall see if the object is achieved. Meanwhile you have with God's help to stand fast against the enemy and defeat him."²

The Chancellor anticipated resolute opposition from France alone, but he was quickly undeceived. On the following day Briand denounced the invitation as a manoeuvre to divide the Entente, the Russian Foreign Minister rejected it "with indignation," and Sonnino urged Italy not to separate herself from her allies in her attitude towards "this treacherous step." The British reply was conveyed by Mr. Lloyd George, who had overthrown and succeeded Mr. Asquith as Prime Minister during the first week of December and had created a War Cabinet, assisted by a Secretariat, to deal with the urgent problems of the conflict, unhampered by the routine

¹ See "Documents Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims," edited by G. Lowes Dickinson.

² See Ludendorff, "The General Staff," I, ch. 6.

business of legislation and administration.¹ "To enter, on the invitation of Germany proclaiming herself victorious, without any knowledge of the proposals she has to make, into a conference is to put our heads into a noose. Before we can consider such an invitation we ought to know that she is prepared to accede to the only terms on which it is possible for peace to be obtained and maintained—complete restitution, full reparation, effectual guarantee. What hope is there in the Chancellor's speech that the arrogant spirit of the Prussian military caste will not be as dominant as ever if we patch up peace now? The very speech in which these peace suggestions are made is a long pæan to the victories of Hindenburg and his legions."

After these individual rejoinders the Allied Governments of Russia, France, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, Serbia, Belgium, Montenegro, Portugal
The Allied and Roumania returned a collective reply
Reply on December 30. "A mere suggestion, without statement of terms, that negotiations should be opened is not an offer of peace. A sham proposal, lacking all substance or precision, would appear to be less an offer of peace than a war manœuvre. It rests on a war map of Europe alone, which represents nothing more than a superficial and passing phase of the situation, and not the real strength of the belligerents. A peace on these terms would be only to the advantage of the aggressors. The disasters caused by the German declaration of war and the innumerable outrages committed by Germany and her allies demand penalties, reparation and guarantees, but Germany avoids mention of any of these. The object of these overtures is to create dissension in Allied countries, to stifle opinion in Germany, and to deceive opinion in neutral countries. The Allied Governments refuse to consider a proposal which is empty

¹ Mr. Lloyd George's activities during the war are described from different points of view in Roch, "Mr. Lloyd George and the War"; Spender, "The Prime Minister"; Sir F. Maurice, "Intrigues of the War."

and insincere. Once again the Allies declare that no peace is possible till they have secured reparation of violated rights, recognition of the principle of nationalities and of the free existence of small States, and a settlement calculated to end forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations."

On receiving this uncompromising reply the Kaiser issued a fighting manifesto to the army and navy drawn up by Ludendorff. "Our enemies have declined our suggestion. They desire the destruction of Germany. Before God and humanity the enemy Governments must bear the heavy responsibility for the further terrible sacrifice which I desired to spare you. In your just anger at the boundless frivolity of our foes, in your firm will to defend our holiest possessions, your hearts will turn to steel. Our enemies have not desired the hand of understanding I offered them. With God's help our arms will compel them to accept it."

The German *démarche* was quickly followed by an appeal from the cooler atmosphere of Washington. On December 18 the President issued an invitation to the belligerents, which, he explained, he had long had in mind and was in no way connected with the recent offer, to announce their views as to the terms on which the war might be concluded. Their objects, as stated by themselves, were virtually the same. Never had the authoritative spokesmen avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their peoples. "It may be that peace is nearer than we know; that the terms are not so irreconcilable as some have feared; that an interchange of views would clear the way for conference. The President is not proposing peace or even offering mediation. He is merely proposing that soundings be taken." On December 25 Germany, who was waiting for the Allied response to her invitation, replied that direct discussion between belligerent delegates in some neutral country seemed the best road to peace, and added that

Wilson
Intervenes

she would be glad to co-operate with the United States in the work of preventing future wars after the end of the present struggle. But while Berlin thus politely declined the President's invitation to state her terms, the Allies dispatched an elaborate reply on January 10, 1917. The Pact of London, signed on September 4, 1914, had pledged Great Britain, France and Russia not to conclude peace separately and not to demand terms of peace without previous agreement. Japan and Italy adhered to the pact at a later date; but no programme

**Allied War
Aims**

had been drawn up. The aims of Great Britain had been explained in general terms by Mr. Asquith at the Guildhall on November 9, 1914. "We shall never sheathe the sword, which we have not lightly drawn, until Belgium—and I will add Serbia—recovers in full measure all and more than all which she has sacrificed; until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression; until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed." The declaration was endorsed by Viviani, the French Premier, on December 22, 1914, who added that France would only lay down her arms when Alsace and Lorraine were restored to her.¹ These utterances, however, only covered a small portion of an ever-widening field, and it was high time that the different peoples of the Entente should be informed of the precise objects for which they were shedding their blood.

The Allies, it was now declared, associated themselves wholeheartedly with the plan of a League of Nations; but such a discussion presupposed a satisfactory settlement of the present conflict. A peace of reparation, restitution and guarantees was at present impossible. The fact of the moment was the aggressive will of Germany and Austria to ensure their mastery over Europe and

¹ The most impartial study of the problem of Alsace-Lorraine is by Coleman Phillipson, "Alsace-Lorraine, Past, Present and Future."

their economic domination over the world. As the conflict had developed their attitude had been a continual challenge to humanity and civilization. The resemblance between the aims of the belligerent groups was only apparent. "The Allies find no difficulty in answering the request. The civilized world knows that they imply first of all the restoration of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro, with the compensation due to them; the evacuation of the invaded territories in France, Russia and Roumania, with just reparation; the reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable regime and based at once on respect for nationalities and the right to full security and liberty of economic development, and upon territorial conventions and international settlements such as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustifiable attack; the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish of their inhabitants; the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Roumanians and Czecho-Slovaks, from foreign domination; the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to western civilization. The intentions of the Tsar in regard to Poland have been indicated by his manifesto to his armies. There is no need to say that, if the Allies desire to shield Europe from the covetous brutality of Prussian militarism, the extermination and the political disappearance of the German people have never formed part of their designs."

The Joint
Reply

The reference to the expulsion and partition of Turkey was plain enough, but the allusion to Austria was studiously ambiguous. The "liberation" of Italians from foreign domination could only mean annexation to Italy; but the liberation of Slavs, Roumanians and Czecho-Slovaks might denote nothing more than autonomy.¹ On

¹ On Aug. 24, 1917, Lord Robert Cecil stated that we were not pledged to the form of liberation.

the other hand the most natural interpretation of the word was adopted not only by the exiled spokesmen of the nationalities concerned, such as Professor Masaryk and Dr. Trumbitch, but by the Central Powers, who pointed out to their suffering peoples that the Entente was bent on conquest and disruption. A dispatch from Mr. Balfour (who had succeeded Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary on the fall of the Asquith Government) to the British Ambassador at Washington restated the policy of the Government, defended the partition of Turkey, and argued that a durable peace could only be based on victory. The President had secured a statement of the war aims of the Allies, but his achievement brought peace no nearer. On January 11 Germany and Austria issued separate Notes to neutrals, saddling the Entente with responsibility for the continuation of bloodshed.

Before the pen made way for the sword President Wilson made a final attempt to stop the war. When Secretary Lansing observed that he failed to understand why Germany would not name her conditions, Bernstorff replied that they were so moderate that they looked like weakness. "You could ask for more," replied Lansing, "indeed for anything which would provide a starting-point." On December 19 Colonel House informed the Ambassador that the President thought a conference unlikely without previous negotiations, and invited him to confidential discussion. Bernstorff wired for instructions, adding that Wilson laid more stress on guarantees against future wars than on territorial changes. A speech which the American Ambassador, recently back from America, was instructed to make on January 6 to the American Chamber of Commerce in Berlin surprised the world by its cordial tone. "Our relations were never better," declared Mr. Gerard, "and their continuance is guaranteed so long as men like Bethmann-Hollweg, Helfferich and Zimmermann, Hindenburg and Ludendorff remain."¹

¹ Gerard, "My Four Years in Germany."

These honeyed phrases were out of date and evoked no response. On the following day Zimmermann, who had succeeded Jagow as Foreign Secretary, replied to Bernstorff that, though Germany would willingly discuss means of preventing wars, American mediation was undesirable, since the enemy must not be led to think that the peace offer had been dictated by fear. "We are convinced that we can win. You must therefore be dilatory in stating our conditions. You can, however, tell Wilson that they are very moderate. We do not wish to annex Belgium, but we cannot discuss Alsace-Lorraine." Two days later, on January 9, at a Crown Council at Pless, the Chancellor reluctantly accepted the demand for the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1; and indeed it was now beyond his power or that of the Kaiser to prevent it. On December 20, after reading Mr. Lloyd George's speech on the peace offer, Ludendorff telegraphed that since Lloyd George had refused the peace offer, he was convinced that the U-boat campaign must now be inaugurated in full force. To such an argument there was no reply; and the feeble Chancellor confesses in his Memoirs that his earlier opposition had arisen not from principle but from the paucity of submarines.¹ The decision was welcomed with enthusiasm by a sorely tried nation fighting against the world. Falkenhayn had urged it in the spring of 1916, the Admiralty promised to bring England to the peace table in five months, and Hindenburg refused to guarantee the western front in 1917 without it. Karl and Czernin protested in vain, for Conrad was among its supporters. To the argument that it involved war with the United States, the military chiefs replied that America was already supplying the Entente with unlimited supplies of munitions, and that Germany was in a position to meet all eventualities. The civilians, among them

Crossing
the
Rubicon

¹ The story of the Chancellor's conversion is told in his "Betrachtungen," II, and Helfferich, "Der Weltkrieg," II. Cf. Czernin, "In the World War," ch. 5.

Czernin, knew better. "It is our last card," observed the harassed Chancellor; and after the decision he wired to Helfferich, who had also opposed the decision, "The Rubicon is crossed." He would have done well to resign, for his prestige was gone, and the military leaders clamoured for the fall of a man whose moderation they disapproved and whose weakness they despised; and henceforward even the opulent personality of the Kaiser shrank to a shadow beside the towering figure and despotic will of Ludendorff.

The momentous decision remained a secret, and meanwhile the Ambassador and President Wilson continued their efforts.¹ Bernstorff reported that the **Count Bernstorff's Efforts** President had no other thought than that of bringing about peace, and implored his Government not to raise U-boat difficulties. Since the Roumanian collapse, he added, the President considered Germany to be unconquerable, and believed that the Entente, despite their confident manifesto, would accept a peace of understanding. The reply from Berlin on January 19 filled the Ambassador with despair, for he was instructed to inform the Government on January 31 that the campaign would open on February 1. He instantly wired imploring postponement, since Colonel House had just told him that the President was about to declare himself.

On January 22, in a memorable address to the Senate, the President reviewed the results of his *démarche*, and explained the ideas which inspired it. They were much nearer a definite discussion of peace, he declared, and therefore of the international concert which must follow the war, in which the peoples of the New World must take their share. Both sides had announced that it was no part of their purpose to crush their antagonists; and these assurances implied that there must be a peace without

¹ The story is told in detail by Bernstorff, "Three Years in America," and in his evidence before the Committee of the National Assembly, reprinted in "Deutscher Geschichtskalender," Lieferung 65.

victory. "Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest not permanently but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last." No peace, he added, could last or ought to last which did not recognize that Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right exists to hand peoples about from potentate to potentate. There could be no stability where the will was in rebellion. For instance, statesmen everywhere agreed that there should be a united, independent, autonomous Poland. Every great people again should be assured a direct outlet to the sea, either by cession of territory or rights of way. The freedom of the seas was the condition of peace, equality and co-operation. There could be no safety nor equality among the nations if great armaments were to continue. The United States, he concluded, would join in guaranteeing the permanence of a peace based on such foundations.¹ It was the utterance of a thinker standing "above the battle," the first indication of the principles embodied a year later in the Fourteen Points. It was also the speech of an observer who believed that the conflict could and should be brought to an end without much delay—a view fully shared by Colonel House, the President's closest friend and unofficial adviser, who visited Europe at intervals and discussed the possibilities of peace with the leaders of both camps.

Next day the Ambassador telegraphed Colonel House's urgent request that Germany should state her peace terms, publicly or privately, on which the President would at once propose a Peace Conference. On January 26 Colonel House read to Bernstorff a memorandum of the President, formally offering to act as mediator for a peace by under-

¹ This and other statements of the President's policy are conveniently collected in Lowes Dickinson, "Documents Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims."

standing. "Wilson thinks the Entente terms impossible," wired Bernstorff, "and gave the Senate his own programme in reply. He now hopes for German terms which could be published. If the U-boat campaign begins he will regard it as a smack in the face and war will be inevitable." The Chancellor, like a drowning man, caught at the straw and wired a reply on January 29. "Germany is ready to accept the offer of mediation to obtain a conference; but our acceptance of the offer must be a secret. We cannot publicly announce the terms we had in mind on making the offer of December 12 after the Entente reply, for they would look like weakness." His terms, however, sent for the private information of the President, included restitution to France of the part of Alsace occupied by her; the acquisition of a strategical and economic frontier-zone separating Germany and Poland from Russia; the restitution of colonial conquests, securing to Germany colonial territory compatible with her population and economic interests; the restoration of occupied France, subject to certain strategic and economic modifications and financial compensation; the restitution of Belgium under guarantees for the safety of Germany; the economic and financial salvaging of territory invaded by both sides; compensation for German undertakings and civilians damaged by the war; renunciation of economic obstacles to normal commerce; and the placing of the freedom of the seas on a secure foundation.

It was too late. Had the offer been made a few days earlier, comments Bernstorff mournfully, Germany could have postponed the campaign; but 21 boats had now sailed for their stations. Bernstorff handed the terms to Colonel House; but on January 31, according to instructions, he informed Lansing of the U-boat decision. "This means war," observed the President;¹ and on February 3 he broke off diplomatic relations. Germany had signed her own death-warrant. "It is too sad," wrote Colonel House to

¹ See "Life of Page," II, ch. 22.

Bernstorff, who shared his opinion, "that your Government should have declared unrestricted U-boat war at the moment when we were so near to peace." Two months later, on April 2, after the discovery of an attempt by Zimmermann to set Mexico against the United States, the President declared war, and nothing more was heard from Washington of peace without victory. Mr. Balfour immediately crossed the Atlantic to discuss military and financial co-operation.

While Germany was presenting her enemies with a new and powerful ally, the Russian autocracy tottered to its fall under the strain of war and the disintegrating influences of treachery and corruption. "This war is madness," declared Witte as early as 1914. "It can only end in the ruin of Russia. We must liquidate this stupid adventure as quickly as possible."¹ As the struggle proceeded the Tsar fell more and more under reactionary influences, and the gulf between the ruler and his suffering people widened. Sazonoff, who stood for a relatively liberal solution of the Polish question, was dismissed in August, 1916, despite the remonstrances of the British and French Ambassadors, and was succeeded by Stürmer, whose loyalty to the Entente, unlike that of the Tsar and the Tsarina, there was grave reason to suspect. An attack by Miliukoff, the scholarly leader of the Cadets in the Duma, drove him from the Foreign Office three months later; but he retained a portion of his power as Imperial Chamberlain. A far more sinister influence was exerted by the rascally monk Rasputin, who had acquired an unhealthy influence over the Tsarina, and whose hand had long been felt in the highest spheres of policy and administration. Representations by the Dowager Empress and the Grand Duchess Serge were of no avail. An earnest appeal to the Tsar by the Grand Duke Nicholas in the name of the Imperial family produced no effect; and at the close of 1916 the impostor, whom Sazonoff described

**Stürmer
and
Rasputin**

¹ Paléologue, "La Russie pendant la Grande Guerre," I, chs. 5-6.

as Antichrist, was condemned in secret conclave and executed by a group of men in high position. The news, which was hailed by the people with delight, plunged the Court in gloom. During the brief span of life remaining to the autocracy the reins were held by Protopopoff, a Liberal turn-coat, who exhorted the Tsar to meet discontent by repression. In vain did the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, advise the misguided monarch at the opening of 1917, in the interests of his dynasty and of the common cause, to select Ministers enjoying the confidence of the Duma. Lord Milner and other members of an inter-Allied Conference at Petrograd at the end of January were appalled by what they saw and heard. The Tsar and the Tsarina were deaf and blind, and diverted British machine-guns from the front to the capital for the suppression of the coming revolt.¹

The first stage of the revolution proved far less terrible than was expected, for the rotten edifice collapsed without a struggle.² On March 8 large numbers of Petrograd working-men ceased to work, and on March 11 a company of soldiers refused to fire on the crowd. The President of the Duma telegraphed to the Tsar that anarchy reigned in the capital; but when the Duma was prorogued it refused to disperse. On March 12 another company refused to fire on the people, and shot its officers. Troops sent to suppress the mutiny joined the mutineers, and in a few hours the city was free. On March 13 Moscow followed suit. It was in vain that the Tsar ordered Ivanoff to march on the capital, for most of the army chiefs accepted the revolution. On March 15 the Tsar abdicated the throne for himself and

¹ Paléologue, "La Russie pendant la Grande Guerre," III; Miss Buchanan, "A City of Trouble"; Princess Cantacuzene, "Revolutionary Days"; Wilton, "Russia's Agony"; and Rosen, "Forty Years of Diplomacy," reproduce the atmosphere of the revolution.

² The most detailed account of the first year of the revolution is given by A. Tyrkova-Williams, "From Liberty to Brest-Litovsk"; cf. M. P. Price, "The Russian Revolution." Denikin, "The Russian Turmoil," describes its effect on the army.

his son in favour of his brother Michael, who declined the honour. A Coalition Ministry was established under Prince Lvoff, with Miliukoff as Foreign Minister, Gutchkoff, the experienced leader of the Octobrists, as Minister of War, and Kerensky, an eloquent socialist lawyer, as Minister of Justice; but power was shared with a Committee of Workers and Soldiers who formed the first Soviet. The revolution was hailed with enthusiasm by friends of liberty throughout the world. Though pity was felt for the Tsar, his unfitness for his position had been proved to demonstration; and in the ranks of the hard-pressed Allies it was hoped that a reformed and rejuvenated Russia, with the Grand Duke Nicholas as Commander-in-Chief, would throw herself with fresh zeal into the fray. But it was soon discovered that the people were weary of the war, and that the revolution was not merely the downfall of the autocracy but the end of effective participation in the struggle.

The disasters of 1915 had in nowise diminished the territorial appetite with which Russia had entered the war. "All suggestions for the delimitation of Central Europe are premature," wrote Sazonoff to Izvolsky in March, 1916; "but we are prepared to allow France and England complete freedom in drawing up the western frontier of Germany, on the understanding that the Allies will allow us equal freedom in defining our frontiers with Germany and Austria. We insist on excluding Poland from international discussion and from being placed under the guarantee and control of the Powers." Nearly a year later, in February, 1917, Doumergue, on his visit to Petrograd, informed the Tsar that France desired Alsace-Lorraine, a special position in the Saar valley, and the political separation from Germany of her trans-Rhenish districts, and expressed a hope that Russia would consent. The Tsar agreed in principle, replied Pokrovsky, the Foreign Minister, subject to a free hand on her own western frontiers and the removal of the veto of 1856 on

the fortification of the Aland Islands. On February 25 Pokrovsky and Doumergue recorded the agreement in an exchange of Notes.¹ A fortnight later the Tsar had fallen.

On April 12 the new Government explained the principles of its foreign policy. "Free Russia does not aim at dominating other nations, at depriving them of their national patrimony, or of occupying by force foreign territories. Its object is to establish a durable peace on the basis of the rights of nations to decide their own destinies. The Russian nation has removed the chains which weighed upon the Polish people. The Government will safeguard the rights of the Fatherland, while observing the engagements entered into with our allies." If Russians were no longer asked to shed their blood for the territorial expansion of their own country, they could hardly be expected to fight for the ambitions of their friends. In the middle of May Miliukoff, who shared the Imperialist ambitions though not the political principles of the autocracy, was forced to resign the Foreign Office, and Gutchkoff, himself an old soldier but

**Kerensky
in Power**

unable to maintain military discipline, withdrew. The Government, hitherto predominantly bourgeois, now tilted sharply towards the left, Kerensky succeeding Gutchkoff at the War Office, while Tchernoff, the champion of land nationalization, and two other socialists entered the Ministry. For the next six months Russia was ruled by Kerensky, who gallantly attempted to combine deference to the growing power of the Soviets with loyalty to the Allies.²

On May 30 the Soviets appealed for a re-statement of the war aims of the Entente; but no response was vouchsafed by the Western Powers. Nor did the statesmen of

¹ See Cocks, "The Secret Treaties." This compact was hidden from Great Britain; and, when it was revealed by the Bolsheviks, Mr. Balfour bluntly observed that we had never encouraged or approved the separation of the left bank.

² Nabokoff's pathetic book, "The Ordeal of a Diplomat," describes the anomalous position of Russia's diplomatic representative in London after the fall of the Tsardom.

London, Paris and Rome smile on a project suggested by Troelstra, leader of the Dutch socialists, strongly supported by the Soviets, and approved by Kerensky, of a Labour Conference in Stockholm to discuss the possibilities of peace. The plan was endorsed by Mr. Henderson, the Labour member of the War Cabinet, who, with Vanderfelde and Abel Thomas, had been dispatched to Petrograd after the fall of the Tsar. Mr. Henderson reported that, if Russia was to be prevented from going out of the war, the confidence of her people in its purposes must be restored. Mr. Lloyd George favoured the plan; but his colleagues were against him, and the Entente Governments refused to grant passports to the labour leaders. The Conference was attended by the socialist leaders of the Central Powers and the neutral North; but in the absence of the labour leaders of the Entente it was doomed to sterility.¹ Despite the lack of response from the Allies to an appeal for a revision of war aims, Kerensky, aided by Brusiloff, who had succeeded Alexeieff as Commander-in-Chief, galvanized the southern armies to a final effort, with Lemberg as its objective. The battle began on June 29; but after three weeks of progress a counter-offensive reconquered the lost ground, and Mackensen swept forward till he was brought to a halt by Roumanian troops on the borders of their own country. The *moral* of the Russian army was utterly broken; and in the north the Germans crossed the Dvina, conquered the islands in the Gulf of Riga, and landed on the mainland within striking distance of Reval.

Russia's
Last
Effort

The intervention of the United States and the collapse of Russia were destined to produce military results of the highest importance; but they exerted no effect during 1917 on the struggle in the West. Early in the year the German front on the Somme was withdrawn to what became known as the Hindenburg line; and if the surrender of

¹ Scheidemann, "Der Zusammenbruch," ch. 9; and E. Bevan, "German Social Democracy and the War," ch. 16.

several hundred square miles of French soil was a source of satisfaction to the Allies, the retirement to a shorter line strengthened the German defences. Despite the failures of 1916 Haig resolved on a fresh offensive, and on April 9 he opened the battle of Arras, of which the most brilliant chapter was the capture of the Vimy Ridge by the Canadians. The British attack synchronized with a more ambitious enterprise of our ally. Joffre had been deprived of his post at the end of 1916, and his successor, Nivelle, the hero of the Verdun counter-offensive, believed that a vigorous blow on the Aisne, between Soissons and Champagne, would roll back the German line, and held out hopes of seizing Laon on the first day.¹ His optimism was shared neither by Painlevé, the Premier, nor by Pétain and Haig, and he offered his resignation, which was refused. The artillery attack began on April 6. Ten days later, a week after the capture of the Vimy Ridge, he launched his offensive on a fifty-mile front. The plan, however, had been discovered by the enemy, and within forty-eight hours it was clear that the blow had miscarried.

**Great
French
Defeat**

The weather broke at the critical moment, the losses were enormous, and no adequate preparations had been made for the reception of the wounded. The battle of the Chemin des Dames was the greatest blow to French arms since the failure of the Champagne offensive in 1915, and was followed by a depression which found vent in mutiny in ten divisions. Nivelle was succeeded by Pétain, with Foch as Chief of the Staff; but for the remainder of the year no further offensives were attempted except at Verdun. During the summer and early autumn a British advance of about five miles was secured in the Ypres salient at the cost of fierce and unprofitable fighting round Paschendaele, and a brilliant success at Cambrai in November was punished by an equally brilliant counter-offensive. Longing

¹ See Mermeix, "Joffre (la première crise du commandement)," and "Nivelle et Painlevé (la deuxième crise du commandement)." Cf. Sir. F. Maurice, "Intrigues of the War."

eyes were turned towards America, who was slowly girding herself for the fray. Meanwhile the opening months of the submarine campaign appeared to fulfil the hopes of its sponsors and filled the British Government with acute anxiety, which reached its climax in April, when one ship in four which left our coasts was destroyed, and Germany constructed submarines quicker than we destroyed them.¹

The disappointments in the West were in some degree lightened by a brilliant campaign in Mesopotamia. The surrender of Townshend at Kut taught the military authorities at Simla and Whitehall that Bagdad could not to be captured by a *coup de main*; and the later months of 1916 were spent by General Maude in preparing for an advance up the Tigris.² The march began in December, Kut was reoccupied **Bagdad and Jerusalem** in February, 1917, Bagdad was entered on March 11, and in April British troops had reached Samara, the terminus of the eighty-mile line running north from Bagdad. But though the loss of central and southern Mesopotamia was an even greater blow to the Ottoman Empire than the fall of Erzerum, its power was not yet broken. Early in 1917 the flanks of Egypt were relieved by the repulse of Senussi attacks on the west and the clearing of the Sinai peninsula on the east; but when the defenders of the Canal at length advanced to the conquest of Palestine, they found the Turks strongly entrenched at Gaza, and their onslaughts in March and April were repulsed. From the time of Allenby's appointment in June the situation improved. In November the defences of Gaza were turned, and on December 9 Jerusalem surrendered.

With their immense superiority in man power, money and material resources, the Allies might well comfort themselves in their defeats and disappointments with the reflection that time was on their side; and their view was shared at Vienna, though not at Berlin. Despite the

¹ See "Life of Walter Page," II, ch. 22.

² See Callwell, "Life of Sir Stanley Maude."

contemptuous rejection of the peace offer of the Central Powers, the Emperor Karl continued to seek peace for his suffering dominions. In the manifesto to his subjects on his accession in November, 1916, he had expressed his desire to bring the conflict to an end, and pointedly

**The
Emperor
Karl**

remarked that he had had no responsibility for its outbreak. Before the Entente sent its joint reply to the peace offer of December 12, Karl urged a fresh offer, to which the Kaiser replied that he prayed for peace but could not beg for it.¹ On December 9 the Duchess of Parma, mother of the Empress Zita, wrote to her son Prince Sixte, who was serving with the Belgian army, urging him to come and see her.² With the permission of King Albert, the Prince met his mother in Switzerland on January 29, 1917, and was informed that the Emperor was ready for a secret armistice with Russia, Austria declaring herself disinterested as regards Constantinople, and favourable to the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, the return of Belgium, and the creation of a Yugoslav kingdom embracing Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia, Albania and Montenegro. On March 5 the Prince handed to Poincaré a diplomatic note from Czernin with a secret "Note Verbale" of the Emperor. The President replied that Czernin's note was too vague, but that the Emperor's explanations were more hopeful. He must show them to the Premier, and would forward them to the Tsar, and to King George and Mr. Lloyd George. Italy, however, would be a stumbling-block, for though she was pleading for French troops to help her to resist the Austrian attacks, her claims were comprehensive.

On March 16 the Prince wrote to the Emperor that things were going well and urged him to send a written

¹ See Cramon, who laments the death of Francis Joseph and the dismissal of Conrad, and reveals his deep distrust of Karl, the Empress and Czernin.—"Unser Oesterreichisch-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse."

² The story is told in full from the Prince's records by Manteyer, "The Austrian Peace Offer"; cf. Czernin, "In the World War"; and Ludendorff, "The General Staff," II, 414-45.

note, embodying the four points of Alsace-Lorraine, Belgium, Serbia and Constantinople. He proceeded to visit the Emperor at Laxenburg, where Karl declared that Germany was certain of victory, but that if she refused what seemed to him a reasonable settlement he could not sacrifice the Monarchy and would make peace separately. With the fall of the Tsar, he added, it was no longer necessary to support Russian claims to Constantinople. Czernin was equally clear that the German alliance must end if Berlin tried to prevent a reasonable peace. The Prince left Laxenburg in cheerful mood with an autograph letter dated March 24 in his pocket, of which even Czernin was ignorant. "I ask you to convey, in a secret and unofficial manner, to President Poincaré that I will support by all means, and using all my personal influence with my allies, the just claims of France in relation to Alsace-Lorraine.¹ The sovereignty of Belgium must be completely restored. Serbia will be re-established in her sovereignty, and we are willing to give her access to the Adriatic as well as large economic concessions. Austria will require that Serbia shall suppress any society aiming at the disintegration of the Monarchy. Events in Russia compel me to withhold for the present my ideas on this subject." On March 31 the Prince handed this remarkable letter to Poincaré, and Ribot, who had replaced Briand as Premier, showed it to the British Premier. The two Ministers agreed that the negotiations should be continued.

Prince
Sixte's
Mission

On April 3 Karl and Czernin met the Kaiser and the Chancellor at Homburg, and told their host that they had no hope of victory, that if Germany refused a reasonable peace Austria could not fight beyond the autumn, that peace involved the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, and that to balance the sacrifice they would cede Galicia to a Poland within the German orbit. On his return Karl forwarded

¹ For the controversy between Clemenceau, Czernin and Karl in 1918 as to the authenticity of this phrase, see Dickinson, "Documents," 36-41.

to the Kaiser a prophetic memorandum by Czernin. "Our military resources are coming to an end. We must begin negotiations before our enemies are fully conscious of our exhaustion. Another winter campaign is absolutely out

**Czernin's
Despairing
Forecast**

of the question. The basis of my argument is the danger of revolution. The burden on our people is now intolerable. The bow is so taut that it may snap at any moment. It is no good telling me that the monarchical idea is too firmly rooted in Berlin and Vienna for the Monarchy to be overthrown. This war has no precedent. If the monarchs do not make peace in the next few months their peoples will make it over their heads, and then the waves of revolution will sweep away everything for which our sons are fighting to-day. German hopes from the U-boat campaign are illusory. We can still wait a few weeks and see if there is any chance of conversations with Paris or Petrograd. If not, we must play our last card in good time." The Kaiser cheerfully replied that he was confident of victory, and that a peace involving heavy sacrifices would also involve great dangers for the dynasties. He enclosed a memorandum by the Chancellor, who argued that the U-boat campaign had exceeded expectation, that unity and confidence were needed, and that Russia should be encouraged to make peace.¹

On April 18 Prince Sixte saw Mr. Lloyd George in Paris on his way to St. Jean de Maurienne. "We would willingly shake hands with Austria if she would leave Germany," remarked the Prime Minister, "but Italy nourishes rather bitter feelings towards her, and she is our ally. We cannot make peace without her." On reaching the rendezvous in Savoy he found that the Italian Minister, who claimed and received a promise of Smyrna, scouted the notion of treating with Austria. On April 20, on his way home, Mr. Lloyd George again saw the Prince in Paris. "What made our interview with Sonnino much more difficult was the fact that we could

¹ See the documents in Czernin, "In the World War," ch. 6.

not communicate to him the direct proposals of the Emperor. He declared that Italy could not conclude a separate peace without the realization of her war aims. No Government could last a day if it proposed a 'white peace,' and a revolution would depose the King. Italy's demands are very large—the Trentino, Dalmatia, all the islands on the coast, and Trieste. It is absolutely necessary that Austria should give something to Italy, but in the Emperor's letter she is not mentioned. Austria will be forced to come to terms, for we shall never cease to fight. If officially we cannot for the moment enter into negotiations, directly Austria testifies her readiness to cede the Trentino and the Dalmatian islands we would negotiate with her." The Prince promised to inform the Emperor, and Mr. Lloyd George invited him to London for further discussion. The French reply to the Emperor's letter was to the same effect.

Far from regarding negotiations as at an end, Karl was more hopeful than ever. He replied that he did not think Germany would attack him, but that if she did he could hold his own. Peace had been proposed to Austria five times since 1915, particularly from Russia, and Prince Lvoff had just proposed an armistice. The Trentino could be handed over to Italy, and the Isonzo frontier could be rectified. If Austria made peace with the Entente, she would carry with her Turkey and Bulgaria. In response to an urgent request from the Emperor the Prince revisited Laxenburg on May 8. Three weeks ago, he was told, an Italian Colonel had proposed peace on the basis of the cession of the Italian Trentino. He had described himself as the envoy of Cadorna and the King, and had addressed himself to the German Minister at Berne, who had sent him on to the Austrian Minister.¹ The Emperor had refused, as he desired to treat with Italy through her allies. He was ready to surrender the Italian Trentino, but must have some compensation—say

**The
Emperor
Hopeful**

¹ Cadorna afterwards denied that he had taken such a step.

an Italian colony. The Emperor handed the Prince a second letter, expressing satisfaction that France and England shared his views except as to the participation of Italy, and adding that Italy had just asked for peace on the basis of the cession of the Trentino. He had postponed his decision till he received a reply from France and Great Britain on the points raised in a covering letter from Czernin, who explained that Austria could not cede territory without compensation and without a guarantee of the integrity of the rest of the monarchy. The Emperor

**Bethmann-
Hollweg
Informed**

proposed that the Entente should send a diplomatist to Switzerland in the middle of June to sign peace. At this point Czernin invited Bethmann-Hollweg to Vienna, and on May 13 informed him, though without mentioning Prince Sixte, that Great Britain, France and Italy had suggested a separate peace in return for the cession of the Trentino and some islands. Such a peace, he added, would not injure Germany, for Austria could transfer her troops from the Italian to the Russian front and thus set free the German troops in the east for service in the west, while the raising of the blockade in the Adriatic would allow food to reach Germany. The Chancellor approved of the negotiations being continued.

On May 20 the Prince saw Poincaré for the fifth time, and handed him the two letters. The President remarked that it would be difficult to extract compensation from Italy, and asked what colony could be considered. The Prince mentioned Somaliland. Ribot complained that there was no reference to Roumania, and added that the Allies could not ask Italy to renounce what had been promised her. He refused to believe that the King and Cadorna could have offered peace without the knowledge of Sonnino, and suggested that it should be cleared up by asking the King himself, who might be invited to visit the French and British fronts and meet King George, the President, and the two Premiers. The Prince proceeded to London, where the Prime Minister introduced

him to the King, who approved the plan of a meeting in France. The invitation, however, was declined by Sonnino, and accordingly no answer to the Emperor's letter and Czernin's note was dispatched. Though Austria and France were on more than one occasion to engage in informal discussions through the meetings of Count Revertera and Count Armand in Switzerland,¹ the refusal of his advances by the Entente forced Karl back into the iron grip of his ally. On May 17 the Emperor and Czernin visited the Kaiser at Kreuznach, and signed an agreement in which there was no talk of sacrifice or surrender. Austria was to annex in the Balkans, and the occupied portion of Roumania was to come into her sphere of interest, while Courland and Lithuania were to join Germany, and Austria was then to renounce her *condominium* in Poland. A further agreement of June 8 placed the organization of Polish forces in German hands.²

The necessity of compromise which inspired Austrian policy since the accession of the Emperor Karl was recognized by a growing volume of opinion in Germany. Early in 1917 Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria began to press for peace. The unrestricted submarine campaign had brought the United States into the war, but there were no signs of the promised downfall of Great Britain. Opinion was disappointed and depressed. On July 6 the danger of the situation was frankly explained in a secret session of the Committee of the Centre party at Frankfurt by Erzberger, who had obtained a copy of Czernin's despairing April memorandum and read it to his colleagues. The war, argued the Catholic leader, could not be won, and Germany should publicly renounce all desire for annexations. When the news leaked out the effect was electrical, for Erzberger had begun by demanding a peace of conquest and was the first bourgeois leader

Erzberger
urges
Compromise

¹ Lowes Dickinson, "Documents," 30-41.

² Cramon vividly describes the embarrassment of this "journey to Canossa" and the Kaiser's irreparable loss of confidence in his ally.

to adopt the Socialist demand. On July 10 Bethmann-Hollweg resigned; but the Austrian Government protested against his dismissal and against the return of Bülow, which Hindenburg, Ludendorff and the Vaterlandspartei desired, and the resignation was declined. The Conservatives had deserted him since the "Easter Manifesto" had promised to reform the Prussian franchise, and the National Liberals and the Centre were now his foes. The army chiefs had long complained of his lack of energy, and when they now threatened resignation the Kaiser reluctantly gave way. The veteran Hertling, the Bavarian Premier, refused the post, which was entrusted to Michaelis, a little-known Prussian official;¹ and Germany, in the bitter words of the fallen Chancellor, was henceforth governed by a military dictatorship.

On July 19 a resolution drawn up by Erzberger was carried in the Reichstag by 212 to 126, the majority consisting of the Centre, the Majority Socialists and some of the Liberals, against Conservatives, National Liberals and the Independent Socialists. "The Reichstag strives for a peace of understanding and the permanent reconciliation of the peoples. With such a peace forced acquisitions of territory and political, economic or financial oppressions are inconsistent. It also rejects all schemes which aim at economic barriers after the war. The freedom of the seas must be made secure. So long, however, as the enemy Governments threaten Germany and her allies with conquests and oppression, the German nation will fight till its own and its allies' right to life and development is secured." The new Chancellor declared that his aims, including the inviolability of German territory and a guarantee against economic barriers, were attainable within the limits of the resolution "as I understand it." "We cannot again offer peace,

¹ See Scheidemann, "Der Zusammenbruch," ch. 7; Ludendorff, "The General Staff," II, 446-76; Erzberger, "Erlebnisse," ch. 19; Bethmann-Hollweg, "Betrachtungen," II, 47-52.

but if the enemy abandon their lust for conquest and their aims of subjugation and wish to negotiate we shall listen in a spirit of readiness for peace." The resolution was believed by its supporters to have rallied the German people to a war of pure defence, by its opponents to have weakened the position of Germany and strengthened the resolution of her enemies.

On the eve of his fall Bethmann-Hollweg had received a visit from the Papal Nuncio, who brought a letter to the Kaiser from the Pope.¹ It would be a great help, declared Pacelli, to know the German terms; and the Chancellor at once responded. Germany would limit her armaments, if others did the same, and would restore the independence of Belgium, which, however, must not fall under the political, military and financial domination of Great Britain and France. "Will you make territorial concessions in Alsace-Lorraine?" asked the Nuncio. "If France is ready for an understanding," replied the Chancellor, "that will not be an obstacle. Each side would make rectifications of frontier." On the east, however, no peace was possible at present. The Kaiser's reception of the Nuncio was no less friendly, and the Chancellor believed that the Pope's action was known to, if not inspired by, the Entente.

After taking soundings at different points the Pope put forward on August 1 "concrete and practical proposals" as the basis of peace—reduction of armaments, arbitration with sanctions, renunciation of indemnities, the restoration of occupied territories. Contested questions such as those between Germany and France, or Austria and Italy, and Armenia, the Balkans and Poland, might, there was ground for hoping, be examined in a conciliatory spirit, taking into account the aspirations of the peoples. The struggle seemed to be becoming more and more a

¹ See Bethmann-Hollweg's article of Feb. 29, 1920, reprinted in Ludendorff, "The General Staff," II, 478-83; Helfferich, III, 147; Erzberger, ch. 20; Spahn, "Die Päpstliche Friedensvermittlung"; and the Kaiser's "Memoirs," ch. 11.

useless massacre. "Listen, then, to our prayer; accept the paternal invitation which we address to you in the name of the Prince of Peace." It was in effect a proposal to return to the *status quo ante bellum*, a "peace without victory," such as President Wilson had urged in the days of his neutrality, but which he now politely declined, informing the Pope that the rulers of Germany were still unconquered and could not be trusted. Belgium replied that Germany had never recognized her rights to reparation which the Pope had proclaimed. A third member of the Grand Alliance, Brazil, also sent a response.

"The Government," wrote Mr. Balfour to Count de Salis, our special envoy at the Vatican, "not having as yet been able to take the opinion of their
The British Reply Allies, cannot say whether it would serve any useful purpose to offer a reply, or, if so, what form any such reply should take.¹ Though the Central Powers have admitted their guilt in regard to Belgium, they have never definitely intimated that they intend either to restore her to her former state of entire independence or to make good the damage she has suffered. Till they and their Allies state officially how far they are willing to go in the matter of reparation and restoration, have announced their war aims, and put forward suggestions as to the measures which may offer an effective guarantee that the world will not again be plunged into the horrors by which it is at present devastated, the Government consider it unlikely that any progress towards peace can be made. It appears to be useless to endeavour to bring about an agreement between the belligerents until the points of difference between them are clearly known, and neither Germany nor Austria has as yet made any statement corresponding to that issued by the Allies in answer to the note of President Wilson. You should point this out to his Eminence." The Pope asked for and received a copy of the letter, and the Cardinal Secretary remarked that Germany had already announced

¹ See "British and Foreign State Papers," 1917-18, 575-89.

her intention to restore the independence of Belgium. "On my objecting to this statement he recalled the resolution in favour of peace without annexation. I answered that the Assembly did not rule Germany." Cardinal Gasparri rejoined that he would reply after having received from the German Government an official declaration on Belgium for which he had asked. "I desired to avoid any statement," reported the Count, "which might seem to give encouragement to any kind of discussions with the German Government, and therefore, on his inquiring my views, I replied that a declaration on the question of Belgium appeared desirable. This point was only one of many at issue, but it was of special importance to us." Even these judicious observations brought a caution from Downing Street. "In the event of your opinion being asked, you should decline to express any views. It is not desirable to intervene in the negotiations between the Pope and the German Government in any way." Paris was alarmed, and on August 26 the French Chargé brought a memorandum to the Foreign Office. "My Government associated itself with the communication to the Vatican because it was to be verbal and would render needless a more explicit response. But a written document has been given to the Cardinal, and we may be carried much farther than we wished." A day or two later Mr. Balfour informed the British Ministers abroad that the Government, in view of President Wilson's note, considered no further reply to the Papal note to be necessary.

Despite the chilling response from the Entente, the Pope continued his efforts.¹ The Cardinal Secretary forwarded Mr. Balfour's letter to Berlin, and suggested that a definite promise of independence and compensation for Bel-
The Pope Perseveres
gium would be an important step towards negotiations. A Crown Council was accordingly held, at which the Chief of the Admiralty asked for the Belgian coast and Hinden-

¹ Helfferich, III, 577.

burg and Ludendorff for Liège; but the Council authorized the restoration of the integrity and sovereign of Belgium. The German Government, however, replied that conversations were only possible on the basis that neither side was beaten, and it was therefore useless to publish terms. In forwarding the German and Austrian replies to London on September 28, Cardinal Gasparri observed that the document left open the door for an exchange of ideas; "and if the Entente will not decline to enter into negotiations, the Holy See is prepared to ask, on its own initiative, for further explanations and more precise definitions on such points as may be indicated." To this invitation Mr. Balfour replied by a formal acknowledgment.

Despite its refusal to respond to the Pope's request for its terms, the German Government attempted during the summer to establish contact both with Paris and London. Messages were forwarded by Baron Lancken, the Political Director of the German Government in Brussels, to Briand, who had recently ceased to be Premier, through the Comtesse de Mérode in June, and again through Baron Coppée in August, that the Kaiser was disposed to peace.¹ Briand replied that France could only treat in co-operation with her allies, and if the evacuation of occupied territory, the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and reparation for damages were conceded in advance. The Belgian Premier, Brocqueville, desired that the French statesman should meet Lancken in Switzerland in September, and Briand himself was anxious to go; but the meeting was vetoed by Ribot, who saw a trap in every advance from the side of the Central Powers. Shortly afterwards Villalobar, the Spanish Minister at Brussels and a friend of Kühlmann, was asked to take soundings in London as to negotiations on the basis of the integrity of pre-war Germany, no indemnity, and no economic boycott. The Spanish Foreign Minister thereupon in-

¹ See Mermeix, "Les Négociations Secrètes et les Quatre Armistices," chs. 7 and 13.

formed the British Minister at Madrid that Germany would be glad to know on what conditions Great Britain would enter on negotiations. Mr. Balfour invited the Ministers of the Allies to a conference, which agreed that it was merely another attempt to separate the Allies; and the British Minister at Madrid was therefore instructed to reply that the British Government was ready to receive any communication which the German Government desired to send, and to consider it with its allies.¹

The minds of the Austrian and German Governments were to some extent revealed in speeches of their Foreign Ministers. On October 2 Czernin, after reminding his hearers that the Dual Monarchy was unconquered, pleaded eloquently for complete international disarmament by land and sea, obligatory arbitration and unfettered economic activity. With such guarantees for permanent peace, he argued, Austria required no annexations. Yet the speech ended with a threat. "Let no one cherish the delusion that this pacific, moderate programme of ours will hold good for ever. If our enemies compel us to continue the war, we shall be obliged to revise it and to demand compensation. I am convinced that in another year our position will be incomparably better." On October 9 Kühlmann, replying to Mr. Asquith's recent declaration that the return of Alsace-Lorraine was as necessary as the liberation of Belgium, denied that Europe was fighting about Belgium. "The ^{Kühlmann's} ^{"Never"} quarrel for which Europe is gradually being transformed into a rubbish heap is the future of Alsace-Lorraine. We have only one answer to the question 'Can Germany make France any concessions in Alsace-Lorraine?' No! Never! So long as a German hand can hold a rifle the integrity of the Empire cannot be the subject of any negotiations. What we are fighting for is not fantastic conquests, but the integrity of the Empire. There is no absolute obstacle to peace except France's wish for Alsace-Lorraine."

¹ Nabokoff, "The Ordeal of a Diplomat," 167-9.

That the Ministers could assume this confident tone was owing to the fact that the autumn of 1917, like that of 1916 and 1915, brought fresh disasters to the Allied cause in the withdrawal of Russia from the conflict and the overwhelming defeat of Italy at Caporetto. Kerensky had succeeded Prince Lvoff as Premier in July, 1917; but his energy and eloquence could not make up for his lack of political support. A social revolution had followed the downfall of the old regime, and the peasants had seized the land of the private owner and the State. The right wing of the Coalition Government had withdrawn, and the Soviets were dominated by his enemies, the Bolsheviks, who opposed the July offensive and whose rising at Petrograd in the same month he had suppressed. Nor could he any longer count on the army; for in September he quarrelled with Korniloff, who succeeded Brusiloff as Commander-in-Chief after the *débâcle*, and whom he suspected of aiming at a military dictatorship. And finally he was unable to bring to the weary people the peace for which they craved. "In perfect accord with its allies," he announced after the Korniloff crisis, "the Government will very shortly participate in a conference at which our representatives will seek to reach an understanding on the basis of the principles proclaimed by the Russian Revolution"; and on October 20 a Russian delegate received instructions that "the new treaty between the Allies

Bolsheviks Overthrow Kerensky	must be based upon the principles of no annexations and no indemnities, with the right of nations to dispose of their own fate." But there was no sign that the Allies were ready for conference or compromise, and on October 9 the British, French and Italian Ambassadors jointly urged the necessity of restoring the fighting capacity of the army. ¹ Early in November Kerensky was overthrown by the Bolsheviks; and the Government of Russia passed into the hands of Lenin, the brain of the party, who became President of the Council of People's Commissioners, and
--	--

¹ See Laloy, "Les Documents Secrets," 179-82.

Trotsky, the President of the Petrograd Soviet, who became Foreign Minister.¹

The first aim of the new Government was to make peace. On November 8 the Congress of Soviets invited all belligerents to begin negotiations for a peace without annexations or indemnities, appealing in particular to "the intelligent workmen of the three foremost nations of the world, England, France and Germany." The note was forwarded by Trotsky, who invited the Governments to consider it in the light of an official proposal for an immediate truce on all fronts and immediate negotiations. No response was forthcoming, and the Russian Government at once approached the Central Powers. Before an armistice was signed on December 3 Russia interrupted the negotiations for a week in order to inform her allies and to allow them to take part. Official negotiations for peace began at Brest-Litovsk on December 22, conducted by Trotsky, Czernin and Kühlmann, the latter being assisted or controlled by a military representative of the General Staff.² On December 25 Germany accepted the Russian principle of no annexations or indemnities, on condition that the Entente accepted it also; and the proceedings were adjourned till January 4, 1918, in order, in Trotsky's words, to give the Allied countries a final chance of securing themselves against the consequences of a separate peace. His declaration was rather an exhortation than an invitation, and a menace lurked behind the appeal. "If they would express their readiness to found a peace upon the unconditional recognition of the principle of self-determination for all peoples in all States, and if they would begin by giving this right to the oppressed people of their own States, this would create such international conditions

¹ See Kerensky, "The Prelude to Bolshevism: The Korniloff Rebellion"; Miliukoff, "The Second Russian Revolution"; Trotsky, "The Revolution in Russia."

² See "Die Friedensverhandlungen in Brest-Litovsk" ("Deutscher Geschichtskalender"); Czernin, "In the World War," ch. 10; Nowak, "Der Sturz der Mittelmächte," ch. 1.

that the programmes of Germany and Austria would be overcome by the pressures of the peoples. A separate peace will undoubtedly be a severe blow to the Allies. The Russian Government has striven all the time for a general peace, and the Russian revolution has opened the way to an immediate general peace. If the Allied Governments again refuse to take part in peace negotiations, the working classes will be compelled to snatch the authority from the hands of those who cannot or will not give peace to the peoples. We promise every support to the working classes in every country which will rise against their own national Imperialists, chauvinists and militarists."

While waiting for the reply of the Entente Germany announced that Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and parts of Livonia and Esthonia had expressed a wish for separation from Russia and for German protection. Trotzky denounced a manœuvre which aimed at the retention of the conquests of the Central Powers; but on January 10 discussion of a separate peace was begun. It was in vain that Trotzky demanded plebiscites for the occupied provinces, and on February 10, while refusing to accept the

Russia Signs Peace

German terms, he announced that the war was ended. The Germans retorted by advancing towards Petrograd, and on March 3 a peace was signed which severed from Russia the three Baltic provinces, Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine, but gave nothing to Austria. Separate treaties of peace were concluded with the Ukraine, Finland and Roumania, the latter being forced to surrender the Dobrudja to Bulgaria and the Carpathian passes to Austria, but, owing to the personal intervention of the Emperor Karl, retaining her King.¹

The withdrawal of Russia and Roumania from the fray encouraged Ludendorff to dream of a decision on the western front in the coming spring before the arrival of American troops in overwhelming numbers; and it was part of his far-flung strategy to divert Allied troops from

¹ See Czernin, ch. 11, "The Peace of Bucharest."

the threatened point. For a costly struggle of two and a half years Italy had little to show but the capture of Gorizia, and war weariness was felt in Turin and other cities. The frowning and inhospitable Carso continued to bar the way to Trieste, and it leaked out that the troops on the left flank of the Isonzo front had lost their stomach for the fight. In the middle of October German divisions were for the first time reported on the Italian front, and on October 24 a stunning blow at Caporetto broke open the unlocked door. The collapse of the defence in the north involved the instant retreat of the Third Army on the Carso front. Cadorna gnashed his teeth over the "naked treason" which had undone the work of the whole campaign and cost him his place; but the Italian Command was in part to blame for the colossal dimensions of the catastrophe. The possibility of an Austrian offensive under German leadership and strengthened by German divisions had never been seriously considered, and no adequate preparations had been made for a rapid withdrawal of troops and artillery or of the vast stores of cattle and grain assembled close behind the fighting line. The larger part of Venetia was overrun in a few days and the Italian troops fell back to the Piave, within twenty miles of Venice. Italy was plunged into gloom, but within a day or two British and French troops were marching across the Lombard plain. The invasion was stayed, and Italy gradually regained some measure of self-confidence; but the Caporetto disaster cost her the fertile province of Venetia, a quarter of million prisoners, eighteen hundred guns, and an enormous quantity of stores.

On receiving news of the catastrophe Mr. Lloyd George, accompanied by British and French statesmen and soldiers, had hurried to Rapallo to take counsel with King Victor Emmanuel and his advisers; and on his way home he delivered a speech in Paris which revealed the bitterness of his soul. He passionately denounced the lack of unity in the councils of the Allies, and announced that hence-

The
Italian
Débâcle

forth a Supreme War Council sitting at Versailles would co-ordinate their activities. "If there had been real co-ordination of our military efforts we should not now be engaged in averting disaster. I had made up my mind that unless some change were effected I could no longer remain responsible. The disaster may yet save the alliance; for without it I do not believe that even now we should have set up a real Council."¹

Though the British Government refused invitations to discussion or conference with Germany, the prolongation of the war into a fourth winter and the Lord Lansdowne's tense anxieties of the military situation Letter were not without effect; and a growing sentiment found expression in Lord Lansdowne's letter published in the *Daily Telegraph* on November 28. "We are not going to lose this war; but its prolongation will spell ruin for the civilized world. Security will be invaluable to a world which has the vitality to profit by it; but what will be the value of the blessings of peace to nations so exhausted that they can scarcely stretch out a hand with which to grasp them? If the war is to be brought to a close in time to avert a world-wide catastrophe, it will be because on both sides the peoples of the countries involved realize that it has already lasted too long." An immense stimulus would probably be given to the peace party in Germany, he added, if our war-aims were revised. Shortly afterwards General Smuts was dispatched to Switzerland to meet Count Mensdorff and to urge Austria to a separate peace.

In a speech to the Trade Unions on January 5, 1918, the Prime Minister set forth the aims of Great Britain more fully, more authoritatively, and more modestly than they had ever been explained before.² The programme had been submitted to Mr. Asquith and Lord Grey, the leaders of Labour, and representatives of the Dominions.

¹ For the nature and utility of the Supreme War Council see Sir W. Robertson, "From Private to Field-Marshal"; Sir F. Maurice, "Intrigues of the War"; Wright, "The Supreme War Council."

² See Lowes Dickinson, "Documents."

The moderation of tone was in marked contrast to the challenging self-confidence of the Allied reply to President Wilson a year before. The British, began the Prime Minister, were not aiming at the destruction or disruption of Germany, and would not fight merely to alter or destroy the Imperial Constitution; yet military autocracy was a dangerous anachronism. The adoption of a really democratic Constitution would be the most convincing evidence that the old spirit of military domination had died, and would make it easier to conclude a broad, democratic peace. "The first requirement always put forward by the British Government and their Allies has been the complete restoration, political, territorial and economic, of the independence of Belgium, and such reparation as can be made for the devastation of its towns and provinces. Next comes the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of France, Italy and Roumania. We mean to stand by the French democracy to the death in the demand they make for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871." We had no intention of shedding our blood for the Bolsheviks. "We shall be proud to fight to the end side by side with the new democracy of Russia. But if her present rulers take action which is independent of their Allies, we have no means of intervening to arrest the catastrophe which is assuredly befalling their country. Russia can only be saved by her own people. We believe, however, that an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe."

The "reconsideration" of the problem of Alsace-Lorraine suggested something less than the integral restoration of the provinces; and the reference to Austria in like manner revealed the shrinkage of our demands. "The break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war-aims; but genuine self-government must be granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it." In one case, however, complete emancipation

was essential. "We regard as vital the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race and tongue." The declaration on Roumania was studiously vague. "We also mean to press that justice be done to men of Roumanian blood and speech in their legitimate aspirations."

If the reference to Austria defined and limited the ambiguous formula of 1917, the new Turkish policy was a frank recantation. "We are not fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor or Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race." The Straits, however, were to be internationalized and neutralized. Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine were entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions. "What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not be here discussed; but it would be impossible to restore these territories to their former sovereignty." The German colonies would be held at the disposal of a conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants. The governing consideration should be to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European capitalists or governments.

After dealing with territorial problems the Prime Minister turned to other considerations. There must be reparation for injuries done in violation of International Law, such as those to our seamen. In the world shortage of raw materials those countries which controlled them would naturally help themselves and their friends first; but as circumstances changed the settlement would change also. Finally a great attempt must be made to establish by some international organization an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes. Three conditions were essential to permanent peace—the re-establishment of the sanctities of treaties, a territorial settlement based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed, and the creation of some international organ-

ization to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war. "On these conditions the British Empire would welcome peace; to secure these conditions its peoples are prepared to make even greater sacrifices than those they have yet endured."

The change of tone was recognized by the Central Powers. "He no longer indulges in abuse," commented the German Chancellor. "I cannot, how-
ever, go so far as public opinion in many
neutral countries which would read in this

Peace
Talk

speech a serious will to peace and even a friendly disposition. The military situation has never been so favourable. If the leaders of the enemy Powers are really inclined to peace, they should again revise their programme." Peace was impossible without the integrity of the Empire. The forcible incorporation of Belgium had never been in the German programme; but until the Entente accepted the integrity of Germany and her allies he must refuse to remove in advance the Belgian problem from the discussion. Shortly afterwards Czernin announced that Austria would defend the pre-war possessions of her allies as her own.

Three days after the Prime Minister's speech to the Trade Unions, President Wilson outlined a peace settlement in Fourteen Points, which was destined to play an important part in the closing stages of the conflict.¹

1. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at.
2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas alike in peace and war, except as they may be closed by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.
3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers.
4. Adequate guarantees that armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

¹ See "President Wilson's Foreign Policy," ed. by J. B. Scott.

5. An impartial adjustment of all colonial claims on the principle that the interests of the population must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and the independent determination of her own political development and national policy.

7. Belgium must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit her sovereignty.

**The
Fourteen
Points** 8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine should be righted.

9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first opportunity of autonomous development.

11. Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free access to the sea, and the relations of the Balkan States determined along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality.

12. The Turkish frontiers of the Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty; but the other nationalities under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

13. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

14. A general association of nations must be formed for affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

The revision of Allied war-aims, the response of the Central Powers, and the efforts of mediators behind the scenes¹ did not suffice to avert the supreme struggle in the West on which Germany concentrated her hopes after the surrender of Russia, and from which even the sceptical Czernin expected success; and on February 4 the Supreme Council at Versailles issued a statement which brought the discussion to a close. The speeches of Hertling and Czernin, it was declared, offered no basis for peacemaking, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk revealed plans of conquest and spoliation. Consequently the only immediate task was the prosecution of military effort till its pressure should have brought about a change of temper in the enemy Governments and peoples. This blunt declaration was reiterated at the opening of Parliament, when the Prime Minister declared that insistence on the integrity of the possessions of the four Allies made negotiation impossible. A new weapon of offence was now forged by the creation of a department of propaganda under the direction of Lord Northcliffe, which devoted special attention to fostering the discontent of the Slavonic races of the Hapsburg Empire and to the vain endeavour of reconciling their aims with those of Italian Imperialism.²

The grand attack opened on March 21 on the St. Quentin section of the British front held by the Fifth Army, where the line was thinnest and where the connexion of the French and British armies might be broken; and

¹ Armand and Revertera met again in Switzerland; the Bavarian Törring-Jettenbach met the Belgian Minister at Bern, and the King of Denmark asked Germany for her views on peace.

² See Campbell Stuart, "The Secrets of Crewe House," and "The New Europe," March 14 and May 2, 1918. For the aspirations of Austrian Slavs during the war see Benes, "Bohemia's Case for Independence"; Vosnjak, "A Bulwark Against Germany" (the Slovenes); and Voinovitch, "Dalmatia."

when the most formidable offensive of the four years' struggle was checked a fortnight later almost at the gates of Amiens, the Germans claimed 90,000 prisoners and 1,300 guns. It was the greatest defeat in the history of British arms; but it reflected no dishonour on the soldiers or on their commander, General Gough. For the British line had been extended without a corresponding increase in troops, and at the critical moment the Germans enjoyed a numerical superiority of three to one. The Prime Minister instantly appealed to President Wilson to accelerate the flow of American troops, hurried across the Channel 300,000 men who had been unwisely held back in fear of invasion, and raised the military age to 50; but the most urgent task was to secure unity of control on the western front. Clemenceau, who had been called to power in November, 1917, and had revived the drooping spirits of his countrymen by his unconquerable will to victory, was from the outset dissatisfied with the Supreme Council at Versailles, which indeed was of little use, and desired the appointment of Foch as supreme commander.¹ On March 25, at a conference at Pétain's headquarters at Compiègne, Clemenceau urged Lord Milner, the representative of the British War Cabinet, to allow unified command. Next day, at Doullens, the French Premier renewed the appeal, and Haig announced his cordial consent.

On April 9, a day or two after the first offensive died down, Ludendorff struck his second blow. Haig had transferred troops to stem the St. Quentin *débâcle*, and it was against his depleted left wing that the new stroke was directed. Had it succeeded Ludendorff would have won the Channel ports; but he employed only a fraction of the numbers he had used in March, and though the British front was pushed back he had little to show for

¹ See Tardieu, "La Paix," 42-8; Lord Milner's report on the conference at Doullens, *The New Statesman*, April 23, 1921; Dewar and Boraston, "Sir D. Haig's Command"; Mermeix, "Le Commandement unique."

the costly struggle that raged till the end of the month. The worst was now over, so far as the British front was concerned; and the promptitude of the United States in responding to the Prime Minister's appeal restored the spirits of the Allies. **Ludendorff's Second Blow**

120,000 American troops crossed the Atlantic in April, 220,000 in May, and 275,000 in June; and though most of them required further training on French soil, they were brigaded with British and French troops as fast as they were ready for the firing line. A speech of General Smuts on May 17 reflected the undiminished anxiety of the War Cabinet and sounded like an echo of Lord Lansdowne's voice. "When we talk of victory we do not mean marching to the Rhine or Berlin, and we do not mean going on till we have smashed Germany and the German Empire and are able to dictate peace to the enemy in his capital. We shall continue the war till the objects for which we set out are achieved. I do not think that an out-and-out victory is possible any more for any group of nations in this war, because it will mean an interminable campaign. It will mean that decimated nations will be called upon to wage war for many years to come, and the result may be that the civilization we are out to save may be jeopardized itself. We shall not have a peace secured merely by the unaided efforts of armies in this war. We will have to use all our diplomacy and all the forces at our disposal to bring it to a victorious end. I can conceive that you have fought up to a stage when the enemy is prepared to concede your principal terms. But if there is no informal conference, how are you to know?"

After his two resounding blows against the British front Ludendorff turned his attention to the French, and his third offensive was launched on May 27 on the line from Soissons to Rheims. Soissons was captured, and in three days the Germans advanced thirty miles to the Marne near Château-Thierry, where they were held. At this moment, on June 15, Austria launched a final offensive

on the Piave. The river was crossed, but floods broke most of the Austrian bridges, and within a week the

**The Piave
Victory** invaders had recrossed the river, with the loss of over a hundred thousand men.

The victory restored to Italy her self-confidence, and confirmed the apprehensions of far-seeing civilians in Germany, whose eyes were not dazzled by the lustre of Ludendorff's costly triumphs or by the bombardment of Paris by Big Bertha. On June 25, three days after the failure of the Austrian offensive, Kühlmann delivered a speech in the Reichstag in a minor key. The territorial integrity of Germany and her allies, he declared, was the only possible basis of settlement; but he could not say when the war would end. Moltke had observed that the next conflict might be a seven or thirty years' war. "A conclusion by military decision without diplomatic negotiations is improbable. The eye must therefore seek for political factors which might eventually open possibilities of peace." The hint that after all the war might not be won on the battlefield came as a shock to German opinion, for the invincibility of the army was an article of faith; and the Foreign Secretary paid for his frankness by the loss of his post at the peremptory bidding of the army leaders. His crime was not in holding these opinions, but in giving public expression to them; for they were widely shared in the highest quarters. Prince Rupprecht had already informed the Chancellor of his view that the time had come to propose peace discussions, and Hertling had replied that he was on the look out for the right moment.¹

The fourth and final act of the German offensive opened on July 15. "If my offensive at Rheims succeeds," remarked Ludendorff, "we have won the war." "If the German attack at Rheims succeeds," observed Foch on the same memorable day, "we have lost the war." The Marne was crossed between Château-Thierry and Epernay, but the attempt to surround Rheims failed; and on July 18

¹ See Hertling, "Ein Jahr in der Reichskanzlei."

Foch stopped the advance which had begun on March 21, and launched the long-prepared counter-offensive which the addition of American troops—"more than I believed possible," testifies Ludendorff—and the growing exhaustion of the invaders enabled him to undertake, and which was never to stop till the enemy laid down his arms four months later. The western side of the salient, which extended from the Aisne to the Marne, was driven in, the Marne was recrossed, and Soissons was recaptured. Counter-offensives on the Amiens and the Belgian front were equally successful, and on August 8 a combined Franco-British attack recaptured part of the ground which had been lost in the battle of St. Quentin. It was not the defeat itself, which was of no great magnitude, but the loss of *moral* in the fighting on that day—"the black day of the German army"—which convinced Ludendorff that the war could not be won; and he informed the Kaiser and the Chancellor of his opinion at a conference at Spa on August 13.¹ While not advising the conclusion of peace, he approved peace feelers; and the new Foreign Secretary, Hintze, reported that Austria could not hold out throughout the winter. The Kaiser now favoured the eventual communication of German conditions through the Queen of Holland, and Hertling obtained a free hand to act when he thought fit. The victorious advance of the Allies continued; and the American army, under the command of General Pershing, was stationed on the right wing of the Allied line, where it proceeded to drive in the St. Mihiel salient. On August 30 the Austrian Ambassador informed the Chancellor that Austria would take independent action by inviting the belligerents to a conference. The German Government protested, but was soon to follow suit. On September 8 the German army leaders told the Chancellor that they desired peace as

Germany's
"Black
Day"

¹ The political side of the German collapse is narrated in the official "Materialien betreffend die Waffenstillstandsverhandlungen," and in Ludendorff's angry "Entgegnung," which is much fuller than his *Memoirs*.

soon as possible; but Hertling resolved to take no action till the Allied offensive died down, except to ask the Queen of Holland to allow a Peace Conference to meet at The Hague.

The plight of the Central Powers was revealed to the world on September 15 by the publication of an Austrian appeal for verbal discussion. The agreement for closer political and military union with Germany after the war, signed at Spa in May, was conditional on an agreement on Poland, which was never reached; and despite an outspoken protest and warning from the Kaiser, Austria now resumed her liberty of action. "We venture to hope that there will be no objection on the part of any of the belligerents to such an exchange of views. War actions would suffer no interruption. The discussions would only go so far as they were considered by the participants to offer prospects of success. No disadvantages could arise therefrom. Mountains of old misunderstandings might be removed. Streams of pent-up human kindness would be released. The Government therefore proposes to all the belligerents to send delegates to a confidential and non-binding discussion on basic principles in a neutral country." To this appeal, almost supplicating in its terms, President Wilson replied that having already stated his terms he could not accept a conference.

Austria's cry of distress was followed by the collapse of Bulgaria.¹ Since the capture of Monastir in 1916 the

**Bulgaria
Surrenders**

Allies, who formed a continuous front from Valona to Salonika, had made no determined effort; but on September 15 an irresistible offensive began, which in ten days led to the request for an armistice and the abdication of Ferdinand. The sudden collapse of Bulgaria revealed the gravity of the situation to the peoples of the Central Empires more effectively than the slow retreat in the West. The withdrawal of their Balkan ally made the surrender

¹ The Bulgarian army, people and Government had lost heart in the struggle. See Nowak, "Der Sturz der Mittelmächte," ch. 5.

of Turkey inevitable, and the triumph of Serbia encouraged the Yugoslav provinces of Austria to throw off the Hapsburg yoke. The Germanophil Ministry of Marghiloman at Bucharest was overthrown, and Roumania prepared to re-enter the war. At the same moment that the Bulgarian line was broken in Macedonia, Allenby resumed the victorious advance which had halted at Jerusalem at the end of 1917.¹ Aided by a few French battalions and by Arab levies on the east of the Jordan, the British troops broke the Turkish armies in northern Palestine and entered Damascus on September 30. The advance continued at lightning speed, and by the end of October Aleppo was occupied and Syria lay at the feet of the conqueror. At the same time the Turkish army in northern Mesopotamia was defeated and surrendered. Talaat and Enver had already fallen, and on October 31, a month after the collapse of Bulgaria, an armistice was signed with Turkey which opened the Straits to the Allies.

Turkey
Surrenders

On September 30, after a defeat between Cambrai and St. Quentin and the loss of the Hindenburg line, Ludendorff announced that Hindenburg and himself were convinced that hostilities must end. Hertling declined to accept the broad-bottom Ministry which the situation demanded, and resigned. While the Kaiser and the Chancellor were closeted together at Spa on October 1, Ludendorff entered and asked excitedly, "Is not the new Government formed?" "I cannot work miracles," replied the Kaiser. "It must be formed at once," rejoined the General, "for the request for peace must go to-day." On October 4 Prince Max of Baden was appointed Chancellor, and on October 5 the German Government requested President Wilson to take in hand the restoration of peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points, and to invite all belligerent States to appoint plenipotentiaries. The position and policy of the new Government were explained

¹ Allenby's triumphant advance is vividly described in Massey's "How Jerusalem was Won," and "Allenby's Final Triumph."

by the Chancellor to the Reichstag. The Ministry contained representatives of Labour, and could therefore speak for the nation. It accepted the Reichstag resolution of July, 1917, a League of Nations, and the complete restoration of Belgium. The Balkan Provinces, Poland and Lithuania should determine their own fate. He had sent a note to Washington, with the assent of all the authorized persons in the Empire and all his allies. "I have taken this step not only for the salvation of Germany and her allies, but also for that of the whole of humanity, and because the thoughts regarding the future well-being of the nations proclaimed by Mr. Wilson are in accord with those of the new German Government and the overwhelming majority of our people."

For the next month the telegraph wires between Washington and Berlin were working at high pressure.

On October 8 Wilson asked for a reply to three questions before he could answer the German Note. Did the Chancellor accept the terms laid down on January 8 and in subsequent addresses? Secondly, would the Central Powers immediately withdraw their forces from invaded territory? Thirdly, did the Chancellor speak merely for the authorities of the Empire who had so far conducted the war? The discussion, answered Dr. Solf, would only be confined to the practical details of the application of the Fourteen Points; Germany and Austria agreed to evacuation, and proposed a mixed commission to arrange details; and finally the Chancellor, supported in all his actions by the will of the majority of the Reichstag, spoke in the name of the German Government and the German people. The President rejoined that the evacuation and the conditions of an armistice must be determined by the Allies, and must guarantee their present military supremacy; that an armistice could not be considered while illegal and inhuman practices, such as the sinking of passenger ships, continued; and, thirdly, that the destruction or reduction to virtual impotency of the

**Wilson's
Inquiries**

arbitrary Power which had hitherto controlled the German nation should be achieved. "It is indispensable that the Allies should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing." The German reply referred the settlement of the details of evacuation to the military advisers, protested against the charge of illegal and inhuman practices, announced that the torpedoing of passenger ships had now been forbidden, and argued that the Constitution of the Empire had been fundamentally altered, and that the offers of peace came from a Government free from any arbitrary and irresponsible influence.

The President, satisfied at last with the results of his searching catechism, replied that he had transmitted the correspondence to his Allies, with the suggestion that they should draft conditions of an armistice. Germany's acceptance

Wilson
Advises
Armistice

of such an armistice would be the best evidence of her acceptance of the terms and principles of peace. Extraordinary safeguards were needed, for there was no guarantee of permanence in the recent constitutional changes. "The heart of the present difficulty has not been reached. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities in the popular will, that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired, that the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany. The nations of the world do not and cannot trust their words, and the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now or later, it must demand not peace negotiations but surrender." The German Government briefly replied that the peace negotiations would be conducted by a People's Government to which the Military Power would be subordinate, and that it awaited proposals for an armistice.

While the Allies were considering their reply, the Hapsburg monarchy passed out of the war and broke into fragments.¹ On October 7 the Government proposed an armistice and negotiations on the basis of the Fourteen Points, and on October 16 the Emperor transformed Austria into a federal state. The President replied that certain events had occurred since January 8. He had then asked only for autonomy for the peoples of Austria; but the United States had subsequently recognized the Czechoslovak National Council as a *de facto* belligerent Government and had also recognized the justice of the aspirations of the Jugoslavs. "He is therefore no longer at liberty to accept a mere autonomy of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action will satisfy their aspirations as members of the family of nations." The aspirations of the nationalities were clearly manifested by successive proclamations of independence in the provincial capitals; and the dying Empire received its *coup de grâce* when on October 23 an Italian offensive shattered the Piave front and the troops surrendered in thousands or fled in disorder. On October 27 the pacifist Professor Lammasch was invited to form a Ministry; and on the same day Austria accepted the President's condition that the nationalities should determine their own future, and declared her readiness, "without awaiting the result of other negotiations," to enter into *pourparlers* regarding peace and an immediate armistice. The terms of the latter were accordingly drawn up by the War Council at Paris and accepted on November 3. On November 11 Karl renounced further share in the Government, on November 12 a Republic was proclaimed in Vienna, and on November 16 Hungary followed suit. The Hapsburg Empire, which had been a Great Power

¹ Vivid accounts of the dying convulsions of a great Empire are given by Count Julius Andrássy, "Diplomacy and the War"; Prince Windischgrätz, "My Memoirs"; and Nowak, "Der Sturz der Mittelmächte."

since 1526, was not only defeated but had ceased to exist.

Germany now stood alone, and the end could not be far off. Ludendorff had changed his mind and clamoured for a *levée en masse*; but it was too late, and his resignation was announced on October 27. The retreat in France and Belgium continued at a rapid rate, and on November 4 Haig struck a decisive blow on the Sambre. On the following day President Wilson communicated the memorandum in which the victors announced the conditions on which they were prepared to treat for peace. "The Allies have given careful consideration to the correspondence. Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's Address of January 8, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses. They must point out that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference. Further, the President declared on January 8 that the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, and the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understood that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air." The President added that he was in agreement with this interpretation, and that Marshal Foch had been authorized to receive representatives of the German Government and to communicate the terms of an armistice.

Foch had already convoked a meeting of the Allied Commanders at Senlis¹ to discuss what conditions would

¹ Tardieu, "La Paix," 66-79.

prevent Germany recommencing the struggle and would allow the Allies to dictate the peace. Haig, who spoke first, urged moderation, since the Allied forces were out of breath and the German army still unbroken. Pétain and Pershing, on the other hand, demanded harder terms. Foch, after reflecting on the debate, drew up an outline which was approved by the Supreme Council, and communicated to Germany on November 8. The terms included evacuation of all conquered territories, withdrawal beyond the Rhine, the establishment of a neutral zone on the right bank, the cancelling of the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, the repatriation of prisoners, the surrender of guns, aeroplanes, rolling-stock, and, last but not least, the transfer of the fleet. The programme was handed by Foch on November 8 to the delegation, headed by Erzberger, which had been conducted through the Allied lines; and there could be no question of its rejection. The inexorable advance continued, and "the home front" in Germany had been broken by revolution.¹ On October 28 a naval mutiny had broken out at Kiel on the issue of orders to sail, which the mutineers interpreted as a signal for battle. On November 4 a Workers' Council on the Russian model was chosen, and on November 5 Kiel was in their hands. A tidal wave swept over the country, and every throne was submerged in the raging waters. A Republic was proclaimed in Berlin with the Socialist Ebert as President and the Socialist Scheidemann as Chancellor, and on November 9 the Kaiser abdicated and fled to Holland. The Armistice was accepted by the new Government, and at 11 A.M. on November 11, 1918, the struggle in which ten million men had laid down their lives suddenly ceased.²

¹ See the Kaiser's "Memoirs," ch. 12; Bernstein, "Die Deutsche Revolution"; Noske, "Von Kiel bis Kapp"; George Young, "The New Germany."

² See the official "Materialien betreffend die Waffenstillstandsverhandlungen," and Erzberger, "Erlebnisse im Weltkriege."

CHAPTER XIX

THE SETTLEMENT

WHEN the roar of battle had ceased King George, King Albert and King Victor Emmanuel visited Paris to congratulate her on the great deliverance.¹

Two courses were open to the victors. After the
Battle
The first was to frame preliminaries of peace at the earliest moment, after which the blockade could be raised, prisoners repatriated, and the wheels of industry restarted. Subject to two reservations the Allied Note of November 5 had granted the request for a peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points; and a skeleton settlement on these lines would have been promptly accepted by the new German Government, whose attention was fully occupied with the task of founding the Republic and combating the Spartacists. The other course was to postpone the discussion till representatives of every unit of the Grand Alliance could arrive from the uttermost parts of the world, and then to deal with the problems arising out of the conflict as a whole. The latter was chosen, and in theory there was much to be said for it; but it involved an incalculable addition to the sum of human suffering, economic

¹ See "History of the Peace Conference at Paris," ed. by H. Temperley, five vols. (to be completed in six); Tardieu, "La Paix"; "What Really Happened at Paris," ed. by Colonel House and C. Seymour; "Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate," 1919; Lansing, "The Peace Negotiations"; Haskins and Lord, "Some Problems of the Peace Conference"; Hanotaux, "Le Traité de Versailles"; Barthou, "Le Traité de Paix." Dillon, "The Peace Conference"; Wilson Harris, "The Peace in the Making"; Huddleston, "Peace-Making at Paris"; and Bartlett, "Behind the Scenes at the Peace Conference," describe the Conference as it appeared to journalists. Rothbart, "Die Grossen Vier am Werk," summarizes the Conference from a German point of view.

disintegration and political embitterment by the prolongation of the blockade at the bidding of France.

The evils inherent in the postponement of the Conference were increased by the decision of Mr. Lloyd George to dissolve Parliament. The Coalition Ministry, he cogently argued, had never been ratified by the people and required a mandate for the tasks of peace; the Parliament had sat since 1910; and a far-reaching reform of the franchise, including woman suffrage and the redistribution of seats, had been achieved. But in seeking authority to represent the country in the councils of the Allies, he increased his difficulties by promises hastily made and impossible of fulfilment. The joint appeal to the electors by the Prime Minister and Mr. Bonar Law was couched in moderate language, and asked for a continuation of the Coalition till the world had settled down. But public opinion, strung up to a pitch of passionate excitement and indignation by the horrors of the conflict, was in no mood to sign a blank cheque, and insisted on a concrete and vindictive programme. When the electoral campaign was already in full swing Mr. Lloyd George, against his better judgment, proceeded to shout with the largest crowd. Apart from glittering forecasts of an England fit for heroes, the main planks of his platform were the punishment of war criminals and the recovery of the cost of the war. Mr. Barnes, the representative of Labour in the War Cabinet, loudly urged the hanging of the Kaiser, and another Minister, Sir Eric Geddes, exhorted his countrymen to squeeze Germany till they could hear the pips squeak. The constituencies endorsed the leadership of Mr. Lloyd George by an unexampled tribute of gratitude and confidence. Mr. Asquith and his friends were smitten hip and thigh, and the new Parliament was filled with unknown men determined to keep the Prime Minister to the pledges by which he had purchased a dictatorship unknown in modern English history.

A widely different gospel was being preached at the

same moment by President Wilson, who, contrary to the advice of his Secretary of State, resolved to represent his countrymen at the Peace Conference, and crossed the Atlantic in the middle of December in order to study the situation before the deliberations began. Belligerents and neutrals alike had read his lofty declarations on the aims of the conflict and the rebuilding of a peaceful world, and he was hailed by liberal Europe as a new Messiah. Vast crowds surged round the man of destiny in France, England and Italy, and men hung on his lips as he expounded with moving eloquence the principles of a lasting settlement and the ideal of a League of Nations co-operating in the fruitful processes of peace. For a brief moment it seemed as if the President, representing as he did a mighty, unexhausted and disinterested nation, might calm the raging passions and bend the statesmen of the Old World to his will.

Historians will continue for generations to discuss whether a "Wilson peace" was possible in 1919; but the chances of its realization were diminished by the selection of Paris as the seat of the Conference. Geneva was considered and rejected; for the claims of France and the conveniences of a great city carried the day. Bombed and bombarded without respite for many months, twice threatened with capture, and almost within sight of the devastated area, the atmosphere of the French capital and the language of the French Press suggested to visitors the disquieting phenomena of shell-shock. Hot with anger and bleeding from a thousand wounds, France sought support for her demands in her sufferings no less than in her achievements, while her geographical position and long traditions of conflict enabled her to argue with some plausibility that she understood the ways of the Boche better than any of her guests. A second and more concrete obstacle to a Wilson peace was the fact that Great Britain, France and Italy were bound by secret agreements into which they had entered, willingly or unwillingly, during the desperate

struggle. It was, indeed, argued by the President that the acceptance of the Fourteen Points abrogated all previous arrangements which conflicted with them; but he failed to convince his Allies, and the result was a protracted struggle and a damaging compromise.

By the middle of January, 1919, the 70 authorized delegates of the 27 States comprising the Grand Alliance had assembled in Paris. The British Plenipotentiaries were Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Bonar Law and Mr. Barnes, while the Dominions were separately represented by their own leading statesmen, General Botha and General Smuts, Sir Robert Borden and Mr. Hughes.

**Mr. Lloyd
George**

From the outset, however, the Prime Minister, whose prestige was at its height, pursued his own path. No plenipotentiary ever approached the task of rebuilding a ruined world with a more slender equipment of detailed knowledge; but he learned quickly, and he brought a fresh mind to the bewildering array of problems which confronted the peacemakers. Mr. Keynes has described his "unerring, almost medium-like sensibility to everyone round him," and credits him with "six or seven senses not available to ordinary men, judging character, motive and subconscious impulse, perceiving what each was thinking and even what each was going to say next, and compounding with telepathic instinct the argument or appeal best suited to the vanity, weakness or self-interest of his immediate auditor." A very similar portrait has been drawn by Mr. Lansing.¹ "His course was erratic. He possessed a wonderfully alert mind which fairly bubbled over with restless energy. He made decisions rapidly and with little regard for details or fundamental principles. If he fell into error through incomplete knowledge or wrong deductions, he picked himself up with a laugh or a witticism and went ahead as if nothing had happened. He had the quickest mind of the Big Four, but it seemed to lack stability. Vivacious, good-tempered,

¹ "The Big Four."

and possessing a strong sense of humour, he was socially an attractive person. It was simply impossible not to like him. In debate his cleverness in finding the weak spots in an opponent's armour and his utter indifference to his own errors made him a dangerous antagonist. But this unusual man possessed none of the arts of diplomacy. His successes at Paris—and they were not a few—were largely due to the excellent advice which was given him, and which he wisely received."

The British delegation entered on its arduous task without a detailed programme, but with a few guiding principles. Germany, it was agreed, must be rendered incapable of renewed offence **The British Programme** by land or sea, must sacrifice her colonies, pay for the war up to the measure of her ability, and surrender her war criminals for trial; but the terms imposed must be of a character which the German Government would be willing to sign, since, if it were to fall, it was feared that Central Europe might stagger into Bolshevism. With the unfortunate exception of Mr. Hughes, the British Empire delegation stood for a relatively moderate settlement. Mr. Lloyd George, however, was in no position to dictate to his Allies; for, in addition to being bound by a series of written engagements, he was compelled to consider the views and interests of France.

Clemenceau possessed a prestige and authority in no wise inferior to that enjoyed by his British colleague. Throughout the agonizing months of the great offensive of 1918 the indomitable old Tiger had kept alight the vestal flame of hope and resolution, and Père la Victoire was rewarded by the unbounded confidence of his countrymen. His strength was increased by the limitation and concentration of his aims. His business was not to set the world straight, but to undo the work of 1871 and to safeguard the frontiers of France. "He felt about France," writes Mr. Keynes, "what Pericles felt of Athens—unique value in her, nothing else mattering; but his theory of

politics was Bismarck's. He had one illusion—France; and one disillusion—mankind, including Frenchmen, and his colleagues not least. He believed that you must never negotiate with a German or conciliate him; you must dictate to him. On no other terms will he respect you, or will you prevent him from cheating you.

Clemenceau But it is doubtful how far he thought these characteristics peculiar to Germany.

Prudence required some measure of lip-service to 'ideals' of foolish Americans or hypocritical Englishmen; but it would be stupid to believe that there is much room in the world for such affairs as the League of Nations." Holding such views, it was not surprising that he should complain that President Wilson talked like Jesus Christ. "He dominated the Peace Conference," testifies Mr. Lansing. "He possessed the essential qualities of great leadership. He knew when to be defiant and when to placate. He was cynical of the real value of the idealism which had been so widely applauded, and which many of the delegates supported with enthusiasm so long as it did not interfere with the material interests of their countries. He succeeded in nearly everything he undertook." "He stands out as the clearest-cut figure of them all," adds Colonel House. "No mystery surrounds him. He fought in peace as he fought in war, openly, intelligently, courageously, for his beloved France. He inspired the affection of many, the admiration of all. He stood frankly for the old order, accepting the League of Nations as an addition to, not as a substitute for, material guarantees. He was utterly convinced that Germany understood nothing but force, and made no pretence to be bound by the Fourteen Points." The masterful Premier kept the scarcely less masterful President in the background; and even his trusted Foreign Minister, Pichon, was allowed no initiative. His closest friend and adviser was Tardieu, whose wide knowledge of foreign affairs, ready pen, tireless industry and personal devotion lightened the burden and earned the gratitude of his chief.

The portrait of President Wilson has given the artists more trouble; but there is no difference of opinion as to the lofty position which he occupied at the opening of the Conference or as to his passionate eagerness to create a better world.

**President
Wilson's
Efforts**

"When he stood at the peak of his influence and power," writes his *alter ego*, Colonel House, "there was never a more commanding figure, for he was then the spokesman of the moral and spiritual forces of the world. His work at Paris was tireless and unselfish." "He was there to make a Fourteen Points peace," echoes Mr. Wilson Harris, the fairest of judges, "and he did his best to make it. He failed in part, but not for want of trying. All through, except during the revision, when Mr. Lloyd George suddenly took the field as an apostle of moderation, he was the one force of the four making consistently for a clean peace. He had to choose between accepting a bad settlement and leaving the Conference to become even worse. He sacrificed more than he realized, but he believed that the League would right the wrongs." "No one who really saw the President in action," testifies Mr. Stannard Baker, "fired at in front, sniped at from behind, will for a moment belittle the immensity of his task or underrate his extraordinary endurance, energy and courage. He worked longer hours, had more appointments, granted himself less recreation, than any other man, high or low, at the Peace Conference."¹ Mr. Lansing himself bears witness to the general feeling among the delegates that his chief stood for international morality and justice. It is in regard to his abilities and his methods that the doctors disagree. "He was not a hero or a prophet," writes Mr. Keynes, "nor even a philosopher, but a generously intentioned man with many of the weaknesses of other human beings, and lacking that dominating intellectual equipment necessary to cope with the subtle and dangerous spellbinders whom a tremendous clash of

¹ "What Wilson did at Paris"; cf. Thompson, "The Peace Conference Day by Day." These two books are the best record of the President's activities.

forces and personalities had brought to the top as triumphant masters in the swift game of give and take, face to face in council. He had thought out nothing. When it came to practice his ideas were nebulous and incomplete. He had no plan, no scheme, no constructive ideas whatever for clothing with the flesh of life the commandments which he had thundered from the White House. He was like a Nonconformist Minister. His thought and temperament were essentially theological, not intellectual." Mr. Lansing rates the abilities of his chief far higher; but he too regrets the lack of detailed preparation for his task and the disinclination to seek counsel from his official advisers. Despite the perfect friendship of Colonel House, the President was politically the loneliest man in Paris.

The Italian Premier, Orlando, possessed neither the authority nor the ability of the Big Three, and he was
**Orlando
and
Sonnino** treated by Clemenceau with less consideration than his British and American colleagues. An ex-professor of law, a man of wide culture and a master of logical statement, he played a secondary rôle in the drama, deliberately confining himself to the questions in which his country was directly interested. He was, moreover, dominated by his masterful colleague Sonnino, the most stubborn and incorruptible of Italian statesmen, who, having seen the Austrian Empire dissolve into fragments, was determined to control the Adriatic and cared nothing for the scowls of new-born Jugoslavia. Saionji and Makino, the representatives of the fifth of the Great Powers, took an even smaller part in the resettlement of Europe. Japan's share in the conflict had been one of limited liability, and she came to the council table with the single definite aim of securing Shantung. "They would sit through a discussion never speaking a word," writes Mr. Wilson Harris, "faces set like masks, a riddle unreadable, challenging by their very reticence. What lay behind it all? What did they really think of the Conference?"

Among the representatives of the minor Powers the first place was unquestionably held by Venezelos, whose eloquence and charm added to the influence commanded by his romantic career and conspicuous services to the Allied cause.

Venezelos,
Bratiano,
Pasitch

The Greek Premier had played for high stakes, and he came to Paris to claim his reward. "What he asked," testifies Mr. Lansing, "was granted because he asked it." The claims of Roumania were less persuasively urged by her Premier, Bratiano, who took little trouble to conciliate friends and who came into open conflict with the Great Powers when Roumanian troops marched into Budapest. Serbia was represented by Pasitch, her Grand Old Man, who had lived to see the fulfilment of his dream of a Yugoslav kingdom rising from the ashes of the Hapsburg Empire. The Adriatic provinces which had thrown off the rule of Vienna found a spokesman in Trumbitch, the respected Mayor of Spalato, and the new Czecho-Slovak Republic in its Premier, Dr. Kramarz, once the leader of the Young Czechs in the Austrian Reichsrath, and Benes, its Foreign Minister, the pupil and colleague of the venerable Masaryk. Poland possessed a picturesque interpreter in her first Premier, Paderewski, whom Mr. Lansing, after close observation both in Washington and Paris, deliberately pronounces to be greater as a statesman than as a musician. Belgium was represented by her Foreign Minister, Hymans, and on one critical occasion King Albert hastened to Paris to his support. The most arresting figure on the crowded stage was the Emir Feisul, the martial son of the King of the Hedjaz, who came to plead for an Arab kingdom stretching north from Mecca to the Taurus mountains and east to the Euphrates. In every case the delegations were accompanied by experts, secretaries and typewriters.

In addition to the recognized partners in the Grand Alliance, uninvited and in some cases unwelcome guests from all parts of the world—Armenians, Syrians, Georgians, Ruthenes, Esthonians, Lithuanians, Letts,

Finns, Albanians, Persians, Egyptians, Koreans, Zionists, Schleswigers, Aaland Islanders, Irish-Americans—descended on Paris like a swarm of bees, in the hope of securing a hearing or at any rate of arousing interest in the aims of their respective nationalities. Never had Europe witnessed such a gathering of rulers and rivals, of realists bent on material gains and of idealists striving for a happier world. To those who watched with disappointment and even indignation the performances of the Ten and the Four, it was some consolation

Mr. Hoover to remember that Mr. Hoover, the most silent of men, was quietly at work in his office. "The Director-General of Allied Relief personified the one great humane influence at Paris. He and the men he gathered round him were keeping dying children from death, and lifting a corner at least of the cloud of misery and suffering that weighed upon Europe. In some elusive, intangible way the knowledge of the work he was doing shot like a purifying ray through the fog that enveloped the endeavours and the impotence of the Congress."¹

The first task was to discuss the number of representatives to which each State was entitled. But the decision was of little practical importance, since the five great Powers—the British Empire, France, Italy, the United States and Japan—allowed the minor Allies to do little more than present their case. On January 18 the first plenary session was opened by the President of the Republic, who urged his hearers to "seek nothing but justice," to apply the principle of national self-determination, and to establish a League of Nations as a supreme guarantee against fresh assaults on the rights of peoples. Clemenceau was then chosen President of the Conference. Five more plenary sessions followed, but they merely registered decisions already reached. Clemenceau, records Mr. Lansing, was utterly ruthless in carrying through the programme agreed upon by the Council of Ten, consist-

¹ Wilson Harris, "The Peace in the Making."

ing of the Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries of the five Great Powers. "His caustic sentences, his fluency of speech, increasing in vehemence as he proceeded, and his real or assumed passion, simply overwhelmed protests and resistance. A plenary session was a farce." The Ten were the Supreme War Council under another name, and they met twice daily, summoning expert advisers as they were needed, till the middle of February, when the three principal actors withdrew for a brief period. Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson returned to London and Washington respectively to deal with domestic politics, and Clemenceau was wounded on February 19. The main result of these preliminary deliberations was to discover the extent of the difference between the French and the Anglo-American attitude towards the maintenance of the blockade, the treatment of Russia, and the territorial redistribution of Europe. On the other hand, expert Commissions and Committees on special political and economic problems had been appointed; and the Supreme Economic Council, guided by Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. Hoover, gallantly laboured to combat starvation throughout Europe.

Council
of Ten

The most distracting problem of the opening weeks of the Conference was Russia, not only on account of its inherent difficulty but owing to the divergent aims and sympathies of the victors. Contrary to expectation, the Bolsheviks had maintained their position for more than a year; but they were surrounded by enemies, domestic and foreign. In the north one British force supported an anti-Bolshevist government at Archangel, and another was stationed at Murmansk. The emancipated nationalities—Finns, Estonians, Lithuanians, Poles, Ukrainians—were in more or less open hostility to Moscow. In the south the counter-revolutionary General Denikin, supported by the Allies in the Black Sea, was pushing northwards up the rivers, while Admiral Koltchak, ready to spring, was hovering on the Siberian railway behind the Urals. The

Bolshevists were generally regarded as traitors and outlaws; but the Allies were not officially at war with Russia. When the statesmen met at Paris in January the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime by the combined resources of the victors was urged by France; but neither Great Britain nor the United States could promise troops, and France was unable to provide the 350,000 picked men which Foch believed the enterprise to require.

The obvious alternative, strongly urged by President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George, was to negotiate with the various Governments which collectively represented the old Russian Empire. The British Premier suggested the summoning of delegates to Paris; but, since Clemenceau objected to the contamination of his capital, three representatives of "every organized group now exercising or attempting to exercise political authority or military control" were invited to the island of Prinkipo, in the Sea of Marmora, where they were to meet representatives of the Allies, provided that a general truce was proclaimed and observed. The invitation was rejected with indignation by the counter-revolutionary Governments; but the Bolshevists, though never officially informed of the plan, replied that they were ready for an agreement with the Entente Powers if they would undertake not to interfere in Russian internal affairs, and would confer with them or with other Russian political groups. They added that they were ready to acknowledge Russia's debts to the subjects of the Allied Powers. The opening of the Prinkipo Conference was fixed for February 15, Allied representatives were tentatively selected, and the Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians and Ukrainians, after some delay, accepted the invitation. But as Denikin and Koltchak had contemptuously rejected the proposal for a truce and a conference, the civil war continued and no further action was taken.

The repugnance of France to any dealings with the Bolshevists was notorious, and her relief at the failure of

the Prinkipo plan was unconcealed; but the British and Americans, recognizing the danger of a policy of drift, were eager for a settlement. Litvinoff had written to profess his earnest desire for a settlement; and, at the instigation of Colonel House and with the approval of the British Delegation, Mr. Bullitt, a member of the American Delegation, was sent to **Bullitt and Nansen** Moscow, and brought back a written statement of Lenin's peace terms, which included an armistice, a conference, the raising of the blockade, the restoration of political and commercial relations, and an amnesty for all political offenders. All Governments of the former Empire were to acknowledge their financial obligations, while the gold seized by the Czechs in Kazan and confiscated by the Allies elsewhere was to go to the payment of the debt. Allied and foreign troops were to be recalled, and all support of anti-Soviet Governments was to cease. On his return at the end of March Mr. Bullitt sent his report to the President, who was too busy to give it his full attention; but Mr. Lloyd George invited him to breakfast and discussed the situation. The news of the mission now began to leak out, and the Press comment both in Paris and London was hostile. In the middle of April the Prime Minister paid a flying visit to St. Stephen's, where he was confronted with a question about the Bullitt mission. "We have had no approaches of any sort or kind," he replied. "There was some suggestion that there was some young American who had come back. All I can say is that it is not for me to judge the value of these communications. If the President had attached any value to them he would have brought them before the Conference." The Prime Minister had been frightened; and this disingenuous utterance, which surprised no one more than Mr. Bullitt himself, ended the chance of direct negotiations. The only positive result of the mission was a proposal by Dr. Nansen, at the suggestion of Mr. Hoover, for the supply of food to Russia. Nearly a fortnight elapsed before his plan was approved by the four—

in the case of Clemenceau very grudgingly. The offer was gratefully accepted by the Bolsheviks, who unwisely added that the cessation of hostilities must at the same time be discussed with the Allies. This attempt to enter on a political discussion offered a loophole of escape. The project lapsed, and Dr. Nansen withdrew in disgust. The Allies now swung over to the active support of the royalists, as the *émigrés* had urged. No chapter in the story of the Peace Conference reflects graver discredit on the vacillation of Mr. Lloyd George and the unbending rigour of official France.

The second act of the Conference drama opened with the return of the protagonists to Paris early in March. Precedence was now given to the German Treaty; but so little progress was made that Mr. Lloyd George wisely suggested the reduction of the Council of
 Council of
 Four Ten to a Council of Four, the Foreign
 Ministers continuing to sit as a Court of Appeal on secondary questions. The new arrangement came into force on March 25, and the issues were threshed out between the four, who met twice a day at each other's houses or at the Ministry of War. Since Clemenceau spoke English fluently, most of the discussions took place in that language; but Professor Mantoux, the accomplished interpreter inherited from the Supreme War Council, was at hand to assist the Italian Premier, and the indispensable Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the British War Cabinet, informally recorded the decisions.¹ The new plan worked well, and during the next six weeks, which have been called the heroic period of the Conference, the settlement with Germany was mapped out in detail.

"The tone was conversational," writes Tardieu, "no pose, no show. Orlando spoke little. It was a dialogue of three—an astonishing contrast of natures the most opposite one could meet or conceive. The dialogue was at times tragic in its grave simplicity; at other times

¹ See Sir M. Hankey, "Diplomacy by Conference."

almost gay; always sincere and direct. That one duped the other is legend. From beginning to end they discussed with a profound desire to agree. Wilson argued like an academician who criticizes a thesis, sitting upright in his arm-chair, developing his ideas with the clarity of a didactic logician. Lloyd George discussed like a sharp-shooter, with sudden cordialities and equally sudden explosions, his knees in his hands, armed with a prodigious indifference to technical arguments, drawn instinctively towards unexpected courses, dazzling in verve and inventiveness, responsive only to the great permanent reasons of solidarity and justice, in constant apprehension of Parliamentary repercussions. Clemenceau's dialectic, instead of being built on syllogisms like Wilson's, or exploding like that of Lloyd George, proceeded by massive affirmations, often animated by fascinated emotion."

The greatest constructive achievement of the Peace Conference presented the fewest difficulties. A League of Nations was one of the Fourteen Points, and President Wilson was determined that it should be created at the earliest moment and embodied in the treaties of peace. Soon after the outbreak of war in 1914 Mr. Asquith had spoken of "a real European partnership"; and groups of men in Great Britain and America, among them Lord Bryce and Mr. Taft, had begun to draw up schemes for keeping the peace. The conception of an association of nations dates from the Middle Ages, and the schemes of Henri IV and the Tsar Alexander I, of Penn, St. Pierre and Kant, began to be studied with a new and living interest. In 1916 President Wilson called the attention of the world to the ideal in a series of lofty pronouncements, and in 1917 a committee under the chairmanship of Lord Phillimore was appointed by the British Government at the instance of Lord Robert Cecil. The plan of the committee was sent to Washington in the summer of 1918; and at the close of the struggle General Smuts propounded a

League
Projects

scheme which the President and Colonel House carefully collated with the Phillimore draft. Both France and Italy submitted statements of general principles, and the veteran statesman Bourgeois, who had represented France at The Hague Conferences, devoted his whole energies to the task. Neither Clemenceau nor Pichon, however, professed any belief in a League, and its fortunes depended on the power of its Anglo-Saxon sponsors to overcome the indifference of their allies.

At the second plenary session on January 25, on the motion of President Wilson, it was decided that a League should be established to promote international co-operation, to ensure the fulfilment of international obligations, and to provide safeguards against war; that it should form an integral part of the Treaty of Peace; that it should be open to every civilized nation which could be relied on to promote its objects; that its members should meet periodically and should have a permanent organization and secretariat; and that a committee should be appointed to work out the details of its constitution and functions. The committee included Colonel House, Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts, Bourgeois and Venezelos. The President himself was chairman, and though he could rarely attend he kept in close touch with its members. On

**The
Covenant
Framed**

February 14 the Covenant was laid before the third plenary session, and on April 28, at the fifth, the President explained the trifling changes made in the draft. To meet the critics in the United States it was agreed that the Monroe Doctrine should not be affected. After an unsuccessful fight on the Commission, Japan moved for the equality of nationals of all members of the League; but in face of the opposition to a principle which neither the United States nor Australia could accept she withdrew the demand. Bourgeois once more appealed in vain for a League Inspectorate to control the reduction of armaments, and for a Naval and Military General Staff. The Covenant, thus amended, was accepted; and though the

League only came formally into existence in January, 1920, the most hopeful and ambitious experiment in the story of human organization dates from an April day in 1919. Belgium, Brazil, Greece and Spain were added to the five Great Powers who were *ex-officio* members of the Council, and Sir Eric Drummond was chosen as the first Secretary-General. The desire of British and American members of the committee forthwith to admit the enemy Powers to the League was frustrated by the opposition of France and Belgium.

The High Contracting Parties, in the words of the preamble, agreed to the Covenant "in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security," and their duties were set forth in twenty-six articles.

The
Members

The original members were the partners in the Grand Alliance, and thirteen neutrals who were invited to join at once. Other States might enter with the approval of two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that they gave effective guarantees of their sincere intention to observe their international obligations. Any member might withdraw after two years' notice. The organs of the League were to be an Assembly, a Council and a Secretariat. The Assembly was to meet at stated intervals, and each member might have three representatives, but only one vote. The Council was to consist of permanent and elected representatives, the former drawn from the Great Powers, the latter selected by the Assembly. The Secretariat was to be established at Geneva, the first seat of the League.

Having thus defined the structure of the new organization, the document proceeds to explain the obligations of membership. The council was to formulate plans for the reduction of armaments and to suggest means for preventing the evils involved in the private manufacture of munitions and implements of war. Members were to exchange full information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes. Articles

10-17, which form the heart of the Covenant, deal directly with the prevention of war. "The members of the League," runs Article 10, "undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League." Any war or threat of war, whether directly affecting a member or not, was declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and at the request of any member a meeting of the Council should be summoned. Every member possessed the right of calling the attention of the Assembly or the Council to any circumstance threatening the peace. Members were to submit dangerous disputes to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and were in no case to resort to war until three months after the arbiter's report. A Permanent Court of International Justice was to be established, with power to determine any international dispute and to give an advisory opinion on any question referred to it by the Council or Assembly. Dangerous disputes not submitted to arbitration were to be referred to the Council, and if the efforts of the Council failed, the facts and the recommendations were to be published. Members were not to go to war with the party to the dispute which accepted the suggestions of the Council. Any member resorting to war in disregard of its covenants was deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members, who would immediately sever all commercial, financial and personal relations with the offenders, and the Council would recommend what force each member should supply. In the event of a dispute between a member of the League and a non-member, or between two or more non-members, the League should offer its services; and if the invitation were rejected and a member of the League were attacked, the others would come to its aid.

The closing articles add a number of directions less directly concerned with the prevention of war. Every new treaty or international engagement was to be forth-

with registered with the Secretariat and published by it, and no such pact was to be binding till thus registered. The Assembly might advise the reconsideration of treaties which had become inapplicable. In accordance with a suggestion by General Smuts, conquered territories inhabited by backward peoples were to be entrusted to advanced peoples under mandates drawn up by the League, to which the mandatory should render an annual report. Members further pledged themselves to co-operate in the improvement of labour conditions, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering, and in combating the white slave traffic, the trade in opium, and other dangers to civilization.

The Mandates

President Wilson's place in history will be determined by the success or the failure of the Covenant; and we are already in a position to estimate the value of his achievement more accurately than was possible in the turmoil of 1919. "So many vested interests were challenged by the League," writes a semi-official observer,¹ "and so many new forces had been liberated in Europe which were antagonistic to it, that unless it had been made part of the peace it might have been postponed for a generation. Even more important was the fact that the Treaties themselves were made to centre round the idea of the League to so great an extent that without it they become plainly unworkable. The recognition that the problems raised at Paris can only be solved by a permanent international organization is perhaps the greatest result of the Conference." We may now add that the blunders of the peacemakers necessitate an international instrument for their revision.

The most difficult task confronting the Big Four was the defence of the eastern frontier of France.² The policy embodied in the Franco-Russian agreement of 1917 had

¹ Temperley, "History of the Peace Conference," I, 276-7.

² Tardieu's chapters on the discussions relating to the left bank and the Saar explain the innermost thought of France.

been sharply repudiated by Mr. Balfour when it was revealed by the Bolsheviks; but the separation from Germany of the left bank of the Rhine appeared to the majority of Frenchmen the only solid guarantee against future invasions. Shortly after the Armistice Foch urged

**The Rhine
Frontier**

Clemenceau to insist on the Rhine frontier, and in January he addressed a similar appeal to the Allied Generals. The French Premier accordingly instructed Tardieu to prepare a full statement of the French case. Germany's capacity for attack, ran the argument, rested on the strategic network of railways on the left bank in combination with the Rhine fortresses. France had no desire to annex the left bank, wishing only that the Rhine should be Germany's western frontier, with Allied occupation of the bridge-heads. To this scheme the British delegation offered unrelenting opposition. "On my first visit to Paris," observed Mr. Lloyd George, "my strongest impression was the statue of Strassburg in mourning. Do not let us make another Alsace-Lorraine." To separate seven million Germans from their Fatherland would be wrong in itself, had never been demanded in any of the separate or joint declarations of war aims, and was, moreover, unnecessary, since Germany was disarmed. Great Britain, at any rate, would refuse to take part in garrison duty.

On March 14, the day of the President's return from America, the two Anglo-Saxon statesmen proposed a joint military guarantee as an alternative. The French Premier asked for time to consider the offer. Three days later he expressed a desire for the guarantee in addition to, not as a substitute for, the occupation, since a treaty might ensure victory but would not prevent an invasion. Negotiations lasted without interruption till April 22, and were complicated by other grave differences of opinion. The views of Mr. Lloyd George were embodied in a comprehensive memorandum of March 26, inspired by the loftiest statesmanship, which set forth the conditions not of a tem-

porary settlement but of a lasting peace.¹ "You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth-rate Power; all the same in the end, if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace of 1919, she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors. The deep im-
pression made upon the human heart by four years of unexampled slaughter will disappear with the hearts upon which it has been marked by the terrible sword of the great war. The maintenance of peace will then depend upon there being no causes of exasperation constantly stirring up the spirit of patriotism, of justice or of fair play. To achieve redress our terms may be severe, they may be stern and even ruthless, but at the same time they can be so just that the country on which they are imposed will feel in its heart that it has no right to complain. But injustice and arrogance displayed in the hour of triumph will never be forgotten or forgiven. For these reasons I am, therefore, strongly averse to transferring more Germans from German rule to the rule of some other nation than can possibly be helped. I cannot conceive any greater cause of future war than that the German people, who have certainly proved themselves one of the most vigorous and powerful races in the world, should be surrounded by a number of small states, many of them consisting of people who have never previously set up a stable government for themselves, but each of them containing large masses of Germans clamouring for reunion with their native land." Vindictive terms would destroy the German Government and might drive the people into the arms of the Bolsheviks, who, with German aid, would dominate Central Europe and threaten the nations of the west. "From every point of view, therefore, it seems to me that we ought to endeavour to draw up a peace settlement as if we were impartial arbiters, forgetful of the

The
British
Warning

¹ The Memorandum was first published in Nitti's "Peaceless Europe." It was subsequently published as a White Paper, Cd. 1614 (1922).

passions of the war." A just and far-sighted peace with Germany, he added, must be supplemented by a League of Nations as the effective guardian of international right and liberty, a limitation of the armaments of the victors no less than of the vanquished, and by the admission of Germany to the League after accepting the Allied terms and establishing a stable and democratic government.

The French reply argued that to create new States without frontiers enabling them to live would cause them to turn Bolshevik, and that the contrast between the security obtained by Great Britain and the insecurity of France resulting from the British proposals would poison the relations of the Allies. The Prime Minister now endeavoured to satisfy the French demand for security without abandoning his resolve to tolerate no fresh Alsace-Lorraines. It was agreed to reduce the German army to 100,000 men, to abolish conscription, and to demilitarize the right bank of the Rhine to a depth of fifty kilometres; but on the permanent separation of the left bank he was adamant, and President Wilson agreed that nothing more was possible or necessary than the joint guarantee. The French Premier caustically rejoined that the German fleet had disappeared and that the United States were far off. Foch and the Allied Generals were summoned to address the four; but the Marshal found no support, and even King Albert, who was called into council, did not ask for prolonged occupation. Sickened by

**The Final
Compromise**

French intransigence, the President ordered the *George Washington* to Brest. France stood alone, and with a heavy heart Clemenceau withdrew his demand for the separation of the left bank. On April 20 the President approved Allied occupation for fifteen years, and on April 22 Mr. Lloyd George followed suit. It was agreed that the period might be prolonged if the guarantees for the security of France at the end of the term were considered insufficient, and that the Allies might reoccupy the territory if Germany failed to pay her debts.

The compromise reached with such difficulty satisfied neither Great Britain nor France. Foch complained of the limitation of time, arguing that "if one is master of the Rhine one is master of Germany, and if we are not on the Rhine we have lost everything." Mr. Lloyd George was equally dissatisfied, and, after receiving the German comments on the original form of the Peace Treaty, he expressed regret for having allowed himself to be convinced. He had twice consulted the Cabinet and the British delegation, and they were unanimously of opinion that he should have offered occupation or the treaty of guarantee. "I do not accuse you," he remarked to Clemenceau; "I only accuse myself for yielding too quickly to your arguments. If you persist I shall have to submit the question to Parliament." The French Premier replied that he could not reopen the matter, and that he too would go before the Chamber and if necessary resign. The British Premier finally gave way. On the other hand, the Marshal's demand for a military regime was rejected, and a Rhineland Commission of five civilians was established.

While the main opposition to a permanent occupation of the left bank came from Great Britain, the annexation of the Saar valley was most vigorously resisted by the United States. When President Wilson told Clemenceau that he could consent neither to the separation of the left bank nor to the annexation of the Saar, the French statesman called him a pro-German and abruptly left the room.¹ The French claim to the district assigned to them in 1814, but not in 1815, was opposed both by Great Britain and the United States, and was withdrawn. All agreed that France should have the Saar coal while her own mines were out of action; but, while Mr. Lloyd George was willing to create an autonomous State under French protection, the President would at first approve nothing but a tribute of coal equal to the losses of France. The French prudently renounced the claim to the annexation of a

The Saar
Coalfields

¹ Isaiah Bowman, in "What Really Happened at Paris," 464-5.

German population and demanded a special political organization for the district, which included the whole of the mining area, whereas the frontier of 1814 would have left one-third of it outside. A compromise was finally reached in an Administrative Commission of five (three appointed by the League of Nations, one by the inhabitants, and one by France), and a plebiscite after fifteen years, to determine whether the district should be annexed to France or continue the existing regime or return to Germany. In the latter event Germany was to pay France the estimated value of the coal mines at that date.

While the British delegation stood for a moderate settlement of the problems of the left bank and the Saar, its attitude on two other questions appeared to one or more of the Allies severe and even vindictive. The trial of the Kaiser was an election pledge; and despite the opposition of the United States and Japan, and the disapproval of Generals Botha and Smuts, his extradition was demanded from Holland, though demanded in vain. On the issue of reparations, again, the British claims appeared to the Americans, who asked nothing for themselves, not only excessive but unwarrantable.¹ The Fourteen Points included the "restoration" of occupied territories; and the note of November 5, on the strength of which Germany laid down her arms, spoke of "compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air." British and French politicians, however, had subsequently declared Germany liable for the whole cost of the war. Clemenceau declared that whatever sum the experts might name, it would still fall short of French expectation; and Mr. Lloyd George added that he, too, would fall if a sum were fixed. The American delegation, on the contrary, was unanimous for

¹ See Baruch, "The Making of the Economic and Reparations Sections of the Treaty," and Keynes, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." R. G. Lévy, "La Juste Paix," gives the French view of the economic clauses and of Mr. Keynes.

a fixed sum in order to restore settled conditions and to encourage Germany to work. Individual British, French, Belgian and Italian delegates agreed with them, but the chiefs were inexorable.

The question what claims should be made under the category of reparation led to prolonged discussion. Mr. Hughes bitterly assailed the American view, ably argued by Mr. Dulles, that the costs of the war could not be described as reparation to civilians. The President was informed by wireless of the controversy on his way back from America in March, and replied that "the inclusion of war costs was clearly inconsistent with what we deliberately led the enemy to expect and cannot now honourably alter simply because we have the power." The British demand was largely due to the fact that our claim for material damage by submarines and air raids was relatively small, and that the fruits of victory had to be brought into some relation with election promises, of which 370 Members of Parliament reminded the Prime Minister in a warning telegram, provoked by an interview with "a high authority" in the *Westminster Gazette*.¹ "Our constituents have always expected that the first action of the peace delegates would be, as you repeatedly stated in your election speeches, to present the Bill in full and make Germany acknowledge the debt." Mr. Lloyd George replied that the Government would stand faithfully by all its pledges. In the middle of April he paid a flying visit to St. Stephen's, where he trounced Lord Northcliffe, in whom he saw the instigator of the telegram, and who was now conducting a fierce campaign against the Prime Minister in *The Times* and the *Daily Mail*. The final result, which was a compromise between "the cost of the war" and the formula of November 5, included war pensions and separation allowances,² to which the Presi-

¹ The high authority was the Prime Minister himself. See Sisley Huddleston, "Peace-Making at Paris."

² For an incisive judgment of British conduct in this matter see Zimmern, "The Convalescence of Europe."

dent was converted by a memorandum of General Smuts, and demanded a thousand million within two years, before the expiration of which a scheme of payments extending over thirty years was to be worked out by an Inter-Allied Reparation Commission.

Agreement on the problems presented by Fiume, Shantung and Poland proved as difficult to attain as on the left bank, the Saar and reparations. By the secret Treaty of 1915 Italy had secured recognition of her claim to North Dalmatia in flagrant violation of the principle of self-determination; yet she now proceeded to advance her "just claims" on Fiume in the name of

**The Fiume
Controversy**

that principle, though the Italians were a minority in Fiume and its suburb Susak taken together. The British and French Premiers, while ready to carry out the pact, advised her to forgo her claim to Dalmatia, adding that if she insisted on the full terms of 1915 she could not obtain Fiume. Convinced that Italy, having accepted the Fourteen Points, must abandon all claims that conflicted with them, President Wilson, whom the Serbs invited to arbitrate but whose services were not desired by the Italians, argued that the Jugoslavs must obtain effective access to the sea. It was in vain, however, that Colonel House strove to bring the Italian and Jugoslav disputants, who were at daggers drawn, to meet him round a table in his hotel; and towards the end of April, when the Germans were about to arrive in Paris, Orlando insisted that the problem should be considered at once, though it formed no part of the settlement with Germany. His harassed colleagues implored him to wait till the outstanding questions of the German settlement were solved; for they required the signature of Italy to the coming German Treaty. Long discussions took place in the Council of Four without result; but neither Orlando nor the President would give way.

On April 20 the President read to his British and French colleagues a memorandum which he proposed to

publish if the Italians rejected all compromise. The peace, he declared, must be built on certain definite principles. "If these principles are to be adhered to, Fiume must serve as the outlet and inlet of the commerce, not of Italy but of Hungary, Bohemia, Roumania and the States of the new Yugoslav group. To assign it to Italy would create the feeling that we had deliberately put the port upon which all these countries depend for their access to the Mediterranean in the hands of a Power of which it did not form an integral part and whose sovereignty must inevitably seem foreign, not domestic. Interest is not now in question, but the rights of peoples, above all the right of the world to peace and to such settlements of interest as shall make peace secure. These and these only are the principles for which America has fought, and on which she can consent to make peace. Only on these principles, she hopes and believes, will the people of Italy ask her to make peace." The memorandum was approved by Mr. Lloyd George and Clemenceau, and the President understood both of them to favour publication. Further discussion by the Four and in a meeting attended by the Foreign Ministers was fruitless; and Orlando sent a message that he would take no further part in the counsels of the Four till the question was settled in Italy's favour. The President now issued his statement to the Press. The same evening the Italians announced that the delegation would leave Paris on the following day, and Orlando issued a reply. In drawing a distinction between the Italian people and its Government, he complained, the President implied that a great free people was capable of submitting to the yoke of a will not its own. Even more offensive was the contention that Italy's claim violated the principles of liberty and justice; for the author of the doctrine of self-determination ought to be the first to recognize the right of Fiume, an ancient Italian city. "And can we describe as excessive the Italian aspiration for the Dalmatian coast, this bulwark of Italy throughout

Wilson
versus
Orlando

the centuries? Why is it especially Italian aspirations that are to be suspected of imperialist cupidity?" Mr. Lloyd George endeavoured to dissuade his colleague from withdrawal; but the President's challenge had evoked a storm of indignation in Italy, and the Ministers had no choice. They received an ovation and a solid vote in Rome; but on May 4 the Three invited them to return, and on May 7 they were once more in Paris. The settlement of the Fiume question was indefinitely postponed.

The angry withdrawal of Italy from the Conference was not without its influence on the settlement of the problem of Shantung. As Italy's entry into the war was purchased by the promise of North Dalmatia, so Japan's services were rewarded in February, 1917, by a secret assurance of British, French, Russian and Italian support at the Peace Conference for her claims to the German inheritance in the Far East. The President, however, refused to be bound by this treaty, of which he only learned at Paris; and he made no secret of his sympathy with China's plea, eloquently urged by the Ambassador Wellington Koo, that her acceptance of the claim in 1915, under duress, should be cancelled. "The difficulties would have been incredible to me before I got here," he telegraphed to Washington on April 25; and his friend and physician, Admiral Grayson, reported that they were terrible days for the President, physically and otherwise.¹ The Japanese delegates threatened that they would leave the Conference if forbidden to retain their prey.² Mr. Lansing considered that they were bluffing, and the American delegation desired to resign in protest. But the President believed that the League would be in danger without the signature of Italy and Japan to the Treaty of which it formed an integral part; and he was in some degree mollified by a verbal promise to restore the peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only

¹ Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Knew Him," 554-5.

² Lansing, "The Peace Conference," ch. 18.

the economic privileges granted to Germany and a settlement at Tsingtau. Yet it was the cession of German rights to Japan which was recorded in the Treaty, whereas the verbal assurances of the delegates were not rated very highly by most of the President's countrymen. "Of all the important decisions at the Conference," records Mr. Stannard Baker, "none worried him so much and none finally satisfied him less. Not one of the problems he had to meet at Paris, serious as they all were, did he take more personally to heart." Not one, we may add, supplied his political opponents with a more formidable weapon in the fierce struggle which they were about to wage against the Covenant and its author.

Neither in regard to Fiume nor Shantung did the President receive effective support from his British colleague; but Mr. Lloyd George, in turn, fought single-handed against extravagant Polish demands. Poland, declared Pichon, with his eye on Berlin, must be *grande et forte, très forte*, evidently thinking that her strength would increase with her size. An Inter-Allied Commission proposed to transfer to her almost the whole of the Prussian provinces of Posen and West Prussia, which had formed part of the kingdom of Poland, including both banks of the Vistula and Danzig, with the district of Marienwerder to secure control of the railway from Danzig to Warsaw, and a plebiscite for the Protestant Poles in the Allenstein district. It also proposed to assign to Poland the greater part of Upper Silesia, which had not been Polish for many centuries. Mr. Lloyd George strongly opposed the transfer of two million Germans to Polish rule; and it was therefore resolved to allow a plebiscite in Marienwerder, and to make Danzig a free city under the League of Nations, though subject to Poland in customs and foreign relations. Poland was also to use the docks, the river and the railways.

The Polish Demands

The German delegates arrived at Versailles on April 29, and the Treaty was delivered to them on May 7 at the

Trianon Palace Hotel. The conflict, declared Clemenceau in briefly opening the ceremony, had cost the victors too much for them not to take all necessary precautions that the peace should be a lasting one. On receiving the bulky

The
Germans
Arrive volume containing the terms Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the Foreign Minister, read a declaration repudiating on behalf of his country the sole responsibility for the war. President Wilson desired oral discussion with the delegates, and his proposal was strongly backed by General Smuts; but Clemenceau, backed after some hesitation by Mr. Lloyd George, insisted that all comments should be in writing. The German Delegation proceeded to forward a long series of critical memoranda, pointing out *inter alia* that after her losses of territory, coal and iron, Germany would be unable to pay a vast indemnity and that millions of her inhabitants would be unable to live.¹ On April 29 the German counter-proposals were ready. It was complained that the principles on the basis of which Germany had laid down her arms had been violated; that the new Government was thoroughly democratic; that no more stringent conditions could have been imposed on an Imperialist Government; that Germany could only fulfil her obligations if permitted to retain Upper Silesia; that she would accept the results of a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine held under neutral auspices; that she should at once enter the League of Nations with equal rights; and that the reduction of armaments should be general, not unilateral. The "rape" of Danzig and the cession of Memel were denounced, and the retention of the colonies under a mandate was proposed.

The German reply, which merely stiffened the back of the French Premier, produced a profound effect on Mr. Lloyd George, who summoned his principal colleagues from London to discuss the situation, and found them no less inclined to moderation than himself. What Tardieu

¹ See the official "Materialien betreffend die Friedensverhandlungen," 13 Teile.

describes as "the second and worst crisis" began. "They were atrocious days. He was scared by the consequences of a refusal to sign or a crisis in Germany. On all questions—disarmament, occupation, reparations, Danzig, Upper Silesia—he proposed inadmissible concessions, apologized for doing it so late, and talked of consulting Parliament. 'Our demands will upset the Government and there will be nobody to sign. The peace must be signed. We cannot remain two or three years in a condition which is neither peace nor war. If France wishes to do so, she can.' The work of two months threatened to collapse." Clemenceau replied that France knew the Germans best, and that concessions would only encourage their resistance, while depriving the Allies of their rights. He added satirically that he noticed that British opinion did not object to making Germany surrender her colonies and her fleet. Though the American Delegation was in general sympathy with the British Premier, the President himself, anxious for the speedy signature of the Treaty, demanded no change in the fundamental clauses, and did not insist on the financial modifications urged by his experts. Deprived of his support, Mr. Lloyd George was unable to gain all his points. "Reason resumed her rights," records Tardieu gleefully, "and the amendments vanished one after the other." Yet the modifications announced in the Allied reply of June 16 were of considerable importance for Germany. A plebiscite was conceded in Upper Silesia; the western frontier of Poland was slightly modified; communications with East Prussia were improved; the rate of reduction for the army was retarded; and the methods of paying the indemnity were to be discussed with a German Commission. Without these changes no German Government would have signed, and it was the unanimous desire of the German delegates to decline even the amended terms. The German Cabinet was divided; but the persistence of Erzberger won over a majority of the National Assembly at Weimar, and on

The Final Stages

Scheidemann's resignation a new Cabinet was formed with a mandate to sign. At this moment the sinking of the German fleet at Scapa Flow solved a difficult problem, but aroused the anger of the Allies. A final effort to secure the omission of the articles providing for the surrender of the Kaiser and other offenders, and declaring Germany and her Allies the sole author of the war, brought a telegraphic refusal from the Four and a demand for immediate compliance. The time-limit expired at 7 P.M. on June 23,

**The Treaty
Signed**

and by 5.20 it was known that Germany had submitted. On June 28 the Treaty was signed by Germany and by all the Allies except China in the Galerie des Glaces, in which the German Empire had been proudly proclaimed half a century earlier. On the same historic day, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, Clemenceau and Pichon, signed the guarantee of assistance against unprovoked German aggression which had been promised in April as a solatium for the veto on the separation of the left bank of the Rhine; and a similar document was signed by President Wilson.

Though portions of the German Treaty have been described above, it may be convenient to summarize its provisions. On the west Germany ceded Alsace-Lorraine to France, and Prussian Moresnet, Eupen and Malmédy to Belgium. In the latter case a plebiscite was to be held after the transfer. The Saar valley was surrendered for fifteen years, Luxemburg withdrew from the Zollverein, and the left bank of the Rhine was to be demilitarized. On the Danish frontier North and Central Schleswig were to determine their allegiance by plebiscite.¹ The most formidable territorial sacrifices were in the East, where the larger part of the provinces of Posen and West Prussia were ceded to Poland. A plebiscite was to be held in Upper Silesia. Danzig was to become a free city under the League of Nations, within the Polish Customs Union. East Prussia was separated from the rest of Germany, and

¹ North Schleswig voted for union with Denmark, and Central Schleswig remained German.

plebiscites were to be held in the south and east of the province. Memel and its district were to be ceded to the Allies. The entire colonial empire was surrendered and was divided among the victors as mandatories. German South-West Africa became part of the Union of South Africa. German East Africa fell to Great Britain, who presented to Belgium a small but thickly populated portion in the north-west which adjoined the Congo State. France secured almost the whole of the Cameroons and Togoland. The territories in the Pacific were divided between the British Empire and Japan, the former taking those to the south of the equator, the latter those to the north. Those to the south were assigned to Australia, except German Samoa, which fell to New Zealand, and the island of Nauru, which was retained by Great Britain.

The disarming of Germany had been carried on under the terms of the Armistice, and the Treaty provided for further limitations. By March, 1920, the army was to be reduced to 100,000 men, Disarming
of
Germany enlisting for twelve years. The General Staff was to disappear. Large guns were forbidden, and the number of small guns and munitions was narrowly limited. A belt of thirty miles on the east bank of the Rhine was to be demilitarized. The navy was to be limited to six battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, and twelve torpedo-boats, with a volunteer *personnel* of 15,000. No submarines were to be built, no fortifications to be erected on the Baltic, and the fortress of Heligoland was to be dismantled. No military aeroplanes or dirigibles were to be retained or constructed. The total sum for reparation was to be fixed by an Inter-Allied Commission by May 1, 1921; but by that date one thousand million was to be paid, the rest being liquidated in thirty years. Germany was to surrender all her merchantmen over 1,600 tons, half those between 1,600 and 800 tons, and a quarter of her fishing vessels, and to build tonnage of 200,000 a year for five years. Large quantities of coal were to be delivered to France for ten years. Ger-

many was to bear the cost of the armies of occupation, to make no tariff discrimination against Allied trade for five years, and to consent to the sale of all German property in the Allied countries. The Kiel Canal was to be open on equal terms to warships and merchantmen of all nations, German rivers were to be internationalized, and Kehl (opposite Strassburg) to be placed under French control. The Kaiser was to be tried by judges of the five Great Powers, and offenders against the laws and customs of war by special military tribunals. The sanction for the Treaty consisted in the occupation of the left bank and bridgeheads of the Rhine for fifteen years, which would be evacuated by stages as the indemnity was gradually paid off. If Germany failed to discharge her obligations as to reparation, either during or after the fifteen years, the area might be reoccupied.

On July 3 Mr. Lloyd George introduced a Bill for carrying the Treaty into effect, and took occasion to review the handiwork of himself and his colleagues. The terms, he declared, were terrible but just, since all the territorial adjustments were reparations. The plotters of the war and offenders against the laws of war must be punished, not for revenge, but to discourage crime, and the Kaiser would be tried in London. The German nation must be punished, for it had applauded its rulers.

**Guarantees
of Peace** He challenged anybody to point to a single clause not in accordance with the demands of justice and fair play. The Anglo-French Treaty, he added, only engaged us in the event of wanton aggression. The army of occupation was a second guarantee. The League of Nations was the greatest safeguard; but it was of no value unless the strong nations behind it were prepared to stop aggression.

The satisfaction professed by the Prime Minister was not shared by all his Anglo-Saxon colleagues. To Mr. Lansing the terms appeared "immeasurably harsh and humiliating, while many of them seem to me impossible of performance." Mr. Keynes, who had resigned his post as

a representative of the Treasury in protest against the reparation settlement, proceeded to denounce the "Carthaginian peace" in a volume which was read all over the world. The disappointment at the result of so much effort which was widely felt among the members of the British and American Delegations found poignant expression in an Open Letter to President Wilson from Mr. Bullitt on resigning his post when the terms of the Treaty were published. "I was one of the millions who trusted implicitly your leadership, and believed you would take nothing less than a permanent peace based upon 'unselfish and unbiased justice.' But our Government has consented to deliver the suffering peoples to new oppressions, subjections and dismemberments. That you are personally opposed to most of the unjust settlements and accepted them only under pressure is well known. If you had made your fight in the open instead of behind closed doors, you would have carried with you the public opinion of the world. I am sorry you did not fight our fight to a finish, and that you had so little faith in the millions of men like myself who had faith in you." In France the Treaty was accepted without enthusiasm, for the failure to annex the Saar valley and to sever the left bank of the Rhine from Germany was keenly felt; but Tardieu, its most eloquent champion, argues with justice that the French point of view generally prevailed. Bethmann-Hollweg spoke for his countrymen when he declared in his Memoirs that the world had never seen a more frightful instrument for the enslavement of the vanquished.

A declaration issued by General Smuts gave eloquent expression to the mixed feelings with which most thoughtful men regarded the achievement. "I have signed the Treaty not because I consider it a satisfactory document, but because it is imperatively necessary to close the war. We have not yet achieved the real peace to which our peoples were looking. The work of making peace will only begin after a definite halt has been called to the

General
Smuts'
Comments

destructive passions that have been devastating Europe for nearly five years. The promise of the new life, the victory for the great human ideals for which the peoples have shed their blood and their treasure without stint, the fulfilment of their aspirations towards a new international order are not written in this Treaty, and will not be written in Treaties. A new heart must be given, not only to our enemies but to ourselves. A new spirit of generosity and humanity, born in the hearts of the peoples in this great hour of common suffering and sorrow, can alone heal the wounds inflicted on the body of Christendom." General Botha was in full agreement with his colleague, and signed the Treaty with reluctance.

Directly the German Treaty was signed Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson left Paris. Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing remained to carry through the settlement with the other belligerents, all of whom had surrendered unconditionally.¹ The Austrian Treaty had been delivered to the Chancellor, Dr. Renner, on June 2, in an incomplete form; and after the Austrian delegates had pointed out the impossibility of fulfilling the economic conditions, it was presented in a modified

**Treaty of
St. Germain**

form on July 20. It was not, however, till September 10 that the Peace of St. Germain was concluded. The Hapsburg Empire had broken in pieces before the firing had ceased, and the victors had merely to register accomplished facts. Austria recognized the independence of Czecho-Slovakia, Jugoslavia, Poland and Hungary, all of whom were to undertake the protection of racial minorities. Eastern Galicia was to be transferred to the Allies, and the Trentino, South Tyrol, Trieste and Istria to Italy. The army was limited to 30,000 volunteers, the navy and air force was to disappear. Austria was to surrender war criminals, and to pay reparation for thirty years from 1921. All merchant shipping, with other contributions in material and money, was to be handed over before that date. National art treasures

¹ See Temperley, "History of the Peace Conference," IV.

were to be inalienable for twenty years. The pre-war National Debt was to be shared with the new States. The Danube was to be internationalized, but Austria was to have unfettered access to the Adriatic. In addition to these economic conditions, the Treaty forbade the union of Austria with Germany without consent of the Council of the League of Nations; and since France was opposed to such union, and the decisions of the Council had to be unanimous, this avenue of escape from an impossible position was blocked in advance. Cut off from the sea, forbidden to join Germany, unable to purchase the coal of Bohemia and the corn and meat of Hungary, and over-weighted by a capital of two million inhabitants, the little Republic of six millions was launched on its career with every prospect of a lingering and painful death.

By the Treaty of Neuilly, signed on November 27, 1919, Bulgaria, where Boris had succeeded his discredited father and Stambuliski had emerged from prison to rule the country, was cut off from the *Treaty of Neuilly* *Ægean*, compelled to surrender Strumnitza to Yugoslavia, and burdened with an indemnity of ninety millions, while her army was limited to 20,000 men. By the Treaty of Trianon, signed on June 4, 1920, the Republic of Hungary, where an interlude of Bolshevik rule was followed by a White reaction, was reduced to little more than a third of its former territory and population. Finally the liquidation of Turkey was postponed till it should be known whether the United States would undertake a mandate for Armenia. The Treaty of Sèvres, signed on August 10, 1920, leaving the Ottoman Empire nothing but a precarious foothold in Europe and the larger part of Asia Minor, remained unratified, owing to the resolute opposition of Mustapha Kemal's independent Government in Angora, the anger of Mohammedans in India, and the substitution of King Constantine for Venezelos as the ruler of Greece. This fact, however, did not prevent Great Britain from retaining as a mandatory her conquests in Mesopotamia and Pales-

tine, in the latter of which Mr. Balfour, on behalf of the Government, had in 1917 promised to provide "a national home" for the Jews.

If some Rip van Winkle had closed his eyes in 1914 and opened them in 1919, he would scarcely have recognized the Europe in which he was born.

**The New
Europe**

Germany was a Republic with a Socialist President, the Kaiser and the Crown Prince in exile, the fleet at the bottom of the sea, and Alsace-Lorraine in the hands of France. The Tsar and his family had been murdered, and a Communist dictator ruled the remnants of the Russian Empire from the Kremlin. The proud realm of the Hapsburgs had been shattered into fragments, and its last ruler was an exile in Switzerland. Poland, Lithuania and Bohemia had risen from the grave. Finland was free. Esthonia and Latvia were independent States. Serbia had grown into Jugoslavia, "the kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes." Montenegro had disappeared. Hungary was halved and Roumania doubled. Italy was in Trieste, Greece in Smyrna, France in Damascus, Great Britain in Jerusalem and Bagdad. Turkey had shrunk to a shadow of her former self. The Balance of Power had ceased to exist. France was supreme on land and Great Britain on the seas. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente were dead and buried. In a new world where familiar landmarks have been swept away by the storm and the earthquake, the beginning of wisdom is to recognize that the survival of European civilization is bound up with the vitality and authority of a League of Nations embracing victors and vanquished alike within its sheltering arms.

INDEX

- ABBAS PASHA**, Khedive of Egypt, 270
Abdul Aziz, Sultan of Morocco, 358
 accepts Conference plans, 361
 deposed, 1908, 459
 French proposals *re* his army, 355
 French reforms in Morocco, 348
 rejects French proposals, 356
 succeeds Muley Hassan, 1894, 340
Abdul Hamid, Sultan of Turkey, 117, 214
 accepts Prince Ferdinand as Governor of Eastern Roumelia, 256
 appoints commission to inquire into Armenian affairs, 236
 Christian Governor for Crete, selects, 246
 confidence in Germany, 263
 Constantinople massacre, 1896, 239
 criticizes the reform scheme, 237
 declares war on Greece, 248
 "February programme," accepts the, 399
 friendship with the Kaiser, 244
 grants the Constitution of 1876, 410
 massacres of 1895, 239
 mobilizes army on Greek frontier, 247
 Note to the Powers, 242
 opposition to Prince George, 251
 orders cessation of hostilities, 250
 the Powers' mediation for Greece, 249
 the Powers, yields to, 403
 reforms promised, 398
 refusal to recall troops from Crete, 251
 rejects Lord Kimberley's reform scheme, 236
 sanctions the reforms, 238
 triumph over Great Britain, 244
 and Sir Philip Currie's scheme of reform, 235
 and the Armenian massacres, 234
 and the evacuation of Crete, 252
Abdurrahman proclaimed Ameer, 27
- Abyssinia**, 213
 claimed by Italy as a Protectorate, 278
 defeat of Italy at Adowa, 279
 Rodd mission to, 284
Adam, Madam, 160
Adowa, Italian defeat at, 279
Adrianople, 509
Aehrenthal, 420
 approaches Bulgaria, 413
 death of, 500
 on Sir Edward Grey, 418
 on the Franco-German Moroccan pact, 462
 satisfaction at Russia's surrender, 421
 success of his Bosnian policy, 423
 and annexation of Bosnia, 414
 and Italy's plans for Tripoli, 486
 and Izvolsky, the Buchlau conversations, 412
 and proposed conference regarding Bosnia, 416
 and Russia, agreement with, 412
 and Russia, understanding *re* Bosnia, 411
 and the Reval visit, 408
 and the Sanjak Railway, 405
 and Serbia, 422
 and Turkey, compensation to, 419
Afghanistan, 24, 369, 373, 394
 Ameer of, 24, 26, 31
Africa, delimitation of, 110
 Franco-British rivalry in, 264
 friction caused by partition of, 209
 the expansion and partition of, 73
Agadir, the *Panther* incident, 470
Aksakoff, Ivan, 32
Albania, 58, 213, 503, 506, 508
Albert, King of the Belgians, 513, 659, 680
Aleko Pasha, appointed Governor-General of Eastern Roumelia, 1879, 7
Alexander of Battenberg (*see* Alexander, Prince of Bulgaria)
 desires to marry Princess Victoria of Prussia, 6

Alexander of Battenberg (*contd.*)

- elected to the throne, 4
- letter to Prince Carol of Roumania, 4
- recognized Governor of Eastern Roumelia, 121
- resents Russian interference, 5
- and the Conference of Ambassadors, 1885, 119
- and the Philippopolis Revolution, 115 *et seq.*
- Alexander II of Russia, 33
 - accepts 1878 Treaty, 3
 - accepts arbitration of Penjdeh incident, 31
 - approves of Austro-German Alliance, 47
 - desires Russo-German agreement, 50, 51
 - his approval of proposed Russo-German agreement, 52
 - his assassination, 52
 - his reception of Lord Dufferin as British Ambassador, 23
 - meets the Kaiser at Alexandrovo, 39
 - message to Queen Victoria, 28
 - and the 1878 Treaty, 2
- Alexander III of Russia, 155
 - accession of, 53
 - approves of military convention, 180
 - contempt for French Republicans, 159
 - defeat of his Bulgarian policy, 154
 - desire for delay, 179
 - desires co-operation with Germany, 53
 - discussions *re* military convention, 178
 - invites alliance with France, 161
 - repudiates clause in Treaty of Berlin *re* Batum, 123
 - visits Danzig, 55
 - and Germany's refusal to renew Russo-German Treaty, 199
 - and Katkoff, 128
 - and the Bulgarian forgeries, 141
 - and Russo-German friction, 137
- Alexander, Prince, of Serbia, 124
- Alexandria, British squadron at, 82
- revolt in, 81
- Alexandrovo, 39, 42
- Algeciras, Act of, 389, 466, 470
 - signed, 1906, 366
 - terms of, 366, 367
 - Conference of, 347, 361, 365, 367, 389, 458

Allenby, General, 625, 653

- Amatongaland, 217
- Amban, the, of Tibet, 373
- Ambassadors, Conference of, in London, 508 *et seq.*
- Amphill, Lord, 85, 103
- Anatolian Railway Company, 263
- Andrassy, Count, 1, 18, 36, 42, 51, 58
 - discusses Austro-German Alliance with Bismarck, 37
 - leaves office, 46
 - letter to Bismarck, 38
 - proposed alliance with Germany, 43
 - signs Treaty of Vienna, 45
 - and Prince Alexander, 8
 - and the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 17
 - and the Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans, 126
- Anglo-Italian Compact, 1887, terms of, 148
- Anglo-Portuguese Convention, 1884, 112
- Anglo-Russian Convention—as a business transaction, 395
 - Persian clauses of, 392, 393
 - a political success, 396
- Angra Pequena, Bay of, 101 *et seq.*
- Appert, General, 159
- Arabi Pasha, 80, 81, 87
 - defeat at Tel-el-kebir, 84
 - leads revolt in Egypt, 76
 - proclaims war against Britain, 82
- Argyll, Duke of, 28
- Armand, Count, 631
- Armenia, 23
 - the massacres, 213, 233 *et seq.*
- Asia Minor, 262, 263
- Asquith, Mr., 447, 575, 592, 607, 642, 660
 - as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 365
 - at Malta, 496
 - congratulates M. Caillaux on the Moroccan settlement, 483
 - on Britain's war aims, 612
- Atbara, battle of the, 287
- Athens, 120, 121, 122, 249
- Austria, alarming reports from, 500
 - annexes Bosnia, 410
 - blockade of Greece, 122
 - Bosnia, problems regarding settlement, 419
 - consents to Conference of Ambassadors, 507
 - declares war on Serbia, 541

Austria (contd.)

desires Italy's support, 146
 enmity towards Serbia, 516
 European feeling towards, 418
 forms secret treaty with Serbia, 69
 Germany's support of, 41, 423
 intervenes to save Serbia, 120
 Macedonia, division of, 401
 occupies western portion of the Sanjak, 18
 opposition to Russian policy in the Balkans, 125 *et seq.*
 orders general mobilization, 546
 partial mobilization, 508
 pays compensation for loss of Crown property in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 419
 proposed second Mediterranean agreement with Great Britain and Italy, 150
 refuses Sir Edward Grey's proposals, 404
 rivalry with Russia in the Balkans, 125
 secret alliance with Roumania, 1883, 71
 Serbia's claim on the Adriatic, 507
 Serbia's claim to Durazzo, 506
 suspicious of Russo-German agreement, 51
 tension with Russia, 152
 the arrest of armaments, 431
 the Balkan war, 505
 the Casablanca crisis, 459
 the Münzsteg programme, 400
 the Sanjak Railway, 405
 the Sarajevo murders, 532
 Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy, 68
 ultimatum to Serbia, 536
 weakness of, 511
 and British offer of mediation, 544
 and Delcassé, support of his policy, 356
 and Eastern Roumelia, 7
 and Macedonia, financial reform scheme, 402
 and Russia, proposed concessions to, 411
 and Sir Edward Grey's speech, 406
 and the Algeiras Conference, 366, 367
 and the Anglo-Italian compact, 149
 and the Balkan Alliance, 501
 and the Balkans, 398
 and the Cretan settlement, 250, 251
 and the opening of the Straits, 489

Austria (contd.)

and the proposed conference, 419
 and the Triple Alliance, renewal of, 147
 and the Tripoli war, 487.
(see the Great War)
 Austro-German Alliance, 48
 conversations regarding, 37 *et seq.*
 Austro-German Treaty of 1879, 68
 Austro-Russian Pact, 1897, 259 *et seq.*
 Austro-Serbian Treaty, 1881, 70

 BAGDAD RAILWAY, the, 334, 391, 392
 final negotiations, 526
 the Anglo-German agreement, 527
 the Anglo-Turkish agreement, 526
 Bahr-el-Ghazel, 209, 271, 289, 290
 Baker, Mr. Stannard, 665
 Baker, Sir Valentine, 21
 Balfour, Mr., 678, 690, 694, 696
 at the Peace Conference, 662
 becomes Foreign Secretary, 614
 in America, 619
 on the Committee of Imperial Defence, 429
 on the Kaiser's visit to Sandringham, 332
 on the Sudan, 280
 on Russia and Afghanistan, 373
 reply to the Pope's peace proposals, 634
 resignation of, 362
 speech on Imperial Defence, 1905, 373
 the Naval Estimates, 446
 and Cardinal Gasparri, 636
 and Germany's peace feelers, 637
 Balkan States, 251, 399, 404, 405, 424, 500, 501, 503
 Austro-Russian policy in, 261
 Austro-Russian rivalry in, 125
 mobilization of, 504
 Russo-Austrian co-operation in, 398
 triumph of, 505
 and the Berlin Congress, 1
 Balkan war, the, 504
 effect on European politics, 510
 peace declared, 510
 renewed, 509
 terms of treaty, 509
 the Allies quarrel, 510
 treaty signed in London, 509
 Barclay, Sir Thomas, 339
 and meeting of British Chambers of Commerce in Paris, 1900, 337

- Bardo, Treaty of, 63, 66
 Baring, Sir Evelyn (*see* Lord Cromer)
 Barnes, Mr., 660, 662
 Barrère, Camille, French Ambassador, 283, 346
 Bashford, Mr., 427
 Batum, 32, 123
 Beaconsfield, Earl, 19, 21, 27
 his discussion with Münster, 49
 his opposition to Russia, 23
 interview with German Ambassador, 48
 on Lord Lytton's appointment as Viceroy, 24
 returns from Berlin Congress, 1
 and Bismarck's desire for co-operation, 191
 and German desire for British support, 49
 and the Bulgarian settlement, 175
 Beatty, Admiral, 590
 Belgium, British War Office surveys the roads and railways, 500
 Canadian preference, 335
 her neutrality, 134
 introduces compulsory service, 1913, 500
 and Britain, military discussions, 365
 and French expansion on Upper Ubanghi, 273
 and the Scheldt, 499
 (*see* the Great War)
 Belgrad, 120, 248
 Benckendorff, 492, 507, 530, 540
 on Sir Edward Grey, 529
 on the Anglo-Russian naval convention, 531
 Russia's proposals to Turkey, 488
 Bennigsen, 59, 230
 Berchtold, Count, Austrian Minister in Petrograd, 411, 412, 413, 419
 his Balkan policy, 503
 succeeds Aehrenthal, 500
 the declaration of war, 540
 and Russia, renewal of conversations, 544
 and the Sarajevo murders, 532
 Berlin Conference, the, 1884, 112
 Berlin, Kruger's visit to, 215
 Lord Haldane's mission to, 492
 et seq.
 Moorish mission at, 351
 Bernstorff, 614
 his efforts towards peace, 616
 on President Wilson's peace terms, 618
 Bernstorff (*contd.*)
 and President Wilson, on the submarine war, 594
 Berthelot, resignation of, 278
 Bertie, Sir Francis, 547
 Bethmann-Hollweg, Anglo-German naval negotiations, 451 *et seq.*
 apprehensions of Anglo-Russian naval convention, 530
 Austria's peace negotiations, informed of, 630
 becomes Chancellor, 449
 Britain's proposal of mediation, 538
 desires peace discussions, 607
 his bid for British neutrality, 542
 his resignation, 632
 on Germany's naval policy, 450
 on Italy and Triple Alliance, 487
 on the *Bourse Gazette* article, 524
 on the cause of the Moroccan trouble, 485
 on the failure of negotiations, 496
 on the French at Fez, 466
 on the Kaiser, 513
 on the Moroccan settlements, 483
 on the *Panther* incident, 472
 on the peace terms, 693
 on the Tripoli war, 487
 peace proposals from the Pope, 633
 the Moroccan settlement, 484
 warning to Vienna, 543
 warns France regarding Morocco, 468
 and America, Germany's peace terms, 618
 and Britain, naval negotiations with, 451
 and Lord Haldane, discussions on colonial co-operation, 525
 and the Allies, proposed peace negotiations, 609
 and the Army Bill, 511
 and the Balkan States, 504
 and the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, 615
 Bessarabia, 1, 8, 9, 32, 71
 Beyens, Baron, 471
 on militarism in Germany, 512
 on the Kaiser, 514
 Bieberstein, Marschall von, 197, 200, 217, 218, 221, 358
 Ambassador to Constantinople, 261
 endeavours to conciliate British Government, 220
 on Germany's policy in the Transvaal, 216
 and the Kruger telegram, 219

Birleff, Admiral, and the Pact of Björko, 385

Bismarck, 2, 29, 32, 36, 145
 approval of Tirpitz Navy Bill, 230
 Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans, 128
 Austro-Russian tension, 152
 Belgian neutrality, 135
 complains to Giers of Press attacks, 141
 criticizes the transfer of Heligoland, 204
 desires Heligoland, 104
 desires political co-operation with Britain, 48
 desires promise of British co-operation, 191
 discusses German-Austrian alliance with Andrassy, 37
 distrusts the Kaiser's relations with England, 205
 explains his policy, 153
 fall of, 194, 195
 German colonies, 99
 his anger against Granville and Derby, 105
 his Bulgarian policy, 119
 his European survey, 130 *et seq.*
 his policy against Russia, 33
 his policy broken through by the Kaiser, 211
 his reply to Münster's report, 49
 his successor's policies, 449
 his support of Russia, 125
 his views on Egypt, 85
 his warning to William II when Crown Prince, 190
 Italy's desire for co-operation, 67
 letter from Andrassy, 38
 makes mischief by disclosing story of Russo-German Treaty, 200
 on Holstein, 197
 on the foreign policy of the German Empire, 155
 on the non-renewal of Russo-German Treaty, 201
 policy regarding France, 57
 proclaims protectorate in S.W. Africa, 102
 protection of German subjects at Walfisch Bay, 101
 reassures Salisbury, 142-143
 receives Kruger in Berlin, 1884, 215
 receives report from Kaiser regarding Russian situation, 40
 relations between Russia and Germany, 34

Bismarck (*contd.*)

resents England's obstruction of his Pacific plans, 107
 securities for Germany in event of war, 140
 signs Austrian Treaty, 53
 success of his Bulgarian policy, 154
 the Dual Alliance, 186
 the Reinsurance Treaty, 1887, 138
 the renewal of the Triple Alliance, 1887, 146
 the Russian loans, 164
 the Russo-German friction, 137
 the war scare of 1875, 157
 visits Vienna, 44
 warning to Russia, 153
 and "Dérouléisme," 159
 and Germany's relation to Austria, 41
 and Italy, 64, 146
 and Morocco, 340
 and position of Jews in Roumania, 10
 and Prince Hohenlohe at Gastein, 42
 and proposed alliance with Austria, 43
 and Russo-German agreement, 52
 and Russo-German entente, 51
 and Treaty of Vienna, 46
 and Triple Alliance, 68
 and Turko-Greek question, 13
 and Turko-Greek settlement, 14
 and Anglo-Italian Compact, 149
 and the Anglo-Portuguese Convention, 112
 and the Bulgarian forgeries, 141
 and the Cameroons, 106
 and the Crown Prince, 188
 and the Eastern question, 22
 and the Egyptian question, 79
 and the French annexation of Tunis, 62

Bismarck, Herbert, 103, 162
 his mission to London *re* German colonies, 108

Bizerta, the fortification of, 265, 267

Björko, the Tsar and the Kaiser at, 385
 Pact of, lapse of, 388
 terms of, 385

Boer Republics, 309, 317
 European sympathy for, 309
 regard Germany as their friend, 221
 surrender of, 332
 the, generals in Europe, 332

Boisdefire, General, 166
 his mission to Russian Staff, 167
 signs military convention, 1892,
 180

Borden, Sir Robert, 662

Bosnia, 16, 17, 56, 58, 65

Bosnia-Herzegovina, annexed by
 Austria, 410

Botha, General, 694
 at the Peace Conference, 662

Boulanger, General, condemned for
 treason, commits suicide, 136
 his indiscretions in office, 163
 rise of, 133 *et seq.*
 the crisis with Germany, 162
 and the new barracks, 162

Bourgeois, M., 674
 at the second Hague Conference,
 432
 fall of his Ministry, 281
 reopens negotiations with Abyssinia, 281
 and the Algeiras Conference, 367
 and the Sudan campaign, 280

Boxer rising, the, 323

Bratiano, the elder, 11
 the younger, 604, 607, 667

Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 639, 647

Briand, M., 636

Bridges, Colonel, 499

Brockdorff-Rantzau, Count, 688

Brocqueville, Belgian Premier, 636

Brodrick, Mr., 332, 373

Brusiloff, 623

Bryan, Mr., 593

Bryce, Lord, 673

Buchanan, Sir George, 539, 546,
 569, 620

Bucharest, Peace Conference at, 120

Bucher, Lothar, on Holstein, 197

Buchlau, Izvolsky and Aehrenthal
 meet at, 412
 conversations, conflicting versions
 regarding, 412

Bulgaria, 509
 acquires nationality, 3
 appeals to the Powers, 399
 Austro-Russian quarrel over, 159
 autocracy of, acknowledged by
 Russia, 1881, 5
 bribed by Greece, 248
 Constitution of 1878 restored, 5
 declares war on Serbia, 585
 defeats Serbia, 120
 dissolves Macedonian Committees,
 399
 Ferdinand of Coburg elected
 Prince, 150

Bulgaria (*contd.*)

independence proclaimed, 1908, 413
 joins the Central Powers, 581, 585
 reconciliation with Russia, 255
 resents Russian tutelage, 4
 Russo-Austrian note to, 403
 seeks co-operation with Serbia,
 501
 the Allies desire her support, 582
 the Oriental Railways, 419
 the three years' crisis, end of, 154
 union of north and south, 116
 victory at Kirk-Kilisse, 504
 and Greece, suggested defensive
 alliance, 502
 and Turkey, agreement with, 401
 and Macedonian Committee, 398
 and the Oriental Railway, seizure
 of, 413

Bullitt, Mr., his mission to Moscow,
 671
 on the peace terms, 693

Bülow, Prince von, 573
 advised by Marschall von Bieberstein on Moroccan reforms,
 358
 averse to Anglo-German agreement, 302
 Chamberlain's proposals to Germany, 299
 co-operation with England, 303
 denies any plan of intervention,
 320
 England's apology *re* Bundesrath
 incident, 315
 explains his naval policy, in "Imperial Germany," 448
 explains the *Daily Telegraph* interview, 440
 his *Weltpolitik*, 449
 holds back from alliance with
 Great Britain, 312
 impresses Chamberlain, 310
 invites the Powers to accept abrogation of Article XXV, 422
 Kruger's desire to visit Berlin, 322
 Moroccan policy defended, 362
 on Austria—her Bosnian policy,
 423
 on the European situation, 430
 on the Kaiser at Windsor, 434
 on the Kaiser's disagreement with
 Salisbury at the Cowes interview, 214
 on King Edward's visit to Berlin,
 445
 on Morocco, speech in the Reichstag, 352

Bülów, Prince von (*contd.*)

- on the Moroccan pact, 462
 - on the Triple entente, 396
 - opposes limitation of armaments, 444
 - presses Russia to accept German proposal, 421
 - quashes Holstein's Algeciras policy, 366
 - succeeds Marschall von Bieberstein, 229
 - the Cretan settlement, 251
 - the Navy Law, 427
 - the Pact of Björko, 388
 - veto conference in Berlin, 436
 - visits England with the Kaiser, 310
 - warns France, 358
 - and Austria, Germany's support of, 416
 - and Jules Hansen, 317
 - and the Casablanca crisis, 460
 - and the Kaiser's visit to Tangier, 352
 - and the limitation of armaments, 431
 - and the Reval visit, 408
 - and the Sanjak railway project, 405
 - and the second Navy Bill, 316
 - and the Triple Alliance, discussions regarding, 346
 - and the Yangtse agreement, 324
- Burns, Mr. John, 550
- Buxton, Mr. Noel, chairman of the Balkan Committee, 582

CAILLAUX, 470

- satisfaction at Congo Treaty, 482
 - on the Franco-German agreement in Morocco, 462
 - and the deadlock of Franco-German negotiations, 480
- Cairoli, 59, 62
- Cambon, Jules, advises acceptance of German draft agreement, 464
- conversations with Kiderlen on compensation in the Congo, 475
 - instructions regarding Morocco and the Congo, 481
 - satisfied with the Congo Treaty, 482
 - the Casablanca crisis, 460
 - the Franco-German Moroccan pact, 461

Cambon, Jules (*contd.*)

- and Anglo-German economic entente, 459
 - and Bethmann, on Morocco, 468
 - and Kiderlen, at Kissingen, 469
 - and Kiderlen, on French plans in Morocco, 465
 - and Kiderlen, 474
 - and the French intervention at Fez, 466
 - and the *Panther* incident, 483
- Cambon, Paul, exchange of letters with Sir Edward Grey, 498
- on Austria's ultimatum to Serbia, 536
 - on King Edward's visit to Paris, 338
 - succeeds Baron de Courcel, 296
 - and Lord Lansdowne, secret treaty signed, 1904, 353
 - and the *rapprochement* between France and England, 339
- Campbell-Bannerman becomes Prime Minister, 362
- British goodwill towards Russia, 389
 - on his foreign policy, 363
 - on the dissolution of the Duma, 390
 - and Sir Edward Grey, 364
 - and the arrest of armaments, 431
- Caprivi, 266
- fall of, 211
 - his defence of his colonial policy, 203
 - his reasons for vetoing renewal of Russo-German Treaty, 200
 - increases German army, 206
 - shares the Kaiser's Anglophil sentiments, 208
 - speech on the Army Bill, 1892, 206
 - succeeds Bismarck as Chancellor, 196
 - visits Russia with the Kaiser, 200
 - and Germany's refusal to renew Russo-German Treaty, 201
 - and Germany's relations with Russia, 199
- Carnot, President, receives the Grand Cross of St. Andrew, 169
- Carol, King of Roumania, 509, 601
- death of, 603
 - Prince of Roumania, letter to King of Bulgaria, 4
 - and position of Jews in Roumania, 10
 - becomes King of Roumania, 11

- Casablanca bombarded, 458
 German deserters from the
 Foreign Legion at, 459
 railway at, 464
 settlement of crisis, 460
 Cassel, Sir Ernest, 492
 Cassini, Count, 389
 Castro, President, 333
 Cavagnari, Sir Louis, assassination
 of, 27
 Cecil, Lord Robert, 673, 674
 Chamberlain, Joseph, 193
 alienates sympathy from Britain
 by his caustic speeches, 309
 co-operation with Germany, 303
 desires alliance with Germany, 298
 discussions *re* Anglo-German com-
 mercial treaty with Morocco,
 328
 his Leicester speech, 311
 his speech on Russia, 299
 on the advance to Dongola, 280
 on the French expedition on the
 Niger, 285
 proposals to Germany, 299
 relinquishes negotiations for
 Anglo-German alliance, 312
 suggestion *re* Heligoland, 201
 talks with the Kaiser *re* an Anglo-
 German alliance, 310
 and Bismarck's approaches to
 England, 192
 and French support, 329
 and the Bagdad concession, 334
 and the Fashoda incident, 293
 and the German army, 330
 and the Samoa settlement, 305
 Chamberlain, General Sir Neville, 25
 China, 372
 authorizes Russian fleet to winter
 at Port Arthur, 225
 defeated by Japan, 1895, 222
 Germany claims compensation for
 murder of missionaries, 224
 Germany's plans for spoliation, 225
 the Manchurian controversy, 325
 the Yangtse Agreement, 324
 Chino-Japanese War, 222
 Churchill, Winston, at Malta, 496
 on the German *Novelle*, 496
 and the Buxton mission, 582
 and the Dardanelles project, 571
 Clemenceau, 63, 160, 690
 at the Peace Conference, 664
 on Rhine frontier dispute, 678, 680
 reparation and compensation, 682
 urges creation of national army,
 442
 Clemenceau (*contd.*)
 urges unified command, 648
 warning against Russian loan, 390
 and Germany's reply to Peace
 Treaty, 689
 and Izvolsky, 414
 and the Congo Treaty, 483
 and the Fiume controversy, 685
 and the German delegates, 688
 and the Saar coalfields, 681
 and the supreme command, 648
 Congo State, 209
 agreement reached, 482
 cancellation of treaty with Eng-
 land, 273
 discussions resumed, 481
 Stanley's exploration of, 111
 the King of the Belgians becomes
 sovereign, 113
 and the Treaty of 1894, 271
 Congress of Berlin, 1878, 1, 3, 10,
 24, 32, 59, 68, 69, 73, 115,
 213, 232
 Constantine, Crown Prince, 249
 Constantine, King of Greece, 586,
 695
 deposed by Great Britain and
 France, 606
 refuses to yield to the Allies, 606
 Constantinople, 150, 257, 409, 412,
 502, 504, 539
 Conference of 1876, 213
 Conference of Ambassadors at, 119
 British influence at, destroyed, 22
 German influence at, 261
 loss of British influence at, 243
 massacre of 1896, 241
 massacre of Armenians at, 1895,
 239
 Organic Statute signed at, 1879, 7
 Treaty of Peace signed, 1897, 250
 the Drummond Wolff Convention
 signed, 1887, 97
 Cook, Sir Edward, on Anglo-German
 naval negotiations, 451 *et seq.*
 Corti, Count, the Anglo-Italian com-
 pact, 148
 Crete, as an independent Christian
 State, 254
 desires union with Greece, 246
 difficulties of settlement, 250 *et*
 seq.
 friction between Christians and
 Mussulmans, 245
 under Greek governors, 244
 Crispi, 58, 59, 64, 84
 complaint to Germany *re* the
 fortification of Bizerta, 266

Crispi (*contd.*)

- fall of, 267
- letter to Salisbury *re* France and the Mediterranean, 266
- supports Bulgaria, 150
- and the fortification of Bizerta, 265
- Cromer, Lord, 88, 92, 442
- appointed British representative in Egypt, 75
- on General Gordon at Khartoum, 94
- and Rhodes, 304
- and the Anglo-French entente, 340
- Cruppi, Cambon reports on the Kissingen conversations, 470
- railway negotiations in Morocco, 468
- summons Cambon to Paris, 464
- and the Moroccan settlement, 464
- and the relief of Fez, 466
- Currie, Sir Philip, 236, 242, 250
- his scheme of reform, 235
- protests against Armenian massacres, 234
- and the 1895 massacres, 240
- Curzon, Lord, apprehensions *re* Russia and Persia, 369
- naval demonstration in the Persian Gulf, 371
- and Tibet, 371
- and William II's degree, 433
- and the Anglo-Russian Convention, 395
- and the Lhasa Treaty, 373
- Czernin, Count, 601, 615, 630, 647
- at Brest-Litovsk, 639
- his despairing forecast, 628
- on peace, 637

D'ALMODOVAR, DUC, as President of Algeciras Conference, 365

d'Annunzio, 576

de Bunsen, Sir Maurice, 538, 540

de Courcel, Baron, conversation with Lord Kimberley, 275

and the evacuation of Fashoda, 293

Delagoa Bay, 105, 218

British squadron at, 220

German warships at, 215, 217

Delcassé accompanies Loubet to London, 339

desire for Anglo-French entente, 337

fall of, 357

interview with Kruger, 321

Delcassé (*contd.*)

mediates in Dogger Bank incident, 378

negotiations with Great Britain *re* African settlement, 296

on Anglo-French differences in Egypt, 288

recognizes Italy's claim to Tripoli, 341

refuses conference *re* Treaty of 1880, 356

and Fez, the mission to, 348

and Kühlmann, on the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Treaties, 351

and Prince Radolin, on Anglo-French Treaty, 349

and Tangier, his mistake concerning British attitude, 357

and the Anglo-French Treaties, 344

and the Fashoda incident, 290

and the secret treaties, 354

Delyannis, 121, 122, 246, 249

Depretis, 58, 59, 66, 150

Derby, Lord, 15th Earl, 102, 105

Bismarck's anger against, 104

and Germany's annexation of New Guinea, 107

Derby, Lord, 17th Earl, his recruiting campaign, 598

de Selves, M., French Foreign Minister, 470

on the *Panther* incident, 471

and the Franco-German negotiations *re* Moroccan question, 475

Devonshire, Duke of, 298, 324, 328

Dilke, Sir Charles, article on Belgium in the *Fortnightly Review*, 135

Dobrudja, the, 8

frontier line determined, 1880, 9

Roumania takes possession of, 1878, 9

Dondukoff, Prince, as commissioner of Bulgaria, 3

Dongola occupied by Britain, 280

projected expedition to, 278

proposed advance to, 279

railway carried south from, 283

Dreikaiserbund, 57, 66, 71, 115, 119, 126, 138, 140, 156, 159

Bismarck desires reconstruction of, 50

re-establishment of, approved by Francis Joseph, 52

Drummond Wolff Convention, 264

- Dufferin, Lord, 31, 81, 269, 272, 274
 British occupation of Egypt, 86
 his reception as British Ambassador at Petrograd, 24
 sent to Petrograd as Ambassador, 23
- ECKARDSTEIN, BARON VON, 212, 213, 215, 221, 329
 arranges meeting between Hatfeldt and Chamberlain, 299
 King Edward complains of the Kaiser's conduct to, 327
 on Holstein's dangerous influence, 198
 proposed Anglo-German-Japanese pact, 327
 the Kaiser's visit to England, 1899, 309
 warns Britain against Jules Hansen, 317
 and Germany's query to France and Russia *re* their European possessions, 318
 and the Bundesrath incident, 314
 Edward VII at Cronberg, 429
 at Ischl, 439
 at Kiel, 350, 428
 at Reval, 407
 conversation with Izvolsky *re* Anglo-French Treaty, 374
 denounces Holstein, 198
 his speech in Paris, 338
 in Berlin, 1909, 445
 letter from Kaiser denouncing English Ministers, 327
 on the Reval visit, 408
 reply to Tsar's letter *re* South African War, 321
 shot at in Brussels, when Prince, 315
 speech of 1908, 437
 visit to Paris, 329, 338
 and Austria, regrets her action *re* Bosnia, 415
 and Clemenceau, at Marienbad, 442
 and Eckardstein, 330
 and President Loubet's visit to London, 339
 and the Algeiras Conference, 365
 and the Casablanca crisis, 460
 Egypt, 341
 commercial liberties of, 342
 control of offered Great Britain, 81
 dual control established by France and Britain, 74
- Egypt (*contd.*)
 and financial difficulties, 92
 and the Anglo-French entente, 340
 and the Dervish rising, 279
 Enver Bey, 509, 600, 653
 Erzberger, 576, 631, 632, 658, 689
- FALKENHAYN, 547, 562, 577, 597, 598, 615
 Fallières, President, and the annexation of Bosnia, 414
 Fashoda, Anglo-French discussions regarding, 291 *et seq.*
 evacuated by France, 293
 evacuation of, effect on French feeling towards Britain, 337
 Marchand arrives at, 287
 Faure, President, receives the Order of St. Andrew, 184
 visits Russia, 186
 Ferdinand of Bulgaria, 502, 509
 abdication of, 652
 desires reconciliation with Russia, 255
 his sympathy with the Central Powers, 584
 marriage to Princess Louise of Parma, 255
 recognized by the Powers, 256
 Russia demands his withdrawal, 154
 the forged letters from, 141
 visits Budapest, 413
 Ferdinand, King of Roumania, 603
 Ferdinand of Coburg elected Prince of Bulgaria, 150
 Ferry, M., 13, 63, 93, 136
 desires Bismarck's good will, 159
 his colonial movement, 112
 unwilling for alliance with Russia, 159
 and General Boulanger, 134
 Fez, 355, 361
 controversy regarding French aid to, 467
 French aid for relief of, 466
 French reforms for, 351
 massacre of French officers in, 483
 mission to, 348
 mission to, apprehensions aroused by, 353
 the rising at, 465
 Fisher, Lord, 407, 571, 589
 appointed First Sea Lord, 428
 predicts Anglo-German war, 443
 Flourens desires Russian alliance, 163

Flourens (*contd.*)

- his apprehensions over the Boulanger crisis, 162
- his good will towards Russia, 161
- receives Bulgarian delegates, 161
- Foch, Marshal, 657
 - as Chief of the Staff, 624
 - and the Rheims offensive, 650
- France accepts abrogation of Article XXV, 422
 - accepts Conference *re* Morocco, 360
 - accepts England's proposal of mediation, 537
 - ambitions *re* the Lower Niger, 284
 - annexes Madagascar, 282
 - appeal to Britain for intervention, 548
 - boundary negotiations with Great Britain, 269
 - Conference plans, 361
 - desires entente with England, 294
 - desires German support in the Egyptian quarrel, 95
 - effect of proposed Austro-German alliance on, 43
 - Egypt and Morocco, 342
 - evacuates Fashoda, 293
 - Franco-Russian Alliance, terms of, 183
 - friction with Italy, 487
 - her abdication of Egypt, 83
 - her African colonies and friction with Great Britain, 74
 - her sympathy with the Boers, 318
 - hostility towards Great Britain in Egypt, 283
 - in Morocco, 458
 - intervenes in settlement of Chino-Japanese War, 222
 - loan to Russia, 165
 - Newfoundland fisheries, 296
 - Newfoundland fishery, privilege surrendered, 343
 - Macedonia, division of, 401
 - militarism in, 515
 - pacts with Italy, 345
 - Peace Conference in Paris, 661
 - et seq.*
 - proposed annexation of the New Hebrides, 265
 - proposed intervention in South African War, 318
 - protest against Anglo-Congolese Treaty, 1894, 271
 - protests against British pact with Congo Free State, 209
 - raises blockade, 269

France (*contd.*)

- recognition of Roumania as a kingdom by, 11
- regards Great Britain as an ally, 499
- rejects German proposals for territorial cessions in the Congo, 480
- repudiates the second Wolff Convention, 98
- response to Germany's military attitude, 514
- rivalry with Great Britain in the Pacific, 264
- satisfied with partition of Africa, 209
- settlement of West African question, 286
- Sudan campaign, 280
- the Marchand mission, 281
- the Ngoko-Sangha Company, 464
- Treaty with Spain, 351
- uneasiness at the Anglo-German negotiations, 528
- West African concessions, 343
 - and Abdul Aziz, proposals to, 356
 - and dual control in Egypt, 74
 - and Germany, discussion *re* Moroccan settlement, 463
 - and Germany's modified demands, 479
- (*see* the Great War)
- and her Mediterranean fleet, 498
- and intervention, 319
- and Morocco, conference regarding, 358
- and Russia, naval convention signed, 502
- and Upper Nile, negotiations concerning, 274
- and the Anglo-Egyptian government in the Sudan, 295
- and the Anglo-Portuguese Convention, 112
- and the Bagdad railway, 435
- and the Balkan War, 505
- and the Conference of Algeciras, concessions gained by, 367
- and the Congo agreement, 482
- and the Congo, co-operation with Germany on, 464
- and the Cretan settlement, 250
- and the Dongola project, 278
- and the Fashoda incident, 289 *et seq.*
- and the Morocco pact, 461
- and the neutralization of Suez Canal, 93

France (*contd.*)

- and the opening of the Straits, 489
- and the Pact of Björko, refusal to join, 388
- and the relief of Fez, 466
- and the Russo-German Treaty, 382
- and the Russo-Japanese War, 374
- and the Siam crisis, 268
- and the Treaty of Berlin, Austria's breach of, 415
- and the Triple Entente, 396
- Francis Joseph, Emperor, 57, 145, 506, 565
- approves of re-establishment of Dreikaiserbund, 52
- his Bulgarian policy, 119
- letter to the Kaiser, on the Sarajevo murders, 533
- ratifies Austro-Russian plot, 258
- sympathy with Britain in the Boer War, 309
- the ultimatum to Serbia, 536
- and Bosnia-Herzegovina, annexation of, 410
- and Ferdinand of Bulgaria, 413
- and the Tsar, appeals for the maintenance of peace, 508
- French, Sir John, 407
- commands Expeditionary Force, 561
- Freycinet, 60, 62, 95
- advocates alliance with Russia, 166
- Cabinet formed, 1890, 166
- Cronstadt, proposed visit of fleet to, 168
- defends Boulanger, 136
- desires Military Convention with Russia, 176
- fall of, 83
- his Egyptian policy, 79
- manufacture of rifles for Russia, 166
- opposed to association with Russia, 158
- succeeds Gambetta, 78
- and Boulanger, 133
- and French abdication of Egypt, 83
- GAMBETTA, 63, 160, 229
- his Egyptian policy, 77
- his fall from power, 78
- his note to Great Britain, 76
- opposed to association with Russia, 158
- George I of Greece, 246, 247

- George, Prince, of Greece, 246
- becomes Governor of Crete, 253
- proposed as Governor-General of Crete, 251
- resigns from Crete, 254
- George V of England in Berlin, 1913, 526
- in Paris, 529, 659
- and the Kaiser's visit to England, 457
- George, Lloyd, 565, 574, 582, 607, 690
- appeal for American troops, 648
- at the Peace Conference, 662
- becomes Prime Minister, 609
- compensation from Germany, 682
- compromise on Rhine frontier dispute, 680
- dissolves Parliament, 660
- Germany's reply to peace Treaty, 688
- his Mansion House speech on British policy, 477
- Memorandum terms of a lasting peace, 679
- on the Bullitt mission, 671
- on the peace terms, 692
- Paris speech on co-ordination, 641
- reply to German peace offer, 609
- trade unions, speech to, on British war aims, 642 *et seq.*
- and Lord Northcliffe, 683
- and Prince Sixte, 628
- and the Fiume controversy, 685
- and the German delegates, 688
- and the Labour Conference in Stockholm, 623
- and the Polish demands, 687
- and the Russian problem, 670
- and the Saar coalfields, 681
- Germany acquires Samoa, 110
- agreement with Great Britain re Heligoland and Zanzibar, 201
- aids Russia, 379
- alienates Japan, 223
- annexation of New Guinea, 107
- attitude towards Moroccan settlement, 340
- Canadian preference, protest respecting, 335
- cedes her rights in Samoa, 306
- Chamberlain's attack on her army, 330
- collective protection of Canal, 83
- colonial co-operation with Great Britain, 525
- commercial competition with Great Britain, 227

Germany (*contd.*)

Conference plans, 361
 co-operation with Russia, 383
 demands conference *re* Morocco, 355
 dispatch concerning Agadir, 470
 disunion of the Powers, 254
 effect of Bundesrath incident on, 315
 encourages Austria to take action, 534
 estrangement with England over Transvaal, 215
 her colonial policy, 203
 her first colony, 103
 her interests in Africa, 100
 her naval programme, 313
 hostility towards the Moroccan settlement, 483
 increases her army, 510
 indignation against Great Britain, 484
 intervenes in settlement of Chino-Japanese War, 222
 Liman von Sanders appointed to Turkish Army, 517
 Lloyd George's speech, feeling created by, 477
 Lloyd George's speech to the trade unions, views on, 645
 military spirit of the people, 512
 modifies her demands, 479
 Navy Law of 1900, 427
 occupies Kiaochow, 224
 opposed to reform in Crete and Armenia, 261
 pro-Boer sympathies of the people, 312
 proposed partition of Morocco, 329
 protests against British pact with Congo Free State, 209
 railways in Asia Minor, 262
 recognition of British claims to the Upper Nile, 280
 recognition of Roumania as a kingdom by, 11
 refuses collective mediation, 319
 rejects French proposals for territorial cessions in the Congo, 480
 replies to Sir Edward Grey, 478
 reply to France *re* Morocco, 358
 second Navy Bill, 316
 seizure of her ships by Russia, 375
 supports Austria's Bosnian policy, 423
 supports the Transvaal, 216
 the Army Bill, 511

Germany (*contd.*)

the Bundesrath incident, 314
 the Casablanca crisis, 459
 the Cronstadt visit, 172
 the *Dreadnought*, alarm at its construction, 428
 the Manchurian controversy, 326
 the Morocco pact, 461
 the Navy League founded, 231
 the opening of the Straits, 489
 the Press, warlike attitude of, 522
 the Reval visit, 409
 the seizure of Port Arthur, 226
 the Yangtze agreement, 324
 ultimatum to Russia, 547
 vetoes reduction of armaments at Hague Conference, 307
 warns Russia, 508
 and Anglo-French Treaty, 349
 and Austro-Roumanian Treaty, 71
 and autonomy for Crete, 249
 and Belgian neutrality, 134
 and British co-operation in Bagdad railway, 334
 and colonization, 99
 and Great Britain, naval negotiations of, 1910, 454 *et seq.*
 and France, discussion *re* Moroccan settlement, 463
 and Russia, pressure regarding settlement proposal, 421
 and the Algier Conference, 365
 and the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Treaties, 351
 and the Anglo-German settlement *re* the Bagdad railway, 526
 and the Anglo-Russian naval discussions, 530
 and the Armenian problem, 212
 and the arrest of armaments, 431
 and the Bagdad railway, 435
 and the Balkan War, 505
 and the blockade of Greece, 122
 and the Bosnian question, settlement proposal, 420
 and the British fleet, 427
 and the Congo, co-operation with France, 464
 and the Cretan settlement, 251
 and the Eastern question, 213
 and the Kruger telegram, 219
 and the Samoa settlement, 305
 and the secret treaties, 354
 and the Treaty of Windsor (1899), 303
 and the Triple Entente, 396
 and the Venezuelan question, 333
 (*see* the Great War)

- Giers, 39, 56, 57
 appointed Foreign Minister, 55
 detects the Bulgarian forgeries, 141
 discussions *re* Military Convention, 178
 explains Russia's policy regarding Bulgaria, 200
 Germany's refusal to renew Treaty, Russo-German, 199
 his desire for reconciliation with Bulgaria, 116
 his illness, 179
 on Russian feeling to France, 170
 protest against action of Tsar *re* Batum, 123
 and diplomatic co-operation in Turkey, 177
 and Eastern Roumelia, 120
 and Katkoff Press campaign, 137
 and Austro-Russian tension, 152
 and the Boulanger crisis, 162
 and the Bulgarian union, 118
 and the military convention, 180
 and the Reinsurance Treaty, 1887, 138
- Gladstone, 15, 16, 22, 30, 105, 107, 122, 134
 denounces Abdul Hamid, 242
 denounces Turkey, 237
 Lord Rosebery's reply to his Liverpool speech, 243
 on the defeat of Greece, 250
 on the occupation of Egypt, 270
 pamphlet on Greece, 248
 supports Montenegro in claiming Port of Dulcigno, 16
 and Egypt, 92
 and Turko-Greek question, 13
 and Uganda, 271
- Goltz, General von der, 72, 261, 517
- Goluchowski, 240, 246
 dispatch *re* Austro-Russian pact, 1897, 258
 scheme of reform in Macedonia, 398
 and the Kaiser, 368
- Gordon, General, as Governor-General of the Sudan, 94
 death of, 94
- Gortchakoff, 25, 26, 33, 34, 55, 156
- Goschen, Sir Edward, 13, 14, 451, 541, 542, 554
- Granville, Lord, 29, 48, 63
 Bismarck's desire for Heligoland, 104
 German settlement in Angra Pequena, 101 *et seq.*
- Granville, Lord (*contd.*)
 Germany's annexation of New Guinea, 107
 his Egyptian policy, 79
 Italy's refusal to co-operate in Egypt, 84
 the proposed cession of Heligoland, 105
 and Belgian neutrality, 134
 and Britain's duty in Egypt, 87
 and Turko-Greek settlement, 14
 and the annexation of the Cameroons by Germany, 106
 and the Sudan, 89
 Great Britain accepts conference *re* Morocco, 361
 advantages gained by Japanese Alliance, 332
 agreement with Germany *re* Heligoland and Zanzibar, 201
 annexes Amatongaland, 217
 appoints British officers as special Consuls in Asiatic Turkey, 20
 army reform in Egypt, 94
 attempts by, to settle Turko-Greek question, 12
 attitude towards 1878 Treaty, 2
 autonomy for Greece, 247
 boundary negotiations with France, 269
 cancellation of Anglo-Congolese Treaty, 273
 collective protection of Canal, 83
 colonial co-operation with Germany, 525
 commercial rivalry with Germany, 227
 compact with Italy, 1887, 148
 complains of German influence in the Transvaal, 216
 desires abolition of the Dual Control, 85
 dissatisfaction with partition of Africa, 209
 disunion of the Powers, 254
 Fashoda, evacuation of, 293
 Franco-Russian obstruction of the Sudan campaign, 280
 French hostility in the Nile valley, 283
 German bitterness towards, 484
 Government's reply to the *Novelle*, 496
 her peace programme, 663
 her support of Japan, 223
 hostile feeling towards Italy, 487
 indignation at the Kruger telegram, 220

Great Britain (*contd.*)

- indignation at the *Panther* incident, 272
- intentions in Egypt and Morocco, 342
- intervenes in Cretan problem, 245
- Mediterranean pacts with Austria and Italy, 151
- negotiations with France *re* African settlement, 296
- New Guinea, division of, 108
- occupies Dongola, 280
- participates in Russian loan, 390
- political relations with Tibet, 372
- protests against action of Tsar *re* Batum, 123
- recognition of Roumania as a kingdom by, 11
- rivalry with France in Pacific, 264
- rivalry with Russia in Tibet, 371
- scheme to prevent recurrence of atrocities, 235
- secret treaty *re* Portuguese Colonies, 302
- seizure of her ships by Russia, 375
- settlement of West African question, 286
- South African War, and the, 308
- supports France in Conference of Algeciras, 367
- suspicious of Russia's aims in the Far East, 369
- sympathy toward Triple Alliance, 171
- the Anglo-German agreement *re* Bagdad, 526
- the Manchurian controversy, 326
- the naval estimates, 446
- the Peace Conference in Paris, 661 *et seq.*
- the Sultan offers administration of Egypt to, 81
- the suppression of the Boxer revolt, 323
- the Yangtse Agreement, 324
- West Africa, boundary settlements with France in, 343
- and Afghanistan, 394
- and Bagdad railway concession, 334
- and Egyptian troubles, 74
- and France's appeal to, for intervention, 548
- and Gambetta's Note, 77
- and Germany, estrangement regarding the Transvaal, 215
- and Germany, naval negotiations of 1910, 454 *et seq.*

Great Britain (*contd.*)

- and Japan, 397
- and Macedonia, division of, 401
- and Macedonia, Lord Lansdowne's scheme of reform, 402
- and Newfoundland, 342
- and Russia, demand conference *re* Bosnia, 415
- and Russia, naval discussions, 530
- and the Austrian declaration of war, 541
- and the Armenian problem, 212
- and the Balkan war, 505
- and the blockade of Greece, 122
- and the Conference of Ambassadors in London, 508
- and the Congo agreement, 482
- and the Egyptian question, 89
- and the Fashoda incident, 289 *et seq.*
- and the French in Madagascar, 282
- and the Kaiser's speech at Tan-giers, 353
- and the neutralization of the Suez Canal, 93
- and the opening of the Straits, 489
- and the Persian Gulf, 371
- and the Russo-Japanese war, 374
- and the Samoa settlement, 305
- and the Triple Entente, 396
- and the Venezuelan blockade, 333 (*see* the Great War)
- Great War, Aisne, battle of the, 562
- Allenby in Palestine, 653
- America enters the war, 619
- Armistice signed, 658
- Arras, battle of, 624
- Austria attacks from the Trentino, 599
- Austria declares war on Russia, 554
- Austria's peace offer, 626 *et seq.*
- Bethmann-Hollweg's speech, 553
- bombardment of Belgrad, 586
- Britain declares war on Austria, 554
- British Expeditionary Force in France, 561
- British reply to the Pope, 634
- Britain's ultimatum to Germany, 554
- Bulgaria declares war on Serbia, 585
- Bulgaria joins the Central Powers, 581
- Bulgaria surrenders, 652

Great War (*contd.*)

- Cambrai, 624
- Canadians capture Vimy Ridge, 624
- causes underlying outbreak of war, 559
- Chemin des Dames, battle of, 624
- collapse of Roumania, 606
- Cradock's squadron lost at the battle of Coronel, 589
- Dardanelles evacuated, 588
- defeat of Serbia, 587
- evacuation of Warsaw, 578
- fall of Antwerp, 562
- fall of Liège, 561
- fall of Namur, 561
- first battle of Ypres, 562
- Foch at Arras, 563
- Foch's counter-offensive, 651
- Fort Douamont stormed, 596
- France declares war on Austria, 554
- France guarantees to respect Belgian neutrality, 549
- France mobilizes, 550
- French defeat at Charleroi, 561
- German army leaders desire peace, 651
- German East African campaign, 601
- German failure at Verdun, 598
- German peace offer, 609
- German rush for Paris, 561
- Germans at Château-Thierry, 649
- Germany and the neutrality of Belgium, 549
- Germany limits the submarine campaign, 595
- Germany repulses Russian attack, 599
- Germany violates Belgian neutrality, 552
- Germany's ultimatum to Belgium, 550
- Great Britain promises naval support to France, 550
- Greece proclaims neutrality in the Serbo-Bulgar war, 587
- invasion of Galicia, 564
- Italy declares war on Austria, 576
- Italy declares war on Germany, 576
- Italy defeated at Caporetto, 638
- Italy joins the Allies, 572
- Japan declares war on Germany, 566
- Jutland, battle of, 590
- Kiel, naval mutiny at, 658

Great War (*contd.*)

- "Kitchener's army" in France, 597
- Kut-el-Amara surrenders, 600
- Lemberg captured, 564
- Lusitania* sunk, 593
- Marne battle, 561
- Mesopotamia campaign, 625
- North Sea blockade, 591
- Paschendael, 624
- Peace Conference at Paris, 661 *et seq.*
- Peace Treaty signed, 690
- President Wilson invites peace discussions, 612
- Przemysl evacuated, 577
- revolution in Germany, 658
- Roumania joins the Allies, 601
- Roumania signs peace, 640
- Russia and Germany at war, 549
- Russia declares war on Turkey, 369
- Russia signs peace, 640
- Russian revolution, 620
- Russian troops in Erzerum, 599
- Russia's defeat in Galicia, 577
- Russia's last effort, and collapse, 623
- schemes of partition, 569
- Serbia invades Bosnia, 565
- Sir Edward Grey and the question of Belgian neutrality, 549
- Sir Edward Grey's speech defining British attitude, 551
- skirmishes off Heligoland, 589
- Soissons captured, 649
- Somme battle begins, 597
- Sturdee's battle off the Falkland Isles, 589
- Suvla Bay, 585
- Tannenberg, battle of, 564
- the Allied war aims, 612
- the Allies' peace terms, 657
- the Allies and the Pope's peace proposals, 635
- the Allies refuse Germany's peace offer, 610
- the Allies' reply to President Wilson, 613
- the Austrian case, 555
- the British case, 558
- the Brusiloff offensive, 599
- the Caporetto disaster, 641
- the Dardanelles project, 571
- the Declaration of London denounced, 596
- the French case, 557
- the German case, 555

Great War (*contd.*)

- the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, 566
- the Gorlice offensive, 577
- the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow, 590
- the Kaiser's speech, 552
- the neutrality of the United States, 591
- the Piave victory, 649
- the Polish problem, 579
- the Pope's peace proposals, 633
- the retreat from Mons, 561
- the Rheims offensive, 650
- the Russian case, 556
- the St. Quentin defeat, 647
- the Salonika expedition, 586
- the Schlieffen plan, 560
- the Somme offensive, 598
- the submarine war, 592
- the transport of the Expeditionary Force, 589
- the Treaty of London, 574
- Turkey joins Germany, 567
- Turkey surrenders, 653
- United States protest against North Sea blockade, 593
- Verdun attack, 596
- Greece accepts autonomy for Crete, 249
 - blockaded by the Powers, 122
 - claims liberty of action, 121
 - demands compensation, 121
 - disputes with Turkey over frontier settlements, 12
 - enters Salonika, 504
 - hope of British aid in war, 248
 - intervenes in Crete, 246
 - mediation of the Powers for, 249
 - proclaims neutrality in the Serbo-Bulgar war, 587
 - refusal to evacuate Crete, 247
 - Russo-Austrian Note to, 403
 - and Bulgaria, suggested defensive alliance, 502
- Grévy, President, 60, 133, 157, 161
- Grey, Sir Edward, becomes Foreign Secretary, 403
 - discusses association of nations to prevent war, 607
 - his declaration in 1895, 370
 - his sympathy with Persian nationalists, 401
 - in Paris, 527
 - letter to Sir A. Nicolson *re* the Persian Gulf, 393
 - military discussions, 364
 - on Austria's ultimatum to Serbia, 536

Grey, Sir Edward (*contd.*)

- on Germany's bid for British neutrality, 542
- on Germany's naval programme, 447
- on Serbia's reply to ultimatum, 537
- on the Allies' Balkan diplomacy, 587
- on the Anglo-Russian naval convention, 531
- on the march to Fez, 468
- on the naval estimates, 445
- on the Niger Commission, 285
- on the *Panther* incident, 473
- on the Reval visit, 407
- on the Sanjak railway project, 406
- proposal of mediation, 543
- proposes mediation to Berlin, 537
- replies to his critics, 484
- Serbia's demand for territorial compensation, 417
- speech in the House of Commons, July 27, 540
- warns Germany, 541
- and America's neutrality, 595
- and Austrian breach of Treaty of Berlin, 415
- and Austria's payment for loss of Crown property in Bosnia, 419
- and Cambon proposed mediation of the Powers, 537
- and Conference of the Ambassadors, 507
- and Lichnowsky, new offer of mediation, 545
- and Lord Haldane's report of his mission, 495
- and Russia's demands on Teheran, 491
- and Russia's proposals to Turkey, 488
- and Sazonoff, 518
- and Serbia, 506
- and Spain, danger of her action in Morocco, 468
- and the abrogation of Article XXV, 422
- and the Balkans, 506
- and the blockade of the North Sea, 591
- and the Buxton mission, 583
- and the Franco-German agreement in Morocco, 462
- and the Franco-German negotiations regarding Morocco, 475
- and the Powers, dispatch on Macedonian question, 407
- and the Shuster crisis, 491

- HAGUE Conference, The, 306, 431
armament question shelved, 432
International Prize Court created, 432
- Haig, Douglas, Sir, 624, 648, 657
succeeds Sir John French, 597
- Haldane, Lord, 561
on his mission to Berlin, 492 *et seq.*
Secretary of State for War, 365
and Bethmann-Hollweg, discussions on colonial co-operation, 525
and the Kaiser, conversation regarding Bagdad railway scheme, 436
- Hamilton, Sir Ian, 572
- Hamley, General, British Commissioner, 1878, 2
- Hankey, Sir Maurice, 672
- Hanotaux, 210, 274, 483
boundary question in West Africa, 286
denial of Marchand mission as a military enterprise, 282
maintains friendly relations with Germany, 283
replies to Sir Edward Grey's declaration, 276
return to office, 281
the Marchand mission, 294
the Niger Commission, 285
and the French at Fez, 467
and the Nile Valley question, 287
- Hansen, Jules, 158, 317
- Harcourt, Sir William, 280
- Hardinge, Sir Charles, British Ambassador in Russia, 374, 384, 389, 407, 408, 429, 438
- Hartington, Lord, and Bismarck's desire for co-operation, 192
- Hartwig, discussions *re* Balkan Alliance, 501
- Hatzfeldt, 191, 193, 208, 213, 218
and Chamberlain's proposals of Anglo-German Treaty, 299
and Holstein's distrust of Salisbury, 305
and proposed Anglo-German Alliance, 310
- Hayashi, Baron, and Japanese Ambassador, 327
and the Japanese Alliance, 1902, 331
- Haymerle, 43
becomes Foreign Minister, 46
his distrust of Russia, 52
suspicions of Russo-German agreement, 51
- Haymerle (*contd.*)
and Italy, 64
and neutrality treaty, 65
- Heligoland, Bismarck's desire for, 104
ceded by Great Britain to Germany, 201
importance to German naval development, 204
satisfaction in Germany at its transfer, 203
- Henderson, Mr., Labour member of the War Cabinet, 623
- Herbette, 95, 159
- Hertling, 647, 651
- Heydebrand, attacks on the Chancellor, 484
- Hicks-Beach, Sir Michael, and the Fashoda incident, 293
- Hilmi Pasha, 398
as Vizier, 407
at Salonika, proclaims constitution of 1876, 410
- Hindenburg, 564, 615, 632, 653
appointed to supreme command of the German armies, 598
- Hohenlohe, Prince, 83, 205, 229, 508
assures Russia of Germany's good will, 223
at Gastein, 42
good will towards France, 159
interviews Kaiser, 44
interview with Hanotaux, 283
on Bismarck, lack of interest in colonization, 99
on General Boulanger's position, 134
succeeds Caprivi, 211
and the Navy Bill, 230
- Holstein, Baron von, 42, 197, 310
averse to Anglo-German agreement, 302
distrusts Salisbury, 305
his dangerous influence, 198
obstructs negotiations towards Anglo-German alliance, 328
supports Austria's Bosnian policy, 423
and Tangier, proposed visit of the Kaiser to, 351
and the non-renewal of Russo-German Treaty, 201
- Hoover, Mr., the Director-General of Allied Relief, 668, 671
- Hoskier and financial help to Russia, 165, 175
- Hötzendorff, Conrad von, 418, 500, 517, 564, 573

- House, Colonel, 514, 614, 616, 617, 618, 664, 665, 666, 674, 684
- Hughes, Mr., 662, 683
- Humbert I of Italy, 47, 67, 145
his first visit to Vienna, 65
- Hymans, representative of Belgium at Peace Conference, 667
- ISMAIL PASHA, Khedive of Egypt, 1863, 73
deposed, 1879, 75
- Italy, 511
accepts abrogation of Article XXV, 422
accepts England's proposal of mediation, 537
anti-Austrian demonstrations, 416
declares war, 486
defeat at Adowa, 279
desire for co-operation with Austria and Germany, 67
difficulties with Abyssinia, 213
friction with France, 487
King of, 424
Mediterranean pacts with Great Britain and Austria, 151
neutrality Treaty, 65
occupies Massowah, 278
pacts with France, 345
Peace Conference in Paris, 661 *et seq.*
prepares the ground for the annexation of Tripoli, 486
privileges obtained through the Triple Alliance, 148
proclaims neutrality, 554
quarrel with the Sultan, 486
recognition of her claims to Tripoli, 341
refusal to co-operate with Germany in the event of war, 222
secures Russia's assent to ultimate annexation, 486
seizes Tripoli, 485
the defence of the Suez Canal, 83
Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, 68
and Austria, 146
and Austro-Roumanian Treaty, 71
and Macedonia, division of, 401
and the Algeciras Conference, 367
and the Armenian question, 240
and the secret treaties, 354
and the Triple Alliance, discussions regarding, 346
(*see the Great War*)
- Ito, Prince, and Russia, 331
- Izvoisky, 505
accepts Germany's proposal, 421
agreement with Austria, 411
Austria, resentment against, 423
conversation with King Edward *re* Anglo-French and Anglo-Japanese Treaties, 374
in favour of a Triple Entente, 391
in London, 415
in Paris, 414
on proposed Conference of Ambassadors, 507
on the Russian fleet, 377
reassures Bülow regarding the Reval visit, 408
Russian Minister at Copenhagen, 374
speech to the Duma *re* Bosnian question, 419
succeeds Lamsdorff, 391
and Aehrenthal, the Buchlau conversations, 412
and Germany's proposal for settlement of Bosnian question, 420
and the Buchlau interview, 413
and the Persian problem, 391
and the Reval visit, 408
and the Sanjak controversy, 411
- JAGOW, 517, 519, 522, 543, 554
- Jameson Raid, the, 218
- Japan, Boxer Rising, suppression of, 323
declares war on Germany, 566
defeats China, 1895, 222
enmity towards Germany, 223
outbreak of war, 342
peace negotiations, 383
reconciliation with Russia, 397
war with Russia, 374
and China's hospitality to Russian fleet at Port Arthur, 225
and the Hague Conference, 307
and the League of Nations, 674
and Manchurian controversy, 325
and the Peace Conference, 666
- Jellicoe, Admiral, 590
- Joffre, 597, 624
(*see the Great War*)
- Jomini, Baron H., 32
- Jungbluth, General, 499, 500
- KALLAY, BARON, 7
appointed Joint Minister of Finance, 19

- Kalnoky, Count, 65, 66, 67, 119,
125, 147, 410
his Balkan policy, 126
success of his Bulgarian policy,
154
and Italy's demands from the
Allies, 146
and Russia's ambitions in the
Near East, 145
- Karavelloff, 116, 117
- Karl, Emperor of Austria, hopeful of
a separate peace, 630
letter to President Poincaré, 627
secret armistice with Russia,
seeks, 626
the Allies refuse his peace pro-
posals, 631
and Prince Sixte, 627
and the Kaiser at Homburg, 627
- Katkov (of *Moscow Gazette*), 32,
120
and Déroulède, 160
death of, 140
his Press campaign, 128 *et seq.*
warned by Giers, 137
- Kaufmann, General, as Governor-
General of Turkestan, 24
- Kaulbars, General Nicholas, as the
Tsar's representative in Sofia,
126
- Kerensky becomes Minister of
Justice, 621
becomes Premier, 638
in power, 622
overthrown by Bolsheviks, 638
and Russia's last effort, 623
and the Labour Conference in
Stockholm, 623
- Khalifa, the, 284
death of, 295
defeat of, 288
- Khartum, 89, 281
the fall of, 94
- Khelat, Khan of, Treaty between,
and Great Britain, 1876, 24
- Kiderlen-Wächter, 517
as Foreign Secretary, 451
conversations with Cambon on
compensation in the Congo,
475
demands access to the Congo, 480
his Moroccan policy, 470
modifies his demands after the
Mansion House speech, 479
Morocco agreement reached, 481
on the French intervention at Fez,
467
on the *Panther* incident, 471
- Kiderlen-Wächter (*contd.*)
on the possibility of war, 480
resumes Congo discussions, 482
the Casablanca crisis, settlement
of, 460
and Cambon, at Kissingen, 469
and Jules Cambon, conversations
regarding Morocco, 474
and Morocco, 466
and the Balkan States, 504
and the Balkan War, 505
- Kiel Canal, the, 184, 201
opening of, 210
- Kimberley, Lord, 234
conversation with French Ambas-
sador *re* Sir E. Grey's declara-
tion, 275
reform scheme *re* Armenia, 236
and French criticisms of Anglo-
Congolese Treaty, 272
- Kitchener, Lord, 563, 571, 588
at Fashoda, 289
at Malta, 496
defeats the Khalifa at the Atbara,
287
enters Khartum, 288
on the defence of Persia, 395
on the Upper Nile, 283
succeeds Lord Roberts in South
Africa, 322
and Rhodes, 304
- Komaroff, General, occupies Penj-
deh, 30, 31
- Kramarz, Dr., represents the Czecho-
Slovak Republic, 667
- Kruger, President, his praise of
German settlers in the Trans-
vaal, 216
in Europe, 1900, 321
in Paris, 338
reply to Kaiser's telegram *re*
collapse of the Jameson raid,
218
the Kaiser refuses to see, 321
urged by Germany to avoid provo-
cation, 217
visits Berlin, 1884, 215
and Swaziland, 216
- Kühlmann at Brest-Litovsk, 639
on Alsace-Lorraine, 637
on General von Sanders' appoint-
ment, 518
Reichstag speech, 650
and Delcassé, on the Anglo-French
and Franco-Spanish Treaties,
351
and the Kaiser's speech at Tan-
gier, report of, 353

- LAMSDORFF, 339
 French refusal to join pact of Björko, 388
 scheme of reform in Macedonia, 398
 visits Sofia and Belgrad, 399
 and the pact of Björko, disapproval of, 387
 and the Treaty of 1905, 384
- Lancken, Baron, 459, 636
- Lansdowne, Lord, 336
 accepts reform scheme, 399
 Britain's policy *re* the Persian Gulf, 370
 conversation with the Kaiser *re* co-operation, 325
 explains British opinion on Morocco, 357
 German claims for compensation in South Africa, 327
 his Macedonian programme, 389
 his reform scheme, 400
 letter in the *Daily Telegraph*, 642
 satisfaction at transactions with France, 344
 the Manchurian controversy, 326
 and Austro-Russian programmes of reform, 401
 and Macedonia, refuses Russo-Austrian financial reform schemes, 402
 and Paul Cambon, secret treaty signed, 1904, 353
 and Tibet, reply to Russian protests *re*, 372
 and Venezuela, 333
 and the Alliance: negotiations with Baron Hayashi, 331
 and the Anglo-French Treaty, 349
 and the Anglo-Russian convention, 395
 and the Moorish mission to London, 341
 and the obstruction in Berlin towards Alliance, 328
 and the Russo-Japanese war, 374
 and the Treaty of 1905, 384
 and the Treaty of Windsor, 303
- Lansing, Mr., 594, 614, 694
 on Clemenceau, 664
 on Japan, 686
 on Lloyd George, 662
 on President Wilson, 665
- Lascelles, Sir Frank, 218, 220, 320, 336, 429
- Law, Bonar, 660
 at the Peace Conference, 662
- Layard, Sir Henry, 13, 19, 21
- League of Nations, the, 612, 654, 661, 673, 680, 687, 688, 690, 692, 695, 696
- Lenin, President of the Council, 638
- Leopold II of Belgium, 110, 112, 209
 becomes Sovereign of the Congo State, 113
 and Cecil Rhodes, 304
- Lettow-Vorbeck, 601
- Lichnowsky, 535, 538
 on Anglo-German colonial co-operation, 525
 and Sir Edward Grey's new proposal of mediation, 545
- Liotard, Colonel, appointed Commissioner in the Upper Ubanghi, 273
 Marchand mission, 281
- Lobanoff, Prince, 223, 255
 advocates no interference in Turkish affairs, 240
 his desire to checkmate British policy in Turkey, 256
 vetoes coercion of Turkey by the Powers, 238
 and the reform scheme, 236
- Loftus, Lord Augustus, British Ambassador at Petrograd, letter from Lord Salisbury, 2
- Loubet, President, 318
 and Delcassé, 356
 in London, 339
 visits Rome, 347
- Louis, Prince, of Battenberg, 530, 589
- Lowther, Sir Gerard, 488
- Ludendorff, 564, 609, 616, 632, 640, 653
 advises peace proposals, 651
 his Rheims offensive, 650
 his second offensive, 648
 his third offensive, 649
 on Germany's military plans, 510
 resignation of, 657
- Luderitz, his settlement in South-West Africa, 101
 plan to secure Pondoland, 106
- Ludwig, King of Bavaria, letter to, from Bismarck, 41
- Lugard, Colonel, 270
- Lumsden, Sir Peter, 29, 30
- Lusitania*, sinking of the, 593
- Lvoff, Prince, forms a Coalition Ministry in Russia, 621
- Lyons, Lord, 77, 90, 133
- Lytton, Lord, 27
 succeeds Lord Northbrook as Viceroy of India, 24

- MACEDONIA, 248, 501, 502
 appointment of Governor, 407
 division of, 401
 financial reform scheme, 402
 Hilmi Pasha to be made Vizier, 407
 rebellion in, 399
 the Financial Commission, 403
 and the Young Turks, 409
 Mackensen, 577, 586, 623
 Makino represents Japan at Peace Conference, 666
 Malet, Sir Edward, 77, 80, 217
 Mangin, General, and the Moroccan army, 465
 Manteuffel, Field-Marshal, 39
 Mantoux, Professor, 672
 Marchand arrives at Fashoda, 287
 his expedition in the Upper Ubanghi, 281
 on the Upper Nile, 283
 the evacuation of Fashoda, 293
 and Kitchener, at Fashoda, 289
 Masaryk, Professor, 614
 Maude, General, 625
 Max, Prince, of Baden, 653
 McKenna, Mr., 446, 447
 Mecklenburg, Grand Duke of, 212
 Menelek II, King of Abyssinia, denies Italian claim, 278
 overtures of peace to Italy, 279
 and the Rodd mission, 284
 Mensdorff, Count, 415, 539, 642
 Metternich, Count, on the *Panther* incident, 272
 Michaelis becomes Chancellor, 632
 Mijatovich, 69, 120
 Milan, King of Serbia, 119, 120
 Milner, Lord, 620, 648
 Milovanovich, Serbian Foreign Minister, 412, 417
 Milutin, General, 32, 34, 39, 41
 Mingrelia, Prince of, 126
 Miribel, General, 166
 Mohrenheim, 161, 162, 163, 169, 184
 Moltke, the elder, 44, 57, 130, 205, 262
 the younger, 513, 547
 Monroe, Sir Charles, 588
 Monson, Sir Edmund, conversation with Delcassé *re* Anglo-French differences in Egypt, 288
 on the Niger Commission, 285
 and the Fashoda incident, 290
 Monteil, Colonel, his mission diverted from the Nile to the Ivory Coast, 273
 Montenegro, 15, 56, 503, 508
 declares war, 504
 Prince of, 191
 verbal understanding with Greece, 502
 and the annexation of Bosnia, 417
 Monts, Count, 205, 347
 Morier, Sir Robert, 130
 Morley, Lord, 550
 Morocco, 328, 331
 commercial liberties of, 342
 Franco - German agreement reached, 481
 Franco-German agreement regarding, 461
 French action in, 346
 French interests in, 341
 German interest in, 350
 proposed conference regarding, 358
 Roosevelt's mediation, 360
 and France, 348
 and Germany, 340
 Mulai Hafid, abdicates in favour of his brother, 483
 accepts French Protectorate, 483
 proclaimed Sultan at Fez, 1908, 458
 and France and his debts, 465
 and France, Fez, the relief of, 466
 Mulai Yusuf succeeds Mulai Hafid, 483
 Muley Ismail, 340
 Münster, Graf von, 48, 49, 103, 105, 107
 Muravieff, 225, 226, 307
 at Potsdam, 318
 criticizes Austro-Russian Pact, 260
 discusses intervention in Boer War in Paris, 317
 Mürzsteg programme, terms of, 400 *et seq.*
 NANSSEN, DR., 671
 Nekludoff, Minister at Sofia, 501
 Nelidoff, 98, 257, 432
 New Hebrides, 264, 343, 344
 Newton, Lord, on General Boulanger, 133
 Nicholas II abdicates in favour of his brother, 621
 agrees to peace negotiations, 383
 distrusts English policy *re* Turkey, 243
 France and the Russo-German Treaty, 382
 his forward policy in Balkans, 522
 his friendship for Serbia, 520
 hostility towards Britain, 375

Nicholas II (*contd.*)

- letter from the Kaiser to, 217
- letter to King Edward *re* South African War, 320
- on Russia's neutrality, 163
- on the Dogger Bank incident, 378
- on the opening of Kiel Canal, 210
- on the Reval visit, 408
- orders general mobilization, 546
- ratifies Austro-Russian Pact, 258
- reveals the Pact of Björko, 387
- reply to Kaiser's letter *re* proposed Anglo-German agreement, 301
- resentment against Emperor Francis Joseph, 424
- Russo-German entente in the Far East, 223
- satisfaction at the Anglo-French *rapprochement*, 239
- the revolution in Petrograd, 620
- visits Roumania, 523
- and French squadron at Cronstadt, 172
- and Germany's aid to Russia, 379
- and King Edward at Reval, 407
- and Rasputin, 619
- and William II at Petrograd, 191
- and the Armenian question, 238
- and the Balkan Alliance, 501
- and the Black Sea fleet, 376
- and the Bosphorus plot, 257
- and the candidature of Prince George for Crete, 253
- and the Hague Conference, 306
- and the Kaiser, meeting at Björko, 385
- and the Kaiser, proposed Russo-German co-operation, 380
- and the Treaty of 1905, 384
- and the Tsarina visit France, 185
- Nicholas, Grand Duke, 157, 166, 387, 515, 621
- as C.-in-C. of Russian forces, 563
- proclamation to the Poles, 579
- remonstrates with the Tsar regarding Rasputin, 619
- and evacuation of Warsaw, 578
- Nicholas I of Montenegro, 508
- Nicolson, Sir Arthur, British representative at Tangier, 328, 422
- letter from Sir E. Grey *re* the Persian Gulf, 393
- on the *Panther* incident, 272
- signs Anglo-Russian convention, 392
- and Russia, 389
- and the Algeciras Conference, 367

- Niger, 209, 284, 286
- Nippold, Otfried, 512
- Noel, Admiral, 252
- Northbrook, Lord, his reports on the Egyptian question, 91
- Northcliffe, Lord, 683
- propaganda of, 647
- OBROUTCHEFF signs military convention, 1892, 180
- Omdurman, the battle of, 287
- Orlando, Italian Premier, at Peace Conference, 666
- and the Fiume controversy, 684
- Ottoman Empire, 501
- PACT OF HALEPA, The, 14
- repealed, 245
- revived, 245
- Paderewski represents Poland at the Peace Conference, 667
- Page, Mr., 592, 595
- Pasitch represents Serbia at Peace Conference, 667
- Russian sympathy with Serbia, 417
- Pawncéfote, Sir Julian, 93, 308
- Peace Conference at Paris, the, 661
- Dr. Nansen and Russia, 671
- German Treaty, criticisms of, 693
- Germany's reply to Peace Treaty, 688
- Germany signs Peace Treaty, 690
- Japan and Shantung, 686
- Treaty of Neuilly, 695
- Treaty of St. Germain, 694
- the Bullitt mission, 671
- the Council of Four, 672
- the Council of Ten, 669
- the Covenant, 674
- the Covenant and mandates, 677
- the Covenant, its obligations, 676
- the Covenant, members of, 675
- the delegates to, 661 *et seq.*
- the disarming of Germany, 691
- the Fiume controversy, 684
- the German delegates arrive, 681
- the League of Nations, 673
- the Peace Treaty, summary of its provisions, 690
- the Polish demands, 687
- the Prinkipo project, 670
- the Reparations controversy, 683
- the Rhine frontier dispute, 678
- the Rhineland Commission, 681
- the Russian problem, 669
- the Saar coalfields dispute, 681
- the Treaty modified, 689

- Penjdeh adjudged to Russia, 31
 claimed by Afghans and disputed
 by Russia, 29
 occupied by Russia, 30
 Pershing, General, 651, 658
 Persia, 371
 Anglo-Russian co-operation in,
 490
 and Europe, 369
 and Russian influence, 391
 Persian Gulf, 263
 naval demonstration in, 371
 and East India Company, 370
 and the Anglo-Russian Conven-
 tion, 393
 Pétain, 597, 624, 658
 Peter I, King of Serbia, 417
 Peters, Karl, 109, 228
 Phillimore, Lord, 673
 Photiades, Pasha, appointed Gover-
 nor-General of Crete, 15
 Pichon accepts German invitation
 regarding Moroccan settle-
 ment, 463
 encourages Franco - German
 economic entente, 459
 his Moroccan policy, 462
 the Franco-German Moroccan
 pact, 462
 and the Casablanca crisis, 460
 and the Congo Treaty, 483
 and the Tangier-Fez Railway, 464
 Pobiedonostseff, 141, 258
 Poincaré, as Minister of Finance,
 and the Russian loan, 389
 elected President, 515
 on the Serbo-Bulgar pact, 502
 the Emperor Karl's peace offer,
 627
 urges conference of ambassadors,
 507
 and Bulgaria, 503
 and Prince Sixte, 626, 630
 and the Balkan war, 505
 and the three years' service law,
 514
 Pokrovsky, 621
 Poland, conquest of, 578
 problem of its future status, 578
 Pope (Benedict XV), the, his peace
 proposals, 633 *et seq.*
 Port Arthur, British gunboats, 226
 desired by Russia as terminus for
 Siberian Railway, 223
 fall of, 383
 occupation of, 226
 relinquished by Japan, 222
 Russian fleet to winter at, 225
 Portal, Sir Gerald, 271
 Portugal, 215
 her claims on the Congo, 111
 secret treaty (1898) *re* her
 Colonies, 302
 Pourtales, 543
 Prinetti, Italian Foreign Minister,
 346, 347
 Protopopoff, 620
 RADOLIN, PRINCE, the Franco-
 German Moroccan pact, 462
 and Delcassé, conversations *re*
 Anglo-French Treaty, 349
 and Rouvier, preliminary agree-
 ment, Morocco, 361
 and the Franco-Spanish Treaty,
 351
 Rasputin, his execution, 619
 his influence over the Tsar and
 Tsarina, 619
 Rawlinson, Sir Henry, 25
 Reid, Whitelaw, 384
 Repington, Colonel, 363
 on the Tweedmouth letter, 437
 Reuss, Prince, 45
 forged letter from, 141
 Reventlow, 219, 221
 on Bethmann's naval policy, 450
 on Kiderlen's modified demands,
 479
 on the Algenciras Conference, 368
 and the Anglo-French Treaty, 350
 Rhallis, succeeds Delyannis, 249
 Rhodes at Berlin, 303
 discussion *re* Anglo-German treaty
 with Morocco, 328
 his activities in South Africa, 316
 Uitlanders' grudge against, 308
 and Cape to Cairo Railway, 303
 and German East Africa, 304
 and Portuguese Colonies, 302
 Ribot, 184, 266
 discussions *re* military convention,
 178
 France impatient of delay, 179
 military convention with Russia,
 176
 Russia's desire for alliance, 173
 and diplomatic co-operation in
 Turkey, 177
 Richter, opposes second Navy Bill, 316
 Ripon, Lord, 28
 becomes Viceroy, 27
 Roberts, Lord, of Kandahar, 27, 332
 receives Order of the Black Eagle
 from the Kaiser, 322
 urges compulsory service, 442

Robilant, 147
 and Italy's co-operation with Germany, 67
 and Italy's demands from the Allies, 146
 Rodd, Mr. Rennell, his mission to Abyssinia, 284
 Rojdestvensky, Admiral, 377
 Roosevelt, President, mediation in Moroccan question, 359, 360
 the Kaiser's message to, *re* Morocco, 352
 and Austria's mediatory proposal, 366
 and Russia, peace negotiations, 383
 and the Algeiras Conference, 365
 Root, Mr. Elihu, 360
 Rosebery, Lord, 93, 227
 endorses Salisbury's Armenian policy, 243
 his policy *re* France and the New Hebrides, 265
 his Siam policy, 269
 on the Dogger Bank incident, 378
 on the Fashoda incident, 292
 protest against Armenian massacres, 234
 protests against French treaties, 344
 reprimands the Khedive, 270
 and the Anglo-German naval rivalry, 447
 and the blockade of Greece, 122
 and the crisis in Siam, 268
 and the Turko-Bulgar pact, 121
 Rosyth, construction of naval base at, 428
 Rothschild, Alfred, 298, 318
 Roumania, 501, 509, 511
 agreement with the Allies, 605
 becomes a kingdom, 11
 becomes a secret partner of the Triple Alliance, 1883, 11
 collapse of, 606
 declares war on Austria, 605
 her support desired by the Central Powers, 602
 joins the Allies, 601
 military convention with Russia, 605
 proclaims neutrality, 554
 secret alliance with Austria, 1883, 71
 the Tsar's visit to, 523
 treaty with Italy, 603
 treaty with Russia, 603

2 U

Roumania (*contd.*)
 and the Central Powers, 604
 and the Peace Conference, 667
 Roumelia, Eastern, works for Union, 6
 Roustan, 61
 Rouvier, 136, 358
 and Radolin, preliminary agreement *re* Morocco signed by, 361
 Rupprecht, Prince, of Bavaria, 631
 Russell, Lord Odo, 48, 99
 Russia accepts Germany's proposal, 421
 Alexander of Serbia surrenders to, 124
 antagonism towards Britain, 244
 Austria's opposition to her Balkan policy, 125 *et seq.*
 belief in British antagonism, 256
 claims free passage through the Straits for her warships, 488
 co-operation with Germany, 383
 defeat of her Bulgarian policy, 154
 delays the signing of military convention, 181
 desires closer relations with Turkey, 488
 desires Port Arthur as terminus for Siberian Railway, 223
 dispute with Afghanistan for possession of Penjdeh, 29
 estranged from Germany, 32
 general mobilization, 546
 German ultimatum to, 547
 Germany's aid to, 379
 Great Britain conditionally involved with, 499
 her friendship for Serbia, 520
 her relation to Bulgaria, 4
 hostility towards Great Britain in Egypt, 283
 hostility towards the second Wolff Convention, 98
 impedes settlement of 1878 Treaty, 5
 increases her armaments, 522
 influence in Persia, 391
 influence in Tibet, 372
 intervenes in settlement of Chino-Japanese War, 222
 Japanese military mission visits, 523
 King Edward at Reval, 407
 loans and speculations, 175
 mobilizes in the south, 541
 occupies Merv, 28
 occupies Port Arthur, 226

Russia (*contd.*)

- opinion *re* war situation, 517
- partial mobilization, 508
- preparing for war in the west, 519
- probable effect of Austro-German Alliance on, 43
- proposes intervention, 318
- reconciliation with Bulgaria, 255
- reconciliation with Japan, 397
- refuses help to Afghanistan, 26
- refuses Sir Edward Grey's proposals, 404
- refuses to accept Kimberley's reform scheme, 237
- regains her foothold in the Balkans, 256
- remonstrates against Liman von Sanders' appointment, 517
- rivalry with Austria in the Balkans, 125
- seizure of British and German ships in the Red Sea, 375
- strained relations with Bulgaria, 5
- supports Serbia, 539
- tension between Austria and, 152
- terms of Franco-Russian Alliance, 183
- the Crown Council, debate on the Straits, 520
- the disunion of the Powers, 254
- the Dogger Bank incident, 378
- the Müritzsteg programme, 400
- the Revolution, 620
- the Triple Entente, 396
- vetoes coercion of Turkey by the Powers, 238
- war with Japan, 374
- and Afghanistan, 373, 394
- and an international loan, 389
- and Austria, joint Note to Bulgaria, 403
- and Austria, joint Note to Greece, 403
- and Austria, joint Note to Serbia, 403
- and Austria, proposed concessions to, 411
- and Austria, resentment against, 424
- and Delcassé, support of his policy, 356
- and Ferdinand of Bulgaria, 150
- and France, naval convention signed, 502
- and Great Britain, naval discussions, 529
- and Macedonia, financial reform scheme, 402

Russia (*contd.*)

- and Sir Edward Grey, response to his dispatch, 407
- and Teheran, 491
- and Tibet, 371
- and Tientsin, 325
- and Treaty of Vienna, 45
- and Turkey, plans Balkan League against, 503
- and withdrawal of Turkish garrisons from Crete, 252
- and the annexation of Bosnia, 414
- and the arrest of armaments, 431
- and the Bagdad Railway, 392
- and the Balkan Alliance, 501
- and the Balkans, 398
- and the blockade of Greece, 122
- and the Boxer revolt, 323
- and the Congo agreement, 482
- and the Cretan settlement, 250
- and the Franco-German agreement in Morocco, 462
- and the Grey-Cambon letters, 529
- and the Persian question, 491
- and the Sanjak Railway, 405
- and the Straits, 412
- and the Treaty of Berlin, Austria's breach of, 415
- (*see* the Great War)
- SABOUROFF signs Austrian Treaty, 53
- and proposed Russo-German agreement, 51
- and Russo-German agreement, 52
- Saionji, Japanese representative at Peace Conference, 666
- Salisbury, Lord, 22, 24, 59, 93, 122, 193
- Anglo-Egyptian conquest of territories subject to Khalifa, 288
- apology to Germany *re* Bundesrath incident, 315
- Austrian Treaty, conclusion of, 50
- Bismarck's desire for co-operation, 191
- Bizerta, fortification of, 265
- Boxer revolt, suppression of, 323
- British ships at Port Arthur, 226
- confirmation of the Grey declaration, 286
- Crete, autonomy for, 247
- danger of isolated intervention in Armenian question, 243
- England's isolation regarding Armenian question, 241
- explains cession of Heligoland, 202
- Germany's reassurances to, regarding China, 225

Salisbury, Lord (*contd.*)

- has no confidence in the Kaiser's good will to England, 205
- his approaches to Bismarck, 142
- his desire for co-operation with Russia, 145
- his Egyptian policy, 96
- his interview with the Kaiser on the Eastern question, 214
- his Nile valley policy, 294
- interview with Münster, 49
- letter from Beaconsfield on the Austro-German Alliance, 49
- letter from, to Lord Augustus Loftus, 2
- letter to Sir Henry Layard, 20
- mediation for Greece, 249
- negotiations with France *re*
 - African settlement, 296
 - on Belgian neutrality, 134
 - on Germany as an ally, 99
 - on the deposition of Prince Alexander, 127
- on the Kruger telegram, 221
- protest to the Sultan, 239
- reopens negotiations with Germany, 302
- reply to Bismarck's letter of reassurance, 144-145
- reply to Crispi's letter, 266
- resignation of, 338
- returns to power, 213
- supports Bulgaria, 119
- supports Prince George as Governor-General of Crete, 251
- sympathy with Balkan Christians, 118
- the Anglo-Italian compact, 148, 149
- the Armenian problem, 212
- the Commission of Liquidation, 75
- the Cretan problem, 246
- the election of Ferdinand of Coburg to Bulgaria, 150
- the Jameson raid, 218
- the Manchurian controversy, 326
- the Powers and Greece, 121
- threatens Turkey, 237
- warning to Serbia, 119
- withdrawal of Turkish garrisons from Crete, 252
- and Austro-German Alliance, 47
- and Egypt, 94
- and Russia's activities in the Middle East, 369
- and the British Chambers of Commerce, 337
- and the Bundesrath incident, 314

Salisbury, Lord (*contd.*)

- and the Cretan problem, 245
- and the Dongola occupation, 281
- and the evacuation of Fashoda, 293
- and the Mekong question, 267
- and the Niger Commission, 285
- and the proposed reform scheme, 238
- and the Treaty of Windsor, 1899, 303
- and the Yangtse Agreement, 324
- Salonika, 401, 405, 504, 509
- Samoa acquired by Germany, 110
- settlement problems, 305
- Sanders, Liman von, appointed General - Inspector of the Turkish Army, 519
- given command in Turkish Army, 517
- resigns command of First Corps, 519
- San Giuliano, 486, 487, 516
- Sanjak, the, controversy regarding, 411
- evacuation of, 410
- western portion of, occupied by Austria, 18
- San Stefano, Treaty of, 1, 3, 21, 33, 36, 69
- Sarajevo, Archduke Ferdinand and his wife murdered, 532
- organized opposition to Austrian occupation, 17
- stormed by Austrian troops, 18
- Sazonoff, 488, 489, 502, 547, 621
- discussion at the Council, on the Straits, 320
- his appeal to the Russian Press, 522
- his schemes of partition, 569
- impatient to conclude naval convention, 531
- succeeded by Stürmer, 619
- on General von Sanders' appointment, 518
- on Poincaré's visit to Petrograd, 503
- on Russia's policy in the Balkans, 507
- on the need of a programme of action, 520
- on the Triple Entente, 528
- on Turkey's reply regarding General von Sanders, 519
- the Powers and the Balkan States, 504
- warns Bulgaria, 505

Sazonoff (*contd.*)

- and Austria's ultimatum, 539
- and general mobilization, 546
- and Serbia, 506
- and the Persian question, 491
- Scapa Flow, German fleet sunk, 690
- Grand Fleet at, 590
- Schiemann, Professor, 350, 481, 483
- on the Kaiser at Windsor, 433
- on the Tripoli war, 486
- Schön, Baron von, 435
- the Franco-German Moroccan pact, 461
- and the Morocco railways, 464
- Schvaloff, 32, 200
- negotiations with Germany, 199
- the Boulanger crisis, 162
- the Reinsurance Treaty, 1887, 138
- and Caprivi's non-renewal of Russo-German Treaty, 200
- Scott, Sir John, 92
- Scott-Moncrieff, Sir Colin, 92
- Selborne, Lord, speech on West Africa at Bradford, 286
- Serbia, 507, 547
- alliance with Greece, 509
- attacks Bulgaria, 119
- Austria's ultimatum, 536
- forms secret treaty with Austria, 69
- refuses acceptance of Bosnian annexation, 420
- Russia's friendship towards, 520
- Russo-Austrian Note to, 403
- seeks co-operation with Bulgaria, 501
- surrenders to Austria, 422
- the annexation of Bosnia, 414, 417
- the Jugo-Slav provinces, 417
- victory at Kumanovo, 504
- and Durazzo, 506
- and the Peace Conference, 667
- (*see the Great War*)
- Shuster, Mr., and the Persian Government, 491
- Siam, 267, 343
- accepts French demands, 269
- crisis in, 268
- Siam, Gulf of, 343
- Siberian Railway, the, begun 1891, 222
- Russia's plans for, 186
- Sixte, Prince, in London, 630, 631
- visits the Emperor Karl at Laxenburg, 627
- and Austria's peace proposals, 626
- and Lloyd George on Austria's peace offer, 628

Skobeleff, 25

- his death, 57
- his speech in Paris, 56
- his speech in Petrograd, 56
- Smolenski, General, 249
- Smuts, General, 601, 673, 674, 677, 688
- at the Peace Conference, 662
- comments on the Treaty, 693
- meets Count Mensdorff in Switzerland, 642
- speech in 1918, 649
- Sofia, 120, 123, 248
- Sonnino, 66, 572, 573, 576, 628, 631, 666
- Souchon, Admiral, 568
- South Africa, cause of dispute between Great Britain and Germany, 215
- Germany's disastrous blunder concerning, 221
- South African War, 308 *et seq.*, 370
- conclusion of, 332
- effect of, on French feeling towards England, 337
- Spain, Delcassé's proposals to, 341
- included in the Mediterranean Pacts, 151
- lands troops at Larache, 468
- occupies El-Kasr, 468
- Treaty with France, 351
- understanding with France *re* Morocco, 342
- and the Act of Algeciras, 366
- and the Algeciras Conference, 365
- and Algeciras Conference, supports France, 367
- and arrest of armaments, 432
- and the Secret Treaties, 354
- Spithead, naval review at, 228
- Stambuloff, 117, 124
- Stanley, Henry, 202
- explores the Congo, 111
- Stead, W. T., 306
- St. Hilaire, Barthélemy, 13, 62
- Stolberg, Count, 42, 45
- Stolietoff, General, 25, 26
- Sturdee, 589
- Sturdza, 10
- Stürgkh, Count, 544
- Stürmer, 619
- on Roumania's claims, 605
- succeeds Sazonoff as Foreign Minister, 604
- Suda Bay, 121, 247, 252
- Sudan, 89, 221
- plans for the reconquest of, 278, 280

- Sudan (*contd.*)
 status of, defined, 294
 surrendered to the Mahdi, 93
- Suez Canal, 90, 354
 attack on, repulsed, 569
 neutrality of, 87
 opened to traffic, 73
 the neutralization of, 93
 the Powers and its defence, 83
 and France, 342
- Sukhomlinoff, Russian War Minister, 549
- Szchenyi signs Austrian Treaty, 53
- TAFT, MR., 673
- Taillandier, Saint-René, and the mission to Fez, 348
- Talaat, 600, 653
- Talienwan, 226
- Tangier, 328, 355
 the demonstration at, 354
 the Kaiser's visit to, 352
- Tardieu, 688, 689, 693
 on the Council of Four, 672
 on King Edward in Paris, 338
- Tattenbach, Count, 355
- Tcharykoff, 488, 489
- Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 84
- Tewfik appointed Khedive of Egypt, 75, 86
- Thessaly, 248
 ceded to Greece by Turkey, 14
 truce arranged for, 249
- Tibet, 394
 border disputes, 371
 Britain's political relations with, 372
 Treaty signed, 372
 and the Lhasa Treaty, 373
- Tirpitz, 219, 227
 appointed head of Admiralty, 228
 assumes office, 229
 criticizes Bethmann, 450
 demands supplementary Naval Bill, 490
 desires Anglo-German naval agreement, 453
 dismissed, 595
 his Navy Bill, 230
 on Wolff-Metternich and the Navy Bill, 444
 supports Bethmann-Hollweg *re* Anglo-German negotiations, 453
 and Britain, naval competition with, 429
 and German sea power, 313
 and the second Navy Bill, 315
- Tisza, 535, 536, 544, 602, 604
- Tittoni, and the Sanjak railway, 405
 on the annexation of Bosnia, 416
 and the Franco-German agreement in Morocco, 462
 on Italy's rights in Tripoli, 485
- Togoland, 208
 boundaries settlement, 283
- Tolstoi, Count, 141
- Townshend, General, 600
- Transvaal, 105
 German support of, 215
 Germany's policy regarding, 216
 the storm brewing, 217
- Treaty of Berlin, 45, 243, 405, 415
 Austria's breach of, 414 *et seq.*
- Trebizond, 239
- Tricoupis, 123
 succeeds Delyannis, 122
 urges intervention of the Powers in Cretan insurrection, 245
- Tripoli, 146, 213, 266, 341, 346
 seized by Italy, 485
- Troelstra proposes Labour Conference in Stockholm, 623
- Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk, 639
 becomes Foreign Minister, 639
 signs peace, 640
 and the Allies, 639
- Tsingtau, 224, 229
- Tunis, 265, 266, 340
 Anglo-French agreement on, 283
 becomes French Protectorate, 63
 controversy regarding, 60
 triple financial control established, 61
- Turkey, 1, 2, 18, 511
 Commission on Armenian atrocities held by the Powers, 235
 concludes peace, with Italy, 504
 Conference of Ambassadors at Constantinople, 119
 declares war on Greece, 248
 declines to open the Straits, 489
 defeat of, 505
 denounces action of Greece, 121
 desires German officer to reorganize its army, 517
 estranged from the Triple Entente, 489
 evacuates Crete, 252
 her suzerainty over Tunis, 62
 occupation of Tabah, 389
 protests to Dulcigno and Roumania, 16
 reply to the three Ambassadors regarding General von Sanders, 518

Turkey (*contd.*)

- support of, by France, 13
- and army reform in Egypt, 94
- and Bosnia, compensation for loss of, 419
- and Bulgaria, agreement with, 401
- and Macedonia, financial reform scheme, 402
- and the Armenian problem, 213, 232
- and the Balkan alliance, 501
- and the Bulgarian union, 118
- and the Cretan problem, 245
- and the Egyptian question, 80
- and the Franco-Russian entente, 176
- and the Macedonian Committee, 398
- and the second Wolff Convention, 98
- and Young Turk revolution, 409
- (*see* the Great War)
- Tweedmouth, Lord, letter from the Kaiser on naval policy, 437
- UCCIALLI, Treaty of, 278
- cancellation of, 279
- Uganda, 270
- annexed to Great Britain, 201
- railway projected, 271
- United States, 384
- Algéciras, supports France in the Conference, 367
- stands aloof from European controversies, 308
- sympathy and aid for relief of Armenians, 240
- and the Hague Conference, 307
- and the immunity of private property at sea, 308
- and the island of Tutuila, 306
- and the Samoa settlement, 305
- (*see* the Great War)
- VASSOS, COLONEL, occupies Crete, 246
- Venezelos, 254, 502, 581, 586, 606, 674, 695
- Greek Premier at the Peace Conference, 667
- Venosta, Visconti, 345, 346
- Versailles, Supreme War Council at, 642, 647, 648
- Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy, 347
- at Rapallo, 641
- in Paris, 659
- and the annexation of Bosnia, 416

Victoria, Queen, 155

- death of, 322
- Diamond Jubilee, 228
- her views regarding Austrian Treaty, 50
- incident in the Kaiser's "Memoirs," 319
- invites the Kaiser to visit England, 309
- letter to German Emperor, 157
- made honorary Colonel of the First Dragoon Guards by the Kaiser, 193
- message to, from Alexander II., 28
- on the abdication of Prince Alexander, 124
- speech at opening of Parliament, 241
- supports Bulgaria, 118
- and the Armenian massacres, 237
- Villalobar, Spanish Minister at Brussels, 636
- Vincent, Sir Edgar, 92
- Viviani, French Premier, on France's war aims, 612
- Vladimir, Grand Duke, 165
- Von Spee, 589
- WADDINGTON, M., 11, 33, 44, 47, 59, 60
- refuses to become involved in Russian quarrels, 158
- succeeds Decazes, 157
- and Mekong, 267
- and Turko-Greek negotiations, 12
- and the Egyptian situation, 96
- Waldersee, Count, 327
- appointed commander of international expedition to suppress the Boxer revolt, 323
- intrigues against Bismarck, 194
- Wallace, Sir Donald Mackenzie, 389
- Warren, Sir Charles, 106
- West Africa, 286
- Anglo-French boundary settlements in, 343
- British concessions in, 344
- White, Sir William, 117, 119
- William I of Germany, 33, 34, 38, 57
- accepts Treaty of Vienna, 45
- death of, 188
- meets the Tsar at Alexandrovo, 39
- returns from Alexandrovo and reports to Bismarck, 40
- and draft of Vienna Treaty, 44

William II, abdication of, 658
 accession of, 188
 admiration of British navy, 208
 aims for German dominance in Constantinople, 261
 allows Russian Treaty to lapse, 199
 answer to Francis Joseph's letter on the Sarajevo murders, 533
 appoints Caprivi Chancellor of the German Empire, 196
 apprehensions regarding the Reval visit, 408
 at Hamburg regatta, 408
 at King Edward's funeral, 454
 at Tangier, 352
 at Windsor, 433
 at the Guildhall, 433
 becomes Doctor of Civil Law, 433
 Bismarck's warnings to, 190
 confident of victory, 628
 congratulates Prince of Wales on his escape in Brussels, 315
 congratulates Schön on Franco-German Moroccan pact, 462
 conversation with Lansdowne, 325
 distrusts the Franco-Russian Alliance, 184
 first visit to England, 193
 friendship for Abdul Hamid, 261
 frustrates Franco-Russian attempt at intervention, 319
 his admiration for Bismarck, 189
 his change of view, 513
 his Colonial policy, 449
 his cordiality to British War Minister, 430
 his forward policy, 211
 his interview with Salisbury on the Eastern question, 214
 his "Memoirs," 319
 his naval ambitions, 204
 his proclamation to the army, 189
 his proclamation to the navy, 189
 his proclamation to the people, 189
 his speech on the anniversary of the battle of Wörth, 215
 his sympathy at Queen Victoria's death, 322
 his telegram to Kruger *re* collapse of the Jameson raid, 218
 his visit to England, 310
 intimate relations with Great Britain, 205
 letter to Jagow on mediation, 543
 letter to King Edward, 327
 letter to President Roosevelt on Moroccan question, 359


William II (*contd.*)
 letter to the Tsar on his Windsor visit, 435
 letter to the Tsar on Russia's policy *re* Austria, 424
 letter to the Tsar *re* the Jameson raid, 219
 letter to the Tsar *re* proposed Anglo-German agreement, 300
 official reconciliation with Bismarck, 195
 on Allies' reply to peace offer, 611
 on Crete, 253
 on Germany's sea power, 228
 on Morocco, 350
 on the *Bourse Gazette* article, 524
 on the evacuation of Crete, 252
 parts with Bismarck, 195
 proposal of peace discussions, 608
 refuses England's offer of mediation, 537
 refuses to accept the Chancellor's resignation, 496
 refuses to receive Kruger, 321
 speech at Damascus, 262
 speech at Karlsruhe, 355
 speech on German sea power, 312
 speeches at opening of Kiel Canal, 210
 telegram of congratulation on the Atbara victory, 298
 telegraph to Tsar *re* Russo-German co-operation, 379
 telegraph to the Tsar *re* seizure of German ships, 375
 thanks Goluchowski for support at Algéciras Conference, 368
 the Casablanca crisis, 460
 the Russo-German Treaty and France, 382
 thwarts alliance discussions, 327
 visit to England, 457
 visit to Russia, 200
 visits Palestine and Syria, 262
 visits Petrograd, 191
 visits Sandringham, 332
 warns King Edward of Franco-Russian plot against Britain, 321
 and Cecil Rhodes, 304
 and Chamberlain's proposal of Anglo-German agreement, 299
 and disarmament, 429
 and Heligoland, 201
 and King Edward at Cronberg, 439
 and Lord Haldane, discussion on Bagdad Railway scheme, 436

William II (*contd.*)

- and Lord Tweedmouth, letter on naval policy, 437
- and Mr. Arthur Lee's speech, 428
- and Roosevelt on Morocco, 352
- and Witte, 386
- and the Algeciras Conference, 365
- and the Bagdad Railway, 435
- and the Black Sea fleet, 376
- and the *Daily Telegraph* interview, 440
- and the Pact of Björko, 388
- and the Papal Nuncio, 633
- and the Potsdam Council, 542
- and the Tsar, advice *re* Britain, 382
- and the Tsar: coaling the Russian fleet, 383
- and the Tsar, draft agreement of Russo-German Treaty, 380
- and the Tsar, meeting at Björko, 385
- and the Tsar, on Russia's capitulation, 425
- and the War Office, 534
- Wilson, President, 643, 674
- advises an armistice, 655
- at the Peace Conference, 665
- breaks off diplomatic relations with Germany, 618
- compromise on the Rhine frontier dispute, 680
- declares war, 619
- Germany and peace proposals, 653
- his peace policy, 661
- invites peace discussions, 611
- leaves Paris, 694
- on the League of Nations, 673
- on the sinking of the *Lusitania*, 593
- outline of peace settlement, 645 *et seq.*
- reply to Austria, 652
- Senate, address to, on his peace policy, 616
- the Allies' peace terms, 657
- and Bernstorff, on the submarine warfare, 594
- and Germany's peace terms, 654
- and Great Britain on the submarine war, 595
- and Japan, 686
- and the Covenant, 677
- and the Fiume controversy, 684

Wilson, President (*contd.*)

- and the German delegates, 688
- and the neutrality of the United States, 591
- and the Pope's peace proposals, 634
- and the Russian problem, 670
- and the Saar coalfields, 681
- Wilson, Sir Charles, 20
- Wilson, Sir Rivers, 93
- Wingate, Sir Francis, defeats the Khalifa at Kordofan, 295
- Witte becomes Prime Minister, 388
- frustrates Bosphorus plot, 258
- on Russia at war, 619
- Russia and the loan, 390
- visits the Kaiser at Rominten, 386
- and the Anglo-Russian Convention, 395
- and the Hague Conference, 306
- and the Pact of Björko, 386
- and the Russian loan, 389
- Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond, 7
- his second Convention, 97
- in Egypt, 95
- sent to Turkey, 94
- Wolff-Metternich, 325, 492
- and the Anglo-German naval jealousy, 444
- and Sir Edward Grey, 404
- and the naval competition, 429
- Wolseley, Sir Garnet, 84
- Wood, Sir Evelyn, 92
- Wood, Sir Richard, 61
- YAKUB KHAN, 26
- abdication of, 27
- Yangtse Agreement, the, 324
- Younghusband Mission, the, to Lhasa, 372
- Young Turk revolution, the, 409
- ZAIMIS succeeds Prince George of Greece as Governor of Crete, 254
- Zanzibar, 109, 203
- becomes British Protectorate, 201
- its importance as key to East Africa, 202
- Zelenoi, General, 29, 30
- Zimmermann, 530, 619
- becomes Foreign Secretary, 615
- the *Panther* incident, explanation of, 471





3 8482 00811 8958

Carnegie Mellon Offsite Facility



F083681



148